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This thesis seeks to explore the possibilities of endorsing the church's authentic political presence
and action in the public sphere. Against the background of modernity, characterised as the age of critical
reason, the exploration will focus on the programmatic theological responses to this background offered
by Charles Davis's critical theology and Stanley Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics. For Davis's critical theology,
authentic politics is a process of communication among fully individual subjects in freedom. For
Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics, authentic politics demands that the church should not have a social ethic,
rather its task is to be a social ethic. These theological responses to the contemporary social and cultural
context broadly represent an appeal to critical reason, in critical theology, as opposed to an appeal to
tradition, in ecclesial ethics. While the former position runs the risk of surrendering the distinctive voice
and action of the church to the desert, the latter risks trapping the church in a sectarian ghetto. To this
extent, criucal theology and ecclesial ethics represent two theological sides of the so-called liberal-
communitarian debate to be found in secular moral philosophical discourse. As such, Davis and
Hauerwas have philosophical antecedents in Jiirgen Habermas's discourse ethics and Alasdair Maclntyre's
virtue or communitarian ethics.
The thesis will argue, further, that to understand fully the implications of critical theology and
ecclesial ethics for the political presence and activity of the church, they must be compared and
contrasted. Firstly, this is because for discourse based critical theology like Davis's to be at all credible it
must be able to meet the kind of challenges posed by Maclntyre and Hauerwas. Likewise, a
'communitarian' theology, such as Hauerwas's, must be able to answer the challenges of a dialogically
reformulated, universalist, ethical theory of the sort envisioned by Habermas and Davis. Secondly, in
exploring these challenges, with respect to Davis and Hauerwas, it will become clear that their respective
positions actually generate compatible visions of integrity in the church's ministry and mission.
To substantiate this claim the thesis will argue that the communities of faith, typified by
discourse in Davis's case and character in Hauerwas's case, should be tested against a control model of a
standard ecclesiology. This model is distilled from an encounter between Roman Catholic, Orthodox and
Free Church ecclesiologists. In so doing, the thesis will suggest that where Davis's community of
discourse is strong on catholicity and unity it is weak on holiness and apostolicity whereas Hauerwas's
community of character is strong on holiness and apostolicity but weak on catholicity and unity. In terms
of fulfilling all the criteria of ecclesiality, therefore, Davis and Hauerwas should be seen as representing
complementaiy rather than oppositional calls to a new vision, integrity and practice of and for theology
and the ministry and mission of the church.
Finally, the thesis will argue that recognising the complementarity of Davis's critical theology and
Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics and then placing them together in an ongoing, mutually corrective
conversation, renders an integrated understanding of the church as both an ecclesia of discourse and of
character. This understanding will allow the promises implicit in critical theology and ecclesial ethics to be
realised. That is to say, first of all, that each will provide a necessary and effective counter balance to the
other, rescuing justice from the desert and virtue from the ghetto. Secondly, the redemption of these
promises will have major implications for the church: principally the possibility of endorsing authentic









This thesis, such as it is, would not have seen the light of day had I not incurred
many debts of an intellectual, emotional and material nature. Intellectually I owe a direct and
irredeemable debt of gratitude to Professor Duncan Forrester who persevered with me and
my often convoluted ideas. He supervised an unruly, and probably over-ambitious candidate,
with patience and diligence, academic rigour and pastoral sensitivity the full extent of which
I am, only now, beginning to appreciate. Equally important are those whom I am honoured
to count as both teachers and colleagues in a theological quest to which I hope I have been
able to make some small contribution. Professor Charles Davis and his wife Dr Florence
Davis whose hospitality and generosity of mind and spirit were lessons in themselves.
Professor J.P. Mackey who taught me, as an undergraduate, that theology isn't theology
without an eternal question mark. Dr Kevin Vanhoozer who taught me the didactic
significance of conversation.
Equal thanks must be extended to the broader academic community at the
University of Edinburgh, now or in the past. Staff and students, scholars of many disciplines,
and of many faiths, whose companionship, conversations, encouragement and criticism have
played a significant but unsung role in my intellectual and emotional development over the
years: Dr Michael Northcott, Dr Jolyon Mitchell, Dr Gillian McKinnon, Dr Stewart Gillan,
Dr Jeremy Crang, Dr Fiona Douglas, Marcus Butler, Heather Widdows, Alan J. Riley, Dirk
Griitzmacher, Tharcisse Gatwa, John McMahon, Nancy Ault, Rachel Benefield and Esther
Mombo all deserve special mention.
The material assistance that I have received over the last four years cannot go
unmentioned. Thanks are due to the University of Edinburgh, Faculty of Divinity who, in
their infinite wisdom, awarded me a University Postgraduate Studentship. In New College, as
always, the library staff, Norma Henderson, Paul Coombs and Eileen Dickson merit
profound gratitude for their unstinting service over the years. So too does Nick Timmins the
computing officer, who provides New College with computing equipment and service that is
second to none.
I must, however, acknowledge an intellectual, emotional and material debt that
precedes these others and is, in fact, as old as I am. It is for this reason that I dedicate this
work, in memory of my father, to my family who provided, from my earliest years, a
community of discourse and character that has persisted in plenty and in want, in sickness
and in health and, recently, in both joy and sorrow. Finally, my thanks go to my wife
Loraine, whose love, patience and sense of humour have sustained my efforts particularly
over this last, difficult, year. Where this thesis succeeds, those named above may accept and
enjoy their portion of the credit. Where it fails, the fault is all mine.
IV
Charles Davis's Critical Theology and Stanley Hauerwas's Ecclesial Ethics:










1. Preliminary Comments 1
2. Background. 1
3. Thesis Statement 12
4. Thesis Outline 14
Chapter 1. Two Critiques ofModernity 27
1.1 Introduction 27
1.1.1 The Age ofCritical Reason: Its Determining Principles 28
v Table ofContents
Charles Davis's Critical Theology and Stanley Hauerwas's Ecclesial Ethics:
Discourse and Character and The Church's PoliticalAction.
1.2. Jiirgen Habermas and the Unfinished Project of the Enlightenment 32
1.2.1. A BriefExposition ofHabermas's scheme and vocabulary 32
1.2.2. The Unfinished Project ofModernity 38
1.3. Alasdair Maclntyre: A Return to Substantive Reason 50
1.3.1. Common Concerns in Maclntyre and Habermas 31
1.3.2 An Alternative Critique ofModernity 34
1.4. Habermas and Maclntyre: challenging opponents 61
1.5. Theological Dilemma: Habermas or Maclntyre, Reason or Tradition 63
1.3.1 Habermas on Religion 63
1.3.2. The Threads ofDavis's Critical theology 68
1.6. From Virtue Ethics to Ecclesial ethics 71
1.6.1. Maclntyre and Religion 71
1.6.2. The Threads ofHauerwas's Ecclesial Ethics 73
1.7. Concluding Summary 77
Section 2
Charles Davis and The Promise of Critical Theology
Chapter 2. Charles Davis's Post-orthodox Critical Theology 80
2.1. Charles Davis's Reading of Jiirgen Habermas 81
2.1.1. Davis's debt to the Habermasian Account ofCritical Social Theory 84
2.1.2. Davis's Differences with Habermas 87
2.2. Charles Davis's Post-orthodoxy 92
2.2.1. Theory and Praxis 93
2.2.2. The Role and Limits ofReason in Theological Discourse 107
2.2.3. The Role ofTradition in Generating Discursive Norms and Identity: Ill
2.3. Conclusion 117
2.4 .Summary 118
Chapter3. Charles Davis and the Promise of Critical Theology 119
3.1. The Implications of Davis Post-orthodoxy for Christian Ethics 121
VI Table ofContents
Charles Davis's Critical Theology and Stanley Hauerwas's Ecclesial Ethics:
Discourse and Character and The Church's PoliticalAction.
3.1.1. Religious Identity as the Basis ofAuthentic PoliticalAction 122
3.1.2. Identity and the Christian Tradition 125
3.1.3 Plurality and Identity and the Problem ofRevelation 130
3.1.4. Privacy and Religious Identity 136
3.2. The Implications of Post-orthodox Christian Ethics for The Church 139
3.2.1. Leaving The church BehindI. 140




Stanley Hauerwas and The Promise of Ecclesial Ethics
Chapter 4. Stanley Hauerwas's Post-liberal Ecclesial Ethics 161
4.1 Introduction 161
4.2. Stanley Hauerwas's Relationship to Maclntyre and Virtue Ethics 165
4.2.1 Hauerwas's Debt toMaclntyre and Virtue Ethics 166
4.2.2. Hauerwas's Differences withMaclntyre 174
4.3. Hauerwas's Communitarian Concerns 180
4.3.1. The Incoherence ofModernity as the backgroundfor Ethical
Discourse 181
4.3.2. The Status ofThe Individual 184
4.3.3. Conceptions the Good against Conceptions ofRight 186
4.3.4. Character andMoral Discourse 187
4.4 Stanley Hauerwas's Ecclesial Theological Proposals 190
4.4.1 Holy Story 190
4.4.2 The Human Response 191
4.4.3 Christian Character 192
4.5 Summary 193
Vll Table ofContents
Charles Davis's Critical Theology and Stanley Hauerwas's Ecclesial Ethics:
Discourse and Character and The Church's PoliticalAction.
Chapter 5. Stanley Hauerwas and the Promise of Ecclesial Ethics 195
5.1. The Implications of Hauerwas's Ecclesial Theology for Christian Ethics.. 196
5.1.1. Religious Identity 197
5.1.2. Identity and The Christian Tradition 201
5.1.3. Plurality Identity and the role ofRevelation 207
5.2 The Implications of ecclesial ethics for The Church 213
5.2.1. Authentic PoliticalAction: Theology as Guerrilla Warfare 214
5.2.2. Embracing the Ecclesial Counter Culture 225




Redeeming the Promises of Creative Disaffiliation
Chapter 6: Whose Ecclesia? Which Disaffiliation? 239
6.1 Introduction 239
6.2. Returning to the Dilemma and Testing Cases 241
6.2.1. A Control Modelfor Testing Ecclesial Identity 242
6.3. Ecclesia and Creative Disaffiliation 254
6.3.1. Creative Disaffiliation and The Community ofDiscourse 255
6.3.2. Is The Church a Community ofDiscourse! 257
6.3.3 The Church is a Community ofDiscourse 266
6.4. Creative Disaffiliation and Ecclesia 270
6.4.1. Creative Disaffiliation and the Community ofCharacter 271
6.4.2. Is The Church a Community ofCharacter! 272
6.4.3. Tloe Church is a Community ofCharacter. 280
6.5 Redeeming Ecclesia 285
6.5.1. The Common Ground ofCreative Disaffiliation 285
6.5.2 Whose Ecclesia! WhichDisaffiliation! 288
viu Table ofContents
Charles Davis's Critical Theology and Stanley Hauerwas's Ecclesial Ethics:
Discourse and Character and The Church's PoliticalAction.
Chapter 7. Vision and Integrity in Practice 292
7.1 Introduction 292
7.1.1. Summary ofthe argument to date 292
7.1.2. The themes that have emerged 296
7.1.3. Conclusion in Outline 298
7.2. Imagined Alternatives in Critical theology and Ecclesial Ethics 299
7.2.1 ImaginedAlternatives ofa Transformative Critical Theology 300
7.2.2 Imagined alternatives ofPerforming Ecclesial Ethics 309
7.2.3 Reform and Truthfulness 314
7.3. The Pilgrim Vision 324
7.3.1. Suffering and death, the ultimate challenge to communication and
community 326
7.3.2. Ecclesia ofDiscourse and ofCharacter. 337
7.4. Conclusion: Vision and Integrity in Practice 338
Bibliography
ix Table ofContents
List of Abbreviated Titles Used in Footnotes.
Jtirgen Habermas
JA Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics. Ciaran Cronin (trans.)
Cambridge 1993
KHI Knowledge andHuman Interests. Jeremy J Shapiro (ed.) (2nd Ed.) London 1978
MC Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Lenhardt & Nicholson (trans.)
Cambridge 1990
PT Postmetaphysical Thinking; Philosophical Essays. William Mark Hohengarten (trans.)
Cambridge 1992
PDM The Philosophical Discourse ofModernity: Twelve Lectures. Frederick Lawrence (trans.)
Cambridge 1997
TCA1 The Theory ofCommunicative Action. Vol. 1: Reason and The Rationalisation OfSociety.
Thomas McCarthy (trans.) Cambridge 1984
TCA2 The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of
Functionalist Reason. Thomas McCarthy (trans.) Cambridge 1987
Alasdair Maclntyre
AV After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. (2nd ed.) London 1985
FPFE First Principles and Final Ends and Contemporary Philosophical Issues. Milwaukee 1990
TV Three Rival Versions ofMoral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition. London
1990
WJWR Whose Justice■? Which Rationality? London 1988
Charles Davis
RMS Religion and The Making ofSociety: Essays in Social Theology. Cambridge 1994
x
TPS Theology and Political Society. Cambridge 1980
TPCT The promise of Critical Theology: Essays in Honour of Charles Davis. Marc P. Lalonde
(ed.) Montreal 1995




AC After Christendom: How the Church is to Behave if Freedom, Justice and a Christian
Nation are Bad Ideas. Nashville 1991.
AN Against the Nations: War and Survival in a Liberal Society. Minneapolis 1985.
CC A Community ofCharacter: Towards a Constructive Christian Social Ethic. Notre Dame
1981.
CCL Character and The Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics. San Antonio 1985.
CET Christian Existence Today. Essays on Church, World and Living in Between. Durham
1988.
DFTF Dispatchesfrom The Front: Theological Engagements with the Secular. Durham 1994.
FTR Faith in The Republic: A Francis Lewis Law Center Conversation. Washington and Lee
Law Review 45 1988 pp 467 - 534.
NS Naming the Silences: God, Medicine and the Problem ofSuffering. Grand Rapids 1990.
PK The Peaceable Kingdom:A primer in Christian Ethics. Notre Dame 1983.
PTS Preaching to Strangers: Evangelism in Today's World. (William Willimon) Louisville
1992.
RA Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony. (William Willimon) Nashville 1989.
SP Suffering Presence: Theological Reflections on Medicine, the Mentally Handicapped and the
Church. Notre Dame 1986.
xi
TT Truthfulness and Tragedy: Further Investigations in Christian Ethics. Notre Dame 1977.
US Unleashing the Scripture: Freeing the Biblefrom Captivity to America. Nashville 1993.
VV Vision and Virtue: Essays In Christian Ethical Reflection. Notre Dame 1974.
Revisions Revisions: Changing Perspectives in Moral Philosophy. Alasdair Maclntyre (co-
editor) Notre Dame 1983.
Epilogue Epilogue; A Pacifist Response to the Bishops. In Paul Ramsey Speak up for Just War
or Pacifism: A Critique of the United Methodist Bishops Pastoral Letter "In Defense of Creation."
University Park 1988 pp 149 - 182
John Milbank
TST Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason. Oxford 1990.
Xll
Charles Davis's Critical Theology and Stanley Hauerwas's Ecclesial Ethics:






This thesis seeks to explore the possibilities for the church's political action
and presence in the public sphere. The public sphere is the social and cultural
background against which the church's claims are made to legitimate action and
presence. Our exploration will focus on the responses to this background offered
by Charles Davis's so called critical theology, and Stanley Hauerwas's ecclesial
ethics. In this introduction it is my intention to justify this exploration. To this
end I shall, first of all, elaborate on the background to the thesis. Secondly, I shall
state the aims and objectives of the thesis. Thirdly, I shall outline the argument
contained in the following chapters.
2. Background
The reason for a theological exploration of this kind arises because in
today's world we find that the church, and consequently theology, is increasingly
marginalised. The business of religion is increasingly condemned to the private
sphere, dealing largely with matters of personal intimacy and remaining neutral in
public matters. In such a secularised society that which remains of the substantive
business of religion lies, more or less it seems, in the realm of consumer preference.
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Therefore, with the possible exception of Islamic states, "... religious impulses are
satisfied ... within the sphere of personal [i.e. private] life that is permitted in
liberal societies."1 Thus, to be charitable, the church and theologians are excluded
from, or at best remain peripheral to, the discourses of modern culture and society
not because of a deliberate policy, but inevitably. Put simply: the subject matter of
theology is deemed to be religion and religion is a matter for the private sphere.
The church as a religious institution, then, has at best a limited right or ability to
comment on matters of public policy or ethics. At best, if the church seeks to offer
guidance on such matters then it has to show that living in light of that guidance is
productive in terms that will not interfere with the operation of secular society.2
Because religious pursuits are, for the most part, limited to the private level
they are believed to deal largely with matters of personal intimacy as it takes place
in the family and among a limited horizon of friends. Although social issues, these
1 Fukuyama The End ofHistory and the Last Man. 1992. Avon Books, New York, p 14.
2 Alasdair Maclntyre says something similar in A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral
Philosophy From the Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century. (1968) 1991, Routledge. London, p 144.
"If religion is to propound a set of rules or a set of goals successfully, it must do so by showing that
to live in the light of such rules and goals will be the productive of what men can independently
judge to be good. ... new values have to commend themselves by reason of the role that they can
have in human life." Even at this early stage Maclntyre was concerned with a sustained critique of
western societies in the face of the division and fragmentation of everyday life in relation to the
great moral scheme of the Enlightenment. In his description of Christian moral reflection he notes
that the Christian view is that all political orders are sinful and stand in need of gospel critique.
Christianity's complicity in the process of the Enlightenment has led to an unstable relationship
between church and state, between sacred and secular and rendered the possibility of such critique
doubtful. Thus Maclntyre advocates an anti-clerical secularism and an atheism that rejects false
gods. For Maclntyre, Marxist atheism has religious roots and can thus provide a potentially
protective doctrine for Christianity. (See Peter McMylor Alasdair Maclntyre: Critic ofModernity.
1994. Routledge. London, p 5). Maclntyre, as we shall note in the thesis, however, has made it clear
latterly that he committed to Augustinian Christianity with philosophical loyalty to Thomism
institutionalised in the Roman Catholic Church (see WJWR and TRY).
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categories lie at the upper limit of the private realm. More large-scale problems, the
structural concerns in society, are not seen as the preserve of the religious. Charles
Taylor, in addressing this problem, suggests that it arises from the loss of
substantive modes of reason. He notes that, as moderns, there is a strong sense that
we:
"... demand universal justice and beneficence, are
particularly sensitive to the claim of equality, feel the
demands to freedom and self-rule as axiomatically
justified, and put a very high priority on the
avoidance of death and suffering."3
Furthermore, he suggests that the original theistic horizon that was the source and
context of these ideas of the good, of our norms and values has been shattered. As
a result, the contemporary effort to reflect on ethics, including Christian ethics,
has lost its substantive content, its coherence and, therefore, its ability to
contribute effectively to universal ideas of the good. Consequently, we suffer
under the dominance of an Enlightenment naturalistic horizon and anthropology
that results in an inability to explain adequately why we bother with these
universal themes at all. Against this background, contemporary secular discourse
on ethics comprises two main, opposing strains. That is to say, communicative or
discourse ethics represented in this thesis by Jiirgen Habermas and virtue or
communitarian ethics represented by Alasdair Maclntyre.




On the one hand, broadly speaking, Habermas's communicative or
discourse ethics represents a continuation of the Enlightenment project while, on
the other hand, Maclntyre's communitarian or virtue ethics represent a challenge
to it. Seyla Benhabib points out that, as such, "... if communicative or discourse
ethics is to be at all credible, it must be able to meet the kind of challenges posed
by Maclntyre and Hauerwas."4 Of course, the corollary is true, Communitarian
ethics must be able to answer the challenges of "... a dialogically reformulated
universalist ethical theory."5 It is outwith the scope of this thesis to engage
Habermas and Maclntyre in the sort of head to head confrontation that this type
of test would require. This is because the primary concern of the thesis is a
theological one. More precisely, and in a particular sense, it is an ecclesiological
one. It is, therefore, more relevant to our needs to read these influential thinkers
through the eyes of two theologians who take seriously their concerns and apply
Habermas's and Maclntyre's ideas to theological questions.
There are, in fact, few occasions where Alasdair Maclntyre and Jiirgen
Habermas confront each other's theories directly. In Maclntyre there are one or
two passing remarks: in After Virtue he refers to "... the heirs of the Frankfurt
4 See Benhabib Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics.




School"6 who, whilst attempting, to counter the Weberian narrative of the
encroachment of instrumental reason, unwittingly reinforce it. In Three Rival
Versions ofMoral Enquiry we find a direct reference to Habermas in the following
passage:
"The claim that I am making is a modest, albeit
metaphysical one, not to be confused, for example,
with Habermas's neo-Kantian thesis that allegiance to
one specific set of norms is a necessary condition for
communicative acts."7
In Justification and ApplicationJ which contains Habermas's general
response to neo-Aristotelian philosophies, he dedicates a section to
Maclntyre's position as it is articulated in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?
This exposition is clear and precise. Habermas sees Maclntyre as developing
a "... version of strong contextualism"9 through which he attempts to
combine two incompatible theses:
"Against the alleged abstract universalism of the
Enlightenment, Maclntyre defends (a) the thesis that
there is no such thing as a context-transcending
rationality, only different forms of rationality rooted
in traditions. And against a performatively self-
contradictory relativism, he upholds (b) the thesis that
productive communication between self-centred
traditions is no less feasible than learning from alien
traditions. ... In what follows I will examine whether
6 Maclntyre AV p 31.
7 Maclntyre TRV p 46.
8 Habermas JA p 96 - 105.
9 Habermas JA p 96.
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the contextualist thesis can be reconciled with the anti
relativist one."10
Habermas, in the course of this discussion, argues that Maclntyre, in attempting to
reconcile these two incompatible theses, becomes embroiled in several
contradictions. He locates the origin of these contradictions in Maclntyre's desire
to combine a hermeneutic view of the translation and interpretation of alien
traditions with a strong form of contextualism that ties the identity of the
translator to the substantive judgements of a particular tradition. In response to
Maclntyre's strong contextualism Habermas draws upon insights from Gadamer,
to formulate a weaker version of context dependency:
"The fusion of interpretive horizons at which, on
Gadamer's account, every communicative process
aims should not be understood in terms of the false
alternative between assimilation 'to us' and a
conversion 'to them'. It is more properly described as
a convergence between 'our' perspective and 'theirs'
guided by learning processes, regardless of whether
'they' or 'we' or both sides must reform the practices
of justification thus far accepted as valid. Concepts
such as truth, rationality, and justification play the
same role in every language community, even if they
are interpreted differently and applied in accordance
with different criteria."11
Here Habermas contrasts a weak formal conception of rationality, with the strong
substantive account developed by Maclntyre. In short, we are looking at an
argument which places in opposition discourse derived from principles of practical
10 Habermas JA p 96.
11 Habermas JA p 105.
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reason and discourse which is tradition dependent: broadly speaking, an argument
between reason and tradition.
It is in this climate that the church continues to claim a valid voice and
presence in the public sphere of debate on morality and matters of public polity.
For Habermas, though, this is a dubious claim.12 The theological tradition, to
which the church is heir, relies on a strong form of contextualism and is, therefore,
as suspect as Maclntyre's position. Hence the secular debate between public reason
and tradition is replayed in the church. A claim, such as the church makes, to a
place in the public sphere is problematic since the pubic sphere is dominated by
distorted principles of instrumental reason. In this context, "neither science nor
the art can inherit the mantle of religion: only a morality, set communicatively
aflow and developed into discursive ethics inherits the authority of the sacred."13
Religion thus disinherited is rightly consigned to the private sphere and
emancipatory activity is focused on developing communicative rationality and
action. Meanwhile, Maclntyre actively pursues a contextualised form of ethical
discourse which clearly endorses the Christian ethical tradition that culminates in
Aquinas which, he claims, is clearly more coherent and of more value in the public
sphere. Maclntyre's strong contextualism appeals to many contemporary
theologians precisely because it apparently vindicates the Christian notion of a
12 Indeed, Habermas has said that religion has no place in the public sphere. We shall deal with this
matter in more depth in Chapter 1.
13 Habermas TCA 2 p 92.
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particular ecclesial community, in the face of the totalising narrative of the
Enlightenment.
Returning to the ecclesiological dimension of this thesis, then, we should
define the precise parameters of our own ecclesiological concerns. The church
claims to be a community with its roots in divine revelation and whose central
principle is that no one should live for themselves alone but also for their
neighbour and the greater glory of God. This presents us with a two-fold problem.
On the one hand, its discourses on ethics and theology are internal and, to an
extent, both exclusive and excluding. On the other hand, it is essential that this
community engage in mission as one of its responses to God's revelation. This
commitment to mission requires that the members of such a community engage
with the culture in which they find themselves. To this extent, at least, theology is
public and necessarily addresses social and political relationships. Consequently it
is concerned with the realm of social ethics. The voice of this community,
however, works in two directions emanating from and shaping the community
from whence it comes. In other words, it is the critical voice of discipline and
authority within, but it is also the prophetic voice that engages critically with the
outside world and articulates its political action.
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Since articulations of the church's political action, and the political action
itself, have created different genres such as apologetics, homiletics and so on, two
questions arise. First of all, we have to ask whether the church can, in fact, have a
viable voice in contemporary public discourse on ethics. If the answer to that
question is 'yes' then we are led to a second question: that is to say, how can the
church hope to comment or act in the public sphere? The answer to the second
question seems to come in two forms. On the one hand, the church is left in the
position of capitulation with modernity, in which case it loses its distinctive voice
and risks disappearing in the cultural desert of the public sphere where, as we shall
see, it is not likely to flourish. On the other hand, the church might stand out
against the prevailing ethos in which case it risks disappearing into a counter-
cultural ghetto, where it may be equally unlikely to flourish. In either case,
political action and religious affiliation run the risk of being separated and
rendered ineffectual. Working on the assumption that we wish to affirm the
church's viability in the public sphere, this thesis will focus on the theologies of
Charles Davis and Stanley Hauerwas. Both Davis and Hauerwas articulate an
understanding of authentic or effectual political action in the public sphere and,
broadly speaking, represent critical, theological re-formulations of Habermas's and
Maclntyre's responses to the concerns of modernity.
Davis and Hauerwas construct their responses in the shape of
programmatic theologies, critical theology and ecclesial ethics respectively. For
9
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Davis's critical theology, authentic politics is "... a process of communication
14
among fully individual subjects in freedom." For Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics,
authentic politics demands that the church should not have a social ethic, rather its
task is to be a social ethic.15 Thus we have two theological responses to the
contemporary social and cultural context which broadly represent an appeal to
practical reason either understood as formal and procedural or as an appeal to
tradition. In other words, they represent two theological sides of the so-called
liberal-communitarian debate that focuses on a choice between reason and liberty
or tradition and authority.
At first sight Davis and Hauerwas present positions which are not
compatible. However, I place them together for two reasons. First, in order to test
the viability of the two, since critical theology represents a community of faith
governed by the principles of discourse ethics and ecclesial ethics represents a
community of faith governed by communitarian principles, they must be put to
the test described by Benhabib above. Secondly, if we understand these two
positions to be poles within a tradition of discourse, then they represent a
productive partnership for dialogue. In which case, a synthesis of two apparently
antithetical positions will, in the first instance, be more representative of the true
feelings of Christians. That is to say, true feelings about the world in which we live
and our self-understanding as complex, modern politically active individuals whose
u Davis WLWD p 1.
15 Hauerwas RA p 43, COC p 40, PK p 99, AN p 74, CET p 101.
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identity is, in part, defined by the community of faith called the church. In the
second place, the import of these two theologies placed together should act as a
constructive counterbalance each to the other, and hence facilitate authentic
political action in the public sphere.
To place Davis and Hauerwas together in this fashion requires that we go
to the heart of their respective theologies and uncover the basic concerns upon
which they operate. In the course of this excavation we shall uncover a series of
shared concerns: namely the problems of modernity; the relationship of the
church to the world; the success or otherwise of political theologies, including
liberation theologies; the significance of praxis in Christian life; the relationship of
faith to belief; questions of identity, political action and community.16 We shall do
no more than list these shared concerns at this point since they will be picked up
and explored in depth in later chapters. However, it should be noted that as such
common themes provide the impetus for Davis and Hauerwas's theological
endeavours, I shall argue that they prefigure significantly more commonality in
their conclusions that has been appreciated hitherto. Curiously, the common
ground that they share is, in fact, much more interesting than their differences.
Nevertheless, at the outset we are left to choose between the church led into a
desert of cultural relativity and the church walled-up in a ghettoised, self-
referential, counter-culture.




The overall intention of this thesis, then, is twofold. Firstly, to explore the
ramifications of Davis's and Hauerwas's positions. Secondly, it is to endeavour to
redeem the promises of authentic political action implicit in critical theology and
ecclesial ethics. To this end I intend to show that Davis and Hauerwas, having used
the philosophical resources provided by Jiirgen Habermas and Alasdair Maclntyre
respectively, represent complementary rather than oppositional calls to a new
vision, integrity and practice of and for theology. The direct consequence of this
complementary vision, integrity and practice will be for the ministry and mission
of the church and will allow it to fulfil the promises implicit in critical theology
and ecclesial ethics. The promises of critical theology and ecclesial ethics relate to
the realisation of what each regards as authentic political action in the public
sphere, and its implications for the community of faith. The implications for the
community of faith lie in the way that the community of faith is understood and
reconfigured by Davis and Hauerwas. For Davis, the church should be configured
as a community of discourse. For Hauerwas, the church should be understood as a
community of character. Discourse and character are both the starting point and
the conclusion for Davis and Hauerwas respectively in their explorations of
authentic political action through critical theology and ecclesial ethics. Hence, the
choice between reason and tradition, replayed in the church, becomes a choice
between discourse and character. Moreover, authentic political action, clearly, is
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profoundly tied up with questions about community which, in turn, bring to the
fore questions of religious and social identity.
Through a detailed exploration of these questions, with respect to Davis
and Hauerwas, it will become clear that their respective positions though not
apparently compatible can and, in fact, should be recognised as such. In order to
substantiate this claim I will argue that Davis's community of discourse and
Hauerwas's community of character, while undergoing the comparison according
to Benhabib's principle cited above, should be tested against a control model of a
standard ecclesiology. This control model will be distilled from an encounter
between Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Free Church ecclesiologists.17 By
undertaking this comparison, I will show that while Davis's community of
discourse is strong on catholicity and unity it is weak on holiness and apostolicity
whereas Hauerwas's community of character is strong on holiness and apostolicity
but weak on catholicity and unity. Consequently, in order to comply fully with
the criteria of ecclesiality described by these credal marks, Davis and Hauerwas
should, again, be seen as complementary and mutually corrective, rather than
oppositional.




Finally, I will argue that recognising the complementarity of Davis and
Hauerwas and placing them together in an ongoing, mutually corrective
conversation, renders a more full understanding of the church as both an ecclesia
of discourse and of character. This understanding will allow the promises implicit
in critical theology and ecclesial ethics to be realised. That is to say that, placing
them together in an ongoing conversation will mean, first of all, that each will
provide a necessary and effective counter balance to the other, rescuing virtue from
the ghetto and bringing justice in from the desert. Secondly, the redemption of
these promises will have significant implications for the community of faith and
the possibility of endorsing authentic political presence and action, that has both
proleptic and anamnestic solidarity with the oppressed, in the public sphere.
4. Thesis Outline
In Chapter 1, therefore, I shall begin by tracing the more substantial
elements of the respective responses of Jiirgen Habermas and Alasdair Maclntyre
to the Enlightenment. Broadly speaking, Habermas continues in the German
idealist tradition to fashion a narrative of the Enlightenment that replaces
dogmatic tradition with the authority of critical reason. Hence, he characterises his
own project as a continuation of that discourse that was given its definitive
expression in Kant. In contrast, Maclntyre challenges this narrative, claiming that
the Enlightenment, far from being an advance, is a fragmentation of the discourse
of rational enquiry that culminates in Aquinas. Truth and rationality, if they are
14
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to retain any sense in the modern age, must be drawn from this tradition. Clearly
both of these positions raise certain theological issues which will be highlighted at
the conclusion of this chapter: that is to say, they raise the issue of the nature and
task of theology and its viability in the public sphere. The next four chapters will
deal with this issue in depth with reference to the work of Charles Davis and
Stanley Hauerwas.
In Chapters 2 and 3 we examine the critical theology of Charles Davis. We
shall see that Davis takes seriously the problems of modernity, engaging with them
head on. In this engagement Davis finds an ally in Jiirgen Habermas and his
account of discourse ethics. The methodology and insights of discourse ethics
provide, for Davis, an important resource upon which to build what he calls
critical theology which confronts the questions thrown up by the contemporary
political, social and economic concerns of late modernity more accurately than
traditional theology manages to do. These chapters rest, first of all, on exploring
Davis's acceptance of Habermas's contention, outlined in Chapter 1, that the
discursive redemption of normative claims, involved in discourse ethics, itself
follows an irreversible sequence from myth through religion to philosophy and
ideology and finds its culmination in critique. The history of religion, therefore,
presents an essential component in this sequence from myth to critique, insofar as
religion identified and mediated norms and moral value. But the rise of critique
renders the mediating efficacy of religion obsolete. The development of
15
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communicative competence however passes the authority, once vested in religion,
into another, public, sphere of communication and discourse wherein norms and
values are worked out. All that is left of religion is a universal moral code that may
or may not be of existential comfort at a private level.
Nevertheless, Davis's exploration of the Habermasian position is the
starting point for his search for a new religious identity. He describes this identity
as a "... post-conventional, universalistic religious identity, both personal and
social, not tied to the fixed contents and norms of any one tradition nor to any
permanent collective body, [which] alone corresponds to the present level of
18
human social development." In the world of 'posts', Davis's position might most
conveniently be described as one of post-orthodoxy and an exegesis of his principal
claim, that theology today ought to be concerned with the relationship between
faith and social practice. "Christian Faith is a transformative principle, not a body
of objective knowledge."19 For Davis, as a transformative principle, faith relates
directly to praxis. Christian praxis, as he construes it, is a response to the reality of
a transcendent gift or revelation and finally: "The message of revelation is a praxis,
an ethical life, a way of being and acting. It may be partially articulated in
propositions. It may stimulate theoretical reflection. But it is essentially the
establishment of a practical way of life."20
Charles Davis RMS p 152.
19 Davis WLWD p 78.
20 Davis RMS p 95 my emphasis.
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This way of being, or praxis, is to be understood as a negation of those
types of theology which themselves negate the transformative principle of faith,
and for Davis this means any theology which does not meet the criteria of what he
calls critical theology. The task of theology, as proposed in Davis's critical
theology, must now be understood as the re-creation of society in light of a
transformative faith. The task of the critical theologian is, therefore, to equip
Christians to contribute to this re-creation. This contribution is not a pastime nor
accidental by-product of faith, but an imperative intrinsic to the practical way of
life. As we shall see, this imperative also calls for the politicising of the church.
"Critical theology acknowledges that the Christian tradition, like other traditions,
is not exclusively a source of truth and value, but a vehicle of untruth and false
values and thus must be subjected to a critique of ideology and critically
appropriated, not simply made one's own in an assimilative process of
21
interpretation." This self-aware assimilation of tradition is a methodology that,
Davis argues, is essential for any theology which is likely to redress the excesses of
modernity at the same time as making critical statements in the public sphere. In
fact it typifies critical theology. Consequently Davis is clearly pointing towards a
much more radical agenda than either liberation or political theology as he
understands them.22
Davis TPS p 25.
22 Davis goes to considerable length in TPS to analyse both political and liberation theologies. His
subjects include Johan Baptist Metz, Dorothy Solle and Jan Luis Segundo. In RMS he returns to
17
Introduction
To understand Davis's insight into the public significance of the
transformative efficacy of critical theology, we must understand that he sees
23
society as the product of free human agency governed by rationality. The
ongoing construction of this society is a political endeavour. Davis does not,
however, claim any special place for religion "... which should not stand apart
from our secular lives as a distinct realm of thought or action. There is no proper
or specific religious language precisely because religion is not a specifically distinct
24
realm of meaning or culture." Therefore, since the religious identity that Davis
has developed is broadly the same as the social, religious and political action should
not be differentiated. (Further to this religion can reasonably be expected to keep
conversations going by refusing to absolutise any finite order.25) Paradoxically,
according to Davis the practices, narratives, symbols and values of a religious
tradition can only be secure when engaged in critical discourse with other
traditions in the public sphere, otherwise a torpid conservatism will ensue.
Religion formulated as sharing a single history and not tied to the fixed contents of
one tradition and then articulated in critical theology, according to Davis, presents
us with a means of salvaging conversations precisely because it refuses to draw on
differentiated spheres of political, theological and religious activity. But what sort
of community would a tradition informed by critical theology give us? Put simply,
this theme and includes an attack on John Milbank as a representative of a latter day, politically
§jgnificant theology.
24 Davis p 124 and Chapter 1 of RMS.
Davis RMS p 118.
Davis RMS p 126.
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a community of discourse. What gives substance to this community's narrative is
the pursuit of justice, that is a constant striving to understand the other in
discourse.26
Leaving Davis's critical theology aside for the moment, in Chapters 4 and 5
I shall consider the ecclesial ethics of Stanley Hauerwas. It is Hauerwas's avowed
intention to stand against 'liberal' theology and faith which seeks to accommodate
itself to the spirit of the age. It is his often stated, virtually axiomatic claim that the
church should not have a social ethic, rather its task is to be a social ethic.27 To this
end, Hauerwas responds to the contemporary situation with a constructive
programme of ecclesial or church ethics offering the church as precisely that
community which offers the necessary context for coherent ethical discourse and
political action. However, rather than Davis's community of discourse Hauerwas
conceives of the church as a counter-cultural enclave.28 By way of a word of
caution, however, it would be disingenuous simply to consign Hauerwas to the file
marked 'sectarian' and abandon him there. Equally, we should be wary of
regarding him as simply providing a facile response to Maclntyre's gloomy
prognosis at the end of After Virtue: "What matters at this stage is the construction
of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral
26 Hodgson God in History: Shapes ofFreedom. 1989. Abingdon, Nashville, p 231.
27 Hauerwas RA p 43, COC p 40, PK p 99, AN p 74, CET p 101.
28 This is generally the thrust of Resident Aliens: Life in The Christian Colony. 1989 Abingdon
Nashville (co-authored with William Willimon). In this book Hauerwas argues that the church has
a mission of its own. Its task is to be the church or a community of faith with a vision and story
which is radically different and which, in turn, tends to a different way of life.
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life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are upon us."29 In fact,
Hauerwas provides sagacious and insightful commentary of his own upon the
contemporary theological and philosophical climate, and, as we shall see in this
chapter, his ecclesial ethics call for reinforcing the integrity of the church in its
mission and ministry. This call resonates with Davis, and it will become clear that
though they share some intuitions concerning modernity, they reach apparently
quite different conclusions.
The focus of these chapters will be rest on Hauerwas's proposed solution to
the problems of modernity that challenge the church. For Hauerwas this solution
lies in redefining what qualifies as authentic political activity. On the one hand,
inauthentic political activity comes for the Christian church when it attempts to
influence the modern, liberal polity because this leads to adapting to that polity
and language. This diminishes one's identity as Christians because the more
adaptation occurs, the less ability there will be to see, think and understand as
Christians. On the other hand, Hauerwas equates authentic political action with
the practices learned by Christians within the context of the Christian
community.30 This, of course, suggests that there is no equivalence in status or
value in the same practices found in other traditions or communities.
29 Maclntyre AV p 253.
30 See, for instance, Hauerwas IGC p 6-8.
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These chapters will elaborate on Hauerwas's point of departure from other
so-called communitarians, and even from Maclntyre. That is to say that he is most
interested in advocating a particular kind of community (the church) typified by
particular characteristics than arguing for the priority of community generally.31 In
his later work, Hauerwas augments his understanding of character with an
exploration of narrative. For Hauerwas, all significant moral claims are historically
derived and require narrative display.32 It is therefore crucial to understand the
right story. For Hauerwas this means the most truthful story, because a truthful
community engenders a truthful people. Thus, for Hauerwas, the Christian story
of Jesus Christ with its prologue in Israel and its sequel in the historic church is the
truthful story and the church is the truthful people and bearer of narrative.
This understanding of the church allows Hauerwas to locate Christian
ethics not in common experience but in difference: not in action but in character
and historical community. That is to say that politics for Hauerwas has less to do
with rules, principles, situations or consequences than it has to do with the
formation of characterful people. The church "...is where stories of Israel and
Jesus are told, enacted and heard, and it is our conviction that as Christian people
there is nothing more important we can do." Further to this "the church is finally
known by the character of the people who constitute it."33 Thus, for Hauerwas,
31 See Rasmussen The Church as Polis: From Political Theology to Theological Politics as Exemplified by
JiirgenMoltmann and Stanley Hauerwas. 1994 Lund University Press, Lund, pp 271 - 274.
32 Hauerwas COC p 99.
33 Hauerwas PK p 109.
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the notion of 'character' carries with it ethical and political connotations to the
extent that Christian character relates to the normative Christian story embodied
and played out in the normative Christian community, that is the church.34 Thus
for Hauerwas the church is best understood as a community of character.
Having thus established the type of communities which critical theology
and ecclesial ethics emanate from and, in turn shape, we return in Chapter 6 to the
original dilemma: reason or tradition? Given Davis and Hauerwas's understanding
of the church, we must ask if the church is best understood according to one or the
other. That is to say, can the church be seen as a community of discourse? If so,
does Davis's community of discourse coincide with any recognisable ecclesiology?
Similarly, can the church be seen as a community of character? To attempt to
answer these questions, this chapter will concentrate on testing Davis and
Hauerwas's claims against a control model of the church. To this end we shall
utilise a definition of the church presented by Miroslav Volf. This definition is
particularly useful since it is distilled from an encounter between Orthodox,
Roman Catholic and Reformed ecclesiology. Yolf takes as his starting point the
biblical passage "... where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the
midst of them."35 From this, Yolf determines two characteristic conditions of the
church, that is to say assembly and confession.36 He says "[t]he church is first of all
34 This understanding of character will be explored fully in Chapters 4 & 5.
35 Matthew 1820: Volf p 136.
36 Volf pp 137ff & 145ff.
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an assembly ... but an assembly is not yet the church. An indispensable condition
of ecclesiality is that the people assemble in the name of Christ."37 This model will
allow us to analyse Davis's community of discourse and Hauerwas's community of
character. In so doing we shall gain a clearer insight into the possibility of each of
these communities fulfilling the criteria of ecclesiality. We shall see that each
community represents a fulfilment of some of the criteria, reflecting to a greater or
lesser extent the church understood as a confessing assembly carrying the marks of
catholicity, holiness and apostolicity. This test will allow us to assess the extent to
which either Davis's and Hauerwas's positions present an accurate rendering of the
church. Indeed, much of the terminology will already be familiar from our reading
of Davis and Hauerwas.
Davis's understanding of communication and plurality finds resonances in
the control model as will Hauerwas's focus on the story of Christ as the normative
constituent for the church. Placing them together provides a more complete
understanding of the church as both a community of discourse and of character.
As such Davis's and Hauerwas's communities both represent productive policies of
creative disaffiliation: Davis from the totalising juridical-hierarchical church with
the attendant threat of sectarianism, and Hauerwas from the corrupting influences
of modern liberal polity to a position of radical witness. I shall therefore conclude
in this chapter that the answer to our original dilemma, concerning the choice
37 Volf Ibid. His emphasis.
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between reason and tradition, should lie in asking of Davis and Hauerwas 'Whose
Ecclesia? Which Disaffiliation?' Expressed thus, it became clear that for the church
the answer to the dilemma is both. That is to say, the resolution is not better
understood as a having to choose between Davis and Hauerwas, as representatives
of reason or tradition, rather it is better understood through Davis and Hauerwas
together. Consequently, the dilemma is resolved into an issue of discovering the
conditions necessary for maintaining these two apparently contradictory positions
in a constructive partnership rather than a destructive opposition. Thus we have a
strong case for suggesting that we should start to look at Davis and Hauerwas as
not, necessarily, contradictory or irreconcilable. A community as described by our
control model and further refined by the credal marks of the church has, as it
were, an internal discourse on ethics and theology which is 'in-house' and, to an
extent, exclusive and excluding dealing with holiness and apostolicity. Hauerwas
equips us well to this end. On the other hand its apostolic integrity requires that
this community engage in mission as one of its responses to its self-understanding.
This commitment to mission requires that the members of such a community
engage the culture in which they find themselves. Such mission is public and
necessarily addresses social and political relationships dealing, as it were, with
catholicity and unity. Davis provides the method and the means for such an
engagement. Meanwhile, the import of their respective theologies on the church
will act as a constructive counterbalance to each other. Hence, I would contend,
Davis and Hauerwas are better understood as complementary conversation
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partners whose positions, rather than describing a deadlock, describe the
boundaries of an ongoing ecclesiological conversation.
In the concluding Chapter 7 I shall consider the implications for authentic
political action of Davis's post-orthodox critical theology and Hauerwas's ecclesial
ethics when understood as complementary rather than oppositional in light of our
findings in Chapter 6. I will explore the conditions necessary for maintaining these
two positions in a constructive partnership rather than a destructive opposition.
To this end, and in conclusion, we shall endeavour to explore the necessary
conditions for such a constructive conversational participation, and examine vision
and integrity in practice. To do this we shall, first of all, explore the relationship
between the transformative principle in critical theology and the performative
aspect of ecclesial ethics in Davis and Hauerwas. This will lead us into a discussion
of the consequences of reform and truthfulness. Secondly, we shall return to the
metaphor of pilgrimage common to both Hauerwas and Davis, and inquire, as to
what conditions must prevail to allow Davis and Hauerwas to continue as fellow
travellers. This exploration will be carried out through a discussion of the
particular practical problem of suffering and death faced by the church daily in its
pastoral office. Finally, I will shall conclude by showing that, through holding
Davis and Hauerwas together in constructive intercourse, we can endorse the
possibility of the church's authentic political action in the public sphere. Hence,
this final chapter will issue concluding statements on the conditions necessary for
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an ongoing theological conversation between critical theology and ecclesial ethics,
insofar as they provide complementary calls to vision and integrity in the praxis of
the church. I will conclude the argument of the thesis by suggesting that we can
endorse the idea that critical theology and ecclesial ethics actually provide an
effective and desirable check and balance each for the other. Understanding the
church in light of this dynamic means that we can endorse the possibility of the
church's political action and presence in the public sphere. Hence, the church's
place is not in the cultural desert or in the ecclesial ghetto, but on the margins.
Political action and presence thus located will be based in the proleptic and
anamnestic solidarity that is indispensable to the operation of critical theology and
ecclesial ethics in the face of humanity's negative contingencies. Proleptic and
anamnestic solidarity, then, is the necessary condition for critical theology and
ecclesial ethics to continue as fellow travellers.
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Chapter 1. Two Critiques of Modernity
1.1. Introduction
As we suggested in the introduction, to understand the significance of
Charles Davis's critical theology and Stanley Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics it is
important to appreciate some of their philosophical antecedents. In this chapter,
therefore, we shall trace the respective responses of Jiirgen Habermas and Alasdair
Maclntyre to the Enlightenment. Broadly speaking, Habermas continues in the
German idealist tradition to fashion a narrative of the Enlightenment that replaces
a dogmatic understanding of tradition with the authority of critical reason. Hence,
he characterises his own project as a continuation of that discourse which was
given its definitive expression in Kant. Maclntyre, in contrast, challenges this
narrative, claiming that the Enlightenment, far from being an advance, is a
fragmentation of that discourse of rational enquiry that culminates in Aquinas.
Truth and rationality, if they are to retain any sense in the modern age, must be
drawn from this tradition. Our exposition of these positions will, in turn, raise a
number of theological questions that we shall introduce at the end of the chapter.
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This will provide a point of departure for our study of Charles Davis's critical
theology and Stanley Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics.1
Thus, the chapter will follow a course from a general description of
modernity as the age of critical reason to the theological matters arising from
Habermas and Maclntyre's philosophical presentation. This will take us, first of
all, from Habermas and the 'unfinished project' of the Enlightenment to
Maclntyre's alternative critique of modernity, culminating in a description of the
precise parameters of the challenges each raises for the other in terms of a
dichotomy between reason and tradition. In this light we shall, finally, pick up the
significant theological matters arising from Habermas and Maclntyre's critiques,
and present them as the point of departure for Davis and Hauerwas's reading of
them.
1.1.2 The Age ofCritical Reason: Its Determining Principles
Before moving on to the substantive business of dealing with Habermas's
and Maclntyre's critiques of modernity we shall outline briefly the determining
principles of modernity in terms of these critiques. The term Enlightenment is
used here to define that project or discourse which is constitutive of modern
societies. To quote Kant:
"Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self
incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to
1 It should be noted that this chapter has been shaped bearing in mind the way in which Davis and
Hauerwas respectively, have read Habermas and Maclntyre. Thus it emphasises the themes that
each sees to be generally important in their philosophical antecedent. Later in this chapter and in
chapters 2 & 4 we shall consider the matters of particular theological interest.
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use one's own understanding without the guidance of
another. This immaturity is self incurred if its cause
is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution
and courage to use it without the guidance of another.
The motto of the Enlightenment is therefore: Sapere
aude\ Have courage to use your own understanding."2
This description of the Enlightenment is further refined as the discourse that
would rid humanity from the yoke of traditional, unreflective, cosmological
world-views, and establish the unity of rational enquiry on the basis of critical
reason. Liberation for humanity from the yoke of authority, in these terms, is
achieved through replacing the teleological ordering of the cosmos with a synthesis
arrived at through the faculty of subjective reason.
Prior to the dawn of the Enlightenment, rationality and truth were defined
in substantive terms.3 Alasdair Maclntyre notes that pre-Enlightenment substantive
conceptions of rationality were tied to teleological ordering of the cosmos: which
is to say there is a realist understanding of beings and their place in the universe,
whereby each being is understood in terms of its place within this hierarchy.
Hence, for Plato and Aristotle, for example, rational enquiry is hierarchically
ordered, reflecting the order of the universe, and each particular science can,
therefore, only be fully understood and fully understand when located in this
2 Immanuel Kant "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" in Hans Reiss (ed.) H.B.
Nisbet (trans.), Kant's Political Writings. 1970. CUP, Cambridge, pp 54 - 60.
3 Charles Taylor provides a definition of a substantive conception of reason thus: "... we judge the
rationality of agents or their thoughts and feelings in substantive terms. This means that the
criteria for rationality is the one that gets it right. Plato has a conception of this kind. You could
not be fully rational, in his book, and believe for instance that Democritus was right about the
natural world or that the best life was one where you fulfilled the most sensual desires." Charles
Taylor Sources ofthe Self TheMaking ofthe Modern Identity, pp 85 - 86.
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order. Maclntyre characterises Aristotle's hierarchical conception of the universe
as follows;
"His is a universe structured in a hierarchical way -
that is why the hierarchical structure of the sciences is
appropriate for giving a realist account of such a
universe - and each level of the hierarchy provides the
matter in and through which the forms of the next
higher level actualise and perfect themselves."4
It was precisely this understanding of the universe that was challenged by the
Enlightenment. Enlightenment thinkers argued that the hierarchical ordering
posited by traditional world-views could not be rationally sustained. Historical
events alone seemed to conspire against these notions. For example, the idea that
humanity has a fixed nature became increasingly difficult to maintain with the
discovery of new civilisations, which in turn gave rise to the questioning of
traditional patterns of social domination.5 In place of a given pattern, mediated
through a tradition of reflection, according to which one was to judge one's
existence, the Enlightenment thinkers suggested that each person must be
responsible for following laws of reason. Thus subjectivity became one of the
determining principles of modernity. With each individual responsible for
ordering their own existence, the Enlightenment emphasis on the related notion of
rational autonomy also developed.
4 Maclntyre WJWR p 101.
5 For instance Peter Singer says "Once we admit that Darwin was right when he argued that human
ethics evolved from the social instincts that were inherited from our non-human ancestors, we can
put aside the hypothesis of a divine origin for ethics." Ethics 1994 Oxford University Press. Oxford
p 6. This quote serves to suggest that the historical event of Darwin's voyages and discoveries poses
a problem for an older form of ethical thinking. This is in keeping with the notion that the very
vulgar fact of our historical contingency, made clear through the Enlightenment, raises problems
for more traditional theological or cosmological understanding.
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The challenge to the teleological world-view of the pre-Enlightenment
simultaneously reflected, and gave impetus to, a new and developing
conceptualisation of nature. The newly emerging natural sciences brought with
them a new way of understanding nature and the universe that challenged
Aristotelian physics. Aristotle had characterised motion as the actualisation of a
potential for being, according to the hierarchical ordering of the universe in which
each being moves in order to realise its telos.b The new sciences, in contrast to the
Aristotelian model, provided the impetus for a theory of the universe in which the
hierarchical order of all beings is replaced by an order described by general
mechanical laws of causation. This in turn gives rise to the second determining
principle of modernity: namely the rise of 'scientific' knowledge and of
instrumental reason. However, this principle, though formulated to challenge
teleological world-views, conflicts with the principle of greater rational autonomy,
since the universe is understood to operate under determinate laws. Hence, we can
characterise the Enlightenment in terms of two contradictory tendencies. On the
one hand there is the move toward greater autonomy, on the other there is the
advance of ever more general causal laws.
Finally, in Kant we see the culmination of this process of evolution away
from pre-Enlightenment thinking to typically Enlightenment thought. Moreover,
we see the two determining principles of the Enlightenment synthesised in an
attempt to avoid the foregoing contradiction. According to Kant it is through the
faculty of subjectivity that the universe is ordered according to determinate laws.
This leads Kant to posit the existence of two worlds, the sensible world in which
6 Nicomachean Ethics 1973 Introduction and notes by Akrill, J.L., Faber, London.
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manifold appearance is placed under ever more general causal laws, and the
intelligible world in which the autonomous subject acts outside this determined
world of nature, according to principles of freedom. As a result of this dynamic,
modern Western society and culture can be understood as having become
differentiated into three main categories, culture, politics and economics. These are
governed by interests that are embodied in the natural sciences, in the market
economy and in the nation state respectively.7
1.2. Jurgen Habermas and the Unfinished Project of the
Enlightenment
Having outlined modernity as the age of critical reason typified by the
work of Kant, we come now to an examination of the work of Jurgen Habermas
and his response to the Enlightenment discourse. We shall do this by, first of all,
highlighting some of the main concerns and vocabulary that he uses. Following on
from here we shall analyse Habermas's exposition of what he calls the unfinished
project of modernity.
1.2.1. A BriefExposition ofHabermas's scheme and vocabulary.
Before going on to explore Habermas's argument in detail, however, it
would be advantageous to illuminate some of the terminology and vocabulary that
he uses because of the immense complexity of his project. In order to understand
the significance of Habermas's position for critical theology, it is necessary to
7 See Peukert "The Philosophical Critique of Modernity" in Concilium 1992 vol. 6 ppl7 - 26. See
also Habermas, "Modernity - An Incomplete Project." In Hal Foster (ed.) Postmodern Culture.
1990 Pluto Press. London pp 3 - 15 andM Passerin D'Entreves and S Benhabib (eds.) Habermas and
The Unfinished Project ofModernity. CUP, Cambridge 1996 pp38 - 55.
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appreciate at least three aspects of Habermas's work. First of all, the nature of his
endeavour to reconstruct the project of modernity; second his crucial distinction
between lifeworld and system; and third, his understanding of the relationship of
the logic and dynamic of rationalisation.
Habermas's seminal work Theory of Communicative Action8 attempts to
reconstruct the project of modernity. That is to say that he attempts to reconstruct
the secular ideal of universal reason harnessed to emancipation and the good life,
first articulated via Kant in late nineteenth century Europe. This reconstruction
takes account of Habermas's insight that universal reason requires grounding, not
in the subject/object relationships of the philosophy of consciousness but in the
subject/subject relationships of communicative action. To be precise, his core
insight is that people's use of language to communicate implies a common
endeavour to attain consensus in a context in which all participants are free to
contribute and have equal opportunities to do so. He writes "[rjeaching
understanding is the inherent telos of human speech."9 Such language use
presupposes a commitment to an ideal speech situation in which discourse can
realise its full potential for rationality. This ideal speech situation, though not
routinely at hand, does imply that communicative action, although always
occurring in an historical context, depends also on an ^-historical dynamic.
Communicative action, or action orientated towards understanding and consensus
is, therefore, to be contrasted strongly with strategic action or action orientated
8 Jiirgen Habermas TCA vols. 1 & 2.
9 Habermas TCA vol. 1 p 287.
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towards success. It is strategic action, resulting from instrumental reason allied to
positivism that has been the overriding theme of the Enlightenment.10
For Habermas, the concept of communicative action correlates with what
he calls the 'lifeworld' that "... appears in interaction as a context of relevance,
conceived not in terms of consciousness" but as a "... culturally transmitted and
linguistically organised stock of interpretative patterns."11 Or, as defined in
Habermas's words "... the intuitively present, in this sense familiar and
transparent, and at the same time vast and incalculable web of presuppositions that
have to be satisfied if an utterance is to be meaningful, i.e. valid or invalid."12 It is,
therefore, the medium or symbolic space wherein and whereby culture, social
integration and personality are sustained and reproduced. Habermas contrasts the
notion of lifeworld with the notion of system. The system represents material
rather than symbolic reproduction and while the lifeworld is the realm of
communicative action, the system is, on the contrary, typified by strategic action
and governed by functional imperatives.
Habermas argues that modern societies have encountered a massive
uncoupling of the system and lifeworld, and the colonisation of the latter by the
10 Positivism is the belief that there exist objective facts and that these facts are available for
empirical testing. Above all, positivism stresses the possibility of explaining these facts by means of
an objective testable theory, not itself linked to any one culture or tradition. This mood is
particularly evident in the historical development of the natural sciences and latterly social sciences.
Cf. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond secularReason. 1990. Basil Blackwell. Oxford.
11 W. Outhwaite Habermas:A Critical Introduction. 1994 Polity Press Cambridge p 86.
12 Habermas TCA vol. 2 p 131.
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former.13 Thus economy and state have been uncoupled from public and private
spheres of the lifeworld. This has rendered four independent subsystems or
domains which, although distinct and specialised in terms of product, rely on each
other for what they do not produce. The economy produces 'money', the state
'power', the public sphere 'influence' and the private sphere 'commitment'. These
products or 'media' are traded between domains. For example without the state to
establish legal institutions such as contract or private property, or the public
sphere to influence patterns of consumption or the private lifeworld to provide a
committed workforce the economy could not produce money. Similarly these
other domains depend on the distribution of the money produced by the
economy.14 However, the media of these domains are far from equivalent in
capacity and as distinction between system and lifeworld become more
pronounced then the former comes to dominate the latter. Simultaneously, the
media that pertain to the system characterise social life. This is what Habermas
identifies as colonisation.15
Colonisation, for Habermas, is but a symptom that suggests that
rationalisation in the West has been selective and distorted. Habermas maintains,
however, that although this dynamic has led to system rationalisation outstripping
the lifeworld this was not inevitable. The logic of this development, therefore,
allows for further lifeworld rationalisation. That is to say that the dynamic, which
Habermas links to Weberian rationalisation and Marxian commodification, that
sees the lifeworld become increasingly state administered, or 'juridified', and
13 See Richard Munch Sociological Theory: Developments Since the 1960's 1993 Nelson Hall Inc.
Chicago pp 256 - 267.
14 See also Crook et al Postmodernization: Change in Advanced Society. 1992 Sage, London p 28.
15 See, for instance Habermas CES Chapter 4 pp 130 - 177.
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commercialised has caused the possibilities for communicative action to be
diminished. This is because social participation has become subject to
rationalisation in favour of immediate and instrumental returns. In human terms
we encounter each other not as thinking, acting subjects but as legal entities.16
Elaborating on his theory of communicative action, Habermas develops
discourse ethics in an effort to redress the imbalance of rationality mentioned
earlier. Starting and departing from Kant, Habermas's principle of universalisation
shifts the focus from what each can will without contradiction to be a universal
law (strategic reasoning) to what all can will in agreement to be a universal norm.17
Thus he attempts to provide a social dimension to Kant's individualistic moral
theory. In so doing, he attempts to compel the universal exchange of roles that
Mead described as 'universal discourse'.18 As a result, Habermas suggests that every
valid norm has to fulfil the condition that "... all affected can accept the
consequences and side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for
the satisfaction of everyone's interest (and these consequences are preferred to
those of known alternative possibilities for regulation.)"19 This should not be
confused with Habermas's principle of discourse ethics: "... only those norms can
claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their
capacity as participants in a practical discourse."20 For Habermas, the principle of
universalisation has to do with moral questions of justice and solidarity. These
16 Habermas CES pp 99, 116, 157 - 158.
17 Thomas McCarthy The Critical Theory ofjiirgen Habermas. 1978. Hutchison, London, p 326.
18 Habermas quotes from Mead Mind, Selfand Society: from the standpoint of a social behaviourist.
Morris C.W. 1934. University of Chicago Press, Chicago; "Philanthropy from the Point of View
of Ethics." in Selected Writings Reck, A. (ed.) University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1964. in TCA
vol. II pp 92 - 96. All of Habermas's writings are extensively littered with references to Mead.
19 Habermas MCCA p 65.
20 Ibid p 66.
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questions pertain to formal universal solution while the principle of discourse
ethics has to do with ethical questions of the good life which are only addressable
in the context of substantive cultures, forms of life and individual projects.
Habermas's discourse ethics accords primacy to moral questions of justice and
solidarity. These two concepts are of the essence of communicative action. Justice
in its modern sense, refers to the "... subjective freedom of inalienable
individuality" and solidarity refers to the "... well-being of associated members of
a community who intersubjectively share the same lifeworld."21 He goes on to say
that morality "... cannot protect the rights of the individual without also
protecting the well-being of the community to which he belongs."22
This brings us to enquire into the social institutions, mechanisms and
structures which are expected to facilitate discourse ethical procedures or, more
generally, the public operation of reason. Habermas contends that what is required
is an extension of what he calls 'substantive' democracy.23 According to Habermas,
this alone will afford genuine participation in the process of will formation, that is
the public consensus on values and norms achieved through communicative action.
This in turn depends on the rationalisation of the lifeworld via the reconstitution
of the public sphere. The reconstitution of the public sphere, is the basis of
Habermas's reconstructive project.
21 Ibid p 200.
22 Ibid p 200.
23 Habermas Legitimation Crisis. 1973 Heinemann Educational Books, London p 36.
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1.2.2. The Unfinished Project ofModernity
From here we can trace Habermas's reconstructive project. In The
Philosophical Discourse ofModernity1* Habermas traces the development of what he
calls the Enlightenment project. He notes that, although Kant established the
emergence of a new critical potential for reason, it was in fact Hegel who first fully
grasped the significance of modernity in the shape of a new historical
consciousness: a present that cuts itself away from the past through an act by
which it opens itself to the future. Habermas quotes Hegel from the preface of the
Phenomenology ofMind:
"It is surely not difficult to see that our time is a birth
and transition to a new period. The spirit has broken
with what was hitherto the world of its existence and
the imagination and is about to submerge all this in
the past, it is at work again giving itself a new form ....
(F)rivolity as well as boredom that open up in the
establishment and the indeterminate apprehension of
something unknown are the harbingers of a
forthcoming change. This gradual crumbling ... is
interrupted by the break of day, that like lightening
all at once reveals the edifice of the new world."25
If it was Hegel who was most conscious of the nature of modernity, he was also
aware of the disruptive effects of the project. The division made by Kant between
the intelligible and the sensible world became increasingly difficult to maintain,
because either the subject was completely determined within the empirical world,
or it became an empty construct, determined through empty general principles.
General principles of practical reason, such as 'treat everyone as an end in
24 In this section, unless otherwise stated, I will be drawing on Habermas's own summary of his
arguments to be found in The Philosophical Discourse ofModernity. Frederick Lawrence (trans.) 1987
(1985) Polity Press, Cambridge.
25 Habermas PDM p6.
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themselves', can be interpreted in any manner if one has no given conception of
what constitutes these ends.26
Hegel's system was intended to be a response to the divisions occurring in
his own time, as reason fragmented with the loss of metaphysical world-views.
Hegel, like Kant, attempted to re-establish the unity of reason upon the principle
of subjectivity. In this way, the disruptive effects of the project could be negated
through the means of its own determining principle. To reconcile Kant's
intelligible and sensible worlds Hegel situated the subject historically; subjects
determine who they are in the course of world history. This enabled Hegel to
maintain the promise of redemption held in religious world-views, whilst
completing the break with unreflective traditions, emerging into a future marked
by the promise of rational self-determination. By retaining the principle of
subjectivity, however, Hegel could not escape the dualism of modernity. Either
the subject was determined historically, in a similar manner to that in which
Kant's empirical ego is determined by laws of nature, or it determines nature and
history in such a way that the contingency of historical events is negated. Hegel,
sympathetic to the second of these possibilities, was led ultimately to make claims
about the realisation of the world subject, in which world history was interpreted
through a predetermined model that became increasingly difficult to maintain.
This mirrors the manner in which, for Kant, the intelligible world loses all
relation to the empirical world. Historical events that contradicted Hegel's claims
about the emergence of the world subject through the Prussian state, soon sent the
Hegelian system crashing under the weight of historical contingency, bringing
26 Habermas PDM p23 - 44.
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about a new phase in the discourse of modernity. Habermas traces the successive
phases of the discourse, each perceiving itself under the temporal consciousness of
modernity, as the key to a new future: unmasking the limitations and the hidden
links with tradition in its predecessor, yet unable to move outside the premises of
the discourse. He argues that each phase of the discourse remains caught up in the
paradigm of the subject, leading to the dualism between the empirical world and
the intelligible world being repeated under various guises.
In response to the thinkers who have constructed a counter-discourse to the
dominant rationalising discourse of modernity, Habermas argues that far from
heralding the beginning of a new age they remain within the temporal
consciousness of modernity. Nietzsche, for instance, argued that it is not just
teleological world-views that hold humanity enslaved. It is, rather, the very search
for rational foundations for thought and action.27 Nietzsche attempted to
reinterpret the Enlightenment narrative of rational self-determination with one in
which humanity is imprisoned through the imposition of rational structures. In
particular, Habermas accuses the authors of the counter-discourse, from Nietzsche
to Foucault, of lacking the conceptual resources to escape from the determining
paradigm of modernity, that of subjectivity. In attempting to break out of the
rational structures of modernity, the authors of the counter-discourse swing
between a radicalised subjectivity or impersonal categories such as Being or Power.
Discussing, for example, the second division of Being and Time. Habermas asserts:
27 Habermas PDM Chapter IV. "The Entry into Postmodernity: Nietzsche as a Turning Point, pp
83 - 105. Nietzsche shall reappear in the thesis in Chapter 7 when we discuss the impact of limit
experiences of death and suffering on critical theology and ecclesial ethics. The impact of these
limit experiences unleash the spectre of nihilism which, according to both Davis and Hauerwas,
can only be adequately addressed in and through a proper understanding of religious hope.
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"The classical demand of Ursprungphilosophie for self-
grounding and ultimate grounding is not deflected but
answered in the sense of a Fichtean act (Tathandlang)
that has been modified into a world-project. Dasein
grounds itself from itself. 'Dasein grounds the world
only insofar as it grounds itself in the mist of being.'
Heidegger once again grasps the world as a process
out of the subjectivity of a will to self-affirmation."28
Far from heralding the beginning of a new age, in which the objectifying attitude
of rationality is replaced by an attitude in which being is allowed to present itself
in modes that challenge dominant categorisations, Heidegger remains within the
confines of the paradigm of consciousness. Once again the Kantian doubling of the
subject can be found: either Dasein lies outside the world as its origin, or it is a
being within the world and determined by the impersonal category of Being.
As each successive critique of modernity ends up entangled in the paradigm
of subjectivity, Habermas must himself propose a means of escape from this
dilemma and account for the gains and losses of the project of modernity. In
response to this challenge Habermas asserts the following:
"It would be a good idea to return once again to the
unmasking of the human sciences through the critique
of reason, but this time in the full awareness of a fact
that the successors of Nietzsche stubbornly ignore.
They do not see that the philosophical discourse of
modernity initiated by Kant already drew a
counterreckoning for subjectivity as the principle of
modernity...
28 Habermas PDM p 151.
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"I have already suggested that the paradigm of the
knowledge of objects has to be replaced by the
paradigm of speech and action."29
To understand where and how Habermas locates this counter-reckoning to the
principle of subjectivity, we need to return briefly to his narrative of the
development of modernity and examine the emergence of autonomous spheres of
reason.
In his analysis of the distinguishing features of modernity, Habermas is
principally influenced by Weber. It is Weber that most accurately characterises the
break in modernity with traditional world-views, and the increasing rational
potential of modern life. Volume One of The Theory of Communicative Action,™
subtitled 'Reason and the Rationalisation of Society', is Habermas's account of the
increased rational potential of modern societies. This account is summarised in an
article entitled "Modernity: An Unfinished Project"31 wherein Habermas sums up
Weber's understanding of modernity:
"Max Weber characterised cultural modernity in
terms of the separation of substantive reason,
formerly expressed in religious and metaphysical
world-views, into three moments, now capable of
being connected only formally with one another
(through the form of argumentative justification). In
so far as the world-views have disintegrated and their
traditional problems have been separated off under
29 Habermas PDM p 295.
30 Habermas TCA vol. 1 particularly Chapter 4 pp 339 - 402.
31 Habermas "Modernity: An Unfinished Project." in (Seyla Benhabib [trans]) Hal Foster (ed.)
Postmodern Culture. 1983. Pluto Press London, pp 3 - 15. See also (N.Walker [trans]) in M Passerin
D'Entreves and S Benhabib (eds.) Habermas and The Unfinished Project of Modernity. CUP.,
Cambridge 1996 pp 38 - 55. The article itself was a speech given by Habermas on receipt of the
Adorno Prize in 1980.
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the perspectives of truth, normative rightness and the
authenticity or beauty, and can now be treated in each
case as questions of knowledge, justice, or taste
respectively, there arises in the modern period a
differentiation of the value spheres of science and
knowledge, of morality and of art. Thus scientific
discourse, moral and legal enquiry, artistic production
and critical practice are now institutionalised within
the corresponding cultural systems as the concern of
experts, and this professionalised treatment of the
cultural heritage in terms of single abstract
considerations of validity in each case brings to light
the autonomous structures intrinsic to the cognitive-
instrumental, the moral-practical and the aesthetic-
expressive knowledge complexes."32
Habermas in turn accepts Weber's insights, and hence ultimately Kant's insights
too, in re-narrating the emergence of three autonomous spheres of reason
corresponding to three world relations. In relation to Kant's First Critique,33 there
is an objectifying relationship to the external world; under this Habermas places
the autonomous sphere of science. The type of rationality associated with this
sphere is that of means-ends calculation, i.e. instrumental reason. To substantiate
his theory Habermas turns to speech-act theory as a method of rational
reconstruction of competencies developed in modern societies. To provide
evidence for the emergence of the first sphere of reason he points to constitutive
speech-acts, i.e. those that are constitutive of fact stating discourse.
32 Ibid p 45.
33 Immanuel Kant Critique ofPure Reason. Werner S. Pluhar (trans.) 1996 Hackett Publishing Co.
Indianapolis.
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The second of Kant's Critiques34 brings to light the social world of
intersubjective norms: in relation to this value sphere Habermas points to the
autonomous legal and moral structures of modernity. The type of intersubjective
relationship thematised here is captured in Kant's dictum of treating others as ends
in themselves. The type of rationality present here cannot be the objectifying
attitude of means-ends calculations. Following the categories of American
psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, Habermas argues that in modernity the highest
stage of moral reasoning is obtained. Participants in a moral discourse are able to
abstract from their own interest positions and assume the position of each of the
other participants, hence operating with a decentred rationality as opposed to
instrumental rationality. This second sphere of rationality also has its own
distinctive type of speech acts, regulative acts, used to establish interpersonal
relations on the basis of criticisable claims to normative rightness.
Kant's third Critique, the Critique ofJudgement,35 equates with the third
autonomous value sphere of modernity, that of subjectivity. Habermas suggests
that the growth of autonomy in the arts is an indicator that subjectivity has freed
itself from the interpretations of traditional cultures, and moved to secure its own
identity. By establishing the formal concept of the external world through the
autonomous spheres of science and justice, the subject is freed to ask the existential
questions "Who am I?" and "Who would I like to be?"36 Unlike the other two
world relations, which are given in terms of validity claims linked directly with
34 Immanuel Kant Critique ofPractical Reason and Other Works On The Theory of Ethics. 6th ed.
Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (trans.) Longmans, London 1959.
35 Immanuel Kant Critique ofJudgement. 1952 James Creed Meredith, (trans.). Clarendon Press,
Oxford.
36 Habermas TCA vol. 1 pp 48 -74.
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action, subjectivity is expressed through the world-disclosing power of language.
The idea that the world is disclosed through language can be traced back to
Wilhelm Humbolt in the German tradition, and is appropriated by Heidegger in
his conception of truth as an event of concealment and unconcealment.37 What
distinguishes Habermas from Heidegger and the postmoderns is his claim that
subjectivity is also connected to criticisable validity claims, in such a manner that
the learning potential of modernity is retained:
"Meaning could not exhaust validity. Heidegger
jumped to conclusions in identifying the disclosure of
meaning-horizons with the truth of meaningful
utterances: it is only the conditions for the validity of
utterances that change with the horizon of meaning -
the changed understanding has to prove itself in
dealing with what can come within its horizon."38
The critical potential of reason is maintained, whilst subjectivity is guaranteed its
autonomy, and is detached from the paradigm of the transcendent subject creating
the external world. Expressive speech acts are constitutive of the third value sphere
of modernity; they are raised and criticised on the basis of authenticity and
truthfulness.39 This understanding of the three aspects of rationality, each with its
own autonomous realm in the modern world, put in place the theoretical
constructs with which to carry out a detailed and thorough critique of modernity,
with the practical aim of correcting the social costs of the project. For Habermas,
modernity is indeed an advance on traditional societies. It is not simply, however,
the disenchantment of traditional world-views that has brought about the ills of
modernity, nor the advancement of rational structures. Rather it is the one-sided
manner in which the project has been worked out.
37 Heidegger op cit. pp 218 - 228. Habermas PDM pp 64, 138, 154.
38 Habermas PDM p 320.
39 Habermas TCA vol. 1 p 10, 32, & 302 - 309.
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This one-sided development has led to the emphasising of the world-
objectifying attitude of instrumental rationality. As mentioned above, the
disruptive effect of the Enlightenment had already been grasped by Hegel.
Habermas continues this critique, tracing a line that runs from Hegel, through the
young Hegelians to Marx with his theory of exploitation. It is taken up, in a
version closest to Weber by Lukacs, and his followers in the Frankfurt school.
From this 'school' it is in the writings of Adorno and Horkheimer that this
critique of reason, for Habermas, reaches its most complete, yet most negative
expression.40 This legacy of the critique of modernity was significant because it had
effectively unmasked the dark underside of the Enlightenment rhetoric of progress
and emancipation. However, the negative dialectic of Adorno and Horkheimer
still needed to perform the positive task of accounting for its own normative
foundations, and put forward a possible alternative to a legacy of instrumental
reason.
The distinguishing feature of Habermas's positive, reconstructive solution
to the dilemmas of modernity is his contention that modernity has always carried
the means of its own redemption. From its inception, modernity has carried the
means for understanding action and rationality in terms other than those of
instrumental reason.41 The second autonomous world relation, that which brings
40 In fact Adorno entitled one of his works Negative Dialectics Ashton, E.B. (trans.) 1990 (1973)
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
41 Instrumental reason allied to positivism is one of the ills of modernity that holds sway when
subjectivity, autonomy and causal laws collide. It is to be contrasted with communicative reason.
Davis WLWD p 71.
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about the development of norms of action on the basis of a decentred reason,
carries with it the promise of emancipation from unjust structures. The German
tradition was unable to step beyond the paradigm of consciousness, lacking an
adequate conception of this decentred, intersubjective concept of reason. In order
to develop this concept, Habermas looks outside the German tradition, to the
American pragmatist school of Pierce and Mead. This move provides the
conceptual tools to move beyond the object centred approach of traditional
ontology and the subject-object relation of consciousness theories.42 Instrumental
rationality resulted from the legacy of the paradigm of consciousness; either the
subject determines the world through the imposition of universal laws, or it is
determined itself by general laws. In moving to the paradigm of communication,
Habermas attempts to overcome the dualism of the paradigm of consciousness. No
longer is the subject determined by the world, or the determinant of the world:
instead the world is disclosed through intersubjective procedures of rationality, by
a plurality of subjects offering and criticising validity claims in three worlds.
Habermas argues that, with the move to the paradigm of communicative reason,
the legacy of metaphysical thinking, according to which the multiplicity of
existents is placed under an abstract concept, is avoided.
Such a move, going as it does beyond metaphysical theories, and entering
into a new age of post-metaphysical thinking, allows Habermas to take up the
traditional question of the unity of reason. Traditional world-views, with their
substantive concepts of reason, bring about an objectifying attitude to the
lifeworld. That is to say the world of everyday action and interaction.
42 See Habermas PT p 121.
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Objectification produces a false unity that prevents the establishment of reflective
rational structures, which emerge through the three value spheres of modernity.
"The linguistic world-view is reified as open to
criticism. Within such a system of orientation, actions
cannot reach that critical zone in which
communicatively achieved agreement depends upon
autonomous yes/no responses to criticisable validity
claims."43
The unity of reason that Habermas proposes is a formal unity. In order to retain
its independence, each sphere of reason is to be kept in harmony with the other
two. Wherever there develops a one-sided emphasis on one particular moment of
reason a 'health-warning' will alert us to the possible dangers.
"If we do not want altogether to relinquish standards
by which a form of life might be judged to be more or
less failed, deformed, unhappy or alienated, we can
look if need be to the model of sickness and health."44
There is to be no overall meta-narrative on the relation between the three spheres,
such narratives representing a return to metaphysical, forced conceptions of unity.
Rationality that attains its unity on a formal procedural basis, can no longer
be characterised in terms of a particular substantive conception of the good life.
Instead it is to be seen in terms of certain procedural limits that are placed on the
establishment of intersubjective structures, within which a variety of traditions
and conceptions of the good can flourish. Social unity is not achieved on the basis
of one dominant tradition, but through a variety of traditions co-existing through
43 Habermas TCA vol. 1 p 71.
44 Ibid p 73.
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the medium of communicative reason. Habermas seeks, therefore, to provide
theoretical foundations for the two phenomena of modernity that, as noted at the
beginning of this chapter, have often been perceived to be incompatible: that is to
say, the increase in the diversity of forms of life and the increase in universal
structures of rationality.45
In conclusion, we can see that for Habermas there is to be no retrieval of a
period prior to modernity, the only positive foundation for a critique of modern
life is to be found in the project that Habermas develops following a line from
Kant through Hegel and Marx, to Weber and Adorno. This project entails
breaking with substantive reason and the establishment of three autonomous
complexes of reason, captured in the three decentred world relations that develop
out of Kant's three critiques. The promise of redemption, inherent in metaphysical
or religious world-views is redeployed in terms of redemption from oppressive
social structures and is, thus, held open. Meanwhile, the utopianism of Marx, with
his narrative of the emergence of the emancipatory proletariat subject, and the
pessimism of the Frankfurt school are avoided.46 The individual is able to assert his
or her independence from traditional teleological world-views, through the
operation of procedures of reason in the three spheres of modernity. Each
individual is able to shape his or her own existence, not through the paradigm of
consciousness, but through equal and reciprocal participation in discourses
spanning the three worlds. No one world-view is to be privileged in these
discourses and no interpretation is to be final, the procedures of rationality offer
45 See Habermas PT p 140.
46 See A. Wellmer, "Reason, Utopia and Enlightenment." In R.J. Bernstein (ed.) Habermas and
Modernity, 1985. C.U.P. Cambridge, pp 35 - 36.
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the possibility of challenging any given interpretation. Habermas attempts to
correct and go beyond his predecessors through recovering a potential for
liberation that is to be found within modernity itself, through the paradigm of
communicative reason.
1.3. Alasdair Maclntyre: A Return to Substantive Reason
If Habermas can be seen as a contemporary defender of modernity,
Alasdair Maclntyre should be seen as one of its most hostile critics. Alasdair
Maclntyre's communitarian47 project attempts to show how the liberal
individualism of the Enlightenment has irretrievably damaged moral thinking. He
argues that standards of rational justification and of moral decision making
themselves emerge from a particular history, or more precisely community with a
shared history or narrative. Embracing a neo-Aristotelian position, Maclntyre
provides a powerful challenge to Habermas's re-constructionist programme. It is
the purpose of this section to explore Maclntyre's return to substantive reason. By
this I mean his call for a return to strong contextualism that ties the identity of the
agent to the substantive judgements of a particular tradition. I shall execute this
exploration by, first of all presenting some of the concerns that Maclntyre has in
common with Habermas and then move on to an exploration of his alternative
critique of modernity.
47 Other epithets for communitarianism are in common usage and generally delineate particular
subsets of interest within the general category communitarian. Thus terms such as neo-
Aristotelianism or civic republicanism describe the work of philosophers, ethicists and sociologists
who may be broadly defined as communitarian. Philosophers such as Alasdair Maclntyre, Charles
Taylor, Michael Sandel and Michael Walzer and sociologists such as Robert Bellah, Amitai Etzioni,
and Philip Selznick, fall into this category but, would not, generally, describe themselves as
communitarians. Nevertheless, with this disclaimer in place, for ease of description we shall
employ the term communitarian with regard to Maclntyre. See Kymlica Contemporary Political
Philosophy. Chapter 6 pp 199 - 238.
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1.3.1. Common Concerns in Maclntyre and Habermas
Although profoundly antagonistic to each other's project Maclntyre and
Habermas, in fact, share some concerns. The areas of shared concern can be listed
as: critical interest in the social sciences as descriptive of the state of modernity;
interest in narrative accounts of moral reasoning; interest in ethical questions of
the good life, substantive cultures, forms of life and individual projects. In this
section we shall briefly outline these concerns as a means of relating the one to the
other.
Both Maclntyre and Habermas have a long-standing interest in the social
sciences, and both attempt to overcome the division between these sciences and
philosophy. For Maclntyre, as for Habermas, it is Weber who most accurately
provides an analysis of our modern self-understanding ",..[t]he contemporary
vision of the world, so I have suggested, is predominantly, although not always in
detail, Weberian."48 Needless to say, the narrative account Maclntyre gives of the
development of this contemporary vision differs on several key issues to that
account developed by Habermas. For Maclntyre, far from representing the
development of distinct rational structures, through which humanity liberates
itself from the dogma of tradition, the Weberian vision of modernity "... cannot
be rationally sustained; it disguises and conceals rather than illuminates and it
depends for its power on its success at disguise and concealment."49 It is the
Enlightenment belief in universally accessible first principles of enquiry that has
48 Maclntyre AV p 109.
49 Ibid p 109.
51
Chapter 1. Two Critiques ofModernity
led to the breakdown of rational discourse in modern societies. In response, he
develops a model of rational ethics closely identifiable with Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics and proceeds to use this to analyse the fundamental
incoherence and disorder of the contemporary moral climate as he sees it. That is
to say, the Enlightenment has established a distorted choice between monism and
50
radical existentialism.
Like Habermas, Maclntyre has an interest in ethical questions of the good
life which are only addressable in the context of substantive cultures, forms of life
and individual projects: this interest extends to a concern with practical reasoning.
What is at stake here between the likes of Habermas and Maclntyre, however, is
the scope of the context that we have to acknowledge as necessary for coherent
moral discourse. Maclntyre argues, therefore, that to resolve the moral problems
of modernity we have to take into account the context for making decisions and
the basis for accepting one theoretical resolution over another is:
"...the rational superiority of that particular structure
to all previous attempts within that particular
tradition to formulate such theories and principles; it
is not a matter of those first principles being
acceptable to all rational persons whatsoever."
This is a direct attack on the liberal universal ideal of all competent participants
being the basis for the validity of a norm. Clearly, in Maclntyre's terms the
community or tradition would be quite sharply defined as those sharing a
50 Janet Martin Soskice in her reply to Robin Gill "Community and Morality 'After Modernity' a
Reply to Robin Gill." Studies in Christian Ethics 1995 vol8 Nol. pl4 - 19.
51 Maclntyre WJWR p 8.
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teleological context that, if lost, would generate problems which could not be
solved in modern moral philosophy. In this context, practical reasoning is best
understood as self discovery in relation to a tradition of discourse insofar as we
approach our own circumstances as "... bearers of a particular social identity ...
Hence, what is good for me has to be the good for one who inhabits these
52
roles." There is an underlying fear that without the community actively
encouraging them individuals will drift into atomistic isolation. Hence even reason
is at the behest of the tradition or community.53
It is at this point that the relationship between tradition, culture and
society is made or broken. All ethical systems, Maclntyre argues, must be
contextual, reflecting the community in which they are born and the traditions
that the community inherits. In rejecting a notion of universally valid ethics he
asserts that justification of ethical decisions can only be on the basis of examination
of our own tradition and that of others with reference to whom we act. This
context has been described in terms of the common good. The common good is a
substantive conception of the good life that defines the community's way of life. In
other words this brings us back to the realm of culture. The common good, rather
than adjusting itself to the pattern of people's preferences, provides a standard by
which those preferences are evaluated. One of the problems for communitarians
arises when it comes to guaranteeing the common good and protecting virtue in its
normative sense. The governance of the culture of the common good has to be
extremely strong and should encourage people to adopt its conception of the good
52 Maclntyre AV p 220.
53 Maclntyre AV p 225 "What I have tried to spell out ... is the kind of understanding of social life
which the tradition of the virtues requires, a kind of understanding very different from those
dominant in the culture of bureaucratic individualism."
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rather than another. This governance will involve a public ranking of the value of
different ways of life,54 within a teleologically orientated perspective, alongside
high boundaries determining who and what is in and out of the community. There
are two implications of this view, one negative and the other positive. The first,
negative, implication is the accusation that authoritarianism rather than modern
liberal self-determination characterises Maclntyre's virtue ethics. To counter this
accusation one might suggest that liberalism in supporting self-determination, in
fact, underplays the social conditions necessary for some level of self-
determination. Consequently, some limits on self-determination are necessary to
preserve the conditions necessary to enable the possibility of self-determination.
Hence, some level of authority is necessary simply to enable self-determination
and the accusation is softened into a matter of degrees.55 However, the second,
positive, implication is that Maclntyre's position necessarily presupposes an
alternative critique of modernity to that of modern liberalism.
1.3.2An Alternative Critique ofModernity.
We are now in a position to assess Maclntyre's account of modernity and
modernity's incoherence as a backdrop for ethical discourse. After Virtue is
Maclntyre's account of the breakdown of the Enlightenment project, the failure of
the attempt to justify ethics without the foundations of a teleological conception of
34 It should be pointed out that a false dichotomy has been generated between the politics of
liberalism and politics of the common good. Liberalism has an idea of the common good which is a
precondition of liberal egalitarian activity. Liberals conceive of policies that promote the interests of
all members of their group. See Kymlika^4« Introduction to Contemporary Political Theory, pp 206 -
208.
55 See Kymlika Ibid pp 216 - 230, and Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences:
Philosophical Papers II. 1985. CUP, Cambridge, p 190 - 191.
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human nature.56 In Whose Justice? Which Rationality? he takes up and develops these
themes within a more comprehensive account of practical reasoning. His central
claim in this later work is that reason arises in and develops from particular
traditions; there is no such thing as reason outside of a tradition of enquiry. The
Enlightenment project of establishing a pure principle of reason, acceptable to any
rational agent irrespective of the tradition in which they are immersed, was
destined to failure:
"There is no standing ground, no place for enquiry,
no way to engage in the practices of advancing,
evaluating accepting, and rejecting reasoned
arguments apart from the that which is provided by
some particular tradition or other."57
Most importantly for Maclntyre the current, incoherent state of ethical
discourse gained momentum when Enlightenment thought removed ethical terms
and concepts from the tradition in which they were originally developed. Hence
they have lost their substantive meanings, becoming mere fragments of a once rich
discourse. The fragmentation of ethical discourse cleared the way for the
establishment of emotivist theories, and the development of the emotivist culture
with which we are now left. For Maclntyre, it is Nietzsche who has most
accurately characterised the breakdown of rational justification in modernity. It is
Nietzsche who also draws the ultimate conclusion from the failure of the
56 In regard to the problems generated by the lack of teleological ordering, but this time in regard
to the social sciences, we encounter the similar sentiments in John Milbank Theology and Social
Theory: Beyond SecularReason.
57 Maclntyre WJWR p 350.
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Enlightenment project, disposing of even the emotivist appeal to inner sentiments.
Maclntyre refers to a famous passage in the Gay Science:™
"Nietzsche jeers at the notion of basing morality on
inner sentiments, on conscience, on the one hand, or
on the Kantian categorical imperative, on
universalizability on the other. In five swift, witty
and cogent paragraphs he disposes of both what I have
called the Enlightenment project to discover rational
foundations for an objective morality and of the
confidence of the everyday moral agent in the post-
Enlightenment culture that his moral practice and
utterance are in good order."59
Nietzsche's positive proposal to replace the Enlightenment project consists in the
inversion of this picture. It is not through rational argument that we are to become
truly human, but through an heroic act of the will in which we fashion our own
laws representing how we choose to view ourselves. Through confronting the
Enlightenment project and drawing it to its ultimate conclusion, Maclntyre argues
that Nietzsche represents one of the two possible alternatives that confront us
today:
"What the conjunction of philosophical and historical
argument reveals is that either one must follow
through the aspirations and the collapse of the
different versions of the Enlightenment project until
there remains only the Nietzschean diagnosis and the
Nietzschean problematic or one must hold that the
Enlightenment project was not only mistaken, but
should never have commenced in the first place."60
The alternative Maclntyre proposes to the conclusions of Nietzsche, consists in the
return to an older tradition of rational enquiry, one which "...is philosophically
58 Nietzsche Gay Science 1974. Kaufmann, W. (trans.) Vintage Books, New York section 3.3.5
59 Maclntyre AV p 113.
60 Ibid P118.
56
Chapter 1. Two Critiques ofModernity
the most powerful of pre-modern modes of moral thought. If a pre-modern view
of morals and politics is to be vindicated against modernity, it will be in something
like Aristotelian terms or not at all."61 Maclntyre develops this theme in his
subsequent works, endorsing that development of Aristotle's thought that resulted
in the synthesis of Aquinas.
The conception of the Enlightenment narrative developed by Maclntyre is
broadly the antithesis of that offered by Habermas. For Habermas, reason frees
itself from pre-modern teleological world-views in order to release its critical
potential. In contrast, for Maclntyre, removed from the unifying teleological
ordering of the Aristotelian tradition, reason fragments and modernity is
characterised by a series of unresolvable debates. Though the origins of the
Enlightenment are complex, Maclntyre traces them, in part, to the new
conceptions of reason and human nature that were developed in late medieval
thought. This new conception of reason and human nature was later taken up and
developed by both the Protestant reformers and Jansenist Catholicism.62 Charles
Taylor, in an article on Maclntyre,63 traces the development from its theological
roots of this Enlightenment conception of reason and nature. In late medieval
scholasticism, although Aristotelianism had been developed as the most powerful
of pre-modern philosophies, achieving a definitive synthesis in the works of
Aquinas, controversy still raged as to the compatibility of the Greek and Christian
world-views. In particular Occam and other nominalists argued that the Greek
61 Ibid pl88.
62 Ibid p 53.
63 Charles Taylor in "Justice After Virtue." in J. Horton & S. Mendus (eds.) After Maclntyre:
Critical Perspectives on the Work ofAlasdairMaclntyre. 1994. CUP. Cambridge. ppl6-43.
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conception of the cosmos, ordered to a fixed telos in accordance with principles of
reason, was incompatible with the Christian doctrine of the sovereignty of God.
The ancient debate concerning whether God is constrained by principles of
reason, or if God is free to decide the laws of reason is re-enacted at the entry into
modernity. Some of the key concepts of modernity can be seen to originate in this
debate. In order to assert the sovereignty of God, Occam is led to conceive of
nature as value neutral material, onto which God wills his commandments. In
modernity, Taylor says, this sovereignty is transferred to humanity, resulting in
the modern emphasis on the autonomy of reason:
"... reason is no longer defined substantively in terms
of a vision of cosmic order, but formally, in terms of
the procedures that thought ought to follow, and
especially those involved in fitting means to ends,
instrumental reason, the hegemony of reason is
consequently redefined, and now means are not
ordered according, to the vision of order, but rather
controlling desires by the canons of instrumental
reason."64
Nature is characterised as a mechanical substrate, and the newly developing natural
sciences are perceived as methods for describing the causal regularities of this
substrate. It was not the development of the natural sciences that brought about
this manner of conceiving of nature: the natural sciences were readily interpreted
on this model of a value-neutral universe. Hence the development of modern
complexes of knowledge in the natural sciences does not automatically entail the
breakdown of a teleological conception of nature. Another consequence of this
64 Ibid p 19.
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conception of nature is the fact/value distinction so influential in modern ethics.
This is manifested in the Kantian distinction between the sensible and the
intelligible worlds. Taylor follows Maclntyre in arguing that this Enlightenment
conception of reason and nature cannot function in a coherent manner.65
This account of the origins of modernity has brought to light the manner
in which, for Maclntyre, reason and nature are torn apart. The result of this
division for ethics is the destruction of a once complete scheme of ethical
development into incoherent fragments. This fragmentation is summed up, by
Maclntyre, in the following passage:
"... a threefold scheme in which human-nature-as-it-
happens-to-be (human nature in its untutored state) is
initially discrepant and discordant with the precepts
of ethics and needs to be transformed by the
instructions of practical reason and experience into
human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realised-its-re/os."66
The Enlightenment, in abandoning the third element in this scheme leaves but two
fragments of a once complete scheme, the relationship between which is left
unclear. That is to say we are left with a twofold scheme where human nature in
its untutored state is expected to appreciate and operate in light of ethical precepts
without any teleological framework wherein practical reason can function. Thus
there is no possibility of discerning what it might mean to live a good life. At this
65 Ibid. 16 - 43. Taylor is inclined to argue against Maclntyre and claims that modernity actually
encompasses a substantive ethic which can be understood as different from, and even an advance,
on previous ethics. This divergence derives from Taylor's understanding of the relationship
between substantive ethical practice and the ethical meta-theory wherein and whereby it is
interpreted.
66 Maclntyre AV p 53.
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point we turn to the explanatory scheme Maclntyre develops from Aristotle and
Aquinas, a scheme that is integral to any account of rational discourse:
"... any rational justification of the place assigned to
the archai/principia in that perfect understanding
which provides the activities of the mind with its
telos/finis is likewise inseparable from the rational
justification of that scheme of teleological ordering as
a whole."67
In placing the Enlightenment in relation to the late medieval debates that
preceded it, Maclntyre can be seen as continuing a narrative that was developed in
this century by Thomists such as Etienne Gilson.68 In Three Rival Versions ofMoral
Enquiry Maclntyre locates the origins of the Enlightenment in late medieval
scholasticism, in particular the works of Scotus.69 Having demonstrated how
modern moral philosophy has its origins in Scotus's theory of the will, Maclntyre
then traces the effects of Scotus's doctrines on the unity of reason:
"In a parallel way Scotus's doctrine of the soul's
immediate intuitive knowledge of singulars, so that
the singular is intelligible - even if only somewhat so -
in independence of the universal, both transforms the
67 Maclntyre FPFE p 45.
68 Etienne Gilson, History ofChristian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. 1955Sheed and Ward. London.
In this work Gilson argues that the late medieval rejection of Aquinas's metaphysics results from a
misinterpretation of his doctrine of esse and entia. He argues that the successors of Aquinas, failing
to grasp the subtlety of the doctrine, rejected its solution to the problem of universals. This led
ultimately to the rejection of any notion of universals or natures, a rejection that Taylor traces in
Occam. Maclntyre says that the likes of Gilson "... in retrieving stage by scholarly stage the
historical understanding of what Aquinas himself said, wrote and did recovered for us an
understanding of what is distinctive about the mode of enquiry elaborated in its classical and most
adequate form by Aquinas. The greatest names in this line of descent are those of Grabman,
Mandonnet, Gilson, Van Steenburgen and Weisheipl, a list in which those who appear later have
sometimes had to correct as well as to supplement their predecessors' scholarship... " TRV p 77
69 Maclntyre TRV p 155 " Scotus thus not only made possible but provoked a good deal of moral
philosophy, directly and indirectly, from Occam all the way to Kant."
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conception of intelligibility and places constraints
upon how the relationship of particular to universal
can be understood, in such a way as to generate a new
problematic for the about to emerge academic
discipline of metaphysics or first philosophy.
Paradoxically Scotus, whose philosophical enquiries
were at every point controlled by his theological
conclusions and whose primary interest was in
protecting, the autonomy of Augustinian theology
from the inroads of either Averroist or Thomistic
Aristotelianism, set the scene instead for the
emergence of philosophy as an autonomous discipline
or set of disciplines, with its own defining
problematic."70
Maclntyre thus suggests that the rejection of Thomism by Scotus provided the
impetus for the Enlightenment fragmentation of reason. The Enlightenment, the
age of critical reason, did not arise as a result of the replacement of dogmatic,
traditional world-views with critical reason, but through the misinterpretation of
Aquinas's project for the teleological ordering of the sciences.
1.4. Habermas and Maclntyre: challenging opponents
It is now clear that Habermas and Maclntyre offer two opposing accounts
of the development of modernity, with two rival versions of reason and its unity.
Habermas argues that with the Enlightenment there emerges a new potential for
reason, and traditional teleological ordering of world-views is replaced. The
challenge Maclntyre, as a representative of the tradition of virtue ethics, offers to
Habermas is to develop a positive conception of reason outside the explanatory
scheme of a teleological ordering of principles of reason. Habermas argues that the
unity of reason can be established formally, and that his theory of communicative
70 Maclntyre TRY p 156.
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reason provides the means of achieving this formal unity on a procedural basis. He
provides a paradigm for this conception, one that he argues is superior to those of
ontology and consciousness: that of equal and reciprocal relationships between the
participants in a discourse. By means of this paradigm, Habermas intends to
resolve traditional metaphysical problems.
The challenge that Habermas, as a representative of discourse ethics, issues
to Maclntyre is to provide a substantive account of the unity of reason that is
compatible with the emergence of differing traditions in modern life. That is, an
account that does not represent the forced assimilation of one form of life to
another. To this end Maclntyre develops a differing account of 'communicative
reason' one that pays respect to cultural diversity, whilst attempting to maintain
the explanatory scheme developed by Aristotle, and adopted in the middle ages by
a variety of traditions. He also develops a different account of the Enlightenment:
far from representing an increase in rational potential, the Enlightenment can only
be understood in terms of the late medieval breakdown of that tradition of rational
enquiry that results in the synthesis of Aquinas. If we are to understand the
dualism and divisions of modernity it will be through tracing these debates. Rather
than representing the emergence of autonomous complexes of knowledge, the
three world relations that emerge, as Habermas identifies them, in modernity are,
according to Maclntyre, the result of certain metaphysical presuppositions that
emerge with the rejection of Thomism. Maclntyre argues that through returning
to the writings of St. Thomas, we are able to comprehend how the unity of reason
is to be established.
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On these grounds alone it is clear that there is a theological dimension to
this debate. However, Habermas and Maclntyre's competing conceptions of
rationality represent constructive attempts to respond to the contemporary
disenchantment with the conditions of modernity. As such, they present the
theologian with serious issues that relate precisely to the viability, nature and task
of theology. We shall, in the next section, pick up the specific theological matters
arising from Habermas and Maclntyre's critiques as the point of departure for
introducing our two theological protagonists, namely the critical theology of
Charles Davis and the ecclesial theology of Stanley Hauerwas.
1.5. From Critical Theory to Critical Theology
Having explored the two critiques of modernity from whence Charles
Davis and Stanley Hauerwas draw their philosophical insight, we are now in a
position to pin-point and assess some of the theological matters arising from them.
To this end, prior to introducing critical theology and ecclesial ethics, we shall
explore Habermas's and Maclntyre's considerations of religion.
1.5.1. Habermas on Religion.
Within Habermas's theory of communicative reason, based as it is on the
reciprocal relationship between participants, the functions of social integration and
expression, first fulfilled by religious ritual practice, pass over into communicative
action: in this way the authority of the sacred is progressively replaced by the
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authority of a linguistic consensus.71 In other words, integration at the social level,
resulting from adherence to a mythical meaning horizon, is replaced by integration
by mutual accord and co-operation resulting from authentic communication. As
bourgeois privatised religion flourishes, Habermas argues, then the sacred loses
whatever public authority it might have possessed. In this move from the sacred to
the sphere of communicative practice, cultural reproduction, social integration and
socialisation profoundly modify the shape of the interaction as well as being
influenced by it.72 Consequently, the role of religion in the public sphere is
profoundly undermined. Indeed, Habermas consigns religion to the private sphere.
In this section we shall explore the rationale behind this attenuation of the role of
religion in the public sphere.
In the second volume of Theory of Communicative Action Habermas
suggests that Emile Durkhiem correctly shows how the generalised other can be
religiously symbolised.73 Religion, then, was the ground for morality and the
impetus behind social integration. Habermas, however, goes beyond this stage and
shows that the sacred moral authority has been replaced by the linguistic action of
a community attempting to reach understanding and consensus. All that is left for
religion, then, is "... nothing more and nothing other than the secular principles of
71 Habermas TCA vol. 2.
72 This reciprocal relationship between the process of communication and the culture in which it
happens, as we shall see, plays an extremely important role in Davis's theological readings of
Habermas, and hence in his critical theology.
73 William J Meyer "Private Faith or Public Religion? An Assessment of Habermas's Changing
view of Religion." The Journal ofReligion 75 1995 pp371 - 391.
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a universalist ethic of responsibility."74 Habermas saw this advance as both logical
and necessary. At its heart lies the contention that:
"... modern structures of rationality have evolved or
developed to the point where they represent a genuine
logical advance over the rational structures found in
religious and metaphysical world views ... That is to
say Habermas believes there is and has been an
evolutionary development from myth to metaphysics
to modern communicative rationality."75
This process reflects a major criterion of Habermas's theory, which is that
development involves differentiation. The differentiation of reason mentioned
earlier is concomitant with a differentiation in culture. Culture has been divided
into three distinct value spheres: science, morality and law, and art. Each of these
spheres has its own logic that spawns its own expert sub-culture.
According to Habermas, differentiation was made possible by what he calls
the 'linguistification of the sacred'76 which, in turn, released an "... unfettering of
the rationality potential of action oriented to mutual understanding."77 Clearly it is
the case that rational and cultural differentiation opens up the possibility of
rational public criticism. That is to say it opens up the possibility for authentic
public discourse on truth and ethical claims. This runs contrary to the pre-modern
world-view that, he maintains, in fact inhibited public discourse. Public discourse,
74 Habermas "Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in This World" In Browning and
Fiorenza eds. .) Habermas Modernity and Public Theology. 1992. Crossroads, New York, pp 226 -
250.
75 William J Meyer op cit. It is clear from this and other writings that Habermas's criterion for
development is reflexivity. Reflexivity is defined as the ability to revise, question and criticise
fundamental questions and claims.
76 Habermas TCA vol. 2 p 77 - 111
77 Habermas TCA vol. 2 p288.
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in the modern sense, was not possible in the religious world-view precisely because
the underlying claims, for instance the notion of God, cannot be exposed to
rational criticism or argumentative doubt and therefore lacked reflexivity.
Furthermore, the programme pursued in the religious world-view was totalising in
so far as it moulded together the different validity claims and values of culture.78
The modern world, however, is one of plurality and diversity. There can be no
place, therefore, for totalising public conceptions of the good. Religious world-
views as carriers of such notions are, consequently, deemed obsolete. As the
autonomous spheres of value develop another problem arises, that is a problem of
mediation: the mediation of art to life, or of theory to practice. According to
Habermas, since Hegel, there has been a corresponding problem of relating
morality to the ethical life: this has
"less to do with an expressive attitude towards the
social world than with the fact that the insights of a
postconventional morality would remain without any
impact on real life unless morality is anchored in
concrete forms of ethical life."79
In discourse the participants can test the claims mentioned above and relate
themselves to the existential context of the concrete forms of ethical life.80
Historically, of course, there are examples of religious discourse that have
been, evidently, the media of cultural and social development.81 At the present
juncture, however, Habermas would suggest that the obsolete religious world-
78 Habermas TCA vol. 1 p203.
79 Habermas in "Questions and Counterquestions." in Richard Bernstein (ed.) Habermas and
Modernity, 1985. Polity Press,. Cambridge, p 209
80 Rudolf J. Siebert The Critical Theory ofReligion. pp8 -11.
81 Ibid. pll.
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views can no longer contribute to social or personal identity because of their
totalising conceptions of the good. Consequently, rational discourse is burdened
with "... that task to constitute brotherly-sisterly communication community,
which religion can no longer fulfil."82 Hence, the high regard and high task
attributed to rational discourse in Habermas's thought. Another feature arising
from this task is Habermas's redeployment of the promise of redemption of
religious world-views. This redeployment is to a task in which intersubjectivity
and interaction mediate and form the crux of an extremely complex social
philosophy. This complexity is absolutely essential, however, because without it
one could not account for the vast complexity of action systems that we encounter
as a direct result of "... the differentiation of the late modern system of human
condition and human action systems including culture, society, personality and
biological organism."83
In the final analysis, if Habermas's theory of secularisation and
differentiation is correct then religion, quite simply, cannot survive the
secularisation of its content in the modern age and, failing to answer or explain the
84
world adequately, can only survive in the private sphere. It should be noted,
however, that Habermas himself recognises the significance of religion at the
private existential level. By extension, because the public sphere is made up of
private individuals with differing concerns,85 religion will have a secondary effect
on the public sphere. Ultimately, though, authority is vested not in religious
claims to authority but in the linguistic dynamic that informs and structures
82 Ibid. pl2.
83 Ibid. p213.
84 Jean-Louis Schlegel "Reconcile la modernite avec elle-meme" Esprit 10 1987 p 119.
85 DavisWLWD pp 42, 83 & 99.
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communicative interaction: this is the authority wherein social energies are
focused. Consequently, the ritual practices that informed the role of religion for
wider society are useless and out of date. But since neither science nor the arts can
claim to be the heirs to religion; in this respect only discursive ethics and
86
communicative morality turn out to substitute for the authority of the sacred.
Religion, thus disinherited, no matter how well intentioned, cannot in any way
maintain a viable place in the public sphere. For instance, it would be well nigh
impossible for theology to contribute to an understanding of justice or aid in its
delivery. Neither has it any real significant contribution to make to identity or
political action. It is, therefore, correctly consigned to the private sphere.
Communicative action, on the other hand, is action directed at reaching an
understanding among people trying to come to an agreement. It occurs when two
or more persons actually seek to reach an uncoerced agreement about their
common situation in order to cooperate and co-ordinate their efforts. As we have
seen, the problem with modernity is the lopsided development of rational
discourse. We have suffered under one form of rationality, the purposive or
strategic holding sway at the expense of the communicative in the public sphere.
Communicative rationality, according to Habermas, is not a rationality among
others that may be chosen or not chosen. It is implicit in, and integral to, the
human need to communicate and cooperate. The rationalisation of communicative
action means overcoming the forces that systematically distort human
See Habermas TCA Vol. 2 p 92 and the introduction to this thesis note 13.
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communication, hinder social interaction and produce structures of
domination.87In other words, it is a drive towards liberation.
1.5.2. The Threads ofDavis's Critical Theology
The focus on liberation in Habermas's thought brings us to Charles Davis's
explorations of the Habermasian form of critical theory. These explorations are
steps on the way to his search for a new religious identity. As he says, a "... post-
conventional, universalistic religious identity, both personal and social, not tied to
the fixed contents and norms of any one tradition nor to any permanent collective
88
body, alone corresponds to the present level of human social development." In
the world of 'posts', Davis's position might, most conveniently, be described as
one of post-orthodoxy and an exegesis of his fundamental claim, embodied in
Theology and Political Society, that theology today ought to be concerned with the
relation between faith and social practice. It would be fair to say that in making
this claim Davis picks up on two central themes in Habermas's work: that is to say
the themes of emancipation or liberation and the theme of praxis. From this
understanding coupled with the intuition that theology does not operate in a
vacuum, nor is self sufficient, Davis makes his argument. That is to say, if theology
is to realise its nature and fulfil its task it must enter into a reciprocal relationship
with the culture in which it finds itself.89
87 Davis RMS pp 26 and 194.
Charles Davis RMS p 152.
89 Charles Davis "Theology for Tomorrow" Chapter 1 of TPCT. pp 23 - 31.
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To understand the nature and task of critical theology for Davis one must
appreciate that at the heart of his theology lies the issue of the distinction between
of faith and belief:
"The absoluteness of faith is the absoluteness of total
demand and total response in an experience of
unrestricted love in relation to hidden transcendence
or mystery. Faith is the drive towards transcendence
the thrust of human beings out of and beyond
themselves to the totality of existence and reach
unlimited reality and ultimate value. It is total
response to felt reality of total demand. That
absoluteness should not be confused with certitude
and beliefs."90
This suggests that faith is mystical insofar as mysticism equates to the drive
towards the transcendent. As mystical it defies any particular claim to religious
knowledge. He can suggest, therefore, that communicative action points beyond
itself, but not necessarily to anything that must be called anything. The content of
faith is, then, constantly open to revision and new experience, it is critical and, in
Habermas's terms, reflexive. Belief, however, falls into the category of orthodoxy
that presumes that knowledge is foundational for religious faith. In understanding
faith as prior to belief, Davis rejects fideism because "... Christian Faith is a
transformative principle, not a body of objective knowledge."91 For Davis it
follows that, as a transformative principle, faith leads directly to praxis. Christian
practice is response to the reality of a transcendent gift or revelation. So, despite
any Marxist notion of the primacy of practice there is also a particular religious
reason for not denying the primacy of praxis. He says,
"The message of revelation is a praxis, an ethical life, a
way of being and acting. It may be partially
90 Davis WLWD P67.
91 Ibid. p78.
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articulated in propositions. It may stimulate
theoretical reflection. But it is essentially the
establishment of a practical way of life."92
This way of being, or praxis is, therefore, to be understood as a negation of those
types of theology which themselves subordinate the transformative principle of
faith to orthodoxy. Thus the nature of theology is essentially practical.
Consequently, the task of theology now must be understood as the recreation of
society in light of a transformative faith.
For Davis, critical theology, as an articulation of the possibility of
transformation, is tied to faith and not to belief. Through this relationship he has
attempted to construct a valid practical theology to counter the "... inadequate
model of Christian community...""encountered in the church and the priesthood
which he left.94 In this light, critical theology is defined as theology which engages
in the process of emancipatory reflection on the life of praxis in reciprocal
relationship to the culture that shapes it.
1.6. From Virtue Ethics to Ecclesial Ethics
As we have seen, Maclntyre has much to say on the fusion of Augustinian
Christianity with Aristotelianism and its expression in a rehabilitated Thomism.
92 Davis RMS p 95.
93 Davis TPS p.74.
94 Davis admits that the dramatic nature of his leaving the church thirty years ago, and the radical
nature of his criticism may seem strange to today's eyes. This is because many of the more
superficial changes that he called for have been implemented over the years. However, he feels that
these concessions, such as they are, may have been for the wrong reasons and his underlying
criticism of the theology and structure continues unabated. Conversation with Prof. Davis
Cambridge February 1995.
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Indeed, Aquinas provides Maclntyre with a dramatic illustration of a tradition of
rational enquiry which is adequate for resolving the moral problems of modernity.
In so doing, he seems to endorse a theological method in philosophical reflection
in the public sphere. In this section we shall explore the theological ramifications
of this position.
1.6.1. Maclntyre and Religion
From the publication of After Virtue through to Three Rival Versions Of
Moral Enquiry, Maclntyre's influence on recent theology has been substantial.
From his work it is apparent that Maclntyre is both a realist and, for ease of
description, a communitarian.95 It is further apparent that the only reasonable
association of these two positions is a theological one.96 It is clear from Three Rival
Versions that Maclntyre is encouraging a rereading of Thomism. David Fergusson97
suggests that this is a postmodern98 reading in which the discipline of philosophy is
understood as a craft learned through the teaching, discipline and
acknowledgement of authority in its quest for goods. To learn the craft the
participant must first realise his or her place within the history of the craft, as well
as realising their contribution to the future development of the craft. Thus, by
using Aquinas's Summa as an exemplar, theology and philosophy are understood
as crafts at the behest of practical reasoning rather than an exploration of
epistemology or metaphysics. This obviously makes his work very appealing for
95 Note the caveat introduced in the introduction concerning the use of the adjective
communitarian. See note 44 above.
96 See note 2 in the introduction.
97 The following comments are indebted to an unpublished conference paper by Prof. David
Fergusson of the University of Aberdeen entitled Theological Reflections on The Philosophy of
AlasdairMaclntyre.
98 It is postmodern, says Fergusson, in the sense that Maclntyre emphasises the role of philosophy as
a craft rather than an epistemological project. Ibid p 9.
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contemporary theologians. However, as the secondary literature on Maclntyre
shows, there are a number of significant criticisms which ought to be taken into
account before any theological appropriation of his work can be dealt with." We
have already mentioned the problem of authoritarianism, but we can list others:
namely, relativism and pragmatism that both undermine Maclntyre's realism; that
he eschews any notion of human rights; from a particular theological perspective,
although apparently endorsing the theological antecedents of moral philosophy
Maclntyre appears singularly reluctant to talk about God.100 Any one of these
topics might generate a thesis in itself.
As we have seen above, Maclntyre's concerns range over three areas. That is
to say, first of all, ethical concepts and their position in a socio-historic context.
Secondly, his contention that the Enlightenment project is doomed to failure.
Thirdly, he is concerned that ethical discourse carried out under the guise of
modern liberalism ignores the connection between standards of behaviour and
socially embodied practices based on agreement about the goods that accrue form
these practices. This characterisation, it seems, vindicates much of what Christian
ethicists and theologians have been saying for some time: there is
"... even a new confidence within Christian ethics.
After decades of being patronised by Moral
philosophy, Christian ethicists have become distinctly
more apologetic and polemical. Christian ethicists
also express an increasing scepticism about the ability
of moral philosophers to be able to resolve dilemmas
99 Of particular interest as secondary sources on Maclntyre see the collection by Horton and
Mendus (eds.) AfterMaclntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work ofAlasdair Maclntyre. 1994. Polity
Press Cambridge and McMylor AlasdairMaclntyre: Critic ofModernity. 1994 Routledge London.
100 See Fergusson Theological reflections on the Philosophy of Alasdair Maclntyre for a more
comprehensive listing of these problems.
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with universally convincing rational arguments about.
In short, the key contentions in After Virtue have
triumphed."101
Nevertheless, Maclntyre's triumph is not without its doubters who, like
Habermas, attack both his realism and his communitarian position.
1.6.2. The Threads ofHauerwas's Ecclesial Ethics
On the other hand, Maclntyre does have his supporters. One such is
Stanley Hauerwas. Over the last thirty years perhaps the most polemical,
apologetic and energetic pursuit of the task of formulating a distinctive Christian
ethic which focuses on narrative in relation to character and the virtues is
embodied in the work of Hauerwas. As such he presents an energetic challenge to
Christian ethical discourse which relies on natural law to give common ground in
the attempt to contribute to the pluralistic public debate on polity and ethics. It is
Hauerwas's avowed intention to stand against liberal faith that seeks to
accommodate itself to the spirit of the age. It is his often stated, almost axiomatic
claim that the church does not have a social ethic, but rather it is a social ethic.102
From this we can say that Hauerwas conceives of the church, or community of
faith, as a counter-cultural enclave.103 To this end, Hauerwas responds to the
contemporary situation with a constructive programme of ecclesial or church
ethics presenting the church as precisely that community which offers the
101 Robin Gill "Moral Communities and Christian Ethics." In Studies in Christian Ethics vol. 18, no
1. 1995 pp 1 - 13. Gill has made this point somewhat strongly for the purposes of the rest of his
argument in this article. However it sums up quite neatly the overall response to After Virtue.
102 Hauerwas RA p 43, COC p 40, PK p 99, AN p 74, CET p 101.
103 This is generally the thrust of Resident Aliens: Life in The Christian Colony. 1989 Abingdon
Nashville (co-authored with William Willimon). In this book Hauerwas argues that the church has
a mission of its own. Its task is to be the church or a community of faith with a vision and story
which is radically different and which, in turn, tends to a different way of life.
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necessary context for coherent ethical discourse. Thus, he envisages the church as a
community of faith that attempts to integrate Christology and social ethics,
breaking down the dichotomy of agent and act and imbuing social ethics with
104
virtues of self-discovery. Hauerwas further asserts that Christian Ethics is a direct
challenge to the theories of autonomy upon which liberal theories like those of
Davis and Habermas are based.
Against a social background of fragmentation and moral disorder,
Hauerwas proposes that the "... intelligibility and truthfulness of Christian
convictions reside in their practical force."105 Thus theology is a practical activity
whereby we attempt to understand and explicate the way in which Christian
convictions construe reality.106 Christian ethics, then, offers the means of reaching
a true understanding of ourselves, and our existence.107 The practical import of
Hauerwas's theology is always orientated towards the church insofar as
understanding ourselves and our existence leads to helping the church do what it
does better.108 As such, theology is rooted in the practices that constitutes the
church.109 For Hauerwas there is little distinction between ethics and theology, in
fact the task of Christian ethics is "... the task of theology itself - namely to help
the churches share their story truthfully."110 In this sentence we see displayed the
essence of Hauerwas's programme. That is to say, he insists on the exclusivity and
separateness of the church from the world and the necessity of acknowledging that
104
See Stanley Hauerwas ACC pp91.
105 Hauerwas COC p 1.
106 Hauerwas TT p 9.
107 Hauerwas COC p 90.
108 Hauerwas CET p 123, RA p 97.
109 Hauerwas Why Resident Aliens Struck a Chord p 420ff.
110 Hauerwas CET p 125.
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all that is good comes to us not as a right but as a gift mediated through the
narrative community of faith that is the church.111 This truthful church, he claims,
is faithful to the scriptures and shapes truthful disciples. In so doing the church
imparts its message to the social order. This is a direct counter to liberal Christians
who, for too long "... have presented their faith ... as a survival tactic for the
modern world: the church primarily has been seen as something of extrinsic
functional value to the culture - helping Caesar keep society in good working
order."112 The nature of theology for Hauerwas, then, is practical while its task is
to help the church to be the church.
Following on from this, one point that is worth making is that although it
has been suggested that Hauerwas is a narrative theologian we should be wary of
categorising him as such.113 While acknowledging the significance of narrative
Hauerwas says that it is a mistake to assume that this is the central focus of his
position. For Hauerwas, "[njarrative is but a concept that helps clarify the
interrelation between the various themes I have sought to develop in the attempt
to give a constructive account of the moral life."114 In fact, he tried to avoid the use
of the term precisely because of the manner in which it could be misconstrued.
Nevertheless, it was necessary for him to employ the term in order to explicate
coherently his idea of character. As such, narrative is a tool that serves to explicate
Hauerwas PK.
112 Hauerwas and Willimon The Christian Century January 30th 1985 101 no. pp 98ff.
113 Paul Nelson, for instance, suggests that Hauerwas is the most significant exponent of narrative
among contemporary Christian ethicists." Narrative and Morality: A Theological Inquiry. 1987
Pennsylvania State University Press. University Park, London, p 109.
114 Hauerwas PK p xxv.
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the politics of discipleship which are always pre-eminent in Hauerwas's thought.115
Consequently, the church is always in the foreground and the language of
narrative in the background.116 Hence, we do Hauerwas most justice if we
understand him as an ecclesial ethicist who makes use of narrative rather than as a
narrative theologian.117
1.7. Concluding Summary
In this chapter I have charted a course from a description of modernity as
the age of critical reason, through Habermas and Maclntyre's respective, critical
responses to modernity. Finally we introduced the threads of Davis's critical
theology and Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics. By exploring their philosophical
antecedents, a foundation has been laid for the detailed, critical exposition of Davis
and Hauerwas that is to follow.
115 Fergusson. "Another Way of Reading Stanley Hauerwas?" Scottish Journal of Theology vol. 50
no2 1997 pp 242 - 249. Fergusson suggests that while Hauerwas's "... stress upon the
distinctiveness of the Christian community and its narrative ... We should not underestimate the
extent to which Hauerwas is calling for a distinctive church." In this light it is the politics of the
church that concerns Hauerwas more than narrative.
116 See, for example, Hauerwas US p 18 n 5, or CET 54 - 62. A common misapprehension of
Hauerwas's work suggests that he is a narrative theologian (see Thiemann Revelation and Theology:
The Gospel as Narrated Promise 1985 University of Notre Dame Press. Indiana and Paul Nelson
Narrative and Morality). This misapprehension comes from a dichotomy between the narrative
form of scripture and the narrative form of experience and the attendant question as to which
should have priority. As will become clear from our exposition in Chapters 4 and 5, Hauerwas
maintains no such distinction. The relationship between the practice of rendering the character of
God and witnessing to the kingdom, the community that embodies such activity and the scriptures
are only coherent, and therefore intelligible in the ecclesial context. Such an understanding resolves
the dichotomy. I would prefer, therefore, to understand Hauerwas as an ecclesial
ethicist/theologian who employs narrative.
117 Hauerwas also describes himself latterly as methodologically a journalist in DFTF p 9 where he
says "What I do is not quite theology not quite ethics, not quite cultural criticism. Yet in the spaces
created by the 'not quite' I hope to entice the reader to enter a world that will change his or her
life." Although relating to this collection of essays in particular, this provides an interesting
description of what Hauerwas actually is an exponent of.
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In the course of this investigation I have noted that Habermas and
Maclntyre shared similar concerns in their responses to modernity. Both
acknowledge that the advent of the Enlightenment was not simply a matter of
disenchantment with pre-modern world-views. Rather, it arose either from an
imbalanced development of rationality, where instrumental reason held sway over
communicative reason, or a misinterpretation of Aquinas's efforts to combine
Christian theology with Aristotelian philosophy. Both trace a narrative of
modernity that pick up the insights of Hegel, Nietzsche and Weber. It is the
spectre of negativity and naive realism unleashed by this narrative of subjectivity,
autonomy and causality that both Habermas and Maclntyre try to counter. In
their respective responses Habermas and Maclntyre represented two sides of a
debate that might be characterised as a choice between reason and tradition. As
such we saw that they raised questions about the place of religion, theology and
the church.
We can now see that Davis and Hauerwas present in the same fashion.
Davis, picking up on Habermas's insights, generates what he calls critical theology
that engages in the process of emancipatory reflection on the life of praxis. This
theology allies the transformative element in Christian faith to the transformative
element in communicative action. The nature of critical theology, then, is practical
and its task is to recreate society in light of the transformative principle of faith.
Similarly Hauerwas, picking up on Maclntyre's insights regarding tradition-
dependent ethical discourse, generates an ecclesial theology to stand against liberal
polity and liberal Christian faith. As such, the church is not to have a social ethic
78
Chapter 1. Two Critiques ofModernity
but to be a social ethic. The church, then, imparts its message to the social order
through its witness to the peaceable kingdom. For Hauerwas, too, the nature of
theology is practical while its task is to generate a different way of life that is a
witness to a different story. This agenda, therefore, places Hauerwas on the
opposite pole from Davis. We shall see in the following chapters, however, that
very similar themes and concerns provide an impetus for, and arise from, their
theologies. In the next two chapters we shall engage in a detailed exposition of
Davis's critical theology, unpacking some of the ideas raised in an introductory
fashion here. In chapters 4 and 5 we shall engage in a similarly detailed exposition
of Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics.
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In the previous chapter we examined the response of Jiirgen Habermas and
Alasdair Maclntyre to modernity which was characterised as the age of critical
reason. Having traced these responses, we found that the choice they presented
between procedural communicative rationality and substantive tradition-based
rationality in moral discourse raised several theological issues along the way. This
in turn allowed us to introduce Charles Davis's critical theology and Stanley
Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics. In this chapter we embark on a closer examination of
Davis's critical theology by focusing on his post-orthodoxy. This refers to his
notion that religious identity, properly understood, is not to be tied to the norms
or contents of any one religious tradition.1
To this end this chapter will follow several stages. First of all we shall begin
by outlining the particular way in which Davis has read Habermas. I shaped the
foregoing exposition of Habermas's work bearing in mind issues that are pertinent
to Davis's theological and ecclesiological concerns. What I intend to do here,
1 We will be using the term post-orthodox for two reasons, while admitting its provisional nature
as a description. First of all it is a description that has gained some currency since Marc P Lalonde
published a short paper entitled "From postmodernity to post-orthodoxy, or Charles Davis and
the contemporary context of Christian theology." Studies in Religion 22/4 (1993): pp 437 - 449.
Secondly, it situates his work in the present theological context, to the extent that it reflects his
creative disaffiliation from the juridical-hierarchical ecclesia. Nevertheless we acknowledge that
such an epithet can never do justice to the extent and vitality of Davis's vision. It is the purpose of
the next two chapters to explore that vision.
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however, is to show and explore in more depth the particular themes that Davis
picked up and developed from Habermas and, more importantly, to show where
his theological agenda causes him to have differences with Habermas.
Secondly, in this chapter I shall develop the theme of Davis's post-
orthodoxy. This development will focus on his understanding of theory, practice
and rationality in theological discourse and finally pick up the matter of the role of
tradition in generating discursive norms and identity. This investigation of Davis's
post-orthodoxy will provide a platform from which we can move on, in the next
chapter, to examine the implications of his post-orthodoxy for Christian ethics,
revisiting the question of identity this time in the light of political action and the
religious understanding of the interior self. Finally, we shall develop these themes
further with reference to their implications for the church and the type of
community of faith that results.
2.1. Charles Davis's Reading of Jiirgen Habermas
Davis's explorations of the Habermasian form of critical theory, as we have
already noted, are steps on the way in his search for a contemporary religious
identity. Davis claims that a "...post-conventional, universalistic religious identity,
both personal and social, not tied to the fixed contents and norms of any one
tradition nor to any permanent collective body, alone corresponds to the present
2
level of human social development." His key assertion is that the idea of practice
in critical theory, as he understands it, is incompatible with any from of religious
Davis RMS p 152.
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orthodoxy. This assertion is derived from Davis's life-long concern with making
theology practical. That is to say, he is concerned with the relation between:
"... religion and society. ... [and] examining the thesis
that society is the product of human agency. That
thesis is characteristic of the modern period. Hence it
immediately raises the question of the meaning of
modernity and the function of religion within the
modern context. ...
Religion is a form of social practice. It is therefore
affected by the manner in which society is conceived
and organized."3
With this in mind, Davis shares an insight with political and liberation theologians
that the interpretative nature of Christianity, as well as its interpretation, is
mediated through actual social and political reality.4 Where he differs from
political and liberation theologians is in his insistence that this mediation has to
become a critical, dialectical mediation, constantly deconstructing and
reconstructing the implications of its own practice in light of the manner in which
society is conceived and organised. This has the effect of transforming the
theoretical self-understanding of the Christian tradition. Thus orthodoxy which,
according to Davis, predetermines the limits of praxis in ever-new situations, is
incompatible with authentic Christian practice. This insight brings us into the
critical public discourse on ethics at a level that gives primacy to praxis.
Giving such primacy to praxis reflects two things. First of all, it reflects
Davis's, basically liberal agenda.5 Secondly, however, it reflects Davis's two-fold
insight that human culture, in its many forms, is the product of human activity
3 Davis RMS pp 1 - 2.
4 Davis WLWD p 2.
5 The word liberal here simply differentiates Davis from the communitarians. Later in the chapter
we shall refine this distinction in terms of Davis's own concerns about the inadequacy of so called
liberal theology.
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and that religion too is a form of social practice.6 Davis, therefore, understands
contemporary society to be defined as modern insofar as it is a "...society or
people that has not committed itself as a collectivity to a single set of ultimate
beliefs and values. It is pluralist in the sense that it embraces people who differ in
regard to their adherence to ultimate beliefs and values."7 He contrasts this with
pre-modern society, which he suggests presented an undifferentiated whole
wherein the religious institution, or church was squarely equated with society.
There are two qualifying points to note here. First, although Davis wants to
understand society as an artefact and subject to formal procedural forms of reason,
he does not want to, nor can he, play down the role of virtue or substantive reason
in the development from pre-modern to modern.8 The second point to note is that
secularisation means that, after the dawn of the Enlightenment, theology is carried
on extrinsically to the social order. The realisation that this precipitates is that
theology has always been a form social practice, once central but now peripheral
to a broader social understanding of human social action. This means that
contemporary theology can, in no way, be seen as a structural principle of society,
neither should it attempt to be. It is Davis's argument that, if theology is to realise
its nature and fulfil its task, it must enter into a reciprocal relationship with the
culture in which it finds itself.9 It is from this position that Davis turns to
Habermas for a more full account of the causes and consequences of modernity.
6 Davis RMS p 2.
7 Ibid p 2.
8 Davis notes an historical paradox whereby the duality of church and state, the first useful index
of secularisation, was the result of the papal victory in the investiture controversy of the eleventh
and the first part of the twelfth century. The investiture controversy saw the church object to the
temporal power of the lay feudal lords. The cotroversy was settled in principle at the Diet of
Worms in 1122, but it neverttheless precipitated the ongoing struggle between the papacy and the
Holy Roman Empire. Significantly, for Davis, it marked the disjunction between temporal and
spiritual authority and, therefore, the first crack in the edifice of totalising Christendom and the
substantive rationlaity that supported it.
9 Charles Davis "Theology for Tomorrow" Chapter 1 of TPCT pp. 23-31.
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2.1.1. Davis's debt to the Habermasian Account ofCritical Social Theory
As we have observed in the previous chapter, Jiirgen Habermas
demonstrates a profound interest in the formation of public will, the relation
between state and society and a belief in practical reasoning. He stresses the role of
intersubjective understanding and the significance of universal norms and values
within the methodology of the social sciences and humanities. Moreover, he shows
that norms and values are subject to procedures of rational inquiry and consensus.
That consensus is subject to compromise by distorted communication that arises
because of the one-sided development of instrumental reason and strategic action.
The procedures of rational enquiry can be realigned to include communicative
rationality and non-distorted communicative action. His extensive interests cover
many areas: sociology, social theory, linguistics, philosophy, ethics and public
policy. His impact on theology generally, though extensive, is more difficult to
estimate. In the case of Davis, however, the debts are clear and present. To
construe theology as critical theology, Davis must attempt to relate theology to the
modern tradition of critique. In this task Davis looks to Habermas to understand
the development of modernity, the structure of discourse and the general norms of
discourse, which arise from this understanding.
A key point of attraction to Habermas's thought for Davis is that
Habermas sees the task of philosophy as be transformative. Since faith also
operates, for Davis, as a transformative principle, then theology and philosophy, as
means of understanding the ethical ramifications of the world in which we live,
cannot be mutually exclusive categories of inquiry. Indeed, as Davis sees them,
both share an overwhelming concern for justice to the extent that the world is
neither as it could be nor should be. To realise justice, then, requires a change of a
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revolutionary nature.10 This revolution is brought about, in Habermas's thought,
through his inheritance of the tradition of critical theory.
The term 'critical theory', as we have observed, refers to the theory of
subject, society, history and religion, promoted by the likes of Max Horkheimer,
Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin in the Frankfurt School of Social
Research.11 Habermas's analysis of modernity from this perspective, which we have
introduced above, is highly critical yet sympathetic. The problems of modernity,
as he sees them, will be answered most effectively by taking seriously the
implications of some strains of the Enlightenment project. Habermas recognised
that distorted communication, brought about by domination, is the essential
problem of modernity. It follows, then, that only undistorted communication can
remedy the problem.12 Distorted communication arises from a corruption of
rationality, a one sided development of rationality, instrumental at the expense of
communicative. This unleashes an invasion, or colonisation of the lifeworld, by
the system: that is to say colonisation by bureaucratised, instrumental rationality.
The result of this process is a destructive domination of the lifeworld by the
system. The only solution, for Habermas, is further rationalisation but this time in
defence of the lifeworld. This can only come about in the redeeming of practical
reason.13 The need for a rational defence of the lifeworld arises from the
10 See Thomas McCarthy in the Introduction to Jtirgen Habermas CES "... it was a characteristic
tenet of the early Frankfurt School that basic psychological concepts had to be integrated with
basic socio-economic concepts because the perspectives of an autonomous ego and an emancipated
society were essentially interdependent." (p ix) This quote indicates Habermas's appropriation of
the main concerns of the Frankfurt School.
11 See Munch Sociological Theory vols. 2 and 3. In particular vol. 2 subtitled Development Since the
1960s explores the impact of critical theory on sociology. See also Benhabib and Dallmayr (eds.)
The Communicative Ethics Controversy, p 296.
12 McCarthy Intro to CES.
13 Habermas TCA vols. 1&2 and PDM deal with working out of this claim. See in particular PDM
pp 336 - 365.
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recognition that, no matter how lopsided, the process of rationalisation,
understood as a basic dynamic of history, is irreversible, so "... [I]n the
development from myth, through religion to philosophy and ideology, the
demand for discursive redemption of normative validity claims increasingly
prevails."14 Davis became intrigued by the appropriation of ostensibly theological
terms such as redemption and transformation and Habermas's concern with
justice. While agreeing with the substance of Habermas's criticisms of modernity
and suspicious of privatised, bourgeois Christianity, Davis felt that Habermas's
denial of the public validity of theology posed a direct challenge to his own
perceived theological vocation of "... giving voice to the word of God in the
language and context of modernity."15 The response to this challenge is a theology
that is "...engaged in the process of emancipatory reflection, sharing in that way
the project of the Enlightenment."16
For Davis, as we have noted, theology is tied to faith and not to belief.
From the dynamics of this relationship, gleaned through the insights of critical
theology, he attempts to construct a valid, practical ecclesiology to counter the
"inadequate model of Christian community..."^encountered in the church and the
14 Habermas LC p 11.
15 Davis "Theology for Tomorrow." TPCT p 24. The story of Davis's first encounter with
Habermas's work, relayed to me in a personal conversation, betrays a certain serendipity. He was
in Holland visiting the Dominican theologian Edward Schillebeecx. Schillebeecx had a habit of
sleeping during the day and working through the night. This meant that Davis was left to his own
devices for most of the day and spent much of his time in the Dominican library. By chance he
happened to pick up a Habermas's Legitimation Crisis. Since then he has been engaged in a self-
critical examination of his own thinking as a Christian. Personal conversation, with Prof. Davis
Edinburgh January 1996. TPCT p 24.
16 TPCT p 24. Other attempts have been made to appropriate Habermas's work into a theological
programme. Most notably, perhaps, is Helmut Peukert's Science, Action and Fundamental Theology:
Toward a Theology ofCommunicative Action. 1986 MIT Press Cambridge MA. See also, Rudolph J.
Siebert The critical theory ofReligion, The Frankfurt School: From Universal Pragmatic to Political
Theology. 1985. Mouton. Berlin & New York.
17 Davis TPS p 74.
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preisthood that he left.18 In this light, critical theology is defined, while
acknowledging its debt to the Habermasian form of critical theory, as theology
that engages in the process of emanciptory reflection. Critical theology directs
.
emancipatory reflection at the life of Christian praxis that exists in a reciprocal
relationship to the culture that shapes it.
2.1.2. Davis's Differences with Habermas
While acknowledging the debt critical theology owes to critical theory, we
must also note the points of difference. The first and most obvious difference is
that, while broadly agreeing with Habermas's critical philosophical assessment of
modernity, Davis continues to do theology. This agenda is dependent upon, and
shares a vision with, Habermas's notions of communicative action and rationality.
As such it gives primacy to praxis over theory because it is through the shared
conversation, as action, that we reach understanding since communicative action
serves the ends of justice and emancipation. However, Davis wishes to place
critical theology firmly in the public sphere. In other words Davis is calling for the
critical theologian to take a position that is a practical way of life. Such a way of
life will radicalise both the form and content of theology. Its radical nature will be
radical only in as much as this way of life is both self-critical and self-aware in
relation to the tradition whence he or she has come. Hence the
"...cognitive contribution of Christianity to social,
cultural, and political life is to be found in providing
the transcendent foundation needed for sustained
communication among human beings, despite their
differences and conflicts. The transcendent horizon
within which Christian Faith places human life, the
unrestricted openness to reality it calls for and,
though yet imperfectly, creates, the self transcendence
18 Davis prefers to use the phrase creative disaffiliation rather than leaving. Creative disaffiliation
describes more positively the move he made away from the juridical hierarchical church towards a
mystical pragmatic model of Christianity. We shall discuss this in more detail in Chapter 6, in the
meantime see Davis QC pp 236 - 239.
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of Christian love, the dignity of each individual
resulting from the relation of each person to God, the
universal community Christian faith intends and
discerns as transcending all social distinctions and
indeed the boundary of death itself so that it includes
past victims as well as present liberators: all this
provides a basis and context within which human
beings can meet together in authentic conversation ...
to tackle the problems of human existence through a
common understanding and commgn action,
unhindered by fixed immovable barriers."
This lengthy quote serves to illustrate precisely what Davis anticipates as the
concrete result of critical theology, while pointing out the principal reason for his
differences with Habermas, that is the transcendent horizon that Christianity
recognises and Habermas does not. Possibly the most significant difference
between Davis and Habermas, then, is Davis's return to the supernatural in an
attempt to provide a basic context for the successful operation of communicative
reason and discourse ethics.20
In the last chapter of Religion and theMaking ofSociety, Davis "...returns to
the question of the necessity of the supernatural..."21 to deal with what is perceived
to be a lack in Habermas's overall schema. This lack pertains to "...the aporia
created for communicative rationality by the destruction of communication by
"Davis WLWD p 122.
20 Davis maintains that, in theology since the High Middle Ages, the word supernatural refers not
to beings but to grace that elevates human beings to participate in the divine life: "God offers
human beings a destiny that lies beyond the potentiality of human nature as such. It is a free gift
from God. It opens for human beings a destiny that lies beyond anything that could be regarded as
demanded as proportionate to the exigencies, not only of human beings but of any finite
creatures."(Davis RMS p 9) In this passage two things become plain, the first is exactly what Davis
means by the 'necessity of the supernatural'. We have already mentioned this in Chapter 3, and we
shall come back to it in the next section when we examine a practical application of critical
theology and ecclesial ethics, but it is worth reiterating that Davis is not referring to a being when
he invokes the supernatural Davis (WLWD pp 85 - 94).
21 Davis RMS p 18 & 188ff.
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death."22 To compensate for this aporetic moment Davis responds with an
investigation of hope. He says:
"...is reason, even communicative reason, enough for
hope? Reason must find its motivation in an attitude
of hope. But does not hope to justify itself require
anchoring in reason?"23
The relationship between hope and reason is explored within the context of
Habermas's theory of communicative action. Davis conceives of hope as "... a
multi-dimensional attitude, consisting (1) in an enduring disposition of the will to
confront the future with confidence despite the negativities of human existence,
having (2) an emotional and bodily counterpart and (3) demanding two
affirmations at its cognitive core, namely, the affirmation of the objective
possibility and the affirmation of the future actuality of a fulfilled human life."24
He has to ask, however, if hope thus understood is rational.
To answer that question, Davis embraces the insights of Habermas's
widening of the concept of reason away from an instrumental to a communicative
understanding. Communicative reason, underpinning action orientated towards
understanding, describes for Davis the boundaries of hope as generally understood.
For the theologian, however, it offers an opportunity to re-examine "... the
rational underpinning of the distinctively religious attitudes... " of faith, hope and
charity.25 This suggests to Davis that the traditional theological endeavour of
relating faith, hope and charity to reason and its demands is not yet to be forsaken.
22 Ibid. Davis is not the only person to note this aporetic moment in Habermas's project. See, for
example Helmut Peukert "Enlightenment and Theology as Unfinished Projects" in Browning and
Fiorenza op cit., and Rudolf Siebert The Critical Theory of Religion, The Frankfurt School: From
Universal Pragmatic to Political Theology. 1985. Mouton. Berlin & New York. We shall return to
discuss this matter in more depth in Chapter 7.
23 Davis RMS p 190.
24 Ibid p 192.
25 Ibid p 198.
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At this point Davis identifies the significance of distinctively religious attitudes to
hope. Religious hope, he claims, is total hope which is "... not content to affirm
the possibility and future actuality of a destiny proportionate to human beings... "
as finite, fallible, temporal creatures.26 Rather it recognises in the depth of human
existence a relationship to "... a transcendent source or power."27 It is this
relationship that informs the interior self, that is itself the basis of authentic
Christian political action. We shall return to a discussion of the interior self later
in this chapter. The relationship that religious hope uncovers also makes sense of
the distinction that Davis draws between faith and belief..
Davis's theology draws our attention to faith and its relationship to belief.
To reiterate our earlier comments, this is no light distinction since "... [t]he
absoluteness of faith is the absoluteness of total demand and total response in an
experience of unrestricted love in relation to hidden transcendence or mystery ...
that absoluteness should not be confused with certitude and beliefs."28 As we
pointed out earlier this suggests that faith rests on a mystical moment. Hence to
this extent faith can be equated with the human response to hidden transcendence
that is intimated by the aporetic moment in communicative action. Davis, in
referring to the aporetic moment can suggest, therefore, that to succeed
communicative action points beyond itself, but not necessarily to anything that
must be called anything. The content of faith, because it rests on a mystical
moment, is constantly open to revision in the light of new experience. In this sense
it is critical and, in Habermas's terms, reflexive. Belief, which is not the same as
faith, falls into the category of orthodoxy. Orthodoxy presumes that 'knowledge'
26 Ibid pp 198 - 202.
27 Ibid p 202.
28 Davis WLWD p 67.
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is foundational for religious faith. Thus, to reiterate, insofar as Davis understands
faith to have priority over belief he rejects fideism and is able to claim that
Christian Faith is a transformative principle, not a body of objective knowledge.29
Thus construed, Christian faith leads directly to Christian practice, a practical way
of life.30 Christian practice is response to the reality of a transcendent gift or
revelation. So, despite any Marxist notion of the primacy of practice that Davis
might harbour, there is also a particular religious reason for affirming the primacy
of praxis.
Given the primacy of praxis, the task of theology now must be understood
as recreation of society in light of a transformative faith through the principles of
communicative action rather than the strategic deployment of orthodoxy. The
cognitive contribution of Christianity to the social political and cultural life that
this entails "... is to provide the transcendent foundation needed for sustained
communication among human beings, despite their differences and conflicts."31
Hence it can be observed that Davis, in aligning himself with Habermas's
constructive programme has provided the starting point for a development of a
reconstructed and reconstructive theology which is orientated towards facilitating
a reconstruction of society within a theological horizon that compensates for the
aporetic moment in communicative action. In effect, critical theology might
provide the "... basis and context within which human beings can meet together in
authentic conversation."32 More precisely, since critical theology, like any theology
29 Ibid, p 78.
30 Davis RMS p 95.
31DavisWLWDp 122.
32 Ibid "What I am calling a process of communication corresponds to the 'authentic conversation'
of David Tracy. ... It is likewise the 'conversation' that Richard Rorty designates as the 'ultimate
context within which knowledge is to be understood,' in contrast to an epistemology-centred
philosophy. In relation to the plurality of religion it is what Wilfred Cantwell Smith calls 'colloquy'
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both reflects and shapes the community from which it comes, I would contend
that in making such a provision critical theology makes demands on the church. In
the remainder of this chapter, therefore, we shall go on to examine in more depth
the substance of Davis's critical theology and its claims in an attempt to prepare
the ground for an investigation of the impact of such claims on Christian ethics
and then on the church.
2.2. Charles Davis's Post-orthodoxy
As I noted previously, Davis's critical theology might best be described as
post-orthodox. By this I mean that, given his eschewal of orthodoxy in favour of
faith as a transformative principle, we are led into a theology that resists the limits
of any one denomination or even religious tradition. This position reflects Davis's
concern with motivating and sustaining effective social and political action, both
within and outwith the church. At the heart of this concern lies the relationship
between faith and social practice. In this section we shall explore in more depth the
exact dimensions of Davis's post-orthodoxy by highlighting three dominant
themes. That is to say we shall, first of all, explore Davis's understanding of the
relationship of theory to praxis. Secondly, we shall determine Davis's
understanding of the role and limits of rationality in theological discourse.
Thirdly, we shall relate this to the role of tradition in generating discursive norms
and identity. While none of these themes are independent of each other, and are in
fact interdependent, I shall distinguish between them for the purpose of analysis.
This analysis will allow us to appreciate more fully the relationship between each
of them and ultimately the relationship between faith and social practice.
'colloquy' in order to suggest a side-by-side confronting of humanity's problems rather than a face-
to-face confronting of one another."
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2.2.1. Theory and Praxis
A primary theme in Davis's work is the relation of faith to praxis, or
practice.33 This raises immediately the question of theory and practice and their
proper relationship. As we have noted, it is not enough for him to restrict this
notion of praxis to what might, in other circumstances, be called religious praxis.
His concern is with a broader conception of social practice in general. He says
quite explicitly that:
"By praxis ... I mean the embodied activities of
socially related men and women, whereby they
struggle with nature as a reality independent of
consciousness, and with the sedimented objectified
products of past human action in order to shape this
world and themselves."34
Davis is calling here for a sharp distinction between, and certainly a subordination
of, what he calls "metaphysico-theological syntheses"35 in favour of a praxis-based
scheme. This assertion is analogous to Habermas's move to a post-metaphysical
philosophical position. By creating a distinction between these syntheses and
praxis-based theology I take Davis to mean a subordination of theologies bound to
orthodoxy and a consequent distinction between the mystical-pragmatic and the
mythical visionary-models of Christianity.36 In mythical-visionary theology myth
33 Davis TPS pp 80 - 97.
34 Davis WLWD p 69.
35 Davis WLWD p 68.
36 These distinctions will be explored in more depth at the end of Chapter 3. For the moment we
should note that this statement represents Davis's disenchantment with what he calls the dominant
































Chapter 2. Charles Davis's Post-orthodox Critical Theology
functions as the ultimate impetus behind social structure and functions, hence the
totalising, undifferentiated shape of pre-modern society. In such a society it is very
difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of that society as a human construct, rather
than something given by grace prior to human activity.37 Inevitably, to sustain
such undifferentiated wholeness, myth had to be translated into propositional
beliefs and thence imposed as dogmas. This, Davis contends, generates a structure
that the myth itself cannot sustain. In the end this destroys the mystical moment
intrinsic to faith.38 An example, for Davis, of a well-intentioned but ultimately
unsuccessful attempt to overcome some of the problems faced by theology and to
provide a feasible theological response is to be found in the work of the theologian
Bernard Lonergan. Lonergan, says Davis, "..attempts to transcribe the Christian
myth into a metaphysical conceptuality."39 As such Lonergan engages in what
Davis disparagingly refers to as ontotheology. He considers that Lonergan's
ontotheological efforts exaggerate the function of detached, discursive rationality
and remains an incurable dogmatist. That is to say he seeks and claims:
"... unrevisable certainties... Among the values faith
discerns, he [Lonergan] argues, is the value of
believing. Hence by faith one enters into the religious
Ideological Conservatism: Liberalism: Radicalism: Anarchism:
implication Prior order as A plurality of New order to be No order outside
normative pragmatic orders created the individual.
We should also mention the four strands of political action associated with each type. That is to
say Sacrament, ritual and moral action in this world, passive expectation/revolutionary action and
withdrawal from action into passive contemplation. Clearly, Davis embraces a mystical-pragmatic
model and is disenchanted with the mythical-visionary model of the church, which he sees as
historically dominant. Nevertheless he sees it as his task to engender an ethos wherein the two
types can engage in productive discourse rather than liberal-conservative deadlock. WLWD
particularly Chapter 11 pp 107 - 123.
37 Davis RMS p 2.
38 Davis WLWD p 68.
39 See Davis TPS pp 169 - 170; WLWD pp 60 - 70, 76, 113; RMS pp 153, 154, 169. Ultimately,
Lonergan gives priority to cognitional theory over metaphysics and attempts to find "... in
consciousness the data for an invariant basis of human knowledge and for an unrevisable
cognitional theory..." nevertheless, according to Davis he has not provided a secure basis for the
restoration of traditional metaphysics and, hence, Catholic ontotheology.
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community as a community of belief, which is a
higher collaboration of men and women in
disseminating the judgements of fact and the
judgements of value proposed for their acceptance by
the word of religion... [this] brings him back to the
familiar Catholic dogmas."40
The results of this theological failure are, to say the least, problematic for
praxis. Davis notes that the result is that praxis becomes "...the sublation of the
cognitional process by deliberation, evaluation, decision and action, and it effects a
discernment between the products, including cognitional products, of human
authenticity and the products of human inauthenticity."41 This does not do justice
to the social and political breadth and complexity of praxis as defined by Davis
above and as understood by critical theory. Notably, Davis contends that such a
theological understanding of praxis depends on, and offers, a philosophy of
consciousness "...in which the inner events or states of consciousness are always
the independent variable, of which everything else in human living and history is a
function."42 This unease mirrors Habermas's unease with philosophies of
consciousness and his consequent move beyond metaphysics.43
Another honourable, but ultimately unsuccessful endeavour to deal with
the problematic relationship of theory and praxis comes, for Davis, in the shape of
so-called 'political theology'. In contrast to the Roman Catholic doctrinal
traditions, and by implication all other doctrinal traditions, political theology
marks an attempt to reverse the privilege of theory over praxis and undermine its
claims to permanence and universality. Hence it is not ontotheological in its
40 Davis WLWD p 70.
41 Davis WLWD p 70.
42 Davis WLWD p 70.
43 See Chapter 1 of this thesis.
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orientation. Insofar as political theology at least attempts to maintain the primacy
of praxis over theory it suggests an affirmation that religious faith, even Christian
religious faith, is always mediated through a cultural element. Davis notes,
however, that this significant claim is not matched by a rigour of execution.44 In
the final analysis the political and liberation theologians, in the same manner as
Lonergan, end up merely reiterating traditional, albeit neglected, dogma that is
immune to the radical self-criticism necessary for authentic praxis. Hence, for
Davis, even an honourable attempt, such as that of the political or liberation
theologians, cannot return the relationship of theory and practice, distorted in
theological orthodoxy, to equilibrium. We are forced, therefore, to consider
seriously his claim that a proper understanding of praxis should turn us away from
theological orthodoxy towards faith while a proper understanding of faith
precipitates a practical way of life.
It should be noted, however, that it has been suggested of Davis, that he too
is promoting little more than a traditional Catholic ontotheology. For example,
John Milbank "... Davis upholds a similarly modernist element of onto-theology:
the ascent to God must be mediated by a transition from particular to universal
discourse. ... [mjodern onto-theological metaphysics (founded in autonomous
immanent reason and still deployed by Davis)."45 However, to make this
suggestion is clearly to have misunderstood what Davis is about. Ontotheology
"...is the attempt to translate the content of the Christian myth into the
theoretical concepts and statements of metaphysical philosophy."46 As such there
44 Davis TPS pp 1-26. Davis notes in WLWD Chapter 4 pp 35 - 45 that, while liberation theology
is an example of what he calls the Pragmatic model of the Christian religion, it also displays the
qualities of the visionary and thus ends up distorted.
45 John Milbank commenting on Davis's RMS Theology vol. 98 1995, pp 320 - 322.
46 Davis WLWD pp 60 - 61.
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are three problems with ontotheology from Davis's point of view. The first
problem is its intellectualism. As is apparent from his criticism of Lonergan, Davis
considers that ontotheology makes knowledge foundational, this is equivalent to
giving privilege to theory over practice.47 Secondly, it assumes the possibility of
abstracting literal meaning from religious symbols. However, as Davis points out,
the possession of meaning by religious symbols does not imply that their meaning
is readily translatable into the concepts of metaphysical discourse.48 The third
problem is that ontotheology actually obscures and finally kills the Christian myth
in favour of "... pseudocertitude and precision. ... Once myth has been strangled
by excessive speculation, there is no ready means of reviving it."49
Davis is well aware of these problems and is, therefore, unlikely to commit
himself to such an approach. Indeed, he says that "...[a] worldview, bringing to
bear all the resources of reason upon the data of faith to form a comprehensive
synthetic account of reality, the world and the human situation is at best a possible
cultural consequence of Christian faith, ... It should never however be identified
with the Christian faith."50 It is Davis's suggestion that this identification is exactly
what happened to the mythical model of the Christian religion. In the end Davis's
post-orthodoxy, focusing as it does on faith rather than dogma, means that he must
embrace the potent images and stories of myth rather than watered down
metaphysical theology.51 Moreover, Davis accepts that the reign of metaphysics has




50 Davis WL.WD p 71.
51 Davis WLWD p 61. "If one looks at the catechisms, the books of instruction, and sermons from
before the recent biblical and liturgical revivals, one will see that what they give is watered-down
metaphysical theology, not the potent images and stories of a myth. The technical concepts of
ontotheology had slowly worked their way down into popular religion."
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Consequently, it is highly unlikely that one could make and sustain a case to
suggest that Davis is engaged in ontotheology, except perhaps to the extent that he
still wants to relate Christian faith, hope and love to reason and its demands: that
is, post-metaphysical, communicative reason.
Returning to the theme of Davis's understanding of the proper relationship
between theory and practice. Davis says, in Theology and Political Society, that
Habermas's work has done much to clarify:
"...the relation between theory and practice. [And]
Some of the distinctions he makes are helpful, I think,
in relating Christian Faith to political policy and
action."52
It comes as no surprise, then, to find that Davis's understanding of praxis is
extremely similar to that which Habermas calls lebenspraxis or, more simply,
living or the habit of living. In his constant search to justify and motivate effective
social and political action and re-establish the correct relationship between theory
and praxis, Davis laments what he calls the 'political misery' of present day
theology. By this I take him to mean, precisely, the paucity of the relevance of the
Christian faith to the habit of living as well as the vain attempts of the Christian
ethicist and theologian to give theoretical voice to motivate such activity in this
sphere. He goes on to say:
"The political misery of present-day theology comes
from the fact that, ever since theology has been
unwilling to serve as a mere legitimation of
ecclesiastical authority, it has become devoid of any
positive significance on the political level."53
52 Davis TPS p 69.
53 Davis TPS p 60.
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Thus, as the social move from pre-modern to modern has resulted in the
disassociation of church and state there has been a decline in the perceived
relevancy of theology. When church and state coincided, then theology that
advised on matters of church order was politically relevant. With the separation of
church and society, and even state, such relevance has been lost. This suggests that
Davis sees the contemporary problem cast as an internalist/externalist dynamic
where theology now has an ecclesial relevance and a social relevance which have
been, and remain, historically separated. Moreover, it suggests that from the point
of view of a theology based on orthodoxy, the tenuous relationship between
orthodoxy and orthopraxis is ever more strained. Indeed, Davis says scathingly,
that in theologies of orthodoxy: "...any appeal to practice is simply an excuse for
lack of theory. So called orthopraxis, spontaneous and independent is quite simply
a myth."54 This theory/praxis dichotomy is quite clearly not unique to theology.
In theology, however it has a unique poignancy, insofar as, for Davis at least, the
essence of theology, the mystical moment in faith, is destroyed.
The parallels here with John Milbank's presentation of "... the pathos of
modern theology" which is "its false humility..."55 cannot go un-noted. Milbank
alleges that this false humility leads theologians to attempt to do exactly what
54 Davis TPS p 61.
55 John Milbank Theology and Social Theory: Beyond secular Reason. 1990. Basil Blackwell. Oxford
Davis is concerned that: "According to Milbank, there is no single system of prepositional truth.
We cannot by argument refute theses opposed to our own. We have our story and they have
theirs. It is a question of who has the better story. We can use rhetoric to persuade but not to
argue. I find that a disturbing prospect. Political debate is already almost exclusively a matter of
rhetoric, with little in the way of argument. Is any dialectical critique of the rhetoric that pours
over us to be ruled out of order? The fact that human reason is finite and belongs to this historical
world does not mean that we can drop the distinction between truth and falsity, right and wrong
just and unjust.." ... A balanced concept of reason demands that we hold in tension two apparently
contradictory features: the historical, embodied practical character of human reason and the
transcendence of particularity implied by such a claim to objective truth or universal
morality."(Davis RMS p 13).
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Davis does, that is incorporate ideas and methods from secular social theory into
theology. It is his argument that this is wrong and that, in fact, secular social
theory depends extensively on false theological assumptions.56 From here Milbank
develops a refutation of modernity and Enlightenment reason enabling him to
discard it in an attempt to establish a latter day, albeit post-modern, Civitas Dei.57
Davis is aware of this, and his retort to Milbank is precisely that there is some
acceptable content to modernity, and therefore, it requires 'determinate negation'58
not a Milbankian, abstract negation. This determinate negation necessitates the
sort of involvement and engagement with Enlightenment rationality that Davis
advocates. Echoing Habermas, he suggests that we should return to the various
crossroads that the Enlightenment travelled through and re-think the path that was
available but not travelled. This, he contends, relocates us in the "... discourse of
the counter-Enlightenment that was present in the Enlightenment from the
beginning."59
In rejoining the discourse of the Enlightenment in order to resolve the
problem of the misery of theology Davis critically assumes the Habermasian
analysis of modernity to provide a useful and illuminating description of the
respective roles of theory and praxis. Following the Marxist historical, materialist
56 "For him [Milbank] the secular social sciences are a bastard form of theology - a heretical
theology as it were. The eagerness of some theologians to incorporate modern secular social theory
into theology is misplaced, Milbank argues. Modern theology has already swallowed more social
science than is good for it, and on the other hand, modern secular social theory is more dependent
upon theological assumptions than the social sciences are prepared to admit."(Davis RMS p 12)
57 We shall return to Milbank again. However, it is important to note that there are alternatives to
Davis's programme. There are also obvious parallels with Hauerwas and we shall see Milbank
reappear in relation to Hauerwas. It should be noted that while Davis is extremely critical of
Milbank (RMS Introduction) Hauerwas is in broad agreement.
58 Davis RMS p 15 Hence Davis's appreciation of the Habermasian position. Milbank, on the other
hand, leaves himself wide open to a performative contradiction. His work does not merely "...
constitute an exercise in rhetorical persuasion, but a closely knit argument - an argument,
therefore, to the effect that no argument is legitimate."(Davis RMS p 14)
59 Davis RMS p 15.
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tradition Habermas, and in turn Davis, focus on the reuniting of theory and
praxis. Furthermore, in the sense and to the extent that such a tradition of enquiry
examines the empirical data of actual situations on the way to providing the causal
explanation of society required for emancipation to function, Davis maintains that
it is an empirically falsifiable theory. Theology shackled to orthodoxy does not
have this property. Critical theory, therefore, provides for Davis an important
methodological paradigm for theology. He says:
"It is not difficult to harmonise religious faith and
fallibalism. What is needed in order to do so is a
distinction between faith and beliefs. Faith is the
fundamental religious response. It is an orientation
towards unlimited reality as accepted in a
transcendent response or movement of unrestricted
love. This faith-love is divine revelation in the
primary sense of divine presence in our minds and in
our hearts. ... gives rise to a body of religious beliefs,
constituting a tradition. The absoluteness of associated
with our religious response belongs not to doctrines...
The absoluteness of faith should not be confused with
the certitude of belief..."60
To develop this paradigm, Davis draws on Habermas's notion of the
intrinsic relationship between knowledge and what Habermas terms 'human
interests.'61 He understands Habermas to say that there are three interests
constituting three modes of knowledge:
"They are: the technical interest which grounds the
information that gives technical control and is related
to the social medium of work; the practical interest
which lies behind the interpretative knowledge of a
common tradition, required for human action and
communication and is related to the social medium of
language; the emancipatory interest which makes
possible, what he [Habermas] calls 'critique', namely
knowledge that takes the form of analyses of freeing a
person from reified social powers, that is from
60 Davis TPS p 27.
61 Habermas KHI.
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unanalysed relations of oppression and dependence
and is thus related to the social medium of power."62
These interests are linked to social media because for Habermas the subject cannot
be construed as anything other than "... the empirical naturally generated and
socially formed subject."63 A subject, thus grounded, will have interests similarly
grounded. Davis agrees that these interests are properly understood not merely
psychologically but "... transcendentally as deep-seated invariants constituting the
a priori structure of human knowing."64 Davis would not, and does not, imply that
knowledge is foundational to human being. Nor would Davis "... reduce our
spiritual life to a struggle for knowledge but insofar as we are engaged in knowing
our knowing must satisfy the general conditions of knowing and of the various
forms of knowledge and the method that each form demands."65 The philosophical
and theological traditions that Davis criticises come in for criticism precisely
because they extend universalist and, therefore, foundational claims which cannot
be sustained at either a theoretical or practical level within those traditions.66 As
Davis points out correctly, this gives rise to questions "... circling round
exclusivism versus pluralism, universalism versus particularism, [and] certitude
versus fallibalism."67 Davis contends that Christian orthodoxy, having made these
foundational claims and forced the questions, is in no shape to answer them. In
other words Christian orthodoxy presents a claim to certitude which is quite
simply incompatible with the fallible nature of all human knowledge including
religious knowledge, if a special case can be made for any such thing. These
inconsistencies, all too apparent to Davis, bring him back to Habermas and his
notion that religion or theology characterised like this is redundant. Hence he
62Davis RMS p 70.
63 Davis RMS p 70.
64 Davis RMS p 70.
65 Davis TPS p 24.
66 Davis TPS p 25.
67 Davis TPS p 25.
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proceeds to examine a better understanding of the nature of knowledge as well as
the interests implicit in such a constitution, to make sense of matters religious.
This examination is underpinned by Davis's firm belief that the Gospel has
a particular expository and explanatory understanding of liberation or, as
Habermas calls it, emancipation. This understanding provides means of closing the
aporetic moment in Habermas's atheistic schema. Davis notes that emancipatory
interest falls into a different category than either technical or practical interests.
This is due to the way in which it is bound up with the process of self-reflection.
Technical and practical interests are not at all tied up in the modes of knowledge
that they ground; they involve cognitive action rather than communicative modes.
Emancipatory interest, however, involves and implies self-reflection as a "...
coming of the subject to self-transparency [which] coincides with the subject's
move towards autonomy and responsibility."68
This distinction of emancipatory interest from the other cognitive forms of
interest is extremely important, Davis contends, for understanding and rectifying
the illegitimate claims of orthodoxy. As Davis says:
"The conscious movement of the subject in self-
reflection toward self-transparent autonomy and
responsibility is identical with the coming to an
emancipatory knowledge that frees it from
unrecognised dependencies. The interest in
emancipation thus becomes actual as a conscious
orientation in the knowledge given in self-
reflection."69
68 Davis TPS p 70.
69 Davis TPS pp 70 -71.
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As Davis points out, the third mode of knowledge, critique, is constituted by the
unity of limited knowledge and emancipatory interest. Further to this though,
intrinsic to any critique of ideology, or even orthodoxy, is a process of
emancipatory self-reflection, or self-criticism. To achieve the critical
interpretations of repressed structures, however, critique must be able to draw on a
critical theory of society that provides a causal explanation of the present situation.
Thus critique becomes a process of "... explanatory understanding, and only
through explanatory understanding can the ideologically distorted communication
within society be correctly interpreted."70
Christian orthodoxy, according to Davis, is inimical to this process of self-
reflection. Within Christian orthodoxy there are, quite simply, components that
are not open to the sort of revision that self-reflection demands. There are non-
negotiable, minimal criteria that are held to be necessarily immune from self-
reflection or revision: that is to say, they are not open to critique. Clearly if this is
the case then Davis would have to agree with Habermas and consign theology to
the private sphere. However, Davis, again developing and moving away from
Habermas's understanding, construes critique to be much more subtle. To be
precise, he suggests that there are two levels of critique or emancipatory
knowledge. Firstly the development of critical theories:
"The claim of these to be true has to be justified in
scientific discourse. Second there is the very process of
self-reflection as the explanatory interpretations,
enlightening people concerning their objective
situation within society and thus freeing them from
unrecognised dependencies."71
70 Davis TPS p 71.
71 Davis TPS p 71.
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Alongside these modes of critique, and informed by them, stands political action.
Implicit in political action is a practical and technical perspective on the realm of
'
lebenspraxis or the habit of living. This is also where the correct relationship of
theory to praxis is to be activated for critical theology.
In his reconstruction of the Christian faith away from orthodoxy and
towards faith, that is to say away from the primacy of theory towards a balanced
relationship of praxis to theory, Davis invites us to understand Christianity as a
way of life. Furthermore, the methodical elaboration of this way of life becomes
theology. Which is to say that theology is a historically hermeneutical discipline,
located within a hermeneutical tradition. On the one hand, theology understood as
part of a tradition immune to critique, is grounded in practical interests. On the
other hand, as a historically hermeneutical discipline it should be concerned
precisely with generating the sort of causal explanations that self-reflection
demands. Davis maintains therefore that the Christian faith, in presenting a way of
life, fulfils the requirements of emancipatory interest. That he can make this
reservation for Christianity has to do with his realisation that the critical theory of
society from which Habermas works, and with which Davis is in broad
agreement, working as it does from empirical data and subject to scientific
discourse, is essentially falsifiable. As such it refuses the positivist fact-value
distinction and is thus, he argues, "... a value impregnated investigation."72 He is
free to ask, therefore, whether or not an investigation impregnated with Christian
values might not produce a different critical theory73: "Cannot the values enshrined
in the historical myths of the Christians find new expression in a critical theory of
72 Davis TPS p 73.
73 Davis TPS p 74.
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history and society?"74 As a way of life, he contends that Christian tradition conies
under the second mode of knowledge, that is, it is grounded in the practical
interest. It "... offers a common tradition or set of interpretations, which makes it
possible people to orient their actions through symbolic interactions and mutual
understanding. "75
Christian faith, the Christian tradition and theology are historical and, as
such, subject to distortions. Therefore we face a question "...[is] critique or
emancipatory self-reflection ... an element intrinsic to the Christian faith or is the
Christian faith ... simply the object, not the agent, of such self-reflection?"76
Understood as a tradition of discourse, then, the Christian way of life and
theology are, and can be, subject to enhanced democratisation and the realignment
of reason and hence the agent of self-reflection. Therefore, while never again
becoming a structural principle of society, the Christian tradition and theology
can, nevertheless contribute to and motivate genuine political action in the public
sphere. This contribution relies on what Davis calls a process of communication
and falls in broadly with what "... Habermas analyses as communicative action
and rationality in contrast to instrumental action and rationality".77 Hence, Davis
reserves the right to suggest that Christianity might make a positive contribution
to social cultural and political life.
As to the question of whether critical, emancipatory self-reflection is an
intrinsic moment within faith itself or a critique of faith from a position of
74 Davis TPS p 75.
75 Davis TPS p 73.
76 Davis TPS p 73.
77 Davis WLWD p 122.
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independent rationality. The answer clears out Davis's agenda. If it is the latter
then the Christian tradition orientated to faith rather than orthodoxy and
understood as lebenspraxis has failed. If the former then there is yet some hope that
a systematised faith, or theology, might in fact engage usefully in the process of
emancipatory reflection in praxis in reciprocal relationship to the world that
shapes it. This is, of course, Davis's preferred position: an endeavour to relate
theology to the modern tradition of criticism which brings about a theology the
nature and task of which is "... itself engaged in the process of emancipatory
reflection, sharing in that way with the project of the Enlightenment..."78 while
realigning the relationship between theory and praxis.
2.2.2. The Role and Limits ofReason in Theological Discourse
Having noted Davis's dependence on communicative reason in realigning
theory to praxis, we must now make some more precise notes on the role and
limits of rationality in Davis's understanding of theological discourse. In so doing
we shall be able to introduce a second refinement of what we mean by post-
orthodoxy. As we have observed, Davis's understanding of Habermas's post-
metaphysical thinking, suggests that linguistic and pragmatic influences on
contemporary philosophy and social theory have fostered a climate wherein
narrative and social praxis are in the ascendancy. However, it is at this point that
we find that while Davis acknowledges the validity of the insight he demurs from
Habermas's exaggerated understanding of reason.
As Davis sees it, for Habermas to follow the procedures of discourse ethics,
to engage in critique, requires, indeed presupposes, a community of moral agents.
78 Davis TPS p 24.
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Unlike Hauerwas and Maclntyre, however, the community that Habermas
envisages is the widest one possible. Norms are only valid when their
consequences for the satisfaction of everyone's interest are acceptable to everyone
as participants in the discourse.79 Clearly, everyone who might have an interest, or
an opinion ought, in principle, to be included. But is this not simply a tradition?
In essence the answer is 'yes'. However, Habermas argues against the absoluteness
of traditions setting up an opposition between "... the unplanned course of its
[tradition's] spontaneous growth" and the reflective appropriation of tradition.80
The reflective appropriation of tradition is enabled by critique. Critique in turn
fosters an appreciation of the contingent character of tradition. This means, as
Davis points out, that although the content might be appropriated, tradition ceases
to operate as understood by communitarians. On this point it should be noted that
Davis takes Habermas to mean that tradition, without critique, is a negative
dynamic on an individual's life. Tradition without critique, for Habermas and for
Davis, reinforces prejudice and authority. When tradition is coupled with critique
we have a flexible structure of pre-judgements which "...is made transparent by
reflection, it can no longer function as a set of prejudices."81 We shall return to the
question of tradition in the next section. In the meantime we should note Davis's
disagreement with Habermas over the role and limits of reason in theological
discourse.
79 Habermas MCCA p 132. This is generally known as the principle of universalisation by which
Habermas supposes that he can ground moral principles in what he supposes to be the unavoidable
presuppositions of argumentation. Put simply a norm can be justified if, and only if, the
consequences that might forseeably flow from universal adherence to such a norm could be
accepted by all of those involved as participants in ideal discourse. For an in-depth discussion of
this issue see Stephen White The Recent Work ofjiirgen Habermas. 1988 CUP. Cambridge. Chapter
3.
80 Davis TPS p 98.
81 Davis TPS p 98.
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Davis disagrees with Habermas on the basis of the latter's two-fold answer
to the question of the rational grounding of values distinct from experience. Davis
thinks that this two-fold distinction represents an "... exaggeration of the function
of theoretical reason."82 Focusing on freedom, and using it as symbolic of a nexus
of values tied up with emancipation or liberation, Davis suggests that it, and they,
must first be experienced before they can become principles. Any talk of freedom
without experience of it would be unintelligible as well as ill-advised. It is, he says:
"... a social and cumulative experience; it is preserved
and transmitted only as an historical form of life,
namely a tradition. The entry to that tradition is
shared by action, not by discourse."83
Theoretical reason, in the form of discourse, without grounding in praxis can have
only a limited role as either the means or the grounds of consensus on values.
Davis presses this point home, quite effectively, by reminding us that
Habermas's ideal discourse requires at least the anticipation of an ideal speech
situation. Such a situation requires, in turn, an ideal social situation. He says:
"[t]he extent to which an ideal social situation is
absent is the extent to which any discourse will be
lacking rationality. It would seem to follow that if the
social situation renders freedom seriously
problematical, discourse will be impotent to meet the
difficulty. How can freedom be grounded by a
discourse free from constraint when such discourse is
possible only if freedom has been attained?"84
This insightful comment marks a significant break with Habermas's reliance on
reason and discourse and sets the scene for Davis's important and distinctive
application of theology given the reconstitution of its nature and task. Davis says
82 Davis TPS p 95.
83 Davis TPS pp 95-96.
84 Davis TPS p 96.
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that the appeal to reason presupposes "...an open community of discourse, in
which all the members participate in seeking knowledge and in which any claim to
acceptance must rest upon evidence and argumentation open to scrutiny and
criticism by all."85 In such a community as Davis envisages, therefore, reason plays
an extremely important role. That is not to say, however, that there are no limits
to this role.
The limits to the role of reason, for Davis, arise from the fact that human
reason properly understood, is limited, embodied and fallible.86 He concedes that
such a stance may not have the excitement of the rhetoric of post-modernity.
However, unlike the post-modernists, he thinks that it is a mistake to assume that
the end of a representational epistemology issues in the death of truth itself. He
perceives the critical thrust of Enlightenment reason turning in upon itself, which
does not of necessity lead us into post-modernity.87 It does, however, bring us back
to a more balanced understanding of the role of substantive reason and tradition-
based discourse.
Davis's preferred understanding of the role and limits of rationality in
critical theological discourse is to modify Habermas's 'exaggerated' understanding.
He argues instead for a limited, embodied and fallible conception of rationality.
This conception follows directly form what Davis sees as the proper relationship
85 Davis WLWD p 109.
86 Although having made this point in print Davis is keen to reinforce it. He has always maintained
the importance of communicative rationality but does not wish to lose sight of the significance of
substantive reason in the development of modernity. Indeed he recognises that political action may
sometimes require strategic reasoning and therefore the context of that reasoning becomes
extremely important. Personal conversation Cambridge February 1996.
87 Davis TPS p 26 see also RMS pp 106 & 109.
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between theory and praxis. That this indicates a modified retrieval of substantive
reason requires us to examine more closely the concept of tradition and its role in
generating discursive norms and identity. We shall begin by recognising that Davis
attempts to ground Christian values in tradition.
2.2.3. The Role ofTradition in Generating Discursive Norms and Identity
In examining Davis's endeavour to ground Christian values in tradition, we
uncover a third refinement of what we mean by post-orthodoxy. In his limited
appeal to tradition, Davis follows a critical understanding of Habermas and is not
unsympathetic to the notion that values are grounded in tradition. Nevertheless,
Davis maintains Habermas's hesitation about relying heavily on tradition to
generate substantive rationality, because of the spectre of authoritarianism that
haunts the likes of Maclntyre.88 He says, whenever the transcendence of "...
Christian experience has been recognised, the indispensable function of tradition
and community re-emerges even after the doctrinalized form of tradition and of an
absolutist form of Church authority have been rejected."89
We still have to ask, however, what Davis means when he talks of tradition
here. It is clear that he recognises that a community/tradition such as that
envisaged by Maclntyre or Hauerwas is little more than a collection of prejudices,
inimical to critique and therefore at odds with emancipation. But it is equally clear
that Habermas's understanding of tradition does not provide, for Davis, a
sufficient fitting model for the operation of Christian faith as he understands it.
This raises an ecclesiological question in that the normative community for the
88 See Chapter 1 of this thesis.
89 Davis WLWD p 80.
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discourse of the Christian tradition is the church. Thus we are faced directly with
the problems of dogma and orthodoxy as the church relies on both to engender
identity and governance. This is an issue to which I shall return in Chapter 6. For
the moment, though, we should note two general points about Davis's
understanding of tradition. First of all returning to the question of freedom as an
exemplar value, although going along with Habermas to a large extent, Davis
reserves the right to draw attention to the fact that there is a sense in which
freedom often manifests itself with a "... gratuitous, unexpected, unaccountable
character."90 This, he suggests, is best summed up by the theological concept of
grace. Habermas is inevitably closed to such an irrational, mystical element in
emancipation. He will, therefore, only give a part of the story. Indeed, it follows
from Davis's realigned notion of theory and practice which presupposes an ideal
social condition or tradition, that Habermas's rational analysis of the Western
cultural tradition uncovers emancipatory values like freedom, justice and equality
precisely because of his participation in that tradition. In other words, could
Habermas have identified emancipatory self-reflection or critique or liberation as
values had they not already formed a significant tradition in Western ethical
discourse? We might put this another way by suggesting that Habermas is being
either naive or disingenuous in not explicitly acknowledging his debt to
theological ethical discourse. It is not so much that there are vestigial traces of a
universal moral code at work in Western moral philosophy as there is a vital
theological heritage being wished away.
Secondly, however, Davis also sounds a warning against those like
Hauerwas, Maclntyre and Milbank who sit, as it were, on the other side. Too
90 Davis TPS pp 102 - 103.
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much focus on tradition leads us back into dogmatism and orthodoxy. There are
those, he says, that consider belonging to a tradition as the only way of
understanding ourselves as humans and overcoming the "... arrogant inhumanity
of technical reason." 91 He asks "[a]re we, then, to turn back ... to a renewed
acceptance of the past as normative, that is to dogmatism?"92 The answer as we
have seen, is a resounding no. Although Davis does concur that theology is only
properly grounded in the social praxis of a living faith, this faith transcends
particular cultures and historical ages.
In the last chapter of Theology and Political Society we see Davis construct a
fascinating argument for this contention. Following Habermas's theory of the
history of religion, Davis summarises his notion that the cultural life of societies is
not a random process. Thus, it:
"... follows a rationally reconstructible pattern of
development. His [Habermas's] argument for this is
an interlocking series of considerations ... social
systems are engaged in a double process of exchange ...
first the appropriation of outer nature, namely the
non-human environment, through production and,
second, the appropriation of inner nature, which
means human material, through socialisation ... The
adaptation or socialisation is brought about through
normative structures, in which human needs are
interpreted and various actions allowed or made
obligatory. Because normative structures are thus the
means of socialisation, the social integration of inner
nature marches in step with the normative claims that
call for justification."
This summary of Habermas's interlocking considerations leads Davis to conclude
that, since one can draw an equation between socialisation and the cultural life of a
society, that cultural life is also "... directional and embodies an irreversible
91 Davis TPS p 30.
92 Davis TPS p 30.
Davis TPS p 162.
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94
sequence." So, in the same way as science and technology represent an inner logic
of rational sequence, normative claims also follow their own inner logic. The
result of this contention is that, so long as a tradition, or the directional and
irreversible sequence, does not lose its continuity "... socially attained stages of
moral consciousness cannot be forgotten and any deviation is experienced as
regression."95
Davis goes on to point out that, in the directional process of human
development, certain trends can be identified: "... the expansion of the secular in
relation to the sacred; the movement from heteronomy to autonomy; the
evacuation of cognitive contents from world views, so that cosmology is replaced
by a pure system of morality; the shift from tribal particularism to universalistic
96
and individualised orientation; increasing reflexivity in the mode of belief." These
features have been discussed at length with regard to Habermas in the previous
chapter and we need not go into further detail here. I should, however, reiterate
that it manifestly demonstrates that Habermas, and in turn Davis, understand the
history of religion as having participated in the development of a process of
reflection and thus represents a tradition of enquiry. Furthermore, this
development is universal and not specific to one religious tradition insofar as the
97
history of religions can be seen as the history of religion.
94
Davis TPS p 162.
Davis TPS p 163.
96
Davis TPS p 163.
97
In this regard Davis draws our attention to the work of Rainer Dobert a younger collaborator of
Habermas. Dobert sees the increasing reflexivity of the mode of belief as the determining factor of
the features listed above. Ibid
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Davis makes this contention for three reasons. First of all, "... past
religious history is not fully intelligible unless it is understood as a single history of
98
human religiousness." Only by understanding the history of religion in this way
can one do justice to the similar events in the development of various, apparently
unconnected religious traditions. Moreover, it is the only way to acknowledge
that, for the most part, religious traditions have, in fact, had a considerably more
intertwined relationship than particular accounts might suggest. Secondly, Davis
suggests that the religious exclusiveness which gave us the particular histories is
itself part of a more overall history and may have reached the end of "... its
99
historical usefulness." Thirdly, one has to account for a contemporary
convergence of religious traditions which generates a transformative effect on each
of the traditions in question. Davis bases this contention on the insights of Wilfred
Cantwell Smith. Smith provides an interesting vantage point from which no
religious history can ever appear quite the same again. He cites Cantwell Smith
"...one is beginning to discern perhaps total history of man's religiousness,
constituting a pattern in which the rise of separated religious communities
100
constitutes a meaningful episode."
While it is outwith the scope of this thesis to indulge in a critique of
Cantwell Smith we can, nevertheless, see that by picking up this insight, Davis is
now in a position to interpret the history of religions within an overall picture of
the history of religion. From here he can interpret the history of religion as the
development of a process of reflection "... through which human beings begin to
gain clarity in regard to themselves and free themselves from the domination of
98
Davis TPS p 171.
99
Davis TPS p 172.
100
Cantwell Smith cited by Davis TPS p 172.
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101
normative systems that impose themselves with nature-like compulsion." We
have to realise that the opposite of such a compulsion is, as Davis puts it, mutual
agreement on norms communicatively achieved.102 This suggests for Davis that,
since the mutual agreement comes about through a free, reciprocal process of
communication, then the history of religion can be seen as "... the evolution of
103
communicative competence."
To understand this claim it is important to reiterate that Davis accepts
Habermas's contention, as we saw in Chapter 1, that the discursive redemption of
normative claims, involved in discourse ethics, itself follows an irreversible
sequence from myth through religion to philosophy and ideology and finds its
culmination in critique. The history of religion, therefore, presents an essential
component in this sequence from myth to critique insofar as, for a time, religion
publicly identified and mediated norms and moral value. As we have seen, the
expansion of the secular in regard to the sacred, the movement to autonomy and
the shift from tribal particularism to a universalistic and individualised orientation,
coupled to the rise of critique renders the mediating efficacy of religion obsolete.
The development of communicative competence, however, passes over into
another, public, sphere of communication and discourse wherein norms and values
are worked out. While all that is left of religion and religious traditions, for
Habermas, is a universal moral code Davis recognises the significant contribution
that the Christian tradition, adequately reformed, has and might continue to have
101
Davis TPS pp 163f.
102 Davis TPS Chapter 7 "Pluralism, Privacy and the Interior Self." expresses this argument most
clearly.
103
Davis TPS pp 163f.
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in developing communicative competence and generating discursive norms and
identity.
2.3. Conclusion
In conclusion we can see that for Davis realigning theory and praxis,
recognising the limits of rationality in theological discourse as well as the role of
tradition in generating discursive norms is markedly different from adapting to
fashionable appropriations of new ideas. Davis's critical theology, therefore,
involves submitting the social and cultural pre-suppositions of orthodox tradition
and theology to critique. Such an examination generates a self-aware re-
appropriation of tradition. For Davis this represents the key difference between
theology as usually practised and critical theology. That is to say, critical theology,
done like this, describes a fundamental dynamic of the tradition itself because the
situations wherein the tradition finds itself can never be conceived of as externally
related to it. It is because of this that we can describe Davis's critical theology as
post-orthodox. It is also because of this that we can intimate the possibility of
'adequate reform'. For as Davis says, traditions, and consequently the identity
which those traditions engender, is betrayed when the theoretical dynamic of the
tradition attempts to "... to keep an earlier form of the tradition intact in new
.104
conditions conceived as only externally related to it." Consequently, Davis is
clearly pointing towards a much more radical agenda than either liberation or
political theology as he understands them.105. Moreover, a tradition that operates to
such a radical, reforming agenda generates a radical identity equated with the
104
Davis WLWD p 3.
105 Davis goes to considerable length in TPS to analyse both political and liberation theologies. His
subjects include Johan Baptist Metz, Dorothy Solle and Jan Luis Segundo. In RMS he returns to
this theme and includes a criticism of John Milbank as a representative of a latter day, politically
significant theology.
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interior self, which fosters authentic political action and realises the promise of
critical theology. In the following chapter we move on to closer examination of
the issues of identity and political action and an investigation of the promise of
critical theology.
2.4. Summary
To sum up, in this chapter we have developed the theme of Davis's
distinctive, post-orthodox critical theology. We have seen that while this theology
makes use of the philosophical insights of Jiirgen Habermas, it does not simply
import them and criticises Habermas's overstated reliance on abstract reason and
his understated appreciation of tradition in generating moral norms. I argued,
therefore, that Davis's post-orthodoxy offered three important insights. First of all,
it endeavours to realign theory and practice in the Christian life. Secondly, it
shows how Habermas and the Enlightenment tradition have overstated the claims
of rationality. Thirdly, it shows that Christianity, when theory and practice are
properly aligned, and therefore eschewing orthodoxy, embodies a tradition of
discourse that is not sectarian or oppressive. Finally, we suggested that Davis is
pointing toward a much more radical agenda than either political or liberation
theologies. The proper realignment of theory and practice leads to the possibility
of a valid practical theology leading to the transformation of society in light of the
transformative principle of Christian faith. In the next chapter, we turn our
attention to the implications of Davis's post-orthodoxy for Christian ethics and
the church generally. I will examine these implications through an investigation of
the promise of critical theology, focusing on identity and political action.
Thereafter, I will comment on the shape of church that Davis calls us to.
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Chapter 3. Charles Davis and the Promise of Critical Theology
In the previous chapter we followed Charles Davis's application of
Habermas's critical social theory to theology.The result was what Davis construes
as post-orthodox critical theology. We shall now examine the impact of this
critical theology on Christian ethics and thence the church. As we have noted
Davis maintains that the only appropriate Christian response to revelation is to
understand Christianity as offering an ethical way of life wherein theory and
praxis are realigned, to provide a way of being and acting. This response may be
partially articulated in propositions and it may stimulate theoretical reflection. But
it is essentially the establishment of a practical way of life. Consequently, the
impact of Davis's post-orthodox critical theology on Christian ethics and the
church will be significant.
As we have seen, for Davis, critical theology is concerned with putting its
own house in order by examining the presuppositions of traditional theology. This
examination means submitting these presuppositions to critique, which in turn
generates the possibility of a self-aware appropriation of the tradition to which one
belongs. These presuppositions find their expression in statements of faith and in
praxis. These two are brought together in tradition. As far as Davis is concerned,
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one cannot assume the integrity of any or all of these things simply because they
are religious. In other words, their identification with or as a religious tradition
does not generate a special case for exemption from critique:
"... critical theology acknowledges that the Christian
tradition, like other traditions, is not exclusively a
source of truth and value, but a vehicle of untruth and
false values and thus must be subjected to a critique of
ideology and critically appropriated, not simply made
one's own in an assimilative process of
1
interpretation."
The self-aware assimilation of tradition, Davis argues, is a methodology that is
essential for any theology which is capable of redressing the excesses of modernity
at the same time as making critical statements in the public sphere. Inevitably, the
notion of 'self-aware assimilation' will raise questions concerning notions of
religious and social identity.
It is the intention of this chapter to examine the impact of these questions
and the consequent appropriate religious identity that Davis sees as impelled by
critical theology. Such an exploration is a precursor to a broader question
concerning the form that the community of faith will take in relation to critical
theology. The form of the community of faith in itself is a partial realisation of the
promise of critical theology. This promise can be summarised briefly as the
realisation of a theology capable of redressing the excesses of modernity at the
same time as making critical statements in the public sphere, thus facilitating
authentic political action. Part fulfilment of the promise of critical theology, then,
1 Davis TPS p 25.
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is the politicising of the church and the inevitable impact that this will have on the
shape and scope of the church. We shall conduct this examination by looking at
four topics: first, religious identity; second, identity and the Christian tradition;
third, plurality and identity and the problem of revelation; and, finally, privacy
and religious identity. In the second part of the chapter we shall assess the
implications of Davis's critical Christian ethics for the church.
3.1. The Implications of Davis Post-orthodoxy for Christian Ethics
As I have suggested, the implication of post-orthodoxy for Christian ethics
will be significant. In this section we shall explore this impact. In order to assess
this impact we must first provide a standard definition of Christian ethics.2 Moral
theology, as it became apparent by the time of the reformation and the Counter-
Reformation, had developed away from being a guide to the confessionals and
penances into a theologically profound and complex discipline aimed at guiding
the conscience of the individual believer against a background of practical
deliberations about how to live a good life. The primary task of moral theology is
to clarify Christian moral concepts, showing how distinctive Christian modes of
expressing moral questions arise from the scriptures and comparing them to other
ways in which moral questions can be put.3 The particular focus of Christian ethics
as distinct from Moral theology, however, is not only to relate an understanding of
God to human behaviour but to explore the appropriate human response to God
required by acknowledgement of the life death and resurrection of Christ as the
grounding of Christian ethical reflection.4 As such, Christian ethics requires the
2 We shall make use of this definition again in relation to Stanley Hauerwas.
3 See MacQuarrie and Childress (eds.) A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics 1986 SCM London.
H&txh. Ethics 1981 T&T Clark Edinburgh.
4 Bonhoeffer Ethics 1985 SCM Press, London, pp 3ff "The knowledge of good and evil seems to be
the aim of all ethical reflection (Bonhoeffer says that it matters little in his discussion whether one
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generation of guidelines, in the light of a formal understanding of revelation, for
both personal and social activity. Thus understood Christian ethics involves
consideration of religious identity, tradition and political action.
3.1.1. Religious Identity as the Basis ofAuthentic PoliticalAction
We start this investigation into the promise of critical theology, therefore,
by examining Davis's understanding of religious identity as the basis for authentic
political action. Although Davis believes that Habermas would disagree, he points
out that:5
"... I see the basic religious identity which I have
described as coinciding with the new social identity he
[Habermas] has analysed, though articulating it at a
deeper level. ... I contend here that the new universal
identity now emerging is a new articulation, beyond
makes morality and immorality, valuable or valueless, actual and proper being and not actual an
proper being synonymous with good and evil.). The first task of Christian ethics is to invalidate
this knowledge. In launching an attack on the underlying assumptions of all other ethics, Christian
ethics stands so completely alone that it becomes questionable whether there is any purpose in
speaking of Christian ethics at all. But if one does so notwithstanding, that can only mean that
Christian ethics claims to discuss the origin of the whole problem of ethics, and thus to professes
to be a critique of all ethics simply as ethics. "Already in the possibility of the knowledge of good
and evil Christian ethics discerns a falling away from the origin. Man at his origin knows only one
thing: God. It is only in the unity of his knowledge of God that he knows of other men, of things
and of himself. He knows all things only in God, and God in all things. The knowledge of good
and evil shows that he is no longer at one with his origin." In this passage, and the chapter from
which it comes, it is Bonhoeffer's intention to highlight the difference between ethics generally and
Christian ethics. Humanity was originally created in the image of God, and aware of his origin in
God. The fall has caused a disunion and obscured humanity's awareness of its true origin. All
ethical endeavour, therefore, reflects this disjunction and focus on interpersonal relationships and
conscience. In contrast, he cites (pp 9 - 13) Christ's ethics, true ethics that start from Christ's unity
with God.
5 We have already explored the reasons for Habermas's rejection of the possibility of religious
discourse fulfilling the conditions of mutual understanding required for communicative action to
work. See Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of this thesis where Chapter 2 explores the significant
differences between Davis and Habermas.
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particularism and orthodoxy, of the religious identity
of the past not its abolition without remainder."6
Here we see Davis making a profound departure from Habermas's contention that
the identity involved in authentic political action cannot be public and religious
since the new emancipated social identity transcends specifically religious
understandings of identity.7 Davis, on the other hand, sees the two identities as the
same.
Habermas's description of the development from myth to critique, Davis
argues, presents a crisis in terms of identity and political action and thus presents a
crisis both for the individual, at a social level, and for the church. The consequence
of this process of "... clarification and purification of the universalistic structures
originally introduced by the world religions is a cleavage between the ego-identity
derived from universalistic structures and collective identity as bound up with a
g
particular community." In other words, we face an identity crisis because the
communities or traditions that provided a collective identity as well as an
individual identity, and which went hand in hand with religious consciousness,
suffer at the hands of critique and are consigned to the private sphere. The
problem of identity, Davis suggests, remained latent because of several factors: (1)
the vestigial traces of earlier identity formations derived from myth and magic. (2)
the distinctions made between the community of believers and those who were
outside and (3) the dualism established between sacred and secular, which
manifested itself in terms such as church and state, transcendence and immanence.
Nevertheless, identity problems were never far away from the moment totalising
6Davis TPS p 174.
7Davis TPS p 161.
8 Davis TPS p 164.
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religious world-views ceased to function.9 In such a secular society, which we have
noted describes our contemporary context, what remains of the substantive
business of religion lies, more or less, in a type of consumer preference for private
consumption as a pastime. Religion, therefore, does not offer much to any notion
of human identity nor can it contribute much, if anything, to effective political
action. Thus, we are faced with an identity crisis wherein the privatised self of
modernity rather than the interior self dominates.10
The distinction that Davis draws here between the private self of bourgeois
individualism and the interior self of, what he refers to, as genuine religious faith is
an important one. This interior self is identified with the mystical element in
religion that construes Christian faith as a transformative principle and not a body
of objective knowledge. In this regard, the interior self that Davis considers
essential is defined as "... the conscious subject as distinctly aware of his or her
individual being and activity. The interior self is the self-reflective self, the self as a
self aware subject, constituting an interior world over against the external world."11
'Davis RMS pp 135 - 136.
10 Davis is referring here to a description of the modern self that Metz, Solle and others have
employed. Bourgeois religion, as they describe it, reflects the radical separation of the social and
personal aspects of ethical, political and theological concern. Similarly it reflects the strain on the
link between orthodoxy and orthopraxy. The development of bourgeois religion arose from the
correlative social development. With this came an increasing degree of social privatisation and a
breakdown in the structural, relational web of society, and the dominance of the privatised self.
The process of privatisation limits Christianity (even, as lebenspraxis) to the realm of personal
integration and excludes it from the whole realm of public and social life. Large-scale structural
concerns in society are generally only a matter of concern at a secondary level that results from
working out individual experience. This results in an introspective religious sentimentality and
hence an inability to deal with the significant pragmatic issues of society and culture. See J.B Metz
(Peter Mann [trans.]) The Emergent Church and The Future of Christianity in a post-Bourgeois World
1981. Crossroad, New York. (David Smith [trans.]) Faith in History and Society: Toward a Practical
Fundamental Theology. 1981 Burn & Oates. London. D. Solle ( John Shelly [trans]) Political
Theology 1974. Fortress Press Philadelphia.
"Davis WLWD p 97.
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As we have seen, Davis has attempted to rescue this transformative principle from
what he regards as the overwhelming and oppressive clutch of orthodoxy.
Orthodoxy and inauthentic political action go hand in hand insofar as inauthentic
politics is simply an administration of a bureaucratised social system, which is in
turn inimical to emancipation. It is Davis's claim that the interior self of religious
identity is the starting point of authentic political action in the sense that authentic
politics, for Davis, operate under conditions of freedom. These are the same
conditions under which the interior self, as distinct from the private self, is
realised. Authentic politics, then is "... a process of communication among fully
12
individual subjects in freedom."
Placed in relation to Davis's understanding of tradition in generating
discursive norms and identity, we can now begin to see the way in which a new
religious identity develops. The religious identity that rests on the interior self is,
by definition, self-aware and self-reflective. Hence, the self-aware assimilation of
tradition is second nature and the first step towards authentic political action. This
new religious identity will enable the critical theologian to speak out prophetically
in the public sphere and constantly to revise his or her own tradition in relation to
the demands of the public sphere.
3.1.2. Identity and the Christian Tradition
We are now in a position to enquire of the particular implications of this
new identity for the Christian tradition. This is not an insignificant issue since
traditionally Christian theology has articulated particular constructive existential
12 Davis WLWD p 1.
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and dogmatic claims that are ostensibly immune to critique. In order to
understand fully the implications for the Christian tradition, we must first of all
return to the question of tradition, generally considered, in Davis's thought.
Thereafter, we will be able to explore the particular concerns of religious identity
for the Christian tradition. The purpose of this discussion, then, is to establish
the viability of Davis's claim that "...basic Christian identity today is not grounded
upon membership in a particular Church, but upon participation in an ongoing,
14
and therefore future-oriented Christian history."
Davis understands the history of the Christian tradition as relating
precisely to a directional and irreversible sequence. By implication, any other view
is limited. To this extent we have to think of the Christian religious identity, as it
relates to that tradition, more as a part of a wider religious and social identity.
With sympathy for Habermas, and developing the insights of Wilfred Cantwell
Smith, Davis encourages us to think of the history of particular religious traditions
as the history of participation in a single total history. Furthermore, Davis claims
that this process of generating religious and social identity intimates the end of
orthodoxy: that is to say the end of a religious identity mediated through the fixed
objectified contents of a particular religious tradition. From all of this, however,
Davis concludes that basic religious identity is neither "...grounded upon
membership in a particular Church..." nor even religious tradition. Rather, it is
given by "...active participation in a universality to be realised in the future.
13 Davis RMS pp 131 -152. This chapter was also published in Browning and Schiissler-Fiorenza eds.
Habermas, Modernity and Public Theology, op.cit.
14 Davis TPS p 171.
15Davis TPS p 171.
16Davis TPS p 172.
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Present working for a yet-to-be-realised universality can already unite people of
17
different positions." The problem, then, is not simply an erosion Christian
identity in the face of a secular onslaught. As we shall see, in some senses Davis
would not consider this to be a problem at all. More problematical is "... the
blurring of the religious identity of Christians by the acceptance of other
18
religions." Clearly, if we consider Christianity as an episode, all be it a significant
episode, in a single history of religion, then such acceptance is mandatory. This
raises the question of the Christian tradition's response to political and religious
plurality in the public sphere.
Tradition and religious identity now need to be scrutinised in the light of
religious plurality. Davis does not see plurality as an evil to be eliminated. Rather
plurality is "...the appropriate expression of the transcendence of the religious
object, of human freedom and of the historical mediation of human truth and
19
value." On this point, as we noted in the previous chapter, Davis holds out
against Habermas, criticising him for an over exaggeration of the role of discursive
rationality and its universalising potential. The universalised religious identity
which Davis envisages focuses on the what he calls the unity of communication in
the "... lasting differences of historical experiences and remembrance and
consequently of tradition, though these remain under a constant process of
20
development and revision." An important consideration for Davis, therefore, is
that we frame all our considerations of tradition and identity in a context that
17Davis TPS p 173.
18Davis RMS p 133.
19 Davis RMS p 174.
20 Davis TPS p 174. It is precisely on this point that Davis thinks Habermas understates the role of
substantive rationality in communicative action.
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recognises and acknowledges the complex pluralist structure of our contemporary
21
situation. As we mentioned earlier, Davis sees culture or socialisation as the most
important factor in the development of the modern worldview. As he says:
"...one can say that modern culture distinguishes three
worlds, to all of which human beings are related in
their living: the external or objective world of human
knowledge, the social world of practice with its
norms, and the subjective world of self awareness.
Because these three worlds have emerged as distinct,
modern culture clearly differentiates the objective
from the subjective, history and society from nature,
22
sincerity and truthfulness from objective truth."
This list of characteristic dichotomies describes the context of plurality within
which the theologian has to operate. It is important to note that Davis does not
attempt to distinguish a sphere specific to religious faith and experience. It is, he
contends, a mistake to assume that religion should designate a special realm of
meaning or practice.
Davis's reluctance to maintain a special preserve in which religious
consciousness operates has significant results. He concludes that authentic political
action, which occurs in a pluralist context, relates precisely to questions of
identity, since he understands the interior self to be the locus of both the proper
reflective relationship between the individual and tradition, and the basis for
authentic political action. Hence, because of the way in which Davis understands
religious tradition as both subject to and an agent of social practice, he maintains
21 This is a recurring theme for Davis. See particularly Chapter 7 of TPS pp 158 - 181. Chapter 1 of
RMS pp 21 -47.
22 Davis RMS p 51. See also earlier in this chapter on Davis's reading of Habermas for a
comprehensive description of this cultural development.
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that religious identity and social identity are closely linked. Moreover, the
conditions surrounding religious and social identity are the same so that political
pluralism is intimately linked to religious pluralism and hence to authentic
political action. Thus Davis justifies his righteous indignation at privatised religion
and his worry about the failure or inadequacies of so called political or liberation
theologies. If religious identity and authentic political action is ever to have a
religious base in the public sphere then it is as "... a post-conventional,
universalistic identity, personal and collective as grounded in the structure of
23
human communication." Here 'post-conventional' relates to the second, or
conventional level, of Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development as read by
Habermas.24 Habermas felt that this level did not adequately describe the
communicative, consensus orientated structure of discourse ethics which he
25
therefore describes as post-conventional. From this Davis concludes that whereas
traditional religious people could be identified as having a conventional identity,
that is to say they conform to pre-formulated teaching and established practices.
The new religious identity equates moral and societal development with the post-
conventional level, wherein political action depends on religious identity which, in
turn, rests on the interior self.26 Nevertheless, there is still a question mark
lingering over the Christian tradition to be considered. The question mark relates
to the status of plurality, pluralism and identity in the face of the revelation that
marks the church out as distinct from all other communities or traditions.
23 Davis RMS p 150.
24 Habermas TCA vol. 1. Davis RMS pp 5If.
^ Davis RMS Chapter 8.
26 For a clear description of Habermas's understanding of Kohlberg see McCarthy The Critical
Theory of Jurgen Habermas. 1978 Hutchison, London, pp 250 - 251 and the table provided by
Outhwaite in Habermas: A Critical Introduction. 1994. Polity Press, Cambridge, pp 52 - 53.
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3.1.3. Plurality and Identity and the Problem ofRevelation
Within a pluralist context there is a specific problem for a religious
tradition such as Christianity whose impetus comes from a perceived special
revelation or set of revelations. Indeed, Davis is a Christian theologian whose
argument suggests that critical theology relates to the Christian Gospel. Davis
further recognises that the present social and religious situation requires more than
27
the adaptation and redeployment of already existing dogmas and orthodoxy. No
one tradition can possibly pretend to provide the solution to the massive problems
that face humanity today.28 And yet he recognises that the Christian tradition has a
mission to do just that: Christians are called to act in the world, to mediate the
kingdom of God to humanity. It is in response to this call to action that Davis has
structured his critical theology and, on the way, provided a new insight into
religious identity based, broadly speaking, on the idea that the history of religious
traditions form a single history of religion which in turn reflects a history of the
development of communicative competence. However, this brings us back to the
question raised earlier concerning the distinctiveness, or at least the feeling of
distinctiveness, of identity that those committed to a particular religious tradition
feel and which, therefore, directs their action.
Much of the claim to distinctiveness, says Davis, rests on the notion that a
particular religious tradition is the bearer or recipient of definitive revelation. The
revelation of God to humanity that has occurred to those committed to the
27 Davis RMS p 149.
28 This attitude is reminiscent of Hauerwas and Maclntyre's assertion that there is no neutral
vantage point from whence to view moral discourse. Yet where Hauerwas, as we shall see, uses this
insight as a springboard to asserting the superior (most truthful) nature of the Christian tradition,
Davis is content simply to no note that it suggests limits to the role of particular traditions.
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tradition clearly gives an identity distinct from any other religious tradition. As
Davis himself says:
"The God who reveals or is revealed is conceived of as
a personal agent who acts and who speaks. Revelation
is, therefore, understood as a communication from a
29
personal God to human persons as persons."
This particularity is precisely the source of antipathy or antagonism towards other
religious traditions. Identifying one's own tradition with another becomes
extremely problematical.30 Revelation marks out the believers of one tradition as
distinct in their own minds from all other religious traditions. We are left with
the question of how to resolve conflict between such a tradition and those who do
not share this understanding of revelation.32 Is conversation viable, or is conversion
the only appropriate action?33 Davis's response to this is intriguing. Rather than
29 Davis RMS p 96.
30 One thinks, for example, of the Decalogue. As we have noted elsewhere, religion in the past has
provided an intense social bond. In turn, this bond affected moral behaviour, and to a degree, this
is still the case among religious communities. If, then, we understand the Decalogue to be a set of
injunctions which presuppose a fellowship with God, one's family, one's tribe and nation, we can
see clearly that identity comes from a sense of moral obligation shared in these respective groups,
which comes in turn from belonging to them. One might formulate it as follows: God who reveals
himself to a people sanctions the idea of a people of God. In turn, being a people of God requires
fidelity to the God who reveals, this fidelity can generate a sectarian, exclusive mentality, often
reinforced by 'revealed' codes prescribing appropriate behaviour or proscribing inappropriate
behaviour. For our purposes, it does not matter whether or not the Decalogue was revealed or
constructed by successive generations of politically astute redactors, except to suggest that it
supplies an self-understanding of distinctiveness to the people who believe themselves to be in
receipt of revelation.
31 Davis points to Hegel and Habermas as the archaeologists of this type of religious identity in
TPS. So, too, does Mark C Taylor in Erring: A Post-Modern A/Theology. 1987. University of
Chicago Press, Chicago. Chapter 2.
32 This is of course the liberal/communitarian debate transposed into a theological key.
33 Davis WLWD p 68, suggests that there are two ways of intellectually living the Christian faith.
There is his way as we are explaining it, and there is a second way. In the second way "[pjossessed
of the essential truths concerning the human condition and intellectually converted by grace, the
believer can proceed to despoil the Egyptians in the sense of incorporating the latest scientific ...
duly purified and corrected, into a vast metephysico-theological synthesis... " Davis is talking here
about the intellectual aspect of Christianity, but the parallels at a practical level are clear:
purification, correction and incorporation are but long-hand for conversion rather than
conversation.
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making some sort of facile claim suggesting that all revelation should somehow be
regarded as equal, he dives right into the particular nature of revelation and in so
34
doing turns this objection on its head. I will briefly outline his argument here.
Davis begins by listing some observations concerning the nature of
revelation. Firstly, that there are two ways of regarding revelation: one is to
examine the means God has used to bring about communication with human
persons; the second is to take the means for granted and to examine the
relationship of the "... constituent elements asking questions about its
permanence... " of the communication itself. Davis opts for the second saying
that revelation should be understood as a "relationship of communication in
which God addresses human beings."36
Secondly, having made the foregoing distinction, Davis contends that
revelation is public insofar as it relates to a community of faith. It is "... an initial
communication ... embodied in a community and institutionalised so that
subsequent generations may join themselves to that communication ... That means
that revelation in its permanent reality is a particular kind of tradition." Thirdly,
the authority that revelation claims is positive. This means that it is "... tied to a
38
particular occurrence and not reducible to the claims of a general rationality." As
such, Davis suggests, for revelation to be revelation it requires faith on the part of
34 The complete argument is to be found in Chapter 6 of RMS. pp 96 - 111, entitled "Revelation
and the Rationality of Tradition."
35Davis RMS p 97.
36Davis RMS p 97.
37Davis RMS p 98.
38Davis RMS p 98.
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the recipient. That is to say, revelation includes both the divine initiative and the
faith by which that initiative is received.39 In the sense that it is positive, revelation
is essentially historical insofar as it relates to a particular set of events and manifests
its continuity with those events in a particular tradition.40
Fourth, he has to ask what is it that is revealed? Which leads him on to
discussion of the message of revelation. He replies, as we have noted elsewhere,
that the message of revelation is a practical way of life "... the centre of reference
which gives the revealed tradition its identity and continuity is the praxis which it
41
embodies. Revelation is basically a way of life." This way of life will, of course,
have a theoretical component but it should always be properly understood as a
42
function of the intellectual context within which the revelation arises. Revelation
is not, therefore, simply a set of propositional truth statements. Such an
understanding, says Davis, has led us into a unacceptable orientation towards
orthodoxy in the name of an identity which depends on doctrinal purity.
This description of revelation in its component parts allows Davis to
recognise two concerns, which are continuity and rationality. Revealed religions,
he suggests, make strong claims to continuity and this continuity makes, in turn,
claims to rationality.
"...because of the account of the past it must give and
its vision of the future. The account of the past has to
39 Davis RMS p 98.
40 Davis RMS p 98.
41 Davis RMS p 99.
42 Davis RMS p 99.
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include a story of an initial communication from
which its particular tradition took its rise and which
remains as its permanent basis. Again its vision of the
future looks forward to a new state of affairs,
individual collective or both, which as the final
destiny of humankind will alone replace the religious
..... 43
tradition in its present functioning."
With this statement Davis takes us directly into the area that he sees as the heart of
the problem. Continuity, both future and past represent the identity of the
revealed tradition.44 As Davis says in criticising the Christian tradition for not
taking proper account of this: "One cannot say that theologians ... have come up
with a theory that in a satisfactory fashion explains the strict continuity or identity
45
claimed by the Christian tradition." Thus Davis explicitly acknowledges that
religious identity is tied up with revelation and therefore with historical
continuity. Furthermore, since history suggests that there have been many
divisions and developments in the history of the Christian tradition, it is not
enough simply to regard the case as closed at this point.
Within this context Davis discerns a converging of religious histories. This,
of course, means a convergence of religious identities which depends upon a
common, mystical core of religious experience which lies behind and ultimately
43 Davis RMS p 100.
44 This concern with revelation is a matter that still exercises Davis's thinking. In a conversation I
had with him Davis February 1996, he was concerned about the question of revelation and
continuity with particular reference to an article in The Tablet (2nd December 1995) by Nicholas
entitled "On Not Inventing Doctrine" in which Lash defended the idea of papal infallibility and
other doctrines. Davis maintained that Lash had missed the point and was erroneously content to
understand theology as a tradition that was about the reiteration of orthodoxy. Davis felt that this
led at worst, simply, to repetition and at best to keeping an earlier form of the tradition alive in a
new context. Davis was concerned that, in fact, theology had much more to do with repetition in
the Kierkegaardian sense. This leads to a continuity of expression but in direct relationship to, and
taking cognisance of, actually existing conditions.
45 Davis RMS p 101.
134
Chapter 3. Charles Davis and the Promise ofCritical Theology
46
relativises all particular religious expressions, symbols, texts and institutions.
Common religious experience relativises expressions, symbols, texts and
institutions precisely because the experience that comes before and has priority
over them is a common human experience that highlights their contingency. A
recurring theme in Davis's work, therefore, is that religious exclusiveness sets
uncalled for, and unreasonable, limits on the ability of humans to strive to
understand and converse with each other. Pluralism, then is not simply the
recognition that the context we live in is pluralist, it is, rather, a positive
orientation towards a "... global self consciousness in which we come together in
communication and partnership, acknowledging the unity that binds us together
47
despite the persistent plurality of our traditions." It is, in fact, a basic component
of the practical way of life to which Davis calls us. As pluralism is of the very
essence of politics, in the sense that authentic politics implies communication and
partnership and a sympathetic understanding of plurality, so it is the very essence
of religion.
Hence, to achieve its own claim to emancipatory efficacy, critical theology
and thence the Christian tradition, has not only to recognise but embrace a "...
significant pluralism in its knowledge and value claims."49 Otherwise, as Davis
points out "... effective political action of Christians is impeded ... by an
inadequate model of the Christian community."50 There can be no conflict
between statements about faith by various traditions because none can be absolute.
46 Michael Oppenheim Welcoming the Other: "The philosophical foundations for pluralism in the
Works of Charles Davis and Emmanuel Levinas." in TPCT pp 93 - 116
47Davis WLWD PP 1 - 2.
48 Davis TPS p 168.
49 Davis TPS pp 1-26, and 167 - 169.
50 Davis WLWD p 2.
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The reason that no claim can be absolute comes from Davis's repeated insistence
that experience of the transcendent is fundamentally negative. It is negative to the
extent that "... the sense of an absence of formulable meaning."51 Symbol and
myth, key components in any religious tradition are likewise 'deabsolutised'52
because, to the extent that they are legitimate responses to an experience of the
transcendent they are not in and of themselves final nor transcendent.53 From this
54
Davis leads on to a discussion of the "... equivalence of symbols." Symbols that
are thus 'de-absolutised' suggest a broad equivalence since they suggest a common
recognition of what lies behind them. That is to say, in Davis's terms the symbols
themselves have been subverted by the unmediated experience of the absolute.55
Hence, according to Davis the practices, narratives, symbols and values of a
religious tradition can only be secure when engaged in critical discourse with other
traditions in the public sphere, otherwise a torpid conservatism will ensue. This
discussion concludes that the "... truth and efficacy of one political system does not
56
exclude the truth and efficacy of other, different systems." This is the case
because 'truth and efficacy' relates to the appropriate response to the revelation of
the ultimate and not a set of propositions about it.
3.1.4. Privacy and Religious Identity
We should briefly note at this point that Davis's concern with the public
operation of critical theology does not mean that he fails to recognise the private
51 Davis RMS p 117.
52 Davis WLWD Chapter 11, pp 106 - 123.
53 See the table in Chapter 2 footnote no. 35. This understanding is both a conclusion and an
impetus for Davis's conjoined mystical and pragmatic wherein symbol an myth are recognised as
relative and contingent.
54Davis RMS p 127.
55 Davis WLWD p 51 and note 109 below.
56 Davis RMS p 127.
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nature of religious experience. It is, rather, that he wishes to reassess the nature of
the privacy. Rather than a concern solely with personal values in private life
typified by the type of privatised, bourgeois Christianity outlined in the
introduction, the social and political aspects of life should be of concern too. The
resulting deprivatisation can only be effective if there is a strong connection
between "... the rational and the existential, between public knowledge and
strategic action on the one hand and private faith and voluntary involvement on
the other." For Davis this deprivatisation can only come about with the
recognition that the self of the new religious identity, although social, has an
58
interior component that "... coincides with the mystical element in religion."
The mystical element is discerned in all religious traditions and further encourages
Davis to think of the history of religions as a single history of religion. More
importantly, however, is the relationship between the mystical element in religion
and faith as the appropriate response to revelation. At one level the mystical
element is apolitical but at another it is purely political in that it is the deepest
source and ground for authentic political action generating the transformative
principle that enables an ethical way of being and acting.
We conclude this section's exploration of the impact of post-orthodoxy on
Christian ethics by returning to our definition of Christian ethics. We can see that
the impact of post-orthodoxy is profound. We started with Davis's assertion that
the message of revelation is a practical way of life. It now appears that this way of
life involves the self-aware assimilation of a tradition of reflection, coupled with a
57Davis TPS p 177.
58 Davis TPS p 180. Davis defines the mystical moment in religion as the experience and subsequent
conviction that at its deepest core the reality of my individual self becomes one with ultimate
reality.
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methodology of pluralism that involves a positive orientation towards a global self-
consciousness, and an engagement in the extended narrative history and future
orientation of the tradition. What gives substance to this narrative is the pursuit of
justice, a constant striving to understand, this is Davis's theological understanding
of the discourse model, and the discourse model in turn:
"... by requiring that perspective taking be general and
reciprocal, builds a moment of empathy into the
procedure of coming to reasoned agreement: each
must put him or herself in the place of everyone else
in discussing whether a proposed norm is fair at all
and this must be done publicly, arguments played out
in the individual's consciousness or in the
theoreticians mind are no substitute for real
discourse."59
A pluralist society rests on communication and aims at consensus and sustains
itself by argument. Politics, Davis says, seeks consensus, and "non idolatrous
60
religious faith acknowledges the plurality and equivalence of symbols." Christian
ethics for Davis, then, involves consideration of religious identity, tradition and
political action. This realises, in a provisional sense, the promise of critical
theology in that it demonstrates how to relate an understanding of the
transcendent to human behaviour. Equally, it demonstrates that the appropriate
human response to the transcendent as the grounding of Christian ethical
reflection in relation to a formal understanding of revelation, for both personal
and social activity, in an ethical way of life.
59 Hodgson God in History: Shapes ofFreedom, p 231.
60 Davis RMS p 127.
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In the second part of this chapter we shall continue our investigation into
the promise of critical theology. We are now in a position to pull the threads of
Davis's thought together and assess its impact on the church generally. We have
seen that Davis does not, indeed cannot, abandon the need for a tradition in
generating discursive norms and identity. We must now enquire into the shape of
the tradition that Davis calls us to. We shall carry out this investigation by relating
the implications of Davis's post-orthodoxy for the church, the church is
traditionally seen the normative community for Christian reflection action and
discourse. As such, it represents the Christian story of Jesus Christ with its
prologue in Israel and its sequel in the historic church as the content of self-
disclosure of the transcendent.
3.2. The Implications of Post-orthodox Christian Ethics for the
church
As we noted in the introduction, Davis envisages a valid practical
ecclesiology to counter the inadequate model generated by contemporary,
privatised, bourgeois Christianity. The practical ecclesiology, that Davis would
develop, entails the politicising and democratising of the church such that it
reflects the reality of transcendent love, expressed through a symbolic heritage that
gives continuity to the various patterns of Christian experience. This continuity
will allow the people of God shaped by these patterns of Christian experience to
pass from the past to the present and from the present into the future.61 In this
section, therefore, we shall explore the consequences of this practical ecclesiology
for the church. We shall do this by, first of all returning to the question of the
interior self and authentic political action and consider if Davis's position leads,
61 Davis WLWD p 123. We shall return to the question of the relationship between past present and
future in Chapter 7 where we shall deal with the ides of anamnestic and proleptic solidarity.
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inevitably to leaving the church behind or opens up new options. Finally, we shall
explore these options culminating in Davis's interpretation of the church as a
community of discourse.
3.2.1. Leaving the church behind?
With a concept of the interior self, as the foundation of a new religious
identity, related as Davis suggests to authentic political action, we are forced to
consider the possibility that the church as the characteristic community of the
Christian tradition must be left behind. As we have seen Davis is certainly wary of
the likes of Hauerwas and Milbank who focus, to his mind, too much on the
distinctiveness of the church. Although Davis himself is not shy of grounding
values in tradition neither Maclntyre's nor Habermas's notions of tradition do
justice to the operation of Christian faith. Consequently, we must revisit Davis's
understanding of tradition in the interests of uncovering a more appropriate
model. To achieve this end we must align Davis's comments on the continuity of
revelation with his understanding of the continuity in tradition from the point of
view that the directional and irreversible sequence of a tradition rests on the
recollection of socially attained stages of development.
Davis suggests that the question of continuity is not simply a problem for
understanding religious traditions, it is endemic to all traditions that regard
themselves as historically continuous. It is, then, a more general problem that
62
Davis focuses on the question of narrative. He notes that Habermas grants that
62 Davis's argument at this point picks up two other contributions to the discussion Hans Michael
Baumgartner and A Danto. However, for the purposes of this chapter we shall only pick up on
Davis's use of Habermas.
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history "... is a retrospective organisation of events and so far the analysis of
narrative has clarified the constructivity and retrospectivity of historical
i 63consciousness and knowledge." However, this continuity:
"... is based on the unifying force of the vital contexts
in which the events acquired their relevance for
participants before the historian comes along. He
[Habermas] finds the model for this pregiven unity in
the identity of the self and the unity of its life-history
kept through a series of narrative constructions.
History is an objective life context. It is not
constructed theoretically for the first time by the
historian. The constructions of the historian follow
upon and are added to the already formed traditional
64
constructions."
Davis, responding to this insight, has identified two levels of narrative. That is to
say, at one level, those produced by the participants in the course of their life
practice and, at another level, those produced subsequently by the historian, who
chooses an interpretative framework and decides on which events are relevant for
inclusion and which are not. Davis says that the former is essentially the realm of
human or communicative action. The latter is the realm of theory which, although
65
it has an ineluctable relationship to practice is, nevertheless, secondary to it.
By 'historian' Davis implies here any person dealing with the manipulation
of the history of ideas. Thus a philosopher, theologian even a scientist can be
understood on one level as an historian.66 The problem of the historian and of the
63 Davis RMS p 104.
64 Davis RMS p 105.
65 Davis RMS p 105.
66 This clarification came from a conversation with Prof. Davis. Cambridge February 1996.
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historian's influence on the narrative itself is that the historian is not in the thrall
of only pure theory in his or her activities, but is "... within the framework of his
own life-practice." Thus, to a degree, the historian's choices generate a narrative
of their own and thereby constitute an historical continuity that arises from his or
her own life. Inevitably, this impinges on his or her writing and interpretation of
historical events. At this point, somewhat surprisingly, Davis draws together
Habermas and Alasdair Maclntyre68 to show that they agree, in principle, on the
significance of narrative. This agreement arises from the realisation that all
narrative is moral narrative since it requires an evaluative framework "... in which
good or bad character helps produce unfortunate or happy outcomes." Clearly,
the parallels between this understanding of narrative and action are inescapable. If
human action, arising from the living of one's life generates a narrative and all
narrative is moral narrative then, it follows that all action is governed by moral
considerations. Moral considerations, in turn, arise from communicative action
orientated toward consensus in a pluralist environment. This is the framework for
authentic political action.
Davis has taken us from the particularity of revelation, through the matter
of identity, to the generalities of historical continuity. Thus, he concludes that
history is 'a retrospective narrative organisation of events.' Further, the act of
organisation of past events has been tied in to practice and under a vision of the
future. Two levels of narrative have been distinguished: narratives produced
67 Davis RMS p 104.
68 We shall encounter Maclntyre in much more depth in a later section of the thesis when we shall
consider the relationship between his thought and that of Stanley Hauerwas.
69 Davis RMS p 106.
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70
within the life-practice and narratives constructed subsequently by the historian.
As Davis points out, all of this can be said to pertain to revelation, according to his
description. Thus, revelation can be understood as not only historical but as
history and therefore bound up with tradition. But Davis has already noted the
positivity of revelation, and hence of history and tradition which is bound into
their particularity. Which brings us back to the question of rationality. If reason is
essentially universal, is not "... an appeal to reason an appeal to universal
principles to universal criteria and argument?" In which case, an appeal to a
particular tradition constitutes an appeal to authority, and hence exclusiveness.
Where, and to what then do we appeal when confronted by competing truth
claims in theological and ethical discourse? Reason or tradition? That question,
however, assumes that either there is absolute distinction between religious
traditions, and no shared history, and, as Davis puts it "... when confronted by the
plurality of traditions we have no defence against the relativist contention that no
72
issue between conflicting traditions is rationally decidable...," or each religious
tradition shares its continuity within the continuity of a broader history of
religions. Clearly Davis appeals to the second option as the adequate understanding
of the Christian tradition within a broader tradition based on a common core of
human experience. Davis suggests, therefore, that the solution to the problem lies
in recognising the rationality peculiar to traditions.73 Echoing the insights of
developmental psychology, Davis suggests that this rationality develops in such a
way that it passes through unquestioning stages, to reflective stages and continually
70 Davis RMS p 108.
71 Davis RMS p 109.
72Davis RMS P 109.
73 Davis cites Maclntyre at this point who has been exercised by the challenge of relativism.
Maclntyre says that "... the relativist challenge [that no issue between conflicting traditions is
rationally decidable] can be met by recognising the special kind of rationality proper to traditions.
That rationality consists in an openness to tradition." WJWR pp 349 - 369.
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reappraises its situation by constructing new narratives to respond to new
situations. Thus:
"[T]he tradition avoids repudiation and remains
worthy of rational assent as long as it can find within
itself the resources to meet new situations and
questions with sufficient inventiveness for the
reformulation and revaluation of its authoritative
74
texts and beliefs."
This rational assent must be tied into the extended history of the tradition as well
as the particularity of the historical context within the broader tradition of the
history of religion. This point is central to Davis's critical ecclesiology.
This self-reflective dynamic, Davis claims, typifies the Christian tradition
from the point of view of the critical theologian. Its history is a conflict of
interpretations of context, of sources, of its relationship to revelation, whose
continuity is achieved by narrative, the narrative of the life-world. This means
that, for the critical theologian, narrative represents two related but distinguishable
dynamics. That is to say, narrative represents both an internal conversation and an
external engagement with society and culture. The internal conversation, at times
painfully slow, at times convoluted and problematic, is still communicative action.
In the final analysis revelation, history and narrative tradition do not present a
problem for Davis, rather they provide the grounding of identity and hence
authentic political action.
74 Davis RMS p 109.
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Thus, Davis is putting forward a powerful challenge to the church.75 The
church has an impressive infrastructure for the facilitation of true communication
if only the will was there. The will is not there because the church has not learned
the lessons of the past, of its tradition. This in turn impinges on its vision of the
future. As Davis says:
"[A] vision empowers. If it does not it remains a weak
dream. So a vision has to have substantive content ... a
content that must be subject to critique. But what
then is the difference between a straight forward
description and analysis of a situation and an
empowering vision of the same situation? It ... is the
imagining of alternatives ... Empowered by the vision
76
we explore new possibilities."
Empowered by the vision of communicative rationality, Davis is led to explore
new possibilities for the church. These new possibilities call for, on the one hand,
abandoning the oppressive, hierarchical, totalising church which Davis feels is
inimical to liberation and hence the kingdom of God. On the other hand there is
the possibility of an alternative understanding of the church as a community of
discourse, which is nevertheless loyal to its tradition; that is the vision to which
Davis calls us.
Finally we return to an earlier theme of Davis's. He understands that
society is the product of free human agency in freedom governed by rationality.
75 The term Church here does not refer to any particular denomination. Although Davis is
generally considered to be a Roman Catholic theologian he sees himself, as it were, addressing
people of good will in whatever denomination, religious tradition or none to which they see
themselves belonging. Conversation with Prof. Davis Edinburgh November 1996.
76 Davis "The End of Socialism?" in Centre for Theology and Public Issues Occasional Paper no 32
After Socialism? The Future of Radical Christianity. Edinburgh 1994 pp 3-10.
77 Davis RMS p 124 and Chapter 1.
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The ongoing construction of this society is a political endeavour. Davis, as we have
seen, does not claim any special place for religion "...which should not stand apart
from our secular lives as a distinct realm of thought or action. There is no proper
or specific religious language precisely because religion is not a specifically distinct
78
realm of meaning or culture." Hence, Davis can assert that the church too is
sphere of human social practice governed by rationality. Thus, since the religious
identity that Davis has developed is broadly the same as the social, it should come
as no surprise to realise that religious and political action should not be
differentiated either. Indeed we have already seen Davis make claims for a
cognitive political contribution from religion in that it can provide the
transcendent foundation needed for sustained communication. Further to this,
religion can reasonably be expected to keep conversations going by refusing to
absolutise any finite order.79 Davis talks of global self-consciousness which seems
to presuppose the formation of a universal social order, which, as universal, will
80
not be distinctively, nor exclusively Christian. More significantly, Davis sees the
formation of this universal social order as the mission of the Christian tradition.
The Christian tradition formulated as sharing a single history and not tied to the
fixed contents of one tradition and then articulated in critical theology, according
to Davis, presents us with a means of salvaging conversations precisely because it
refuses to delineate differentiated spheres of political, theological and religious
activity.
78 Davis RMS p 118.
79 Davis RMS p 126.
80 Davis WLWD p 2.
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However, this leaves us with a related question and the topic of our next
section: given the new religious identity that Davis has established, how far can
one go away from the claims of one's own religious tradition while still attempting
to ground values in that tradition? In other words, what sort of community of
faith would critical theology as an expression of a community of discourse give us?
Davis contends that what guarantees the basic continuity of a community is the
narrative of the life world, the continual working out of just outcomes; the praxis
of a community of discourse. It is this that has primacy over the contents and
norms of any one tradition or any permanent collective body. For Davis, it
presupposes a universal community, transcending all social distinctions, the
church, as it stands, has a huge infrastructure that could if the will was there
facilitate true communication, the church did not adequately respond to the
challenge of the critical public as it developed. Thus, the church without the will
to facilitate communicative action is, in fact, an impediment to authentic political
action.81 The institutional church must, therefore, be re-formed rather than left
behind. Davis suggests that the best way to reform the church is to begin to
conceive of it as a community of discourse.
3.2.2. The Church as Community ofDiscourse
That the church should be conceived of as a community of discourse is a
provocative and important claim. Clearly, first and foremost, the church for Davis
is a community of faith formed through the first order of narrative mentioned
above, that is life practised in response to the divine initiative. However, when it
81 For Davis, the institutional church as the locus of authentic [Christian] political action is
possibly necessary but certainly not sufficient. It is necessary insofar as it can be constructed as a
community of discourse. Its dogmas and fixed contents fall into the second level of narrative.
However, the continuity of the Christian tradition is achieved by the narrative that originates at
the first level.
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comes to the second level of narrative, the theoretical, we reach the level of
doctrine and orthodoxy. This level is essential for ordering a community, even in
the most 'hands-off' manner. If, however, Davis's claims for reformation based on
the insights of critical theology are to succeed, then he has to avoid falling back
into a hierarchy of doctrine and orthodoxy. This is precisely where the model of a
community of discourse reflects, for Davis, an accurate representation of the way
the church can and should be. To develop this idea, however, we must explore the
conceptual framework that Davis deploys in coming to this conclusion.82
The essence of Davis's conceptual framework rests on two assertions. The
first assertion is that a religious tradition, as we have seen, forms a dynamic process
of historical development and modification. The second assertion is that, just as
the history of religions is a history made up of constituent elements, contributing
to the history of religion, so Christianity is not simply a unitary phenomenon. It
is, rather, a relation of four distinct but related typological models, effectively
generating a complex symbol system that allows for the mediation and
interpretation of human existence.
With these assertions in mind, Davis proceeds to identify four models of
the Christian tradition. He identifies the Mythical, the Pragmatic, the Visionary
and the Mystical models of Christianity.83 These four models represent the
character of the Christian tradition as the "...coexistence of and successive
82 For this analysis we shall rely extensively on an exploration of WLWD. See also Chapter 2 of
this thesis, footnote 34.
83 Davis WLWD Ch 2. pp 13 - 24.
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dominance of different symbol systems, partly complementary, partly in
conflict."84 Further, the models can be understood to represent epochs in the
history of Christianity. Therefore, insofar as any model coincides with an era in
Christian history and becomes dominant, it describes crudely a sequential
relationship that mirrors the move from pre-modern to modern.83 That is not to
say, however, that they represent accurately stages in the development of the
Christian tradition. That says Davis would be an oversimplification of the
complexities of history. Rather they represent concern with "...the different
possibilities available to the religious imagination as it works religious data into an
overall symbol system."86 The religious data to which he refers, relates to the
human experience of response to "... contradictory features ... such as unmerited
suffering on the one hand and the joyful goodness of life on the other."87 Davis,
not content with describing the four models, wishes to explore their relative
merits in light of both Christianity and of humanity at large in their
contemporary social, cultural and political context.
Mythical Christianity,88 has been and is the dominant model and is in many
ways the benchmark for Davis. He equates it with the presentation of a normative,
total order. It presents, he says, "... a comprehensive account of the order of the
world, of society and of the nature and destiny of the individual."89 Its influence
rests precisely on this comprehensive presentation. Typically, the mythical model
is based on a literal and historical reading of scripture and the Christian story is
84 Davis WLWD p 12 and p 14
85 Davis WLWD p 14.
86 Davis WLWD p 14.
87 Davis WLWD p 12.
88 Davis WLWD Ch 3 p 25 - 34.
89 Davis WLWD p 25.
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thence understood to relate directly to the human condition. Language, even
metaphorical language, is held to be directly related to reality, thus allowing us to
uncover patterns of relationship within the world. The Bible, therefore, represents
a realistic account of salvation history. As such, the individual is related to a
greater cosmic order, from the creation of the world, through the incarnation in
Christ to the consummation of the eschaton.
Although, the parallels with pre-modern world-views are clear, Davis
maintains that this is not the most primitive model (this distinction is held by the
Visionary model). Rather it represents the formalisation of a world-view broadly
parallel with the integration of Christianity into the Roman Empire.90 This
integration gave rise to the patristic vision of the church, with its rituals and
sacraments being part of a divinely ordered world history. We have mentioned
above the development of myth into dogma, as salvation and world history
coalesced.
"In its conception of a normative order as prior to
human intelligence and creativity, in its stress upon
tradition and the church as indispensable bearers of
revealed knowledge and value, and in its view of
language as no mere external tool but as reflecting the
patterning of reality, the mythical type of the
Christian religion is inevitably conservative in its
attitude to social reality and history."91
The effect of such conservative orientation, Davis claims, was an elaborate
doctrinal scheme that had become separated from its roots in the experiences of
90 Davis WLWDp 31.
91 Davis WLWD p 31.
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suffering, guilt and death. Dogma had lost contact with genuine human experience.
The consequence, Davis suggests, was an inability to interpret this experience.
Subsequently, there have been a number of attempts to mediate the content of this
model to the contemporary world while leaving the form unchanged. Broadly
speaking Davis characterises these attempts as liberal.92 He argues that such liberal
efforts are simply implausible. Even notable events such as the Second Vatican
Council are characterised as fundamentally conservative insofar as they attempt
"... continuance with the mythical version of the Christian religion." 93 The
church according to this model, can make no constructive contribution to the
contemporary crises of faith. The problem is that the myth cannot be sustained
much longer in the face of a "... situation that cannot be met by an orderly
development of traditional categories, but which demands something radically
new..."94 Myth, says Davis, must relate to the deepest challenges of human
existence if it is to continue as myth and not devolve into folklore. Hence Davis
calls for a radical new development within Christianity.
Having recognised and noted the problems intrinsic to the mythical model,
Davis turns his attention to what he calls the Pragmatic model.95 Pragmatic
Christianity is to be understood initially as a response to or even a derivative of
the mythical model." Within the pragmatic model the Christian story no longer
92 Davis links this type of mediation to Drey and Mohler on the Catholic side and Schleiermacher
and his descendents on the Protestant side. Curiously, according to Davis's argument, because of
their adherence to the basic form of the Mythical model these theologians though considered
liberal were actually engaged in a profoundly conservative project. The same can be said of
Lonergan according to Davis in WLWD p 63 - 64.
93 Davis WLWD p 33.
94 Davis WLWD p 34.
93Davis WLWD Chapter 4 pp 35 - 45.
96 Davis WLWD p 35.
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functions as a complete account of the cosmic order. Neither does it offer an
objective system of salvation. Instead, the pragmatic model splits the whole into its
constituent components and submits each to critical analysis as to their ability to
further the cause of human moral striving.97 The Christian religion is seen
primarily as a practical way of life. The focus falls on the individual in relationship
to God rather than upon the church as an organising community. This
relationship with God is interpreted in terms of the commandment to love God
and one's neighbour. Consequently there is a simultaneous internalisation of
religion coupled to a public manifestation of its moral practice. The church was
refashioned so that it "... no longer stood on the side of the State as an institution
of power but belonged as a social system to the bourgeois public sphere."98
"Practice in this type of religion is no longer
conformity to an objective system but fully personal,
moral action, rooted in the explicit belief and the
conscious commitment of the individual."99
This type of Christianity, Davis suggests, has its roots in the 15th Century
humanistic Renaissance.100 As a result it coexisted with the high medieval
expression of the mythical model, paving the way for the reformation and the high
Renaissance of the 16th and 17th Centuries, 101and contributing to the fragmentation
of the mythical model. A major feature of the development of pragmatic
97 Davis WLWD p 35.
9S Davis WLWD p 42. To recap, Davis is using a Habermasian term here. Bourgeois public sphere
translates from Habermas as the sphere of private people formed into a public. This in turn reflects
to the development of philosophies of consciousness from Descartes throughout the
Enlightenment.
99 DavisWLWD p 36.
100Davis WLWD p 35.
101 Davis WLWD pp 37 - 38.
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Christianity is a de-emphasis of the Christian story, with its prologue in Israel and
working out in the church, and the consequent focus on tradition. Jesus becomes
epitomised as a moral teacher and exemplar. As a result it is the contention of
Pragmatic Christianity that the "...specifically Christian meanings lay not in his
life as a story but in the content of his teaching and the moral goodness of his
actions."102 His crucifixion and death, therefore, represent the ultimate and tragic
nature of human existence. No longer emphasising an eschatological system of
salvation, religion has become a philosophy of life wherein reason and doctrine are
orientated towards illuminating the ethical aspect of human existence.103
From his analysis of the mythical and the pragmatic models of religion
Davis moves on to the visionary104 model which, he suggests, concerns itself with
aspects of human experience which the other two do not.105 In particular, Davis is
concerned that the mythical and pragmatic models are inadequate in addressing
"...the needs of the oppressed and the marginal elements in human society for
deliverance and integration."106 We can see that visionary Christianity also bears a
close relationship to mythical Christianity, particularly to the internal
fragmentation of the mythical model. Davis describes the distinguishing feature of
visionary Christianity as the distinction it draws between two worlds. That is to
say, it distinguishes between a new world which will replace the old.1C7In this
model, the Christian story emphasises the death and resurrection of Jesus as that of
a romanticised "... victorious hero, successfully completing his quest and
102 Davis WLWD pp 38 - 40.
103 Davis WLWD pp 44 - 45.
104 Davis WLWD pp 46 - 50.
105Davis WLWD p 46.
106Davis WLWD p 46.
107Davis WLWD pp 46 - 47.
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overcoming the forces of evil."108 This model represents a social and ethical
radicalism that rejects the norms of this world in favour of a commitment to the
coming of the kingdom of God on earth. Davis maintains that this model reflects
the primitive form of Christianity, which began as "...visionary message or
kerygma, offering apocalyptic hope in a new order."109Notably Davis maintains
that visionary Christianity has never been wholly absent from the matrix of
pragmatic and mythical Christianity, although it may only have survived on the
very fringes. In contemporary Christianity, however, the visionary model has
moved back towards the centre. Paradoxically, this is in the guise of two
apparently opposed forms: fundamentalism and liberation theology.
Finally, Davis turns his attention to mystical Christianity.110 lie
characterises this as the "... unmediated experience or apprehension of ... the
Godhead or Ultimate."111 He claims, further, that this is an experience of mediated
immediacy whereby the symbols and resources of the Christian tradition provide
transparent and dispensable means to this experience. The relationship between
mystical Christianity and the mainstream of the Christian religion has always been
fraught and ambiguous, since it implies that the mediating elements are not
important in themselves. Davis maintains, therefore that mystical Christianity has,
as we have mentioned already, provided an implicit critique of the ontological
pretensions of the mythical Christianity. The epistemological basis for mystical
Christianity rests on the inadequacy of any and all language to apprehend the
meaning of the ultimate. Hence there is some continuity with pragmatic
108 Davis WLWD p 47.
109Davis WLWD p 49.
110 Davis WLWD pp 51 -54.
111 Davis WLWDp 51.
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Christianity, insofar as both types consider the dogmatic content of the mythical
type to be unimportant.112
These descriptions form for Davis a platform from which he can embark
upon his normative project. This normative project is to discern what Christianity
can become for us today.113As Davis says "... Christianity is a dynamic reality,
always changing. ... The appraisal of the past and of the present to uncover the
resources that can lead us into the future."114 To this end Davis embarks on a
critical appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of the four models described
above. However, we must acknowledge Davis's own agenda in that the
interpretation of Christianity to which he leans and to which "... he is reaching
through the critical discussion of the four models of Christian religion belongs by
its fundamental principle or generative idea to the second model or type."113 That
is to say, and as we have seen, Davis's interests lie within the Pragmatic model of
Christianity. That Davis has an explicit agenda does not diminish the weight of his
insight, but it does mean that we need to pause for a moment to make some
critical observations.
Davis concedes that the inheritance of pragmatic Christianity, can best be
described as a mixed blessing.116 On the positive side the pragmatic inheritance
112 At this point we should mention the four strands of political action associated with each type.
That is to say Sacrament, ritual and moral action in this world, passive expectation/revolutionary
action and withdrawal from action into passive contemplation. Davis WLWD p 54 see Chapter 2
note 34.
113 Davis WLWD p 55.
114 Davis WLWD p 55.
115 Davis WLWD p 78.
116 Davis WLWD pp 78 - 94.
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articulates the Christian tradition as a practical way of life, understood as a
response to revelation of divine love. As we have seen, for Davis this is the locus of
Christianity's authentic religious and, therefore, political content. On the negative
side, however, pragmatic Christianity has presented two flaws. The first is its
tendency to abrogate the transcendent core in terms of which Christian practice
has articulated its own vision. Secondly, it has become bound to a language that is
essentially instrumental and is, therefore, weakened in its efforts to convey the
symbolic richness of the Christian heritage that serves its practical aim. On both of
these points, however, Davis regards the mystical model as providing an effective
counter balance to these negative dynamics. This works insofar as the mystical
model provides a means of recovering a sense of the transcendent while providing
an insight into the inadequacy of all language in the expression of the transcendent.
In turn, Davis suggests, this would generate a more pluralistic and tolerant view of
humanity's diverse religious heritage.117
Davis goes on to argue that, whenever the transcendence of "... Christian
experience has been recognised, the indispensable function of tradition and
community re-emerges, even after the rejection of a doctrinalized form of tradition
and of an absolutist form of Church authority."118 Davis's assertions about the
importance of this tradition, therefore, leads us to make some provisional
conclusions as to the shape of the community of faith that Davis envisages. We can
see that such a community as Davis would lead us to, can have its roots in divine
117 Davis WLWD pp 95 - 97.
118 Davis WLWD p 80.
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revelation.119 The result of comprehending this revelation is a post-conventional,
universalistic religious identity, both personal and social, not tied to the fixed
contents and norms of any one tradition nor to any permanent collective body,
which will alone correspond to the present level of human social development and
which will facilitate authentic political action. Authentic political action comes
about from a practical way of life that revolves around voluntary association in the
public sphere. Religion is institutionalised in the church, subject to and the subject
of social practice and organisation. The process of communication that Davis
invokes as the governing principle for his democratised church coincides with
Habermas's communicative action. Thus we can say that the impact of Davis's
critical theology on the church is the realisation of the inheritance of a mystical-
pragmatic Christianity and the subordination of the mythical-visionary legacy.
This demands, in the final analysis, a reconfiguration of the church as a
community of discourse providing the transcendent foundation for sustained
communication among human beings, despite their differences.
3.3. Conclusion
In this chapter we have been engaged in assessing the promise of critical
theology. We have seen that critical theology can exercise a profound influence on
Christian ethics and thence on the church, understood as an appropriate response
to revelation. By gaining a proper understanding of revelation we were able to
gauge the correct relationship between reason and tradition in Davis's thought.
The promise of critical theology, then, lies in the realisation of a theology capable
of redressing the excesses of modernity at the same time as making critical
119 Davis's idea of revelation is one that relies on the notion of divine immanence. It is the ongoing
story of conflict and resolution resulting from human experience. It involves scripture as a way of
making some sense of this experience.
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statements in the public sphere, thus allowing for authentic political action. Part
fulfilment of the promise of critical theology is the politicising of the church.
Politicising, or democratising the church provides the first step toward a valid
practical ecclesiology, embodying the appropriate response to revelation is to
understand Christianity as offering an ethical way of life wherein theory and
praxis are realigned, to provide a way of being and acting.
It is clear, however, that from Davis's argument the politicising of the
church requires a complete rethinking of what tradition, identity and praxis mean.
The result of this rethinking tends toward reforming rather than abandoning the
church. As such two observations must be made. First of all, we must
acknowledge Davis's basically liberal agenda. He clearly embraces the mystical-
pragmatic model of religion over and against the mythical-visionary. That the
divisions should be thus made rather than say visionary-pragmatic or mythical-
mystical reflects the insights of critical theology. That is to say, reflects a liberalism
that is identifiable by "... its refusal of any dogmatic claim to final, immutable
teaching."120 This means, inevitably a subordination of dogmatism from either the
Christian Right or Left.121 The Christian Right is typically, wary of any creative
response to new challenges, particularly in the destructive features of modern
rationality. Hence it tends to fundamentalism, stressing formal systems technical
language, narrowly conceived empirical verification and the manipulative
instrumental use of reason. The Christian left, on the other hand, "... runs the risk
of Marxistlike dogmatism in supposing that there is some radical, clearly
120 Davis WLWD p 121.
121 The terms Christian Right and Left are used by Davis in WLWD basically to denote Christian
conservatism and Christian liberalism.
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delineated, once-for-all solution to the ills of human society."122 Davis's own liberal
agenda is more political commitment to a tradition of tolerance and pluralism than
theological. Hence it is the ground for breaking the conservative/liberal deadlock
in Christian discourse.
This brings us to the second point that must be made, how can a non
dogmatic interpretation of the Christian faith be combined with a tireless living
out of the demands of Christian love? The point Davis makes is that common
action, the political action that is our concern, does not necessarily rely on prior
agreement on a set of formulated doctrines.123 It can, however, be based upon a
process of communication. He says:
"This [process of communication], if made
continuous, can keep creating afresh a common
understanding that goes beyond any previously
reached agreement, providing thus the flexibility
required for action and doing justice to the unity of
theory and practice."124
Hence Davis's call for a politicised, reformed church. It is reformed away from the
prior agreement of dogma towards a process of communication. In terms of shape,
it represents the mystical-pragmatic model. It is thus conceived of as a community
of discourse. One question remains, however, and will be the dealt with in
Chapter 6. That is to say, while Davis's church might be conceived of as a
122 Davis WLWD p 121. Davis is fortunately careful to point out that the critique of Western
capitalist society from the left is, nevertheless well founded. He does however provide the caveat
that in providing such a critique one does not automatically supply a ready made solution to the
problems.
123 Davis WLWD p 121 - 122. He suggests further that dogmatic bases tend to split under pressure
of action and create disputing factions, such as the Christian Right and Left
124 Davis WLWD p 122.
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community of discourse, does the community of discourse fulfil the criteria of
ecclesiality?
3.4. Summary
In this chapter we have analysed the promise of critical theology with
reference to Christian ethics and the church. We have seen that this analysis raises
questions of religious and social identity, plurality, rationality and the shape and
scope of tradition. In the second part of the chapter we focused on the scope and
the nature of the Christian tradition and the impact of critical theology on it. This
focused our attention on religious identity as the ground for political action. We
asked whether Davis's post-orthodoxy leaves the church behind or causes us to
rethink. It became apparent that the latter was the case. Hence, noting and
defining Davis's liberal agenda we suggested that he espoused creative disaffiliation
rather than abandonment. Creative disaffiliation leads to reformation and
reformation means, for Davis, conceiving the church as a community of discourse.
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Section 3
Stanley Hauerwas and The Promise of Ecclesial Ethics
Chapter 4. Stanley Hauerwas's Post-liberal Ecclesial Ethics
Chapter 4. Stanley Hauerwas's 'Post-liberal' Ecclesial Ethics
In the previous two chapters of the thesis I examined the critical theology
of Charles Davis. We saw that Davis took seriously the problems of modernity,
engaging with them head on. In this engagement Davis found an ally in Jiirgen
Habermas and his version of discourse ethics. We found that the methodology and
insights of discourse ethics provided, for Davis, an important resource upon which
to build what he calls critical theology which confronted and dealt with the
questions generated up by the contemporary political, social and economic
concerns of late modernity more effectively than traditional theology managed to
do. In so doing Davis led us, as it were, into the cultural desert of modernity
wherein religion scarcely flourishes.
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we turn to a second theological response to similar
questions.1 This response is found in the work of Stanley Hauerwas. As we saw in
Chapter 1, and by way of introducing Hauerwas's work to the thesis, we made
some preliminary comments and observations about his understanding of the
content and context of his work, thus showing that it is a strong challenge to
Davis. In Chapter 1, I placed Hauerwas in relation to the particular concerns of
Alasdair Maclntyre and thus in the broader area of, so called, communitarian
thought. Having provisionally identified Hauerwas's theology as 'communitarian',
by association with his philosophical antecedent, I will now examine, more
1 I noted in the introduction the concerns that Hauerwas and Davis share. In Chapter 6 I will
reassess these concerns and comment upon them in more detail.
161
Chapter 4. Stanley Hauerwas's Post-liberal Ecclesial Ethics
closely, Hauerwas's work and the promise of ecclesial ethics. This promise is that
authentic political action should, in the end, not make the world just but make the
world the world. That is to say, authentic political action represents the tactical
deployment of the art of maintaining a good society subject to the witness of the
peaceable kingdom. In the final analysis, for Hauerwas, the art of maintaining a
good society represents the conversation necessary for a people to discover the
goods they have in common.2 I will continue to explore this promise in more
depth in Chapter 5. In the meantime we have to concern ourselves with an
exposition of Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics.
Hauerwas, along with Alasdair Maclntyre, suggests that:
"... [t]his is not the first time that ethics has been
fashionable. And history suggests that in those periods
when a social order becomes uneasy and even alarmed
by the weakening of the moral bonds and the poverty
of its moral inheritance and turns for aid to the moral
philosopher or the theologian, it may not find these
disciplines flourishing in such a way as to be able to
make available the kind of moral reflection and
theory which the culture actually needs."4
The reason for the malaise in the social order is that we live in an age of relativism
and competing truth claims, wherein various groups and communities are vying
for attention. When the claims of these groups come into conflict then at the point
of effecting radical change through political action, "... we will not all share
common intuitions...one needs some account of the nature of our society and the
character of moral judgements - one needs, in short, something that looks very like
2 Hauerwas Epilogue p 25.
Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair Maclntyre (eds.) Revisions: Changing perspectives in Moral
Philosophy 1983. University of Notre Dame Press. Indiana
4 This quote comes from the preface to Revisions.
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a theory."5 There has to be, therefore, some degree of globalised discourse to
provide a platform for any kind of action. Hauerwas, however, opposes any form
of globalised discourse since no system or theory can give a complete picture and
this is precisely because there is no neutral vantage point. Hauerwas offers us,
rather, an understanding of moral discourse rooted in smaller scale narrative
traditions, which nurture character and virtue and thus foster authentic political
action.
Hauerwas, therefore, stands against 'liberal' faith and theology that seeks to
accommodate itself to the spirit of the age of modernity. To this end, Hauerwas
responds to the contemporary situation with a constructive programme of ecclesial
or church ethics presenting the church as precisely that community which offers
the necessary context for coherent ethical discourse. It is his often stated, almost
axiomatic, claim that the church should not have a social ethic, rather it is a social
ethic.6 This church, he claims, is faithful to the scriptures and imparts its message
to the social order rather than complying with the social order. It is not a
community that is constituted simply as a survival tactic for the modern world
helping Caesar keep society in good working order.7 Hence, he envisages the
church as the community of faith which attempts to integrate Christology and
social ethics, breaking down the dichotomy of agent and act and imbuing social
ethics with virtues of self-discovery.8 Hauerwas further asserts that Christian ethics
in particular is a direct challenge to the theories of autonomy upon which liberal
theologies and theories like those of Davis and Habermas are based. He insists
further on the exclusivity and distinctiveness of the church from the world,
5W. Placher Unapologetic Theology: A Christian Voice in a Pluralistic Conversation. 1989 Louisville p
92.
6 See for instance, CET pp 133 - 137 & 148, and RA pp 112 - 143.
7 Hauerwas and Willimon The Christian Century January 30th 1985 101 no. pages 98ff.
g
See Stanley Hauerwas COC p 91.
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coupled with the necessity of renouncing the liberal priority of the self. Moreover,
he wants to assert and acknowledgement that all that is good comes to us not as a
right but as a gift mediated through the narrative community of faith that is the
church.9
This agenda places Hauerwas, ostensibly, on the opposite pole from Davis.
We shall see, however, very similar themes and concerns arise as appeared in our
investigation of Davis's critical theology, and these must be addressed in this
investigation. The concerns are the nature and task of theology, questions of social
and religious identity, political action and plurality and the implications of these
themes for the church. Where Davis's critical theology leads us into the desert, this
investigation will lead us into the ghetto. Because Hauerwas conceives of the
church, or community of faith, as a counter-cultural enclave we have no option, it
appears, but to be at best circumspect about, or at worst withdraw from the sort of
cultural involvement encouraged by Davis.10
Thus, the task in this chapter is to analyse the work of Stanley Hauerwas in
order to assess the claim that Hauerwas, on his own, leaves us in an ecclesial
ghetto. This shall be done by locating Hauerwas's work in the broad spectrum of
current ethical thinking but most precisely in relation to Alasdair Maclntyre.11
This, in turn, will raise questions concerning the nature and task of theology with
Stanley Hauerwas The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics. 1983. University of Notre
Dame Press. Indiana.
10 This is generally the thrust of Resident Aliens: Life in The Christian Colony. 1989 Abingdon
Nashville (co-authored with William Willimon). In this book Hauerwas argues that the church has
a mission of its own. Its task is to be the church or a community of faith with a vision and story
which is radically different and which, in turn, tends to a different way of life.
11 In developing his ideas Hauerwas drew from Iris Murdoch's "Vision and Choice in Morality." in
Ian T. Ramsey ed. Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy. 1966 SCM Press London, pp 181-
218. In this article Murdoch brought the Platonic theme of the contemplation of the good back
into the contemporary discussion of morality. Hauerwas went a step further and argued that the
vision that shapes the moral life of Christians is not just the timeless contemplation of beauty or
goodness but a narrative vision. This narrative vision is a sense of the continuing Christian story.
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implications for the church, for identity and political action. We shall endeavour,
therefore, to explore Hauerwas's intellectual relationship to Maclntyre and his use
of Maclntyre as a philosophical ally and resource for his ecclesial ethics,
concentrating on the two main areas of virtue and religion. This will provide the
basis for a final two-part, in-depth analysis of Hauerwas's response to the nature
and task of theology in respect to ecclesial ethics and thence the church.
4.2. Stanley Hauerwas's Relationship to Maclntyre and Virtue Ethics
Stanley Hauerwas's intellectual relationship to Alasdair Maclntyre is an
intimate but critical one. Every one of Hauerwas's books is peppered with
references to Maclntyre's work that provides for him a substantial philosophical
basis from which to justify his theological claims.12 As we shall see they both share
a profound suspicion of the standard account of moral reasoning and crave a
return to substantive rationality to provide the basis for coherent, tradition-
dependent moral reasoning.13 In this section we shall examine the development of
Stanley Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics in relation to Maclntyre's virtue ethics. To
understand fully Hauerwas's position it is necessary to trace the development of
his thought from the background of Alasdair Maclntyre's virtue ethics. Where
Jiirgen Habermas concerned himself with the redemption of the lifeworld in the
interests of justice, Maclntyre is interested in recovering the notion of virtue in
public discourse. Like Habermas, Maclntyre's thoughts on this theme are wide-
ranging. Unlike Habermas, however, his impact upon theology has been much
more immediate. This is principally because of his call for a return to the tradition
of moral discourse which runs from Aristotle to Aquinas. In this section we shall
examine Hauerwas's reading of Maclntyre by highlighting the main areas of
12 Curiously, Hauerwas theological claims, if he were to be consistent, shouldn't really need
justification as we shall see in the next chapter.
13 The "standard account" is Hauerwas's shorthand for modern liberal ethical discourse TT p 15 -
39.
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connection. Hence we shall highlight, in turn, Maclntyre's efforts to return to
substantive rationality in his virtue ethics following on from his conceptualisation
of modernity; Maclntyre's concern with virtue and its relation to tradition and
practice; and Maclntyre's position as regards the viability of theology. Finally,
from this exposition, we shall relate the development of Stanley Hauerwas's
ecclesial ethics.
4.2.1 Hauerwas's Debt to Maclntyre and Virtue Ethics
In this section I will outline Maclntyre's virtue ethics. In so doing I will
establish the extent of Hauerwas's debt to Maclntyre. Maclntyre's conception of
modern society, and one with which Hauerwas agrees,14 is of a random collection
of fragments with no generally acceptable criteria for for the resolution of moral
disputes and conflicts.13 The lack of such generally acceptable criteria means that:
"The inability of philosophers to reach agreement is
notorious. And this inability extends to disagreement
over how to characterise their disagreements and as to
which of their disagreements are central to their
discipline and which peripheral ... Contemporary
moral philosophy is likely to suffer even more from
the endemic inability to agree than are such other
subdisciplines as logic or epistemology; for differing
standpoints within moral philosophy have always
been closely related to differing moral standpoints."16
Indeed, the notion of differing moral standpoints is at the very heart of
Maclntyre's and, therefore, Hauerwas's concern. On this matter, since he does not
develop a theory of society, culture or modernity he relies on Maclntyre's insights.
14 In this section it would be neither feasible, nor desirable to indicate every single occasion on
which Maclntyre is cited by Hauerwas, mostly because the references come in footnotes and end
notes. For instance this statement can be corroborated from the introduction to Revisions, AC notes
to Chapter 4 pp 179 - 183, DFTF notes to the introduction p 187 - 201. Therefore unless a direct
quotation or citation is necessary the rest of this section will represent a presentation of the manner
in which Hauerwas reads Maclntyre
15 Maclntyre AV p 104.
16 Hauerwas and Maclntyre, Revisions p 2 -3.
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The differing moral standpoints suggest to Maclntyre moral fragments, which we
manipulate with less than resounding success, are the surviving vestigial traces of
substantive moral perspectives that were once ensconced within various traditions
and practices which have been discredited by modernity. That is to say, that the
metaphysical presuppositions, which are to be traced in modernity, are at odds
with the metaphysical presuppositions of these earlier traditions and practices. For
instance, deontological and teleological ethics betray an implicit debt to divine
command or divine law ethics or rest upon some eschatological understanding of
reward and punishment. Such debts cannot be redeemed in modernity, hence the
problem. Without reference to the earlier traditions we simply manipulate ethical
fragments. Maclntyre's contention, however, is that by relocating the fragments of
moral discourse in the traditions from whence they have come we might rescue
moral philosophical discourse and provide the sort of reflection and theory which
the culture actually needs.
Put simply, Maclntyre's claim is that even the procedural notions of
rationality developed by the likes of Habermas require more significant
substantive foundations than can be permitted under the terms of the notion itself.
Maclntyre, in an attempt to ground his call to substantive reasoning, calls for a
return to the tradition of enquiry which runs from Plato, through Aristotle to
Aquinas.17 Maclntyre begins this process with a disquieting suggestion "...we
possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key
expressions. But we have - very largely, if not entirely - lost our comprehension,
both theoretical and practical, of morality." 18 Lack of comprehension leads to a
loss of coherence. Coherence can be regained only by the rediscovery of
17 See Chapter 1 of this thesis.
18 Maclntyre AV p 2.
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philosophical reflection on the virtues, discarded in modern thought. Maclntyre
says further that:
"... [m]oral enquiry moves towards arriving at
theoretical and practical conclusions about [particular]
virtues. But ... one cannot learn how to move
towards such conclusions without first having
acquired some at least of those same virtues about
which one is enquiring and without therefore having
first been able to identify which virtues they are and,
to at least some minimal extent, what makes these
particular habits virtues."19
This insight on Maclntyre's part generates a paradox wherein, by understanding
moral enquiry as a craft, one has to have reached certain conclusions even to be
able to become the sort of person that can engage in the sort of enquiry that can
reach sound conclusions.20 This paradox must be addressed and Maclntyre does so
by suggesting the need for a teacher to enable one to realise the potential for
moving towards the necessary theoretical and practical conclusions that virtue
requires. The authority of the teacher rests on his or her place within the tradition
of the practices of that craft, while the tradition itself has a didactic aspect. Hence
the craft, of architecture or moral enquiry, has a component of rational teaching
authority internal to the practice of the craft itself.21 In order to understand fully
Maclntyre's position, we must examine what he means by practice, virtue and
19 Maclntyre TRV p 63.
20 Maclntyre TRV p 63 "How is the threat of this paradox - recognisably a version of that posed at
the outset of by Plato in the Meno about learning in general - to be ... met? The answer is in part
suggested by the Meno: unless we already have within ourselves the potentiality for moving
towards and achieving the relevant theoretical and practical conclusions we shall be unable to
1 "learn.
21 Hauerwas points out that it is one of the fallacies of modern liberal education that we teach
students to be able to think and make up their own mind. "What must be said is that most students
in our society do not have minds well enough trained to be able to think - period. A central
pedagogical task is to tell students that they do not yet have minds worth making up." AC p 98.
See also DFTF p 5.
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tradition. We begin with practices for it is in the shared practices of a tradition that
substantive concepts of reason are born.
Common human social practices give rise to the virtues of common social
life. But these practices in turn depend on a narrative understanding of that life.
Maclntyre defines social practice as any:
"... coherent and complex form of socially established
cooperative human activity through which goods
internal to that form of activity are realized in the
course of trying to achieve those standards of
excellence which are appropriate to, and partially
definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that
human powers to achieve excellence, and human
conceptions of the ends and goods involved are
systematically extended."22
From this we can conclude that, for instance, marriage and the practice of
medicine are practices. Similarly, according to Maclntyre, chess and the game of
football can be considered practices. Bricklaying, however, is not a practice but a
skill in so far as it finds its point only in connection with a larger practice such as
architecture.23
Hence we can list some characteristics of practices as understood by
Maclntyre. First of all, they are end-means activities to the extent in which they
realise an internal goal. So the goal of the practice of medicine would be the
propagation of good health, in architecture the development of habitable useable
ascetically pleasing space. Secondly, the means of achieving these goals is not
12 Ibid p 187.
2' We pick up on the analogy of bricklaying because it is a theme that recurs in Hauerwas's
thought. In AC he dedicates a chapter to "The Politics of the church: How We Lay Bricks and
Make Disciples." pp 93 - 112. Here Hauerwas uses the analogy of bricklaying as a craft in relation
to the 'craft of discipleship' and the craft of discipleship in relation to the practice of being the
church.
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arbitrary. Practices must develop means of attaining their goals that are, at one and
the same time, sufficiently stable and dynamic to allow for the growth of the
practice and the human life it invests. Thus, medicine and architecture must be
teacheable to beginners but capable of evolving in the face of changing needs and
knowledge. Thirdly, and notwithstanding the foregoing, practices must contain
sufficiently definite means to generate formulable rules: which is to say "...those
standards of excellence that are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that
form of practice."24 And fourthly, the intention to achieve the goals of the practice
should identify the practitioners by their appropriation of rule-describable means.
Further to this, Maclntyre draws a distinction between goods externally
attached to a practice and those intrinsic to it.25 The example he uses is of a child
who can be prompted to play chess for sweets - demonstrating an external
relaltionship between the chess and the sweets- and the same child who plays
becaause she enjoys the game of chess itself. This child demonstrates the discovery
of "goods internal to the practice ... which can only be recognised by the
experience of participating in the practice in question."26 Participating in the
practice in question, therefore, means becoming identified with and by that
practice - in this case becoming a chess player. The extension of the analogy is
clear, insofar as Maclntyre maintains that external goods can be understood almost
in the sense of commodities and objects of competition, internal goods,
characteristically, benefit or 'enrich' the whole community of practitioners. That is
not to say that Maclntyre understands practices as simply an amalgam of technical
skills.27 Although this is a component in the broad understanding of practice,
Maclntyre wants to maintain that technical skills are "transformed and enriched"
24 Maclntyre AV p 187.
25 Maclntyre AV p 188.
26 Ibid p 188 - 189.
27 Ibid p 193.
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by the conceptions of the good and the ends which the technical skill serves: "...
no one is the master of a techne who does not understand how and in what way
the end which the specific techne serves is a good, and that understanding requires
a knowledge of goods and good in general."28
Knowledge of the good and goods in general in realtion to techne prompts
Maclntyre's further contention that virtues are internal to certain practices. In
other words, virtues are to be located in practices whose pursuit evokes precisely
those virtues. "A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of
which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and
the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods."29 Thus
Maclntyre maintains that there are a range of what he calls 'key virtues' which
allow the achievement of the internal goods of practices. Maclntyre holds that the
achievement of the goods internal to a practice can only be brought about by "...
subordinating ourselves within the practice in our relationship to other
practitioners."30 This relationship demands that we accept, as 'necessary
components' of any practice, that there are virtues which are evoked in every
practice. Thus every practice requires a particular relationship between those who
participate in it. The virtues are therefore to be understood as "...those goods by
reference to which, whether we like it or not, we define our relationships to those
other people with whom we share the kind of purposes and standards which
inform practices."31 Maclntyre argues, further, that the coherence of virtue in a
definite moral character requires the grounding of the virtues in the shared
practices and commonly agreed goods of a particular community or tradition.32
28 Maclntyre WJWR p 70,
29 Maclntyre AV p 191.
30 Maclntyre AV p 191.
31 Maclntyre AV p 191.
32 Maclntyre AV p. 191.
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Thus, to specify what is meant by talk of a particular virtue we need to further
specify a particular narrative background within which that virtue appears. This
brings up the matter of narrative and tradition in relation to virtue.
Maclntyre argues, at chapter length,33 that his concept of virtue makes sense
only within a concept of selfhood "... whose unity resides in the unity of a
narrative which links birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to
end." 34 This concept of the unity of the self gives rise to a notion of a history
within which the self is situated. The actions perpetrated by agents can only be
explained by reference to the history of institutions, which are themselves
represented by narrative display. One understands the excellence appropriate to a
role or practice, therefore, only with reference to examples which explain and
elucidate. Maclntyre writes:
"It is through hearing stories about wicked
stepmothers, lost children, good but misguided kings,
wolves that suckle twin boys, youngest sons who
receive no inheritance but must make their own way
in the world and eldest sons who waste their
inheritance on riotous living and who go into exile to
live with the swine, that children learn or mislearn
both what a child and what a parent is, what the cast
of characters may be in the drama into which they
heve been born and what the ways of the world are.
Deprive children of stories and you leave them
unscripted, anxious stutterers in their actions as in
their words."35
However, the social dimension of practices suggest that one person's life history
will, undoubtedly, intersect with others'. These intersections mean that each
individual history becomes bound up with the histories of institutions that
33 Maclntyre AV chapter 15 pp 204 - 225.
34 Ibid p 205.
35 Ibid p 216.
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which we are active participants, embody a provisional consensus about the goods
appropriate to the practice which is constitutive of that institution. Traditions
arise when such consensus is reached concerning the ordering of goods relevant to
a wide variety of practices. Thus a living tradition is one which evolves and adapts
over time, responding to the ongoing conflict and tension about the ordering of
goods.36 We can see therefore that the concepts of practice, virtue, identity,
narrative and tradition are all of a piece and co-dependent to the extent that they
inform coherent moral discourse. On the matter of tradition, Maclntyre has much
to say on the legacy of the Christian tradition of moral enquiry.37 In particular he
is interested in the fusion of Augustinian Christianity with Aristotelianism and its
expression in a rehabilitated Thomism. Indeed, Aquinas provides Maclntyre with a
dramatic illustration of a tradition of rational enquiry which is adequate for
resolving the moral problems of modernity.
Since the publication ofAfter Virtue, Maclntyre's influence on theology has
been incredibly strong. As we have surveyed in Chapter 1 and seen above, his
concerns range over three areas: ethical concepts and their position in a socio-
historic context, his contention that the Enlightenment project is doomed to
failure and that ethical discourse carried out under the guise of modern liberalism
ignores the connection between standards of behaviour and socially embodied
practices based on agreement about the goods which accrue from these practices.
Understanding Maclntyre in this way, it seems, vindicates much of what Christain
ethicists and theologians have been saying for some time. It has been suggested that
there is a new confidence within Christian ethics. Christian ethicists have become
distinctly more apologetic and polemical.38 This may or may not be the case, but
36 Ibid pp 222f.
37 See note 2 in the Introduction to this thesis.
38 Gill Moral "Communities and Christian Ethics." Studies in Christian Ethics vol. 18, no 1. 1995 pp
1-13.
173
Chapter 4. Stanley Hauerwas's Post-liberal Ecclesial Ethics
distinctly more apologetic and polemical.38 This may or may not be the case, but
our exposition of Maclntyre does show that there is at least a contemporary
philosophical ally for Christian ethics that itself relies on a methodology that
unites the concepts of practice, virtue, identity, narrative and tradition to form
coherent moral discourse. The work of Stanley Hauerwas embodies perhaps the
most energetic, polemical and apologetic (or unapologetic, depending on one's
perspective39) pursuit of the task of formulating a distinctive Christian ethic that
focuses on recapturing the significance of the virtues for the display of Christian
convictions. As such he has endeavoured to relate the concepts of practice, virtue,
identity, narrative, character and tradition to form coherent ecclesial theological
discourse.
4.2.2. Hauerwas's Differences withMaclntyre
In this regard, although deeply indebted to the tradition of virtue ethics in
general, and Maclntyre's virtue ethics in particular, Hauerwas displays a profound
difference of opinion. He says, for instance that "...Maclntyre argues that
philosophy necessarily must become the master craft if our hierarchies are to be
rational. There I fear he and I may well be in disagreement ... since I necessarily
must argue that theology, not philosophy, is in service to a community that
ultimately must claim philosophy as a servant."40 This slightly vague contention
can be illuminated by a comment made by Hauerwas as he tries to define, with
more resolution, his own activities
"... I began by trying to recapture the significance of
the virtues for the display of Christian convictions. I
am better acquainted of the Nicomachean Ethics than I
am of the New Testament. I am often more interested
38 Gill Moral "Communities and Christian Ethics." Studies in Christian Ethics vol. 18, no 1. 1995 pp
1-13.
39 See Hauerwas DFTF p 7 "That I do Christian theology in such an unapologetic, radical manner
will seem particularly offensive to those with liberal sensitivities."
40 Hauerwas AC pl82 n 16.
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in issues of epistemology and philosophical ethics
than I am in most of the work done as 'systematic
theology.' Yet in an odd way it was my increasing
appreciation of the importance of Aristotle's
understanding of phronesis, the kind of politics
necessary to sustain an ethic of virtue, and the
corresponding historicist perspective required by each
that led me to appreciate Yoder's significance."41
If we can trust self-descriptions, we can see here that he sees philosophy as the
servant to theology. That is, philosophy can be used to illuminate, and hence
enhance appreciation of, theological insight. Thus, where Maclntyre seems content
to provide a diagnosis and prognosis of the problems of modernity in terms
relating to communities in general, Hauerwas is adamant that there is a cure in the
shape of the particular community that is the church.
Hauerwas responds to the contemporary situation, therefore, with a
constructive programme of ecclesial or church ethics presenting the church as
precisely that community which offers the necessary context for coherent ethical
discourse. We should be wary, however, of regarding Hauerwas as simply
providing a facile response to Maclntyre's gloomy prognosis at the end of After
Virtue. The prognosis suggests that ",..[w]hat matters at this stage is the
construction of local forms of community within which civility and the
41 Hauerwas DFTF p 22. While Hauerwas's main ally is clearly Maclntyre, he has also been
influenced by others as will become obvious. Here we see him acknowledge the significance of
Yoder. John Milbank and Stanley Fish are two other thinkers to whom he is profoundly indebted
at the moment. See DFTF p 198 n 30, p 214 n 7, p 221 n 5, AC p 9 on Milbank and DFTF p 5 on
Fish. Wells writes, introducing Hauerwas's "... colleagues, those who share his anger with the state
of Christian social ethics in North America and from whom he learned the foundations of a
different approach. John Howard Yoder ... draws attention to the whole of the tradition [of
Christian social ethics] outlined thus far simply swallows without question the social strategy of the
Magisterial Reformers. ... What Yoder gives Hauerwas is a perspective from which he can see that
the tradition from Rauschenbusch to Gustafson is united by common assumptions that can be
seriously questioned." Transforming Fate into Destiny: The Theological Ethics of Stanley Hauerwas.
Forthcoming Paternoster Press Carlisle, p 10. Wells also notes that Hauerwas is joined in this debt
by James W. McClendon particularly in Ethics: Systematic Theology Volume One. 1986. Abingdon
Press. Nashville.
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intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are
upon us."42 In fact, as we have already mentioned, Hauerwas provides sagacious
and insightful commentary of his own upon the contemporary theological and
philosophical climate, and, as we shall see, his ecclesial ethics call for reinforcing
the integrity of the church in its mission and ministry. This is a call that, as we saw
Davis also issued. It will become clear that, though they share some intuitions
concerning modernity, they reach apparently quite different conclusions.
Nevertheless, I maintain that Hauerwas provides the strongest possible challenge
to Davis's critical theology, because to return to Benhabib's comment "... if
communicative or discourse ethics is to be at all credible, it must be able to meet
the kind of challenges posed by Maclntyre and Hauerwas."43
It should be noted, at this point, that whereas I described Davis as basically
liberal, to the extent that while trying to break the liberal conservative theological
deadlock he confessed to liberal political inclinations, Hauerwas has been described
as post-liberal.44 This designation comes from his association with the likes of
George Lindbeck, Hans Frei and Ronald Thiemann. Although Hauerwas has
concerns and even approaches in common with Lindbeck in particular, there are
nevertheless significant differences.45 While Hauerwas can be readily aligned with
Lindbeck and Frei, in seeking to perpetuate Barth's understanding of theology as
narrativist explication, he can be seen to be more radically post-liberal than
either.46 Hauerwas's approach is certainly less complicated and probably more
42 Maclntyre AV p 253.
43 See Benhabib op cit.
44 Jeffrey Stout says Postmodern theology "[a]lso called 'posdiberal theology'; the quest initiated in
recent years by the most interesting American followers [also known as the Yale school] of Karl
Barth, to get beyond all forms of modernism in theology; either a cul de sac or the harbinger of a
new theological age (too soon to tell)." Ethics After Babel: The Languages of Morals and Their
Discontents. 1988 Beacon Press. Boston MA. pp 301.
45 See Placher Unapologetic Theology, pp 17 - 21, & 154 - 174. Lindbeck The Nature ofDoctrine:
Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age. 1984. London.
46 See Milbank "Critical Study" Modern Theology No 4. 1987 - 88, pp 211 - 216.
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profound. That is not to say that Hauerwas could ever be described as simplistic.
For instance, Lindbeck wants to place the world in the text rather than the text in
the world and in so doing:
"... he reduces the bible and doctrine respectively, to
a set of fixed narrative structures and instantive rules
for performative practice which allows Christianity to
remain 'essentially' the same in a series of different
'translations' to meet the terms of varying historical
contexts. The trouble with Lindbeck is not simply a
sealed off sectarianism, but much more a continued
liberal essentialism in new structuralist guise."47
For Hauerwas the bible and the Church form a single dynamic, inhabited
narrative. This dynamic represents the possibility of a different history embodied
in the church and given by God in anticipation of the kingdom. There is no
difference, then, between the world's history and God's history because God is
God of both the church and the world. So, whereas Lindbeck generated a
text/context dualism, Hauerwas creates a unity. This carries over into Hauerwas's
political insight where Christians do not operate as an isolated sect but operate in
the world as Christians.48
For the purposes of this thesis, therefore, we will take the term post-liberal
in two ways. In the first instance, and for the purposes of this chapter, we shall
take it as a simple means of distinguishing between the liberal agenda of Davis
designating, therefore, Hauerwas's efforts to overcome the failures of liberal
theology and assert his thesis that "... questions of the truth and falsity of Christian
convictions cannot even be addressed until Christians recover the church as a
political community necessary for our salvation."49 The post-liberal agenda that
47 Ibid, p 212.
48 Hauerwas AtN p 2.
49 Hauerwas AC p 26.
177
Chapter 4. Stanley Hauerwas's Post-liberal Ecclesial Ethics
Hauerwas embraces is to insist on the Christian legitimation knowledge and the
social order being thoroughly Christological and ecclesiological.50
In the second instance, in Chapter 7, we shall return to the term post-
liberal and consider the consequences of using it to denote a method in theology
that is broadly speaking non-foundational. That is to say, a method that sees the
Christian tradition as "... 'an historically extended, socially embodied argument ...
precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition.' 'The Christian
faith' is that set of beliefs and practices which in their social and historical reality
provide the context for arguments about which beliefs and practices ought so to
function."51 Insofar as it refers to a non-foundationalist position, the designation
post-liberal unites Davis and Hauerwas to the extent that Davis appreciates and
applies the insights of Habermas's non-foundationalist position.52 In this regard a
50 See particularly Hauerwas CCL pp 136 - 147 & 169 - 177. Hauerwas exercises and exorcises his
interest in Barth's theology and ethics, understanding that Barth concedes to a degree the
significance of character. However, Hauerwas contends that Barth finally relies on a preference for
a language of legal command and thus criticises his ethics as concern with what we do rather than
what we are.
51 Ronald Thiemann Revelation and Theology: The Gospel as Narrated Promise. 1985. Notre Dame
University Press. Indiana.
52 Although the discussions surrounding foundationalism and non-foundationalism in philosophy
and theology are many and varied, here we shall restrict ourselves to understanding it as follows.
Beliefs fall into two categories. The first category that need the support of other beliefs and the
second category in which beliefs are held to be self-evident. For a foundationalist in order for a
belief to be rational it should be based on the foundation of either empirical or rationalist,
deductive or conceptual justification. The most common response to this type of foundationalism
is an approach that acknowledges no prior starting point for argument. Rather it relies on an
appeal to what W.V. Quine suggested was a web of beliefs. Thus "... a discipline is rational not
because it has a foundation, but because it is a self-correcting enterprise that examines all claims, all
relevant background theories - even though not all at once." Schtissler Fiorenza Foundational
Theology: Jesus and the Church. 1986. New York, p 287. This is clearly an adequate description of
Davis's critical theology. Hauerwas's commitment to non-foundationalist narrative theology is
more problematic. Is there such a thing as the 'Christian story'? Even an appeal to scripture does
not clear that up. Different denominations adopt varying collections of books as the definitive
canon, and even if everyone agreed one might argue that it still does not constitute one story.
From there, as the variety of understandings of the unity of the story increase, one can argue that it
does not take long for the notion of one story to become incoherent. That is to say nothing of the
variety of interpretations that the church, the continuation of the story, has come up with over the
centuries. Where is the proof the Christian story is true? Is there some universal arbiter? Because
Hauerwas does not expand on ontology he has been accused of being a relativist who can give no
reasoned argument as to why Christianity is more worthy of commitment than any other
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point of which to take note and one to which we shall return in a later chapter
when discussing catholicity, is Thiemann's insight that "[i]n order for rational
argument to occur between proponents of theologically diverse positions, one
simply needs some set of common beliefs from which to begin the process of
persuasion. The more extensive the set of beliefs held in common, the broader the
range of agreement is likely to be."53 Having made this observation, though, we
can anticipate a common theme in both Davis and Hauerwas. That is to say they
are both Christian realists.54 For Davis this means that rather than knowledge
being foundational, love is foundational.55 For Hauerwas as a post-liberal this
means advocating a universalism of love, embodied in the church in anticipation of
the peaceable kingdom.56 It has been further suggested naming this as the Christian
narrative makes Hauerwas dependent on confessional language.57 This comment
raises the issue of the scope of the tradition, community or church in question and
the attendant charge of sectarianism.58 In the meantime, in this chapter, we shall
carry on to examine Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics.
of life. Indeed, Hauerwas admits that there is no objective way of choosing between Jew, Christian
and Muslim (CET pp 10 - 11).
55 Thiemann Revelation and Theology p 69.
54 Hauerwas represents an orthodox Christian realism resting, as we shall see, on revelation. We can
reasonably ask of him, therefore, does he not rest his case on claims that he cannot justify? Should
he not be more explicit about the ontology that lies behind the theological statements that he
makes: is he not simply a fideist? Indeed, Hauerwas does not elaborate much on what he means by
revelation or even ontology and appeals more often to his interest in ethics as primary. Hence he
can't be expected to explain everything. However, underlying all of Hauerwas's proposals is the
insight that Christian truth claims are about lives and not propositions. Wells claims that this makes
him "an unusually pragmatic realist." Transforming Fate into Destiny p 133.
55 Davis WLWD p 117 Another point of contact between Davis and Hauerwas lies in Davis's appeal
to Frei's understanding of realistic narrative.
56 See John Milbank's review of Davis RMS Theology 98 1995 pp 320 - 322 where he puts this
forward as the post-liberal agenda. Hauerwas US contains this argument.
57 Gloria Albrecht "Article Review of In Good Company: the church as Polis" Scottish Journal of
Theology 50 no.2 1997 pages 219 - 227.
58 This new form of confessional foundationalism is criticised by Linell Cady "Resisting the
Postmodern Turn" in Sheila Devaney (ed.) Theology and the end ofModernity. 1991. Trinity Press
International Philadelphia. This is also quoted by Albrecht op. cit.
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4.3. Hauerwas's Communitarian Concerns
I wish to maintain Hauerwas presents an energetic challenge to Christian
ethical discourse that relies on natural law to give common ground in the attempt
to contribute to the pluralistic public debate on politics and ethics. This agenda
places Hauerwas, ostensibly, on the opposite pole from Davis. We shall see,
however, that very similar themes and concerns drive and arise from their
theologies, and these must be addressed in this investigation. The concerns are,
broadly, the nature and task of theology, questions of social and religious identity,
political action and plurality and the implications of these themes for the church.
As we have noted, while Hauerwas displays some hesitancy at being
described as a communitarian,59 and that he is interested in advocating a particular
kind of community. That is to say, he is advocating the church, typified by
particular characteristics, as the best model of community rather than arguing the
priority of community generally.60 However, the constructive nature of his
programme places his work among shared concerns covered by the adjective
'communitarian.'61 These concerns number four. The first is the coherence, or lack
of it, of modern liberal society, and the theories upon which it is based, as a
suitable background for intelligible ethical discourse. The other three, interrelated,
concerns are the status of the individual; conceptions of the 'good' against rights;
59 Reinhold Hiitter "The ecclesial ethics of Stanley Hauerwas." Dialog 30 Summer 1991 pages 231 -
241. Anthony B Robinson "The Church as Counter-cultural Enclave." Christian Century 107
August 8 - 15 1990 pages 739 - 741.
60 See Rasmussen The Church as Polis pp 271 - 274.
61 For an excellent concise discussion of these concerns see Ted Koonz "Mennonites and
Postmodernity" in The Mennonite Quarterly Review. 63 Oct. 1989 pp 401 - 427. While I use the
term communitarian, I invoke it in the same way as I described Davis as post-orthodox. That is to
say I recognise the provisional nature of the description while using it to situate Hauerwas's
thought in a broad philosophical/theological context. A description such as communitarian could
never do justice to the scope and vitality of Hauerwas's vision.
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and concern with character. We shall use this collection of 'communitarian'
concerns to aid in our analysis to establish the shape and extent of Hauerwas's
ecclesial ethics.62
4.3.1. The Incoherence ofModernity as the backgroundfor Ethical
Discourse
The modern problem of privatisation of religious convictions looms large
in Hauerwas's agenda. Privatisation of religious conviction directly fosters the
attempt of contemporary moral theories to "... secure foundations unfettered by
the contingencies of our histories and communities."63 Like Maclntyre, Hauerwas
prefers to see the differentiation that gives impetus to this privatisation as
'fragmentation'. His attitude to the public sphere is, therefore, best described as
suspicious. The plurality that results from this fragmentation is simply another
name for confusion. In this confusion the church, as Hauerwas sees it, can
participate in public life only to the extent and on the terms laid down by the
dominant social polity or culture. To put it another way, Christians thus described
are engaged in inauthentic political action. Instead of developing a theory of
culture, then, Hauerwas wants to question the assumptions that adapt Christian
theology, ethics and political action to the needs of the culture. In questioning
these assumptions he wants to equip the church to be the church and to live, as it
were, in the world but not of the world. Hence Hauerwas's serious contention
62 One of the problems with Stanley Hauerwas's thought and writing is that it does not lend itself
easily to systematic descriptions. His writing is deliberately piecemeal and very often his
substantive convictions and theoretical approach combine when he reflects on particular issues. It
is no easy matter to distil a systematic representation of his work apart from these particular
concerns. In trying to do so, or if one attempts to force it into a system, one would do violence to
the integrity of his thought. Nevertheless to generate an accurate comparison with Davis some
degree of systematisation is necessary. To this end we have chosen to utilise the communitarian
concerns with the coherence (or lack of it) of modern liberal society as a suitable background for
intelligible ethical discourse, the status of the individual, conceptions of the "good" against rights,
concern with character, as hooks for the following analysis. For more on this see Chapter 7 on
Milbank. Rasmussen faced the same problem in generating a comparison between Moltmann and
Hauerwas. Church as Polis pl76 - 179.
63 Hauerwas PK pp 2 - 15.
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that the first task of the church is not to make the world just but to let the world
be world. The church, then, does not have a social ethic it is a social ethic.64
Consequently, there is a de facto responsibility to advise on matters of public
polity to the extent that they impinge on the well-being of the church and its
members. He argues long and hard that what is needed is not "... theory but actual
engagement with other people in hopes of finding and securing common
commitments. "65
Hauerwas argues, then, that all moral reasoning is radically contextual and
narrative-dependent. As a result we must come back to the question of relativism.
For Hauerwas, in the context of modernity, moral notions "... describe only as we
have purpose for such descriptions which means that they do not merely describe
our activity; they also form it."66 Therefore, these notions are purpose dependent
and are embedded in, and so affected by, specific narratives. Consequently when
such a notion is challenged it becomes extremely difficult to resolve the conflict.
The conflict cannot be reduced to relations between the principles and the facts
because perceptions of both are formed by different narratives. In the case of
justice, for instance, outwith a narrative community could we even assume that we
share enough to know what justice might mean? The answer is no, unless we share
a common narrative. For instance, for Hauerwas, understanding and discerning
justice, as with all other moral notions, requires that we take up a distinctive way
of life. Following Maclntyre, Hauerwas says talk of justice only makes sense when
bolstered by more substantive moral language, that is to say the language of virtue.
Gloria Albrecht67 says that, for Hauerwas, "... [ljanguage is not just a neutral set of
64 Hauerwas RA p 43, COC p 40, PK p 99, AN p 74, CET p 101.
65 Hauerwas PK p 60, COC p 106.
66 Hauerwas TT p 21.
67 Albrecht op cit. See also Gloria Albrecht The Character ofour Communities: Toward an Ethic of
Liberationfor the Church. 1995 Abingdon Press Nashville.
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symbols: it is the symbolic representation of the meaning and value of the
community that has formed it. As we learn our language we literally learn to see
and understand our experiences." In this light the confusions of modernity are
made intelligible from the perspective of narrative and tradition dependent
discourse.68
A final consequence, for Hauerwas, of the incoherence of modernity as a
background for ethical discourse echoes Maclntyre's concerns about the
manipulation of ethical simulacra. That is, the modern liberal society is inherently
violent and its polity is characterised by coercion. He says that liberal "... politics
is finally an arena of limited options in which ideas must be wedded to the power
of self-interest for the realization of relative goods."69 In this world social life is
understood as power struggle and human relations deteriorate into "...forms of
manipulation to maintain dominance."70 Economic and political systems regard
self-interest as the dominant public virtue:
"We see ourselves and others as but pawns engaged in
elaborate games of power and self-interest. I do not
mean to suggest that there has ever been a time or
social order from which manipulation was absent.
What is new about our present situation is that our
68 Albrecht is not completely convinced by this understanding of language nor by Hauerwas's
project. She says: "Hauerwas represents ... the appeal to traditioned community. With and
acknowledged debt to Maclntyre and Stanley Fish, Hauerwas argues that intelligible human action
requires the pre-existence of a particular community and its language which gives an individual the
means of interpreting the material reality of the world and of one's interactions with it." Although
she acknowledges a certain congruence in their interests, she claims that Hauerwas does not subject
the traditioned community to the critique that is levelled at liberalism.. She says that if it is true "...
that the confessional language of a tradition is all Christians have to fall back on, then who the 'we'
is who have the power to define confessional language becomes very important. Who has access to
the social power within this tradition to describe it? Do 'Christian' descriptions and practices,
formed within a defense of oppressive practices mediate oppression? By Hauerwas's own account of
material practices how can they not? By ignoring these questions, Hauerwas resists the full
implication for ecclesiology of his epistemology. He repeats the errors for which he condemns
liberalism."
69 Hauerwas DFTF p 10.
70 Hauerwas SP p 56 & COC p 84.
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best moral wisdom can conceive of no alternative. We
seem only to be able to suggest ways to make the
game more nearly fair."71
This negative and suspicious conception of liberal society permeates all of
Hauerwas's work. It is to this that he refers when he talks of Christians affiliating
themselves to the liberal polity and thus losing their Christian vision.72 We shall
return to this issue when we consider the choice between conceptions of the good
or the right.73
4.3.2. The Status of The Individual
In the light of a tradition-dependent discourse, the second of Hauerwas's
concerns that we ought to consider is the status of the individual.74 For Hauerwas,
the general denial of the individual as the locus of ultimate value and meaning has a
correlative assertion that value and meaning, in fact, reside in larger, human
concerns. Within these concerns the individual retreats, as it were, into the crowd.
Consequently, the values attached to the individual in liberal theory, and
associated with the language of rights also recede. For instance, Hauerwas says that
it is not true that T am born to be happy since death is the end of my life, both
teleologically and temporally. Therefore, T am born to learn to die for the right
thing. Obviously this right thing must be something larger than myself.75 The
highest good, then, is not individual self-fulfilment or happiness independent of a
71 Hauerwas PK p 9.
72 Hauerwas refers us to a recent book in support of this contention. He cites Michael Himes and
Kenneth Homes O.F.M., Fullness and of Faith: The Public Significance of Theology. 1993. Paulist
Press. New York. They suggest that Christian belief in the trinity is not at odds with commitment
to human rights. Hauerwas says he is puzzled by why they think that this matters and who they
are trying to convince. He concludes that they might be trying to convince Catholics that they can
be good liberals. In so doing they paint God as "... the great liberal bureaucrat." DFTF p 190
73 Hauerwas refers "those anxious for an adequate characterization of liberalism" to his chapter
"Killing Compassion" in DFTF p 164 - 176 or to Maclntyre's WJWR.
74 These considerations come mostly from two books of Hauerwas's namely, COC and PK unless
otherwise stated.
75 Hauerwas COC p 86.
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shared life with others. Hauerwas's paradigmatic description of Christian person-
hood sums this up "... [s]uch a people do not believe that everyone is free to do
whatever they will, but that we are each called upon to develop our particular gifts
to serve the community of faith."76 Thus, for Hauerwas, the community of faith
describes the parameters of concern for the individual, and is constituted by
groupings such as the family and church and the relationships within and between
them. This in turn gives substance to the larger human concerns that he has in
mind. Moreover, these groupings obtain a moral priority which, broadly speaking,
they are denied within so called liberal theory.77
Therefore, individuals simply cannot be understood when abstracted from
their historical and communal contexts. Histories and communities are not things
that can be chosen randomly but are central to, and definitive of, the individual's
identity. Thus, identity is a central concern for Hauerwas. It would not be fair to
say, however, that Hauerwas's understanding of the individual rests on the value of
the individual, rather it rests on the respective understandings of the individual's
potential fulfilment within the community. For the communitarian, this is
dependent on the ongoing fulfilment of the community from which he or she
derives his or her identity and not independently of it.78 For Hauerwas the ecclesial
theologian, that fulfilment and the identity that ensues is tied to the church. Hence
we realise Hauerwas's concern with identity.
76 Hauerwas PK p 103
77 Hauerwas COC chapters 8 & 9.
78 For instance, this is particularly clear in Michael Sandel's criticism of John Rawls. His critique
rests precisely on the contention that Rawls has misunderstood and therefore misconstrued the
self. Thus Rawls's individuals, behind a veil of ignorance, are not real people at all. See Sandel
Eiberalism and the Limits ofJustice. 1982. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
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4.3.3. Conceptions the Good against Conceptions ofRight
The third concern that we ought to examine is Hauerwas's suspicion of the
liberal priority of rights over conceptions of 'the good'. Put simply, the difference
lies in a question of maintaining a society where individual rights are guaranteed
over against communities that foster conceptions of the good. Much talk of rights
presumes that individuals should pursue their own interests. Hauerwas says:
"We have made freedom of the individual an end in
itself and have ignored the ... fact that most of us do
not have the slightest idea of what we should do with
our freedom. Indeed the idealists among us are
reduced to fighting for the freedom or rights of others
to realise their self interests more fully..."79
In a similar vein, as I pointed out in the introduction, Charles Taylor has noted
that as moderns there is a strong sense that we demand universal justice,
beneficence, equality, self-determination and the avoidance of death and suffering.80
In other words, Hauerwas suggests that we might want to be good people but since
we the good boils down to self-interest because "... we have lost any idea of what
that could possibly mean."81 Indeed, Hauerwas repeatedly points out that notions
of individual rights undermine the very communities that give our lives meaning.
Hauerwas comments that the language of rights seems to embody, at least in
principle, "...the highest human ideals" while it endorses the "...assumption that
anyone who does not agree with such rights is morally obtuse and should be
'forced to recognize the error of his ways."82 He goes on to conclude that even
allowing for the kernel of good that rights and the language of rights possess, they
actually provide a powerful justification for violence. Moreover, he says, to the
extent that language of rights "... 'absolutizes the relative' in the name of a
79 Hauerwas COC p 80.
80 Charles Taylor Sources of the Self: TheMaking ofTheModern Identity p 495.
81 Hauerwas COC p 80.
82 Hauerwas PK p 61.
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universal that is profoundly limited and limiting just to the extent that it tempts us
to substitute some moral ideal for our faithfulness to God."83
A good society, therefore, rather than protecting or guaranteeing rights
should be in the business of being good (virtuous). A society will be virtuous to
the extent to which the individual members are virtuous and this will in turn
nurture more virtue in the individuals. So that, ethically speaking, the primary
language should not be of rights but of virtues and how to nurture them. Hence
we realise the concern with political action that Hauerwas describes as the
conversation necessary for a people to discover the goods they have in common.
Nurturing virtues, therefore, equates, as we shall see, with political action. A
society that operates along the lines of practising virtue helps the wider society not
by abandoning the practice of virtue but by embracing it.
4.3.4. Character andMoral Discourse
This leads us to consider a fourth concern of Hauerwas's, that is the
concern with character, wherein identity and political action coalesce so as to form
the moral agent. For Hauerwas the stress on character is a necessary response to
the liberal mode of ethics which is in fact self-fulfilling and self-perpetuating: "...a
social order that is designed to work on the presumption that people are self-
interested tends to produce that kind of people."84 Opposed to the notion of self-
interest is the notion of a 'common good'. The common good must, somehow, be
achieved and preserved and the greatest possible common good attained. For the
liberal, the common good is simply the sum total of individual goods or interests.
83 Ibid.
84 Hauerwas COC page 79.
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Hauerwas argues, however, that this simple aggregate equation is fallacious. Hence
his concern with character or, to put it another way "... the qualification of man's
self agency through his beliefs, intentions and actions, by which a man acquires a
moral history befitting his nature as a self-determining being."85 Obviously this
definition requires some serious unpacking, and we shall do so in the course of the
following section. In the meantime, though, we should pick up a qualification that
Hauerwas himself presents. When using the word character, and after an extended
treatment of the etymology of the word, Hauerwas tells us that for any:
"[fjull theory of character it is not enough simply to
indicate phenomenologically the basic elements of
having character in terms of the determination of the
self. In other words it is not enough to explain the
'how' of the persistency of the self that allows a man
to acquire a moral history which informs his action in
the present and directs him in a particular way
towards the future, but the 'what' must also be
included. In order to explain the 'what' it is necessary
to put the agent in the context of the communities
from which he draws his moral norms, values and
direction."86
Clearly, then, the 'what' and the 'how' combine to form character which pertains
precisely to the virtues (norms, values and direction) nurtured in the community
which nurtures the individual. Thus, since modern society lacks the coherence that
can make meaningful moral disagreement and discussion possible, virtues like
justice become legal currency for getting strangers to co-operate87 and character,
such as it is, is understood merely in terms of 'how' at the expense of the 'what'.
For Hauerwas the church seeks to unite the how and the 'what.' The 'what'
represents the character of God revealed in the Christian stories. The 'how'
represents the church's teaching and developments of particular habits and
85 Hauerwas CCL p 12.
86 Ibid page 17.
87 Hauerwas AC pp 60-61.
188
Chapter 4. Stanley Hauerwas's Post-liberal Ecclesial Ethics
practices derived from its understanding of virtue. So, in the same way as one
trains to be a doctor,88 becomes an apprentice to be a bricklayer,89 so one practices
with experts to become a Christian disciple.90 An example of how this works in
practice arises when Hauerwas displays some caution about characterising
Christians primarily in terms of 'love', Christian, divine or otherwise. This
hesitation arises because of the dangers that 'love' becomes abstract and malleable.91
For Hauerwas, although love might be a characteristic of discipleship, it remains
an abstract it remains so until it is embodied within the ambit of the Christian
character, shaped by the community of faith and thus given substance. He starts,
therefore, form a position of faith and focuses on hope.
Another example of how these concerns work together is to be found in
the notion of justice. We shall here note briefly that there is an implication in
Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics for the pursuit of justice that we shall consider in more
depth in the next chapter. For Hauerwas, justice becomes a secondary virtue as the
community structures that govern behaviour and identity generate an un-confused
background for ethical reflection. Virtues that define and support the community,
such as benevolence or fraternity, as well as their performance in the ritual
practices of the community, come to the fore.92 Justice is only needed as a norm
when the virtues of a nurturing community recede.
88 Hauerwas TT pp 184 - 202.
89 Hauerwas AC pp 93 -112.
90 Hauerwas CET pp 237 - 252.
91 Hauerwas VV ppll-29&lll - 126.
92 This is an exceptionally complex and challenging argument, and will be considered in greater
detail later in the thesis when we look at justice as a test case for the types of community of faith
that Davis and Hauerwas call us to. In the meantime, see, for instance Sandel op cit 31 - 32
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4.4 Stanley Hauerwas's Ecclesial Theological Proposals
In the foregoing section we introduced communitarian concerns as a means
of providing a basic insight into the shape and extent of Hauerwas's theological
position. We saw how each of these issues raised a theological point for Hauerwas.
We could go on building up on each of these individual issues at length. It would
be more useful, however, to conclude this chapter by presenting a list of
Hauerwas's ecclesial/theological proposals distilled from these communitarian
concerns before going on to assess the implications ecclesial theological ethics on
Christian ethics and thence the church.93
4.4.1 Holy Story
Hauerwas's starting point for his project is the revelation of the sovereign
God, through the prophets, in Christ and through the church. In particular,
Hauerwas is concerned with the Kingdom of God as it is embodied and revealed in
the life, death and resurrection of Christ.94 The character of God is not, however,
self-evident in any inspection of natural laws, moral law or even in human longing.
It is, rather, revealed in the holy story of Christ, begun in the scriptures and
continually worked out in the church. The definitive aspect of the holy story is the
manner in which Christ met his death despite the apparent possibility that the
world might be saved in some other way.95 The history of the church relates the
divine revelation to human contingency and makes it the locus of connection
between God and human response.96
93 See Wells Transforming Fate into Destiny, pp 126 - 130. Wells presents a similar and extremely
useful systematic summary in these pages. He presents five theses that sum up Hauerwas's
constructive project.
94 Hauerwas SP pp 147 - 148.
95 Hauerwas PK p 76. See also Chapter 6 of this thesis n 95.
96 Hauerwas PK pp 78 - 79. This relates to the Gospel story
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4.4.2 The Human Response
While the conviction of the sovereignty of God is paramount in
Hauerwas's thought, he chooses to concentrate on the human response to
revelation.97 Revelation calls people to be holy by imitating the character of the
sovereign, holy God. It is for the people of God to be perfect even as God is
perfect.98 Christian ethics, is therefore, the process of developing the human
response to God's revelation and hence shaping the historical community that
embodied this response. That is to say, Christian ethics should be concerned with
forming and informing the church.
Christian ethics, or theological ethics, that engage in any other practice
such as forming guidelines or principles, regardless of the kind of person involved
in implementing them, is misguided. For Hauerwas what is important is the kind
of person involved.99 Hence he can say actions are good if they lead to the
formation of good people and good people are those who imitate the character of
the sovereign God.100 Furthermore, to sustain such a people requires a community
that must also display certain characteristics.101 First, it must be nonviolent because
capitulation with violence and force abrogates one's commitment to God who is
loving and peaceable rather than forceful. In anticipation of the peaceable
kingdom, the church's witness must also be peaceable.102
97 It would be to labour the point, and inappropriate at this stage, to make too much of the
similarity with Davis in this perspective. We shall simply paraphrase Davis comment to the effect
that Christian praxis, as he construes it, is a response to the reality of a transcendent gift or
revelation. The message of revelation is, therefore, an ethical life, a way of being and acting. It may
be partially articulated in propositions. It may stimulate theoretical reflection. But it is essentially
the establishment of a practical way of life.
98 Hauerwas PK pp 76 - 86. See also Chapter 6 of this thesis n 96
99 Hauerwas COC pp 114 - 115 & TT pp 15 - 39.
100 Hauerwas PK p 81.
101 Hauerwas COC pp 9 - 35.
102 Hauerwas PK 89 - 91, COC 36 - 52, AN plOl. The significant and unique characteristic of
Christ for Hauerwas lies in the cross. That Christ accepted the cross vindicated his nonviolent
witness in the resurrection. Christ therefore makes possible the peaceful kingdom.
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Second, the church must be holy as Christ is holy. By imitating Christ's
nonviolent acceptance of his destiny, the church follows God's definitive
revelation. Consequently the church has to do two things. First of all it must resist
the temptation to be drawn into attempts to control the wider society, Secondly, it
must establish a separate politics of discipleship, that creates the right kind of
conflict, or at least the right conditions for resolution of conflict based on the
practices of forgiveness and not coercion.103 Thus, the church is the focus of God's
purpose in the world and the purpose of the church is to embody the holy story of
that divine purpose. Moral rationality, in terms of Enlightenment discourse is
secondary to such a community and the church can embrace those otherwise
excluded by such rationality.104
4.4.3 Christian Character
We have already mentioned Hauerwas's communitarian concern with
character but, at the risk of some repetition, it is worth stressing the point as
regards Christian character specifically. The primary question for Christian ethics
is what sort of person one is or wants to be. Hence Christian ethics develops those
practices that pertain to the formation of Christian character. Hauerwas contends
that character is most fully displayed in the face of adversity. In the face of the
irremovable negativities of human existence, such as death, Christian character
does not assume that life is a virtue or a value in itself. The Christian history of
martyrdom for instance suggests that some things are worth dying for.105 Hauerwas
cites other moments of adversity, such as the unwanted pregnancy or the retarded
child, all of which raise the spectre of self-deception.106 Self-deception can only be
103 Hauerwas CET 89 -99. The parallels with Davis understanding of the role of the church in
creating optimum communication and Habermas's ideal speech situation are to be noted. We shall
return to this matter in Chapter 7.
104 Hauerwas lists the mentally handicapped, infants and the mentally ill as examples. VV pp 187 -
194, TT pp 147 - 168.
105 Hauerwas TT pp 101 -115, CET 199 - 220.
106 Hauerwas COC pp 167 - 174.
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overwhelmed by truthfulness. Truthfulness, in turn, can only be achieved by
commitment to the truthful story of God.107 And commitment to that truthful
story can only be sustained through the truthful community of character that is
the church.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter we have developed the theme of Hauerwas's distinctive,
post-liberal ecclesial theology. We have seen that while this theology makes use of
the philosophical insights of Alasdair Maclntyre, it does not simply import them.
For instance, Hauerwas disagrees with Maclntyre about the relationship and
priority of philosophy over theology. We argued that Hauerwas's post-liberalism
offered three important insights. First of all, as Christians our understanding and
interpretation of reality is mediated through the narrative community of faith that
is the church. The church in turn is Christological in focus. Secondly, Christian
ethics, focused on the church as the normative community, in particular is a direct
challenge to the theories of autonomy upon which liberal theologies and theories
like those of Davis and Habermas are based. Thirdly, he insists on the exclusivity
and separateness of the church from the world and the necessity, as he sees it, for
renouncing the liberal priority of the self while acknowledgement that all that is
good comes to us not as a right but as a gift. Finally, as with Davis, this suggests a
much more radical agenda than either political or liberation theologies,
endeavouring as he does so to relate the concepts of practice, virtue, identity,
narrative, character and tradition to form coherent ecclesial theological discourse
that is not compromised by capitulation with modernity.
107 Hauerwas DFTF pp 31 - 88.
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From here we go on to the second aspect of the task and, in the next
chapter, in light of Hauerwas's ecclesial theology, examine the themes of the
nature and task of theology in the public sphere and its implications for political
action and the church. We shall do this as part of an exploration of the promise of
ecclesial ethics, for while it is Hauerwas's intention to develop a meaningful
theological discourse, he is also concerned with coherent ethical practice. The
promise of ecclesial ethics is that authentic ethical practice or political action
should, in the end, not make the world just but allow the world to be the world.
That is to say, authentic political action represents the tactical deployment of the
art of maintaining a good society subject to the witness of the peaceable kingdom
which, in the final analysis, for Hauerwas represents the conversation necessary
for a people to discover the goods they have in common.
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Chapter 5. Stanley Hauerwas and the Promise of Ecclesial Ethics
As I noted in Chapter 4, Hauerwas provides a political insight to the effect that
Christians do not operate politically as wanderers in a cultural desert, nor as an
isolated sect but operate in the world as Christians. Like Davis, then, Hauerwas is
concerned with what we are calling genuine political action. This concern stems from
his avowed intention to stand against what he calls 'liberal' faith. Liberal faith, as
Hauerwas understands it, seeks to accommodate itself to the spirit of the age of
modernity. The spirit of the age against which he rails, involves a privatising of faith
and a reduction of Christian activity and, therefore, relevance to the public sphere
with little or no recognition of a separate, spiritual dimension.1 In this context,
'liberal' Christian ethics that capitulate with the prevailing culture and, therefore,
with the 'standard account' of modern moral discourse.2 Again, the parallels with
Davis's concerns are clear. As we have already pointed out, Hauerwas responds to this
situation by offering a programme of ecclesial ethics presenting the church as precisely
that community which provides the necessary context for coherent ethical discourse
and political action. Thus, genuine politics, according to Hauerwas, is "... the
conversation necessary for a people to discover the goods they have in common."3
1 Hauerwas CC p 121 and PK pp 96f.
2 Hauerwas CCL p 25.
3 Hauerwas Epilogue p 179
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This view has several serious implications when considered in the context of
ecclesial ethics. First of all, there might be something describable as a common good
that is public in nature. Secondly, therefore, deliberation on the sort of people,
communal structures and authority structures involved in shaping this kind of politics
is essential. Thirdly, we are required to consider the question of religious identity and
character in Hauerwas's Christian ethics and the shape of the community or church
that sustains this identity and character. It is the purpose of this section to explore
these implications in depth. In the first part of this chapter, therefore, I will first of all
explore Hauerwas's conception of religious and social identity. Secondly I will explore
the consequences of this understanding for the Christian tradition. Thirdly, I will
raise the issue of revelation and plurality. Having done this we will move on, in the
second part of the chapter, to consider the implications of Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics
for the church by reconsidering the charge of sectarianism, the criticism that is most
consistently levelled at him.
5.1. The Implications of Hauerwas's Ecclesial Theology for Christian
Ethics.
In the last chapter we concluded that Hauerwas's ecclesial theology manifested
itself in an ecclesial ethic. Ecclesial ethics focuses theological reflection on the role of
the Christian community in generating norms and identity. Returning to our
definition of Christian ethics, I suggested that Christian ethics is concerned not only
to relate an understanding of God to human behaviour but to explore the appropriate
human response to God required by acknowledgement of the life death and
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resurrection of Christ as the grounding of Christian ethical reflection.4 This involves
generating guidelines, in the light of a formal understanding of revelation, for both
personal and social activity. Thus understood, Christian ethics involves consideration
of religious identity, tradition and political action. From this starting point we shall
explore and assess the impact of ecclesial ethics on Christian ethics. To this end we
shall examine Ffauerwas's understanding of religious and social identity, the
relationship of identity to the Christian tradition and the role of revelation against a
backdrop of plurality.
5.1.1. Religious Identity
As we have seen, for Hauerwas, the general denial of the individual as the locus
of ultimate value and meaning has a correlative assertion that value and meaning, in
fact, resides in larger, human concerns. The individual's fulfilment, for Hauerwas, is
dependent on the historically contingent continuity of the community from which he
or she derives his or her identity and not independently of it.3 Returning to
Hauerwas's definition of genuine politics as the conversation necessary for a people to
discover the goods they have in common, we must examine the matter of religious
identity in relation to this definition. As we have noted previously, Hauerwas
maintains that inauthentic political activity arises for the Christian when he or she
attempts to exercise a direct influence on modern, liberal polity. Such an attempt leads
to adapting to that polity and language and, therefore, colluding with the general
trend toward religious privatisation. This in turn has a deleterious effect on one's
4 See Chapter 3 of this thesis.
5 See Sandel op. cit.
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religious identity because the more one adapts the more one loses the ability to see,
think, understand and act as a Christian.6
On the other hand, Hauerwas equates authentic political action with the
practices learned by Christians within the context of the Christian community.7 For
Hauerwas, the Christian community is, quite simply, the church and the church is the
designated people of God.8 The church comprises real people existing in definite
historical and institutional forms,9 called to witness to the peaceable kingdom10 As
such the church presents a counter-cultural enclave, witnessing to the kingdom of
God in faithfulness to Christ:
"What it means to be Christian, therefore, is that we are
a people who affirm that we have come to find our true
destiny only by locating our lives within the story of
God. The church is the lively argument, extended over
centuries and occasioned by the stories of God's calling of
Israel and of the life and death of Jesus Christ, to which
we are invited to contribute by learning to live faithful to
those stories. It is the astounding claim of Christians that
through this particular man's story, we discover our true
selves and thus are made part of God's very life. We
6 This statement foreshadows our discussion of the charge of sectarianism against Hauerwas. In the
meantime we can note that central to this problem is the issue of violence. The extent that Christians
capitulate with the world is the extent to which they capitulate with the politics of violence and
coercion and hence abrogate their commitment to nonviolence. In principle, there is no reason why
Christians cannot be involved in law, government or public life as long as they are discriminating in
their involvement (COC pp 72 - 86. Wells Transforming Fate into Destiny p 133). The grounds for
discrimination rest on the choice between violence and nonviolence. It must, however, be said that
although this is the case in principle, it is difficult to see in practice how this might work, or how a
particular tradition like the church might have priority over any other.
7 Hauerwas IGC pp 6 - 8.
8 Hauerwas CC p 2.
9 Hauerwas CET pp 11 If
10 Hauerwas PK p 93.
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become part of God's story by finding ourselves within
that story."11
By 'finding' Hauerwas is of course picking up Maclntyre's understanding of practical
reason whereby one discovers one's role and the goods appropriate to the role within
a community.
For Hauerwas, though, the very notion of this kingdom, and uncovering one's
role in it, implies a politic. To be a Christian, therefore, is to be a part of this politic.
That is, to be part of the new polls.12 But how can we best describe a participant in this
new polls? If, at Hauerwas's urging, we understand the polls to be the community that
witnesses to the kingdom then we may conclude with him that participation implies
common discipleship. To summarise, for Hauerwas, becoming a Christian is to
discover oneself located in God's story, which finds its expression in the church,
which is in turn a witness to that self same story. This, it seems, is the identity which
is at stake. "Such a people do not believe that everyone is free to do what ever they
will, but that we are each called upon to develop our particular gifts to serve the
community of faith."13 This paradigmatic statement on Hauerwas's understanding of
Christian person-hood reveals the relationship of the individual to the community as
one of servitude.
It is important to mention the origins of this line of thought in Hauerwas's
work. Hauerwas starts from a point of view that is basically in sympathy with the
11 Hauerwas CET p 102.
12 Hauerwas CC pp 46 - 51 & AN p 116.
13 Hauerwas PK p 103.
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proponents of political theology.14 The fundamental point of agreement is in the
realisation "... that the meaning and truth of Christian convictions cannot be
separated from their political implications."15 Hauerwas thinks that this alone is not
enough and "... [t]hey are wrong, however, to associate politics only with questions
of social change."16 His point of departure from the interests of political theology,
therefore, comes in his understanding of genuine political activity. In taking his leave
he maintains that the church not society is the primary locus and source of politics, so
the crucial political question is "... what kind of community the church must be to be
faithful to the narratives central to Christian convictions."17 This marks a significant
departure from the political theologians in terms of the scope of the vision of the
political horizon. That is to say, where the political theologian regarded politics and
social change in the wider cultural sense to be the defining parameters of the nature
and task of theology, Hauerwas sees the community of faith describing the parameters
of concern. This is precisely because the church embodies a new polis and therefore,
according to Hauerwas's own definition, a specifically theological politics. Hence his
much vaunted claim that the church is rather than has a social ethic. Politics in the
wider sense of social and cultural change, therefore, can only be understood and
related to in the light of the specifically theological politics of the church.18
14 See Rasmussen Church as Polis. Chapter 9 part 4 "Towards a Theological Politics" pp 187 - 189.
15 Hauerwas CC p 2.
16 Hauerwas Ibid.
17 Hauerwas Ibid.
18 See Rasmussen Church as Polis p 187 - 188 where he makes a similar point in relationship to Jiirgen
Moltmann "Moltmann and political theology make politics the basic horizon for Christian theology
and practice. Hauerwas can be said to agree but their understanding of the political horizons differ. For
Moltmann the politics of the national and world communities, and more precisely power over the
national (or future world) state has priority. Hauerwas, on the other hand, sees the church, the called
people of God as the primary locus for a new politics."
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Such a perspective, and the attendant understanding of the primacy of
theological politics, gives rise to a stark distinction between the church and the world,
and the ongoing concern with Hauerwas as a sectarian. Leaving the sectarian criticism
aside for the moment we can see that the church-world distinction has significant
implications for notions of religious identity. Hauerwas says himself that, ultimately,
the church is "... known by the character of the people who constitute it."19 Since the
church is the locus of authentic political action Hauerwas clearly presents us with the
conclusion that political action has, at its heart, an issue of identity. Further to this
Hauerwas sustains a distinction between ethics as general theories and a particular
understanding of Christian ethics as theories of the Christian way of life.20 This in
turn gives rise to a particular understanding of identity relating to the Christian
tradition.
5.1.2. Identity and The Christian Tradition.
Given Hauerwas's understanding of genuine politics, we turn now to examine
in more detail exactly what constitutes the specifically Christian identity of
Hauerwas's new polis. As we have seen already Christian identity, for Hauerwas, is a
political identity, and to become Christian is to become part of the church. However,
for Hauerwas, the church is a community called to witness in common discipleship. It
is quite clear, therefore, that the defining characteristic of Christian identity for
Hauerwas is discipleship and "... if we lack that character the world rightly draws the
19 Hauerwas PK p 109.
20 James Wm. McClendon Jr. outlines a similar definition in his Systematic Theology: Ethics, p 47 "Thus
'ethics' will generally (though not always) be used here of theories of morality, that is of conduct or a
way of life; accordingly, 'Christian ethics' will refer to theories of the Christian way of life."
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conclusion that the God we worship is in fact a false God."21 Hence, the truthful life is
formed through faithful participation in a communal tradition of authentic political
activity.
According to Hauerwas, becoming part of the church is to be joined with the
body of Christ and to be immersed in its daily practices such that "... we are
transformed over time to participate in God's life."22 Christian life, thus defined,
concerns the formation of an identity which is described by the tradition-formed
community that is the church. "To become a disciple is not a matter of new or
changed self-understanding, but rather to become part of a different community with
a different set of practices."23 This suggests that Christian religious identity, for
Hauerwas, is not something that comes naturally nor automatically, but is something
that can be taught and requires training.24 Hauerwas famously invokes examples to
describe the nature of this training. The examples include the learning of a musical
instrument or the apprenticeship in the craft of bricklaying or learning a language, all
of which, he claims, demonstrate a parallel with learning to be a disciple. Moreover,
these examples suggest that one has to be initiated into a tradition maintained by a
community and taught by people who have already mastered, or are more advanced
in their study of the particular crafts.25 Thus, one learns not only what to do but how
to do it properly. Being a disciple, and for Hauerwas being moral, means that one is
formed in certain ways that involve seeing, understanding and practising in the right
21 Ibid.
22 Hauerwas VCC p 20,& PK p 93.
23 Hauerwas AC p 107.
24 AC p 93 - 111 and RA p 93 - 111.
25 Hauerwas AC p 101.
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way. "Living morally is not simply holding the right principles; it involves nothing
less than learning to desire the right things rightly."26 So, for Hauerwas, being and
doing coincide. To be a Christian means to live according to the practices of the
Christian tradition which, in turn, develop Christian characteristics in the individual.
Inevitably, highly developed ecclesial practices are required to sustain notions of
common good that genuine political action is involved in discerning. The community
of faith is therefore, a community of character engaged in transforming the individual,
over time, to become part of God's life.
To elucidate these various claims concerning character, we return to
Hauerwas's concern with virtue and virtue language.27 Hauerwas finds it useful to
substantiate his talk of discipleship with virtue language28 For the church to fulfil its
role of witness to the kingdom of God, and to provide an alternative politics, a certain
kind of people "... are required to sustain it as an institution across time."29 For
Hauerwas, this means a people of virtue. Given his particular understanding of virtue,
that means a people possessed of the goods by reference to which they define their
relationships to those other people with whom they share the practices necessary to
remember and retell the story of Christ.30 Thus, it is important to note that
Hauerwas's virtue language is derived not from general accounts of human nature or
26 Hauerwas CET p 103.
27 Hauerwas VV pp 48 - 67, TT pp 40 - 56, CC pp 111 - 152, PK pp 102 - 106, CET 191 - 197.
Hauerwas's discourse on virtue come mostly from his earlier writing wherein he laid the foundations
of his theoretical understanding of ecclesial ethics. By the time his of his later work he was no longer
interested in virtue theory in general but rather in Christian Virtue in particular.
28 For Hauerwas's relationship between virtue and discipleship the following articles are useful
Happiness pp 28f. VCC p 4.
29 Hauerwas PK p 103.
j0 This relates to Maclntyre's account of virtue. See p 171 of this thesis and AV p 191
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human good but from the life understood and depicted in the Christian story. He
says, "...there is no virtue theory in general. Rather the characterisations of the
virtues and their content, how they interrelate, will differ from one community and
tradition to another."31 Virtue is, therefore, reinterpreted by Hauerwas as the "...
skills for a people who are trying to be faithful to a journey they believe to be crucial
for God's dealing with the world."32 These virtues, then, are not to be understood to
hold true always and everywhere for everyone. They are, rather, particular to the
church and dependent on the church. That is to say, specifically Christian behaviour,
character and practice actually makes a difference not only to individual virtues but to
the very understanding of virtue itself.
Therefore, rather than taking this understanding and pursuing a description of
a well defined telos for human life, Hauerwas reverts to the metaphor of journey:
"For the telos in fact is a narrative, and the good is not so
much a clearly defined 'end' as it is a sense of the journey
on which that community finds itself. In political terms
it means that the conversation of community is not about
some good still to be realised, but the conversation is the
good insofar as it is through the conversation that the
community keeps faithful to the narrative."33
Thus the character of the Christian narrative forms the description of the virtues and
determines the most significant. It is in this respect that he describes the church as a
31 Hauerwas TheDifference of Virtue, p 260.
32 Hauerwas Happiness p 29.
33 Hauerwas PK p 119.
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community of virtue. More significantly, for Hauerwas, this virtue forms and sustains
Christian character
The connection, for Hauerwas, between the skills mentioned above and
genuine political action and identity becomes even more obvious at this point. This is
because virtue, or more correctly the virtues, thus understood is clearly political. That
is to say, Hauerwas does not deny that other communities may share a natural
understanding of virtues such as faith, hope, charity, love and so on. They may even
need such an understanding just for survival. It is Hauerwas's substantive point,
however, that the virtue the Christian community displays, deriving from the
Christian tradition, is the most true and therefore the most efficacious in terms of
engendering coherent ethical practice.34 Thus, questions about the truth or validity of
actions are to be more usefully understood as questions about the truthfulness of the
questioner. Such a question, for Hauerwas, is a question about character. For
Hauerwas,33 the struggle for truth, implies a question of character. Truth as a value is
meaningless unless it is understood in light of self-involvement. That is to say the
pursuit of true facts or beliefs, true to 'any thinking person' in the guise of a neutral
observer is a pointless endeavour.36 But the self-involvement for the Christian is
involvement in the church and the Christian story.
This marks a distinctive break for Hauerwas from other, more traditional
understandings of virtue. The Christian is not at liberty simply to adopt such an
34 Hauerwas PK p 103.
35 See, for instance, Hauerwas's TT.
36 Hauerwas TT ppl5 -39.
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understanding, as say the ancient Greek, because the Christian telos is different. For
example, Hauerwas draws extensively on Aristotle but in the final analysis cannot
build an understanding of the virtues on Aristotle's account because, he maintains,
Christianity announces a new end for humanity.37 We must, however, put another
question to Hauerwas here. In the first place we saw in the last chapter, according to
Hauerwas, that, all else being equal, there were no grounds for choosing between one
tradition and another. Thus he could be accused of irredeemable moral relativism.38
So, in what sense would the Christian vision be better or more true than any other,
and why maintain such a contention? Similarly, while acknowledging the caveat that
we noted previously, with regard to the new Christian telos, Hauerwas still imports a
conception of Aristotelian virtue via Maclntyre and Aquinas. John Milbank claims
that there is a question hanging over this idea of virtue. Milbank suggests that the
antique notion of virtue contains an unpalatable presumption of violence. Hence
would not any Aristotelian conception of virtue, however diluted, always be at odds
with the politics of the peaceful kingdom that Hauerwas advocates?39 Hauerwas has as
yet not provided an adequate response to this charge. However, an investigation of his
attitude to the form and content of the revelation that informs his understanding of
both virtue in a Christian setting and the new telos of Christianity, will illuminate his
37 Hauerwas VCC pp 9 -21. See also Rasmussen Church as Polis p 197 n 47.
38 See for instance Ogletree "Character and Narrative: Hauerwas' Studies of The Christian Life."
Religious Studies Review 6/1 (Jan. 1980) pp 24 - 30.
39 Milbank Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason. 1990. Basil Blackwell. Oxford pp362 -
376. "Hence the word arete (virtue) is always a standard of victory, and while conquest puts an end to
war, it requires a preceding war, and only ends war by war. It appears, of course, that the Greeks
believed that a stable peace depends upon justice, yet their aspiration to justice that is more than
victory is precarious. "Because virtue presupposes justice, and justice involves real peace, the ontological
priority ofpeace to conflict (peace is what is most real, most secure, most guarantees human life) is an
issue of yet more importance than that of virtue." [Milbank's emphasis]
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position with regard to the issue of relativism and with regard to the convictions that
underlie his concept of virtue.
5.1.3. Plurality Identity and the role ofRevelation
For Hauerwas, the new end for humanity is displayed in the vision of an
eschatological concept of the kingdom of God revealed through the gospels.40
Hauerwas maintains that the centre of all theological notions within the narrative
community that is the church is the story of the life, death and resurrection of Christ
with its prologue in Israel. As such it provides a series of events which are "... decisive
for God's relationship to mankind."41 This narrative is further worked out in the
community of discipleship in which:
"Jesus's life was seen as the recapitulation of the life of
Israel and thus presented the very life of God in the
world. By learning to imitate Jesus, to follow in his way,
the early Christians believed they were learning to
imitate God, who would have them be heirs of the
kingdom."42
Thus, common discipleship represents, for Hauerwas, the continuation of the life of
Christ and as such is the appropriate response to God's revelation. Further to this,
revelation provides the basic core of the Christian identity. Inevitably, in the face of a
public sphere with rational criteria for the assessment of knowledge and truth claims,
we have to weigh up the strength of Hauerwas's 'revealed' ecclesial theology.43
4u Hauerwas CC pp 44 - 46, PK, 76 - 91, AN ppl07 - 121, RA pp 86 - 92, US pp 63 - 72.
41 Hauerwas PK p 77.
42 Hauerwas PK p 78.
43 Hauerwas CC pp 53 - 71, PK pp 64-71, US pp 15 - 44.
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Hauerwas says:
"All knowledge of God is at once natural and revelatory.
But like all knowledge it depends on analogical control.
Analogies, in turn, derive their intelligibility from
paradigms that draw on narratives for their rational
display. Our narratives of God's dealing with us inspire
and control our attempt to test how what we know of
God helps us understand why the world is as it is."44
This suggests that the distinction, commonly held, between revealed and natural
theology is, for Hauerwas, a false distinction. The nature of Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics
and therefore of Christian ethics is that they are "determined by the fact that
Christian convictions take the form of a story, or perhaps better a set of stories, that
constitutes a tradition, which in turn creates and forms a community."43 As a result
the way the Christian faith helps people to interpret the world has priority over
ethical rules. Being a Christian is to "... grow into the story of Jesus and the story of
God's kingdom."46
This might suggest that Hauerwas's ethics is subject to a different set of
epistemological criteria than, say, liberal ethics. In the face of this, Hauerwas
maintains that his ecclesial ethics is not methodologically different from other modes
of ethical discourse:
"Christian ethics is not in principle methodologically
different from other ethics, for I suspect all accounts of
44 Hauerwas PK p 66.
45 Hauerwas PK p 24.
46 Hauerwas PK p 30.
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the moral life require some appeal to the virtues,
principle and narrative display of each. What makes
Christian ethics Christian is not our methodology, but
the content of our convictions."47
The content of these convictions come, as we have seen, from the community which
is attempting to be faithful to the revelation of God in Christ. In other words
Hauerwas's epistemology, such as it is, is tied to Christology and bound up in
ecclesiology.48
The distinction between revelation, tradition and faith on the one hand and
reason and rationality on the other, is only a relevant distinction when we forget the
communal basis of our values. Following Maclntyre, Hauerwas sees knowledge as
formed and tested within the communal traditions of enquiry under the rigours of
substantive rationality. As such there is no longer any need to maintain the dualism of
revelation and reason. Indeed, Hauerwas disputes any move to place revelation in a
special epistemological category. Revelation, he says, is knowledge about God, not the
method of deriving that knowledge.49 Consequently, insofar as all knowledge is
context dependent, then Hauerwas can conceive of no significant problem with
claiming a rational basis for both revelation and Christian identity in the public
sphere. We can conclude that Hauerwas does not see revelation as an independent
47 Hauerwas PK p 69.
48 Wells Transforming Fate into Destiny pl28. See also Hauerwas "Failure of Communication or A Case
of Uncomprehending Feminism." Scottish Journal ofTheology 50 no.2 1997 pp 228 - 239. In response to
Gloria Albrecht, Hauerwas writes in this article "So when Albrecht later in her review suggests that I
resist the full implications of my epistemology for my ecclesiology, I can only say that ecclesiology is
all I have. I understand, of course, that it may come as startling news to Albrecht that I do not have an
epistemology and she may find this problematic, but that is another issue."
49 Hauerwas PK p 66.
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epistemological category, separate from the church. It is not separate precisely because
the church is the embodiment of the practices and habits through which we come to
understand the character of God. Furthermore, he can allow for God to be at work in
the whole of the world:
"...once one begins with the rationality of Christian
claims about God ... we can then indicate how the very
finite character of existence is a witness to God. But the
witness is not just to God's existence, but to a very
particular kind of God that we have learned to name
through the very means God has made available to us -
that is through the ongoing practices of a community
who has learned what it means to be a creature and
redeemed."50
As we have already noted the story of the kingdom, upon which this
understanding of revelation depends, is the story of Jesus. The life and destiny of
Christ is gives substance to this revelation in that it shows, for Hauerwas, that God
does not govern by force. The new telos that the Christian tradition proclaims is the
coming of the kingdom in Christ, as illustrated by the Sermon on the Mount. That
this is not an impossible Utopian vision depends on the eschatological dynamic in the
teaching of Jesus.51 The eschatological dynamic is made sense of precisely because God
has acted in history, initiating the kingdom of God in Christ. This, in turn, is the
necessary condition for the possibility of the existence of a community of discipleship
50 Hauerwas On God. p 208 This quotation comes from an article dealing with Hauerwas's
understanding of the trinitarian nature of the Godhead. It is outwith the scope of this thesis to deal
with this issue except to the extent that it might, as in this case, illuminate a more general matter.
51 Hauerwas PK p 85.
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that witnesses to this revelation and to salvation. Substantively, for Hauerwas,
salvation subsists in that:
"...Jesus saves us from sin and death. Yet sin and death
are embodied in a history that requires an alternative
history if our salvation is to be anything more than a
vague hope. The name we give to the social manifestation
that makes that history present is the church."52
Salvation, then, is socially and historically mediated through a specific people of God.
In other words, through the story of Christ, with its prologue in Israel and
continuation in the historic church, God has created a people to bear the new life that
Christ's life, death and resurrection made possible. Consequently, Hauerwas does not
see Christ simply as an exemplar of a way of life. Rather because he sees "...the
ontological change occasioned through Christ's resurrection... "53 he can assert that
"...forgiveness and love are real alternatives to the coercion the world thinks
necessary for existence. Thus our true nature, our true end is revealed in the story of
this man in whose life, we believe is to be found the truth."54 This christocentric
understanding of the Christian revelation, and therefore of Christian identity, as well
as being faithful to his radical reformed agenda is theologically decisive to the extent
that ethics thus based is not complicit with liberalism.
Christian identity, therefore, means being a disciple of Christ. Discipleship and
identity are not possible apart from christology. The gospels, which display the story
52 Hauerwas Epilogue p 163; CET pp 47 - 54; RA pp 49 - 68; AC pp23 - 44.
53 Hauerwas Epilogue p 162.
54 Hauerwas PK p 87.
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of Christ, train us to "... situate our lives in relation to that life. For it was assumed by
the churches that gave us the gospels, that we cannot know who Jesus is without
learning to be his followers."55 Discipleship is communal and assumes the memory
and the society of the church, while having an impact on its common life. Private
discipleship is not an option because God is creating a new polis. Therefore,
Hauerwas's Christology and social activity are to be seen as intimately related. In the
final analysis, the impact of Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics on Christian ethics is to
construe appropriate response to God's revelation in the church as the ongoing
presence of Christ in the world. This presence has significant political and social
consequences. Indeed Hauerwas writes:
"Christianity is mostly a matter of politics - politics as
defined by the gospel. The call to be part of the gospel is
a joyful call to be adopted by an alien people, to join a
counter-cultural phenomenon, a new polis called the
church."56
To conclude, we have examined the implications of Hauerwas's ecclesial
theology for Christian ethics through an exploration of religious identity and political
action. We have seen that this investigation leads us to the conclusion that, for
Hauerwas, religious identity is tied up with the church. The church, in turn, provides
a communal identity which is christocentric, developing a community of character
which reflects the values of forgiveness and mercy while highlighting the counter-
cultural dynamic of this new identity.
55 Hauerwas PK p 74.
56 Hauerwas RA p 30.
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The stark christocentrism of Hauerwas's new religious identity for the
individual and for the church has led, frequently, to allegations of sectarianism against
him. It has been said of Hauerwas, that if he was to be consistent, he would relinquish
the possibility of advising, even in the most general sense, on matters of public
policy.57 This charge though harsh, cuts to the very heart of his attempts to do
Christian ethics and present a publicly viable theology. Nevertheless, Hauerwas is
determined to keep his approach going in such a way that the narrative community,
as the locus for Christian faith and language, are radically is distinct from public
language and accountability.58 The church is only one of the many influences shaping
the life and thought of today's Christian. We must ask, therefore, if it can possibly
have priority. Hauerwas assertion that it can has led to the accusations of relativism or
even sectarianism because, ultimately, he is not arguing that any narrative or narrative
community is as good as any other but that Christianity is the best. 59 In the next
section we shall examine the impact of this conceptualisation of Christian ethics for
the church and deal with the charge of sectarianism.
5.2 The Implications of Ecclesial Ethics for The Church
In this chapter we have so far explored Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics, and
recognised the impact of ecclesial ethics for Christian Ethics. We are now in a position
57 Nelson Narrative andMorality, p 138.
38 Hauerwas AC p 16. "I have learned that there is simply nothing I can do to prevent my position
from being described as fideistic and/or sectarian. That these categories presuppose the epistemological
and social positions I am challenging does not quiet the criticism." He goes on to claim that his most
significant attempts to refute this accusation come in CET and RA.
59 See McClendon Systematic Theology: Ethics pp 71, 214.
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to pull the threads together and ascertain precisely the implications of ecclesial ethics
for the church. Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics is not content to suggest that the
appropriate human response to God's revelation is merely coherent ethical discourse
but that such a discourse should manifest coherent ethical praxis. This quest for praxis
is made sense of, once again, within the context of the church. To understand this
position we shall explore three issues. First of all, we shall look at Hauerwas's
conception of authentic political action and deal with the allegations of sectarianism.
Secondly, we shall see how this position leads to endorsing the ecclesial counter
culture. Finally we shall explore what it means for the church to be a community of
character.
5.2.1. Authentic PoliticalAction: Theology as Guerrilla Warfare60
If, as Hauerwas claims, authentic political action is the conversation necessary
for people to discover the goods that they have in common, then perhaps the most
obvious point of concern with regards to Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics is the relationship
between the church and the world. As we have observed already, when Hauerwas
talks of the church, he uses the term to denote a real people in definite historical and
institutional forms.61 As such, real people in real social situations must perforce act in
the world. The church, as we have seen, operates as an interpretative community
when it comes to scripture. However, Hauerwas extends the notion of an
60 I excuse the military imagery in this section heading by quoting Hauerwas on the title of his book
Dispatches From The Front, p 18 "The military imagery contained in the title of this book is meant to
challenge the widespread assumption that pacifists are passive. ... Those committed to Christian non¬
violence do not seek conflict, but in a world that has learned to call violence order, they know that
they cannot avoid confrontation." It is terms of this confrontation that I wish to use the term guerrilla
warfare.
61 Hauerwas PK p 107, "Epilogue" p 153, CET pp 11 Iff, Why RA, p 424.
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interpretative community, in the face of what he maintains is the essential
incoherence of modernity as the background for ethical discourse, to the
interpretation of these actions in the world. The church's role in respect of the
modern public sphere, by interpreting these actions and relating them to the holy
story, is to create people of virtue and character.62 In so doing, he argues, the church
provides a base for meaningful contribution to the public sphere.
However, for a number of reasons Hauerwas is charged with maintaining a
sectarian position. Indeed it is the most consistent charge that is levelled at his ecclesial
ethics. Rasmussen, for instance, devotes a whole chapter to the genealogy of this
charge on the basis that this might be a deficiency in Hauerwas's position. 63 Indeed,
Hauerwas has himself responded to this charge in his usual polemical fashion.64 The
roots of the problem lie broadly in four components of his ecclesial ethics. First of all,
the communitarian thrust of his ecclesial ethics leads to a withdrawal from the public
sphere of ethical discourse.65 Secondly, he endeavours to keep Christian faith and
language separate from public language and accountability and thus renders it
unintelligible to the world at large.66 Thirdly, Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics have been
described as sociologically impossible, since there seems to be no way of defending the
62 Hauerwas CET p 13.
63 Rasmussen pp 231 - 247.
64 See note 58 above where I observed that in AC 163 note 3 Hauerwas claims his most significant
attempts to refute this accusation come in CET and RA.
65 Gustafson in "The Sectarian Temptation: Reflections on Theology, Church and the University."
Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society. 40 (1985) pp 83 - 94.. p 88 makes this charge "...this
[Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics] means that Christian morality is not based on a concern to be responsible
participants in the ambiguities of public choices. It is rather based on its fidelity to the biblical
narratives, and particularly to the gospel narratives."
66 Gustafson in "The Sectarian Temptation: Reflections on Theology, Church and the University." pp
92 - 94.
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primacy of the community of faith over any other tradition that might have an
impact on shaping us.67 Fourth, Hauerwas has been accused of excessive
christocentrism insofar as tying the communal identity so closely to Christ makes
God into a tribal God and not recognisably the creator of the world.68 Clearly, then,
sectarianism is an extremely wide-ranging charge that cuts to the very heart of
Hauerwas's theology. In this section we shall explore precisely what these criticisms
mean for an ecclesial counter culture. We shall do this in terms of asking what the
relationship of Hauerwas's church is to the world thereby investigating Hauerwas's
claim that the world only knows that it is the world because of the existence of the
church as a separate people.69
Superficially, the fact that Hauerwas makes a distinction between church and
the world, characterised as modern liberal society and seen in a pejorative light, is
irrefutable. However, Hauerwas echoing his position on revealed and natural
theology, maintains that the two are not to be understood as oppositional in the
traditional sense. The world, as he understands it, is a theological construct.70 Church
and world have no meaning apart from each other, each says something about the
possibility of the existence of the other's perspective. In the end, he concludes, the
distinction between church and world is not a "distinction between realms of reality,
between orders of creation and redemption, between nature and supernature... "
67 Gustafson in "The Sectarian Temptation: Reflections on Theology, Church and the University." pp
90f; Nelson Narrative andMorality. p 137.
68 Gustafson in "The Sectarian Temptation: Reflections on Theology, Church and the University." p
93; Wogaman Christian Perspectives in Politics. Pp 111 - 113 & 137 - 140.
69 Hauerwas CC p 91 & PK p 100.
70 Hauerwas PK pp 101 - 102 & 166, CC p 247.
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rather it is a distinction "... between agents."71 That is to say he sees the distinction
between the church and the world more as a distinction between those of a certain
character and those of another. Strictly speaking, between those who follow Christ
and those who do not. Consequently, as we have already seen, authentic Christian
agency is compromised to the extent that the Christian capitulates with modernity
and does not follow Christ. In these circumstances the ability to see, to think and to
act like a Christian is limited. Thus, the world can be in the church limiting its
faithfulness and truthfulness.
"Those of us who attempt to live faithful to that
kingdom are acutely aware of how deeply our lives are
held to and by the world. But this cannot be an excuse
for acting as if there were no difference between us and
the world. For if we use our sin to deny our peculiar task
as Christians and as members of the church, we are
unfaithful to both the kingdom and to ourselves - and
most importantly to the world itself."72
To this extent the world is opposed to the church, and like the church, subject to
God's judgement.
On the other hand, the world is the same world that was created, loved and
redeemed by God.73 Rasmusson refers this as Hauerwas's relation to the "double
Johannine concept of the world as both that order that is in opposition to God and
therefore under God's judgement and the world created, loved and redeemed by
71 Hauerwas PK p 101.
72 Hauerwas CET p 102.
72 Rasmusson Church as Polis p 211.
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God."74 Hence, because the world is God's world, it is not possible for the church to
be completely opposed. That is to say, the church cannot be "... anti-world but rather
an attempt to show what the world is meant to be as God's good creation."75 This
exemplary position is only possible to the extent that the world's opposition to the
church is not ontological, and this is precisely what Hauerwas takes from the 'double
Johannine' concept of the world. If the church-world opposition is not ontological
then the world, as the church is, must be historical and contingent. As such, in the
same way as the world can affect the church, there is scope for the church to change
the world, to make the world, not holy, but the world. The change is wrought, not
by violent means but through the witness of the church to the peace, justice and
salvation of the kingdom because the world is already, in principle, loved and
redeemed by God. Hence, Hauerwas can contend that the distinctiveness of the
church from the world is not in opposition to the world but for the sake of the world,
giving the "world the means to see itself truthfully" and offering an alternative
vision.76 For Hauerwas, this is not a withdrawal from the public sphere of ethical
discourse rather it is locating the church in the midst of the world. This position does
imply for the church a withdrawal of sorts. Not withdrawal from the world so much
as from the church's own Constantinian heritage or capitulation with the power elites
of secular politics.77
74 Rasmussen Ibid, p 211
75 Hauerwas PK p 100.
76 Hauerwas PK p 101.
77 Hauerwas AC p 16.
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Hence, although Hauerwas is basically optimistic about the relationship
between the church and the world, we still have to consider his pessimism about what
he calls liberal society, because it is this liberal society which provides the criteria
against which Hauerwas's sectarianism is measured. Hence the charge of sectarianism.
Hauerwas's convictions about the historical and contingent nature of the world,
suggests that states and societies which govern the world have taken many forms. In
the present context Hauerwas's writings are placed against the background of liberal
• yo
society.
"[liberalism is the notion that there is a distinctive liberal
way of life, characterised by the aspiration to increase and
enhance the prerogatives of the individual; by maximal
mobility in all directions, throughout every aspect of
social life (in and out of particular communities, in and
out of socio-economic classes and so on); and by a
tendency to turn all areas of human activity into matters
of consumer preference; a way of life based on progress,
growth and technological dynamism. This liberal mode
of existence is marked by tendencies toward universalism
and even homogenization."79
We have already seen how Hauerwas reacts against modernity thus characterised,
because this vision is reinforced by violence and coercion and renders impossible any
form of coherent ethical discourse. However, since reality is socially and historically
constituted, there is no reason for the church or the individual to capitulate
uncritically with the dominant situation just because the dominant account may be at
7k Hauerwas PK pp If & Hauerwas Killing Compassion DFTF pp 164 - 176. Here Hauerwas relates the
virtue of compassion to modern, liberal theory. He quotes from Ronald Beiner What's the Matter with
Liberalism. 1992 University of California Press, Berkeley, pp 10 - 14 & 22 - 23.
79 Ibid.
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odds with Christian convictions.80 Consequently, if the church is not to capitulate, it
must needs interpret in light of its own story and practices. The church, he says, has
its own agenda and cannot, therefore, choose sides in contemporary conflicts.81 The
church, then, cannot but endeavour to maintain its independence from public
language and accountability. By so doing the church provides "... the space and time
necessary for developing skills of interpretation and discrimination sufficient to help
us recognize the possibilities and limits of our society."82
Nevertheless, as we have seen already, arguing from the point of view that all
moral reasoning is radically contextual and narrative dependent, we can see that the
charge of sectarianism against Hauerwas is still viable on the basis of character. It is
clear that, for Hauerwas, moral notions "... describe only as we have purpose for such
descriptions which means that they do not merely describe our activity; they also
form it"83 Therefore, these notions are purpose dependent and are embedded in, and
so affected by, specific narratives. Consequently when such a notion is challenged it
becomes extremely difficult to resolve the conflict. The conflict cannot be reduced to
relations between the principles and the facts because perception is formed by
different narratives that interpret these relationships differently. To reiterate a point
80 For an exposition of the dangers of capitulation see Hauerwas DFTF & AC p 142 where he talks
about the education of Christians in liberal society. He says: "Christians ironically have entered into
this grand educational project in the name of objectivity, the quest for the universal, and most of all
societal peace. For education ... has ... as its purpose the suppression of minority voices in the interest
of ironically fostering communication. It is true that past explicit Christian social orders suppressed
dissenting voices, but it is even more the case today that the alleged pluralistic states of the present that
profess to be guided by no visions of human nature or destiny are in fact ... guided by a very specific
ideology of the Enlightenment."
81 Hauerwas PK p 100, VV p 245.
82 Hauerwas CC p 74.
83 Hauerwas TT p 21.
220
Chapter 5. Stanley Hauerwas and the Promise ofEcclesial Ethics.
made earlier, if we take justice as an example, as far as Hauerwas is concerned,
outwith a narrative community we could not even assume that we share enough to
know what justice might mean. This ignorance arises because we do not share enough
of a common narrative to substantiate such an understanding. Understanding and
discerning justice, as with all other moral notions, requires that we take up a
distinctive way of life. Following Maclntyre, Hauerwas says talk of justice only makes
sense when bolstered by more substantive moral language. This substantive language
comes as a result of embracing substantive rationality that is tradition and narrative-
dependent. Language dependent on the Christian tradition is Christian language that
pertains to that narrative tradition, and access to it is necessarily limited for those
outwith the tradition in which it is embedded. Access is limited to the extent to which
they have not or cannot appropriate the distinctive way of life. Furthermore, a claim
rooted in a particular history, set of events or tradition cannot justify itself as rational
in any globalised sense.84 An appeal to a particular tradition cannot be other than an
appeal to authority that prohibits conversation by promoting conversion. If this is the
case then there is no defence against the contention that no issue between conflicting
traditions is rationally decidable and the charge of sectarianism is proven. However,
Hauerwas is aware of this problem and since there is no way for him to argue against
the charge and remain consistent, he attempts to transform a vice into a virtue.
84 This insight into the problem comes from Davis RMS p 77 "Is not reason essentially universal so that
an appeal to reason is an appeal to universal criteria and arguments. An appeal to a particular
...tradition cannot be other...than an appeal to authority...then we have no defence against the relativist
contention that no issue between conflicting traditions is rationally decidable."
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For Hauerwas, developing people of virtue and discipleship within the church
means that there is an inevitable exercise of authority.85 It follows that if training in
particular skills is desirable then authority is also necessary. This, Hauerwas points
out, is true of every discipline, not just theology or moral reasoning. He says, "[B]y its
very nature, then, authority seems to involve peoples' willingness to accept the
judgements of another as superior to their own on the basis of that person's office and
assumed skills."86 This understanding of authority presupposes a tradition with a
shared vision of goods and practices. As such, and given Hauerwas's understanding of
practical reasoning, it does not necessarily imply or demand blind obedience. "We
listen to the teacher and respect his authority because he speaks with greater
understanding, greater wisdom, deeper experience, and more truly than do others."87
Discipline and authority are necessary but properly exercised they "... are hardly
noticed as such."88 Exercised in such a manner authority should in fact encourage
ethical discourse, rather than being a stumbling block to it by closing it down.
Authority, well exercised, should "... direct others to go further, using what can be
learned from tradition, afforded by the past, so that he or she can move towards the
telos of fully perfected works."89 To understand authority in this way means that
Hauerwas can see no conflict between authority and freedom, nor authority and
reason. This is precisely because the tradition of shared practice and language renders
these relationships intelligible. Hence Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics can, in his terms, be
sociologically possible, since every tradition that shapes us involves an appeal to
85 See Hauerwas TT ppl95 - 197, CC pp 53 - 71 SP pp 39 - 62. AC pp 93 - 111.
86 Hauerwas SP p 40.
87 Hauerwas Protestants and the Pope, p 84.
88 Hauerwas AC pl07.
89 Hauerwas AC p 106.
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authority. The primacy of the community of faith over any other tradition that might
have an impact on shaping us, comes from the community of faith having a better
understanding of the manner in which authority is exercised.
We return, therefore, to the question of genuine politics, or authentic political
action, in the face of the contention that issues between conflicting traditions are
rationally decidable. This is because the Enlightenment conceptualisation of reason
and knowledge tied to systematic doubt, the ideal of personal autonomy and the
critique of tradition, make positive accounts of authority and tradition unintelligible.
Hence, Hauerwas's deploys an understanding of politics as gesture.90 This idea stresses
the importance of small actions. These are the small actions that take place in the
everyday life and existence of individual Christians and churches. These small acts
constitute a politic of, and concern about, the common life of the community.
Hauerwas argues that it is through these small acts that people communicate, form
and shape their world. It is, furthermore, through these small acts that a people of
virtue is formed, and thus the potential to witness to the alternative politics of the
kingdom is realised.91 To give concrete form to this contention Hauerwas says:
"We must be a community with patience amid the
division and the hatreds of this world, to take the time to
nurture friendships, to serve the neighbor, and to give
and receive the thousands of small acts of care which
ultimately are the heart blood of the kingdom. That we
must take time to help the neighbour in need, no matter
how insignificant that neighbour or his or her need from
the perspective of the world, is but a sign that we
90 Hauerwas CET p 106.
91 Hauerwas CET p 105.
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recognize that we are called not to make the history-
come out right but to be faithful to the kind of care that
we have seen revealed in God's kingdom ... Nothing in
life is more important than gestures, as gestures embody
as well as sustain the valuable and significant. Through
gestures we create and form our worlds ... In this sense,
the church is but God's gesture on behalf of the world to
create a space and time in which we might have a
foretaste of the kingdom."92
In this light theology and ethics, for Hauerwas, should be a matter of helping us to see
the significance of the everyday and the sacredness of the ordinary.93
It is the ordinary events that, for Hauerwas, embody a determinate challenge
to the dominant, liberal culture. Consequently, to facilitate this challenge, it is
Hauerwas's endeavour to see the church as a tactic for living in an alien environment,
to "... better understand our situation as Christians today and to lead that situation in
a positive and constructive manner."94 By seeing the church as a tactic93 he means "... a
calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus. No delineation of
exteriority provides it with the conditions necessary for autonomy. The space of a
tactic is the space of the other, thus it must play on and with the terrain imposed on it
and organized by the law of a foreign power."96 Thus described, the idea of tactic
92 Hauerwas CET p 105 - 106.
93 Hauerwas Why Resident Aliens p 424.
94 Hauerwas AC pp 18 - 19.
95 Here he is following Michel de Certeau who distinguishes between tactic and strategy and defines
strategy as: "calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes possible as soon as a
subject that will empower ... can be isolated. It postulates a place that can be delimited as its own and
serve as a base from which relations with an exteriority composed of competitors, enemies ... can be
managed. ... it is also the typical attitude of modern science, politics and military strategy." AC pp 16 -
17.
96 Hauerwas AC pp 17 - 18.
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presents Hauerwas with a description of the art of the weak. It is his preferred
position for the church, as he sees it. That is to say, the church is on alien or foreign
ground. As such it must use the language resources and tools that are at hand, but not
controlled or determined by the church. The church cannot withdraw from the
public sphere because there is no place of its own to retreat to.97 Finally, this is where
the church has to abide both practically and theoretically. Unlike conventional
military strategy, therefore, the political action that Hauerwas envisions for the
church is the tactic of guerrilla warfare. As such the church is a counter-cultural
enclave that does engage with society and the world at large. Moreover, Hauerwas has
made a tactical virtue out of the strategic vice of sectarianism. Hence, despite or
perhaps even because of the charge of sectarianism, Hauerwas leaves us with a church
that is "... an island of one culture in the midst of another."98
5.2.2. Embracing the Ecclesial Counter Culture.
The preceding quotation from Resident Aliens epitomises Hauerwas's ecclesial
position in relation to the nature and task of theology in the modern world. The book
itself is addressed, for the most part to ministers of the church, who are not
encouraged to respond to the needs of people in the sense of a helping profession.
Rather, they are encouraged to contribute to the creation of a community. This
community needs to be trained to be capable of hearing proclaiming and embodying a
Christian perspective. By extension this presents a corrective to the whole church's
ministry. The intention of this section is to explore this corrective, and on the way,
the fourth and final sectarian criticism levelled at Hauerwas. That is to say of excessive
97 See notes 58 and 64 above.
98 Hauerwas RA p 12.
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christocentrism insofar as tying the communal identity so closely to Christ makes
God into a tribal God and not recognisably the creator of the world."
That is not to say, however, that Hauerwas is not aware of the demands of the
culture outwith the church. He recognises that the church is not the only community
in which Christians must participate. Indeed, there is much in the way of claims to
truth and ultimate meaning outside the church. In the face of this Hauerwas claims
that the basic insight and conviction of Christianity, understood as an Ecclesial ethic,
helps us to appropriate critically the other narratives which have a claim on our lives.
That Christianity can do this rests on the relationship between community and
narrative, realisations about the contingent nature of reality. Coupled with
Hauerwas's insight that there is no neutral standpoint outside history or outwith
some narrative account of reality, these factors suggest a primacy, and a need to
embrace the Ecclesial counter culture in order to:
"provide the means of recognising and critically
appropriating other stories that claim our lives. For it is
true that we always find ourselves enmeshed in many
histories, of families, of Texas, of America ... each of
99 Similarly Milbank. "... Once theology gives up the claim to be a meta discourse, it cannot any longer
articulate the word of the creator God, it is bound to turn into the oracular voice of some finite
idol... " TST p 1. However, that is not to say that Milbank and Hauerwas agree on the manner in
which this counter history, or meta narrative should be proclaimed. Hauerwas has his doubts about
the grand scale of Milbank's narrative. Hauerwas fears that the grand scale of the narrative itself might
be reproducing the violence of liberalism.(Hauerwas "Creation, Contingency and Truthful Non¬
violence." p 15, n 7. See too "The Church's one foundation is Jesus Christ Her Lord." p 35 n 3.) He
fears that by responding to the totalising narrative of liberalism with another totalising narrative
argument Milbank could well be in danger of presenting the Gospel as a system or a theory. (Ibid) This
fear partly anticipates Davis's suggestion that despite claims to a rhetorical method, Milbank is
presenting a grand argument. Hauerwas's preferred option, on the other hand, is piecemeal articulation
augmented by authentic political presence witnessing to the Kingdom and the character of God
through the politics of discipleship
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which is constituted by many inter-related and confusing
story lines. The moral task consists in acquiring the
skills, i.e. the character, which enable us to negotiate
these many levels of narrative."100
This claim for the consistency and relevance of the Christian tradition, rests on the
interplay of three related convictions: that is to say the narrative character of
Christian convictions, the church as an interpretative community and the political
dimension of reading the bible.101
We have already mentioned Hauerwas's association with narrative theology,
and noted that he is not a narrative theologian as such. However, narrative does play
an important, if not central role in his theology. Hauerwas makes three related claims
about narrative. Firstly, that it is the formal and most basic display of the existence of
humanity and nature and the contingency of both. Second, that narrative is the
characteristic mode of our self-understanding and our history of contingency. Third,
he claims that God has revealed himself in the history of Israel and the life of the
church.102 With these three taken together, Hauerwas concludes that we come to
know ourselves and to understand the world to the extent to which we learn to locate
our histories in the story of God.103 The role of the church, therefore, is to make the
story of God heard. In so doing narrative renders the "... character of God" and
"... renders us to be the kind of people appropriate to that character."104 Hauerwas
100 Hauerwas CC p 96, see also CET 64 n 17.
101 Hauerwas US pp 13 - 44, CC 53 - 71. Negatively one might use the word superiority rather than
consistency and relevance.
102 Hauerwas PK pp 28ff, by way of comparison see Milbank Theology and Social Theory pp 259 - 277.
103 Hauerwas PK pp 24 - 29.
104 Hauerwas CC p 67.
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must, as a result of this contention, stress the relationship between narrative and
community. Interestingly, we can trace a development in Hauerwas's thought here. In
his early work, his thought on the matter of narrative and community is much more
abstract and this relationship far from explicit. His starting point on these abstract
investigations was either from a phenomenology of moral experience,105 or an analysis
of how stories work.106 In both of these examples the role of the church is minimal.
Latterly, however, he has surrendered most of the formal claims made for narrative
and concentrates on scriptural narrative. The stress is now on the rendering God in
and through the community and narrative has become the servant of the church.107
Indeed, he suggests that biblical narratives are only recognisable as scripture within
the Christian church that he has brought to the fore.108
The church, therefore, is presented as the interpretative and interpreting
community.109 This notion reflects Hauerwas's interest in the work of Stanley Fish.110
Hauerwas maintains that there is no objective meaning in texts that can be maintained
outwith the context of the interpretative community. This interpretative community
will, necessarily, have particular interpretative interests that render the text intelligible
because what we perceive is always shaped by our interpretative acts. The church, or
"... that community pledged constantly to work out and test the implications of the
story of God, as known through Israel and Jesus Christ, for its common life and the
105 Hauerwas Selfas Story VV pp 68 - 89.
106 Hauerwas Story and Theology pp 69.
107 Wells Transforming Fate into Destiny p 133.
108 Hauerwas CC.
109 Hauerwas US 19 - 21.
110 Hauerwas DTF p 5.
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life of the world... "m is the community wherein the bible as scripture can be
properly interpreted. In this light, God's story, the story of building up his people,
can be heard. This position is, of course, laden with political implications. The bible,
if it is not an objective text, must be understood differently. Hauerwas uses the
example of the Pauline epistles that are transformed when they become part of the
church's scripture. Paul's intentions as the author, though still of interest, are no
longer as important.112 Consequently, he argues that there is not one way of
construing scripture inherent in the texts themselves. As a result Hauerwas must
reconfigure the church's use of the bible in terms of learning a craft under the tutelage
of masters, the proper context of which is the liturgy and preaching of the church
which in turn is in the interest and in the light of common discipleship113
This form of communitarian rationality depends, significantly, not on
understanding how ideas work but on understanding how communities work.
Hauerwas says:
"Practical reason is not a disembodied process based on
abstract principles but the process of a community in
which every member has a role to play. Such a process
does not disdain the importance of logical rigour for
111 Hauerwas PK p 87.
112 Hauerwas US pp 20, 151, and CC 64 - 66.
113 On this point Rasmussen cites Nicholas Lash as the provider of an understanding of the use of
scripture as performance which is broadly in line with Hauerwas's thought. "... the fundamental form
of the Christian interpretation of scripture is, in the concrete, the life, activity and organisation of the
Christian community, and that Christian practice consists ... in the performance or enactment of the
biblical text: in its 'active reinterpretation'." Rasmussen Church as Polis p 205.
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aiding in their deliberation, but logic cannot be a
substitute for the actual process of discernment."114
The way communities work, is through practical reason, or a process of discernment
which in turn is shaped by the virtues or character of the community. Further to this,
practical reasoning, he says, should be the activity of the whole community, not
merely the function of the expert theologian or biblical scholar.113 Readings and
interpretations of the bible are informed by the church as an interpretative
community with particular strategies in mind which themselves derive from the
character of the community. This in turn will affect the pertinence of the readings and
the statements derived from that reading. The church's ties to liberal polity will,
consequently, diminish the possibility of correct readings or interpretations of the
bible since these ties will diminish the interpretative community's ability to hold fast
to its specifically Christian interpretative agenda. The very fact that the church might
ask how to relate the bible to ethics betrays its hostage status. This attitude, Hauerwas
suggests, assumes the given-ness of liberal politics and in turn necessitates the question
of relevance.116 The truth, for Hauerwas is precisely an inversion of this state of
affairs. The bible's relevance is not to the world but to the church. The church as
counter culture allows for a critical reading of the dominant culture. Thus the
question ought to be how is the bible relevant to the church as the interpretative
community? Inevitably this is a political question.
114 Hauerwas CET p 73 (67 - 87), PK pp 130 - 134, CC p 54.
115 Hauerwas PK p 134.
116 Hauerwas US p 39.
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The answer to this question brings us back to the significance that Hauerwas
gives to sacraments and liturgy in his understanding of the church. The bible is only
properly understood in connection with a church as a liturgical and sacramental
community. The authority of scripture, then, is intelligible insofar as it is located
within "a community that knows its life depends on faithful remembering of God's
care of his creation through the calling of Israel and the life of Jesus."117
5.2.3. The Church as Community ofCharacter.
Finally, the church is for Hauerwas an alternative culture.118 Consequently the
church is faced with a political challenge. That is to say, in the contemporary context
how does the church live in light of the story of Jesus Christ?119 According to
Hauerwas the church is called to witness to the reality that is the kingdom of God,
making public the "...politics of the kingdom that reveals the insufficiency of all
politics based on coercion and falsehood and finds the true source of power in
servanthood rather than dominion."120 In effect this means, as we have observed, that
the church doesn't have a social ethic but is a social ethic. If the church adopts the
understanding of politics abroad in the world, even the most humanitarian, it is
surrendering its own distinctive politics and, therefore its ability to witness to the
kingdom of God. The church, for Hauerwas, is the locus and springboard for all
Christian ethics. In principle, the church embodies an ethic for all people everywhere,
117 Hauerwas CC p 53.
118 Moltmann would describe this model of the church as a contrast society containing contrast stories
and practices. Rasmussen Church as Polis compares and contrasts Moltmann's political theology with
Hauerwas's theological politics.
119 Hauerwas RA p 112 - 114.
120 Hauerwas PK p 102.
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but insofar as yet not everyone acknowledges the supremacy of the Christian story, it
only extends to those who are the people of God.
Hauerwas's understanding of authentic politics as well as his account of
practices and virtues in the communal life, provide ecclesial ethics with the conceptual
resources for understanding everyday life. In so-doing everyday life becomes for him
what the focus of political activity should be just as much, if not more, than national
politics. To this extent, Hauerwas does not approach the church with either a
sociological or theological definition.121 He does not say, for instance, that the church
is the community of saints, nor does he suggest that the church is a specific human
community, constituted for a specific religious purpose.122 Rather, he assesses the
concrete activities and practices which gives the church its identity as the church.
Whenever these activities and practices are to be found there too is the church to be
found. Equally, the extent to which these activities and practices are not to be found is
the extent to which the church is absent or compromised.
These activities and practices or marks of the church, that is preaching and the
sacraments, are augmented for Hauerwas by the life of Christians. These three things
together define the church. The sacraments are particularly important since they
frame the understanding that the story of Jesus is to be enacted as well as told. The
church then:
121 Hiitter "The Ecclesial Ethics of Stanley Hauerwas". Dialog 30 Summer 1991 pp 231 - 241.
122 Ibid p 233.
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"... is constituted by word and sacrament as the story we
tell, the story we embody, must not only be told but
enacted. In telling we are challenged to be a people
capable of hearing God's good news such that we can be a
witness to others. In the enactment, in Baptism and
Eucharist, we are made part of a common history which
requires continuous celebration to be rightly
remembered. Through this telling and enactment we, like
Israel, become peculiarly a people who live by our
remembering the history of God's redemption of the
world."123
Hauerwas further emphasises the significance of the sacraments by describing them as
the essential rites of our church politics.124 Hiitter suggests, critically, that
notwithstanding the central place Hauerwas has given to the sacraments, he has
missed the central theological point of them. That is to say that while Hauerwas holds
them to be our most important social witness to the extent that "... these liturgies are
our effective social work. For if the church is rather than has a social ethic, these
actions are our most important social witness... "125 he neglects to point out the
manner in which, in their performance they communicate God's reconciling
activity.126 We shall return to explore these themes in more depth in the next chapter.
For the moment it is sufficient that we take note of them.
In the meantime, we return to the form the church takes through the
communal life of its members. As we have seen the church is known by the character
of the people who constitute it. Further, the extent to which this character is in
123 Hauerwas CET p 53.
124 Hauerwas PK p 108.
125 Hauerwas PK p 108.
126 Hiitter op cit. p 234.
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evidence is the mark of the truthfulness of the church's witness. Consequently, the
shape of the church reflects the patterns of the coexistence of its members and this, in
turn, is determined by their character as disciples. The key to understanding the shape
of the church with regard to this third characteristic lies in the first characteristic,
which is to say, Hauerwas's understanding of the church as a body which performs
the sacraments. To this end, Hauerwas notes that the kind of holiness which he is
describing and which mark the church:
"...is not that of moral perfection, but the holiness of
people who have learned not to fear one another and thus
are capable of love. We do not go ahead with our own
meals, or our lives, but have learned to live in the
presence of others without fear and envy. We thus
become a perfect people through the meal we share with
our Lord. We learn that forgiveness of the enemy, even
when the enemy is ourselves, is the way God would have
his kingdom accomplished."127
From this we can extrapolate the pattern of the church as acceptance of forgiveness
and willingness to forgive, and reconciliation.
These, of course, are not one-off events and Hauerwas is also concerned with
the church as an institution across time. Thus holiness and character are brought
together for him when considering virtue. Virtue, in this sense means those particular
goods relevant to the practices that are "... necessary for remembering and telling the
story of a crucified savior."128 Thus, while mentioning hope and patience as specific
127 Hauerwas PK p 110.
128 Hauerwas PK p 103.
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features of this community,129 he argues that the virtues form a particular disposition,
acquired by acting in a particular way and reflecting the character of the person. By
extension, this character shapes the community and the church in its attitude to the
public sphere. Moreover, the church becomes the training ground for men and
women of virtue to be built up in this character which tends toward holiness as
described above.
Finally, all of the virtue and character and marks of the church are to be
properly understood only in light of the new telos promised by the kingdom of God
to which the church is a witness. That is to say that Hauerwas recognises the
eschatological dimension of the kingdom to which the church is required to be
faithful. Thus "...we are an eschatological people who base our lives on the
knowledge that God has redeemed his creation through the work of Jesus Christ. We
thus live out of control in the sense that we must assume God will use our faithfulness
to make his kingdom a reality... "13° The overriding virtue, for Hauerwas arises at this
point in that this new telos means that the church and individual Christians are to live
"... out of control."131 By this he means that Christians are no longer called to be
effective political agents so much as we are called to be faithful to the kingdom. We
are, he says, liberated from concerning ourselves with making history come out right.
Instead we are called to the responsibility of witnessing to the kingdom.
129 Rasmussen notes that Hauerwas has no where given a list of virtues which could characterise the
church but does emphasis hope and patience in CC pl27, PK 103 - 106, & CET 199 - 219. The Church
asPolis. p 198.
130 Hauerwas PK p 105.
131 Hauerwas PK p 105.
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Clearly this will have profound significance for our political activities in the
public sphere. In witnessing truthfully to the peaceable kingdom, we cannot realise
justice or peace through force or coercion. Neither can the church allow injustice to
carry on unresolved, because the peaceable kingdom is a kingdom of justice which is
concerned with the well being of the neighbour.132 This disposition, Hauerwas claims,
requires the Christian to become the "... most political of all animals."133 Consequently
the church will be the most political of all institutions, since the practice of
peaceableness requires policies practices and institutions to make possible non-violent
confrontation and resolution of conflict which marks the worlds politics. In short,
Christians are politically active, in and in light of the politics of the kingdom, wherein
and whereby they are understood to be "... a community which tries to develop the
resources to stand within the moral witnessing to the peaceable kingdom and thus
rightly understanding the world."134 And this is because "[pjolitics as the art of the
maintenance of a good society is the art that is at the heart of being a Christian."135
In conclusion, we can see how, for Hauerwas, as it was for Davis, community,
identity and political action relate to each other on the basis of a theological
representation of philosophical antecedents. In this chapter we have explored
Hauerwas's relationship to Maclntyre but noting also the differences. We then
explored the component parts of Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics that led us into a
discussion of the nature and task of theology with reference to Christian ethics and
132 Hauerwas PK p 146.
133 Hauerwas CET p 96.
134 Hauerwas PK p 102.
135 Hauerwas TT p 143.
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the church. In the final analysis we can say that the promise of ecclesial ethics is in the
realisation of living out of control in witness to the kingdom. Hence the nature and
task of theology, for Hauerwas, is to realise the promise implicit in ecclesial ethics.
That is to say it is to realise the tactical deployment of the art of maintaining a good
society subject to the witness of the peaceable kingdom. In other words it is the
authentic political activity of maintaining the conversation necessary for a people to
discover the goods they have in common.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter we have explored the implications of Hauerwas's post-liberal
ecclesial ethics for Christian ethics and the church. We did this by examining
Hauerwas's idea of authentic politics understood as the conversation necessary for
people to discover the goods they have in common. This took us through questions of
religious identity, identity and the Christian tradition and plurality and the role of
revelation. In the final analysis, the impact of Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics on Christian
ethics is to construe appropriate response to God's revelation in the church as the
ongoing presence of Christ in the world. This presence has significant political and
social consequences. From here we went on to analyse the implications of ecclesial
ethics for the church. We continued our exploration of authentic political action.
Here we revisited the charge of sectarianism and noted that Hauerwas's authentic
political action was akin to the tactics of guerrilla warfare. From there we examined
the possibilities of embracing the ecclesial counterculture and finally portrayed the
church as a community of Christian character.
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At this point we have adequate understanding of what Davis and Hauerwas
mean by authentic political action, in terms of the promises of their respective
theologies, as well as the sort of community the church needs to be in light of these
theologies. We shall now move on to a critical attempt to redeem the promises of
both Davis's critical theology and Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics. In the meantime we
should draw together some threads to highlight the common ground shared by Davis
and Hauerwas in light of these promises. We have seen that both Davis and Hauerwas
are concerned with five similar issues. Firstly, the modern privatisation of religious
conviction. This flows from the second area of concern that is the incoherence or
excesses of modernity as the context for the church and its practices, both being
sceptical about the merits or effectiveness of so called political theology as a response
to this situation. The third point of shared concern is that the contemporary context
has forced a divide between theory and practice generally, and in particular for the
Christian tradition. This results in other familiar theological dichotomies such as
reason and faith, reason and revelation, reason and tradition. The fourth point is that
for a proper realignment of theory and practice we need to rediscover a more effective
understanding of tradition and narrative. Fifth and finally, this realignment should
issue in a practical ecclesiology that ought to facilitate authentic political action. That
this is shared ground does not, however, overlook the fact that the conclusions which
Davis and Hauerwas reach, and the promises implied, appear on the face of it to be at
odds with each other. In the next chapter we shall develop the idea of shared concern
as we take up Davis's Community of Discourse and Hauerwas's Community of
Character and test them against a model ecclesiology in an attempt to redeem the
promises of critical theology and ecclesial ethics.
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6.1 Introduction
Up to this point in the thesis we have explored Charles Davis's critical
theology and Stanley Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics. I have argued that a necessary
condition in Davis's case for authentic political activity and Hauerwas's case for
authentic political presence in the public sphere was a normative community of faith.
Both Davis and Hauerwas understand the church properly reconfigured as able to
provide that community. For Davis the church is reconfigured as a community of
discourse, appealing to critical reason as understood by Habermas. For Hauerwas the
church was reconfigured as a community of character based on an appeal to
substantive reason and the authority of tradition as described by Maclntyre. So, with
these ecclesial theological claims in mind we return to the original dilemma of the
choice between reason and tradition.
It is by now clear that, in fact, the debate is not one between reason and no
reason, rather it concerns competing conceptions of traditions of rationality. Given
this understanding we have to ask if the church is best understood according to Davis
or according to Hauerwas. That is to say, can the church be seen as a community of
discourse? If so, does Davis's community of discourse coincide with any recognisable
ecclesiology? Similarly, can the church be seen as a community of character? If so,
does Hauerwas's Community of character coincide with any recognisable
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ecclesiology? It is my intention, in this chapter, to answer these questions. This will
be done by, first of all, defining the church as an assembly and as a confessing
community, in light of the biblical passage Matthew 18:20. This definition presents
itself as the most obvious one to use for two reasons. Firstly, the interest in the
church's political action that motivates this thesis, focuses as we have seen on the
relationship between persons, community and political action. Such a focus means
that we must consider the vision and practice of these communities. Secondly, Volf
maintains that, while it was the post-Reformation churches that gave specific
systematic weight to this passage, it has a long and noble history in reflection on the
church from the time of the Fathers.1 Hence, this definitive description is not a
random choice but one that will allow us to flesh out the substance of the
communities that Davis and Hauerwas describe in respect of their own writings on
ecclesiology, such as it is. Having tested Davis's community of discourse and
Hauerwas's community of character against this control model, we will be in a
position to compare the two communities directly, like for like. Hence, the
conclusion will show that this test actually provides a mandate for placing Davis and
Hauerwas together in order to provide an effective check and balance each for the
other. This will echo Davis's suggestion that mystical-pragmatic Christianity, in effect
the normative model suggested by his critical theological community of discourse, has
always provided an effective counter to the 'ontological pretensions of the mythical-
visionary model' which is the type that best describes Hauerwas's community of
character.2
1 Volf After Our Likeness; The Church as the Image of the Trinity. 1998. William B. Eerdmans.
Michigan/Cambridge, p 136.
2 Another model for analysis did suggest itself but I decided that it did not meet the requirements of
this thesis. I had intended to explore an apparently useful device namely Ernst Troeltsch's church sect
typology in an attempt to quantify the respective communities (Ernst Troeltsch The Social teaching of
the Christian churches. 1931. Allen & Unwin. London [2 vols.]). Indeed this typology has been invoked
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6.2. Returning to the Dilemma and Testing Cases
I begin, therefore, by presenting a control model of the church in order to
assess the ecclesial identity of Davis's community of discourse and Hauerwas's
community of character. To this end, I shall outline briefly a model presented by
Miroslav Volf and derived from Matthew 18:20.3 This model is particularly useful
since it is distilled from an encounter between Orthodox, Roman Catholic and
Reformed ecclesiology.
by both Davis (Davis WLWD pp 53, 96 & 104) and Hauerwas (Hauerwas The Ethicist as Theologian pp
411. The Future ofChristian Social Ethics ppl29f. VV p 214, TT p 215) at various times and to varying
degrees of success. Troeltsch's description, however, provides us with an external description of the
identification of the church when, to assess fully Davis's and Hauerwas's position, we require an
internal description of the identity of the church. Troeltsch says that "... both types [church and sect]
are a logical result of the Gospel and only conjointly do they exhaust the whole range of its
sociological influence."(Troeltsch Ibid p 340). Which is to say that if the gospel has a social influence it
is not adequately represented by only one type, since the history of the Christian tradition shows that
the church has understood itself as either one or the other types and sometimes even both. Which
brings us back to Davis and Hauerwas. In Chapter 3 we outlined the models of the church that Davis
works with. It is clear that these models owe a great deal in their inception to Troeltsch's types,
although, he remains critical of them. Broadly speaking, Davis's agenda of recreating society in light of
a transformative faith wherein the task of the critical theologian is to equip Christians to contribute to
this recreation, places him in opposition to Hauerwas and, therefore, apparently in the church type.
And yet, invoking the church sect typology is not that straightforward for Davis. He does not fall
neatly into the church type, but rather draws on the 'mystical' and picks up on his understanding of a
pragmatic model of Christianity. We needed, therefore, to find a more adequate means of assessing this
position. As for Hauerwas, in Chapter 5 we said that in spite of, or even because of, charges of
sectarianism he continues to present a community of faith which is radically different from the world.
Indeed, he maintains explicitly the church sect typology in his early writings, as a useful device,
expressing sympathy for the sectarian position. In his later writings, however, Hauerwas has rejected
the use of the term sectarian because of the political and social agenda that the term implies. Thus he
can say that the contemporary use of the term sectarian denotes a person who will not "... 'act
responsibly' for building a just society."'(Hauerwas US p 154. For further articulations of his current
position see AN p 7, CET pp 1 - 18 & 113, RA pp 39 - 43 & 155, AC pp 16 - 19). Insofar as his first
priority is not to make society just then Hauerwas is, indeed a sectarian and, therefore, at one level
Troeltsch's type serves a useful descriptive purpose. On the other hand, as we saw in Chapter 5, such a
description is woefully inadequate for capturing the nuances of Hauerwas's thought. Again, we needed
to find a more adequate means of assessing his position.
3 Volf p 130.
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6.2.1. A ControlModelfor Testing Ecclesial Identity
Volf takes as his starting point the biblical passage "...where two or three are
gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of them."4 From this, Volf determines
two characteristic conditions of ecclesiality, that is to say assembly and confession.5
He says "... [t]he church is first of all an assembly ... but an assembly is not yet the
church. An indispensable condition of ecclesiality is that the people assemble in the
name of Christ."6 Hence, in order to generate our control model we shall, following
Volf, deal in turn with these two characteristics, namely assembly and confession. In
dealing primarily with these questions we shall frame a concise discussion of the
credal marks of the church, namely unity, holiness, catholicity and apostolicity.
As an assembly, the church represents a "... visible assembly of visible persons
at a specific place for specific action."7 Volf takes the focus of this expression to be the
people. The church is not simply the act of assembling, it is also "... the people who in
a specific way assemble at a specific place." From this he concludes that assembly is
constitutive of ecclesiality.8 Considering the New Testament appropriation of the
Greek £KKA.r|cn.a (ecclesia), Volf notes that whereas in secular Greek usage, ecclesia
referred to the assembly of free citizens of a city, in Pauline writing ecclesia has
developed two senses. First it had come to refer exclusively to the "... concrete
assembly of Christians at a specific place."9 Volf takes this specificity of place to refer
to the locally congregated people where it "... is the body of Christ in the particular
4 Volf p 136 quoting Matthew 18:20.
5 Volf pp 137ff & 145ff.
6 Volf Ibid. His emphasis.
7 Otto Weber cited by Volf Ibid p 137.
8 Volf Ibid p 137.
9 Volf Ibid p 137.
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locale in which it gathers together."10 Nevertheless, the concrete local church is not
the extent of this aspect of the definition. The early church had a particular
eschatological self-understanding. That is to say:
"... it understood itself 'as the company elected by God
and determined by him to be the center and
crystallization point of the eschatological Israel now
being called into existence by him.' When Paul later uses
the term £kka,r|cua tov 0eov ... as a designation for the
church of Jewish and gentile Christians, he is preserving
this eschatological horizon. ... Christians are the
eschatological people of God assembling themselves from
all the nations at particular places."11
It is in this respect that the second sense of ecclesia becomes evident. That is to say, a
particular understanding of the universal church comes about in the New Testament.
Thus the term ecclesia has come to designate both local congregation and universal
church in light of its eschatological self-understanding. Volf says "... [a]s the universal
church the ekka,r|cn.a is the 'heavenly' church gathered around the resurrected Christ in
anticipation of the its eschatological consummation."12 The universal church,
understood eschatologically, is not the same as the universal church understood as the
accretion of local churches or total number of Christians. The relationship between
these two positions is not easily resolved.13 Volf rightly points out that this
relationship raises a significant question for conceptions of church unity revolving
around the question of what is theologically primary, the universal or the local
church. He points out that taking the local church as the primary understanding of
10 Volf Ibid p 138. He makes this assertion on the basis of Romans 12s, 1 Corinthians 1212~13.
11 Volf Ibid p 139. The internal quotation comes from Jiirgen Roloff SKKAr/cnoc An Exegetical
Dictionary of the New Testament 1993 Eerdmans. Michigan. The Greek term church of God, Volf
claims, is the expanded version of the simple ecclesia in Paul's writings.
12 Volf Ibid p 139.
13 Volf Ibid pp 139- 141.
243
Chapter 6. Whose Ecclesia? Which Disaffiliation?
ecclesia, then the . communio sanctorum emerges through the addition of many
local churches; the whole eschatological people of God is a sum of all the local
churches in which individual Christians have gathered together."14 On the other hand
giving primacy to the universal church implies an emphasis on the communio
sanctorum at the expense of the visible church and in favour of the invisible.
In response to this Yolf embarks on an analysis of the traditional
understanding of the church as the body of Christ. He says "... [t]he alleged relation
of actualization between universal church and local church as well as the notion of the
identity of the two is grounded in a certain understanding of the relation between
Christ and the church."15 Traditionally, Christ and the church were held to be one;
the church and Christ representing an organic relationship constituting a single
person.16 From this notion flows the theological claim that Christ is the subject of the
church and the church adopts the subjectivity of Christ. Therefore, as Christ is
present in the local church so too is the universal church present. This view gives
priority to the local. Volf advocates, however, a different, 'non-organic' reading of this
situation which concludes with the assertion that the church "... both the universal
communio sanctorum and the local church, is not a collective subject, but rather a
communion of persons."17 As such, the church represents a collectivity of people who
as a communion are interdependent in two ways:
"First, they live only insofar as Christ lives in them
through the Spirit (see Gal. 2:20; 1 Cor. 6:19). Second,
the Christ lives in them through the multiple relations
14 Volf Ibid p 139.
15 Volf Ibid p 141.
16 Volf attributes the origin of this view to Augustine and notes that both Ratzinger and Zizioulas, two
outstanding contemporary writers on ecclesiology, have appropriated this understanding, p 141
17 Volf Ibid p 145.
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they have with one another (see 1 Cor. 12: 12 - 13). Yet
even though Christians are bound into this complex
network of relationships, they still remain subjects;
indeed, their being subjects is inconceivable without these
relationships (see Gal. 2:20). This is why one must also
conceive the 'one' who Christians are in Christ (Gal.
3:28; see Eph. 2:14 - 16) not as a 'unified person' who has
'transcended all differentiation,' but rather precisely as a
differentiated unity, as a communion of those who live in
Christ."18
Hence, Volf concludes, the universal church is not a subject that acts in the local
church. Neither is it identical with the local church. It is, rather, the interconnection
of local churches in Christ that configures the entire church as a prolepsis of the
eschatological gathering of the people of God. This configuration represents a notion
of the church as an assembly that, at a local level connects every church with all other
churches of God.
Understanding the church as an assembly, however, is not in itself a sufficient
condition of ecclesiality since an indispensable condition of ecclesiality is the action of
gathering in Christ's name. "In order to be a church," Volf contends "... the people
must assemble in the name ofChrist. In so doing, they attest that he is the 'determining
ground' of their lives; in him they have found freedom orientation and power."19 The
18 Volf Ibid p 145. This conclusion follows a reading of Heon-Wook Park, Robert Gundry and John A.
T. Robinson. He suggests that if we do not assume to understand the church as identical with the
earthly body of Christ then we are using the term body metaphorically. This includes the
interpretation whereby the church is taken to be identical with the resurrected body of Christ. Thus a
body which consists of a grouping of individual persons can only be a body in a figurative sense. Volf
says that "the question whether or not Paul is using the body of Christ metaphorically is falsely put;
the only correct query concerns the referent for that metaphor."
19 Volf Ibid p 146. Volf maintains that the church gathers first of all to call upon Christ as saviour and
in so doing to bear witness to him in front of others so gathered, and thence witness to the world.
Secondly, the church gathers to call upon and profess Christ as Lord of the church and the universe
under whose authority and in obedience to whom they act. Thirdly, assembling in Christ's name the
church acknowledge him as the "power in which they live" since Christ is Immanuel, God with them.
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conditions of ecclesiality, therefore, demand and depend upon certain confessional and
doctrinal articulations without which the church cannot exist. It is outwith the scope
of this thesis to delve into the world of doctrinal argument and specification.
Nevertheless, we can note that these confessional and doctrinal articulations can
present two conditions of ecclesiality for our consideration. That is to say, they
present an understanding of the church as communio fidelium and the related matter
of the commitment of the assembly.
"The church is essentially a communio fidelium, whatever else it may be
beyond this."20 Without faith the church is not the church. That is not to say that the
church's ecclesiality rests solely on the faith of the individual and thence imputed to
the assembly. "The church exists even if I do not believe; yet without at least some
believing, there can be no church, and in this sense the existence of the church is
bound to the faith of its members in Christ as their Savior and Lord."21 This in turn
raises the second consideration, which is the commitment of the assembly to allow
their lives to be determined by their faith in Christ. Rather than talking of the
relationship between works and faith as the index of commitment, Volf is more
inclined to discuss "... the path of imitatio."22 The church is not a club 'of the perfect'
but a communion of individuals who confess themselves to be sinners and, in
acknowledging Christ as Lord, place themselves under the power of the Spirit. In
20 Volf Ibid p 147.
21 Volf Ibid p 147.
22 Volf Ibid p 148. "Radicalizing the Calvinist tradition, the Free churches originally took as their point
of departure the assertion that faith without fruit is dead; where there is no fruit, there is no true faith,
and where there is no true neither is there a church. This ecclesiological use of the syllogismus practicus
is correct insofar as no common ground exists between God and mammon (Matt 6:24), between justice
and injustice, ... Yet the self-appointed church of the saints inevitably degenerates into a self-righteous
church of hypocrites. If the connection between faith and the fruit of the Spirit (Gal. 5:22 - 23) is to be
preserved while simultaneously avoiding hypocrisy, it is better to speak of the necessary commitment
of believers to take the path imitatio."
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confessing faith, the personal identification with Christ coincides with cognitive
specification. Volf suggests that "[w]ithout personal identification with Jesus Christ,
cognitive specification of who he is remains empty; without cognitive specification of
who Jesus Christ is, however, personal identification with him is blind."23 Thus, the
means of articulating a profession of faith says something about the person and work
of Christ. Thus "Jesus is Lord" or "Jesus is Saviour" refers to the work of Christ and
without this dimension, what Volf calls "... the cognitive dimension essential for faith
itself ... "24 confession would be impossible.
On the other hand, confession itself "... consists less in verbalizing a particular
theological content than in acknowledging that which the content of the confession is
identifying."25 Volf suggests that this describes the performative aspect of confession.
Thus to say, for instance "Jesus is Lord" is for one to acknowledge "... the crucified
Christ 'as the Lord whom God raised from the dead and elevated to ... [Lord of All],'
subordinate^] himself or herself to his rule, and 'presents to him praise and homage
calling upon his name.'"26 Hence to make a statement of confession is also to perform
a speech act that commits the speaker to that which is acknowledged in the
confession, in the sense that one is expressing commitment which in turn manifests
itself as a way of life as well as association.
23 Volf Ibid p 148.
24 Volf Ibid p 149.
25 Volf Ibid p 149. Volf makes this suggestion quoting Hans Von Campenhausen who suggests that the
history of confessions shows a change in emphasis. Early ones focused on Christ's work while later
ones e.g. 1 John focus on the essence of his person. Das Bekenntnis im Urchristentum. Zeitschrift fur die
Neutestamentlische Wissenschaft. 63 (1972): 210 - 253.
26 Volf Ibid p 149.
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A further dimension to be considered with regard to confession, as a
declaration of faith, is the public and social nature of confession. The etymology alone
suggests confession in the presence of someone as well as to someone. When
contextualised within the understanding of church as assembly of the universal and
local church we have a broader context within which the communicative acts of
Christians are to be understood. Hence, confession is not restricted to formulaic
expressions. Rather, every act of Christian communication is "... at least formally and
implicitly, an act of confession."27 It is in and through this that the church manifests
itself as the church. This understanding of confession extends to the daily life of
individual members of the church as well as to the more stylised expressions of the
singing of hymns and the ritual practice of the sacraments wherein and whereby the
church, those gathered in the name of Christ, speak the word of God to each other
and to the world.28 Thus, Volf suggests, echoing Luther, "... the pluriform speaking of
the word is the central constitutive mark of the church"2' In this regard even the
sacraments, rather than being constitutive of the church, can only be a condition of
ecclesiality insofar as they constitute a public profession and confession of faith that is
performative and determines commitment.33 That is to say, only insofar as the
sacraments represent a public display of remembrance and proclamation, can they be
understood to operate as instruments of God's activity in and through the church.31
27 Volf Ibid p 150.
28 Volf Ibid p 150.
29 Volf Ibid p 150. Quotes Luther's Werke 50.692.28 - 30. "Wherever you hear such words and see
preaching, believing, confessing and commensurate behavior, you can be sure that an ecclesia sancta
catholica must be there." His emphasis
30 Volf Ibid p 153.
31 Volf Ibid pp 153 - 154. "First they are a public representation of such confession; in baptism the
person baptised professes publicly faith in him in whose name baptism occurs (see Heb. 10:23), and the
ecclesial praise of God and God's salvific activity is constitutive of the Lord's Supper (avot|j,VT|at<;
[remembrance] and xoctuyye^Vetv [proclamation] in 1 Cor. 11:25 - 26). Second, the mediation of salvific
grace through the sacraments is bound to the faith of those receiving them. ... Although celebration of
the sacraments are certainly not a product of faith, they can be what they are for the persons who receive
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"There is no church without the sacraments; but there
are no sacraments without the confession of faith and
without faith itself. The church is wherever those who
are assembled, and be they only two or three, within the
framework of their pluriform confession of faith profess
faith in Christ as their Saviour and Lord through baptism
and the Lord's Supper."32
Thus we have a definition of the church as assembly and as confessional. So far
we have explored a localised understanding of the operation of these conditions. This
localised understanding means that the confession of faith is a condition of ecclesiality
"... internal to a local church; it is an intraecclesial event when a congregation
professes faith in Christ before the world."33 In other words it represents a confession
among people gathered at a specific place. It is not sufficient, however, that the
confession is the "... idiosyncratic act of a local church."34 If the confession is to be a
condition of the whole church then it has to be a confession constitutive of every
church. In so doing it distinguishes and identifies the church in the world and
connects every local congregation that is likewise distinguished and identified. This
point raises an interesting comparative doctrinal point whereby we have to ask if the
same confession will suffice for all denominations.33 Volf asks "... will the same
confession of faith suffice, as often seems to be view in the Free church tradition. Or
is a fellowship already separated from Christ and also from its own ecclesiality insofar
as it lives separate from the larger church, as Cyprian and ... both the Orthodox and
them, namely, instruments of God's activity and to that extent also constitutive for the church, only if
they are indeed received in faith." The ongoing debate about infant or adult baptism is not relevant
here, except to say that, given Volf's position the same general conditions apply.
32 Volf Ibid p 154.
33 Volf Ibid p 154.
34 Volf Ibid p 154.
35 Volf Ibid p 154.
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Catholic traditions believe?"36 An in-depth exposition of this question is outwith the
scope of this thesis. We may, however, make two observations in order to clarify the
situation in terms of the definition that we seek. First of all, we should consider the
practical import of this question. How, in fact, are the various churches connected at
the confessional level and are they able to express practically this unity? In response,
since intrae.cclesial conditions of unity are not sufficient to guarantee unity, Volf
suggests that an znter-ecclesial openness to other churches should be considered an
indispensable condition of ecclesiality. By this he means that:
"Since the eschatological gathering of the people of God,
whose foretaste is the local church, is not identical with
all churches of the past and present, the ecclesiality of a
local church need not depend on the sacramental relation
to them. Yet since the eschatological gathering of the
people of God will include all these churches as its own
anticipations, a local church cannot alone, in isolation
from all other churches, claim to be a church. It must
acknowledge all other churches, in time and space, as
churches, and must at least be open to diachronic and
synchronic communication with them."37
Thus a confession of faith, emanating from a local church, must at least bear an
additional characteristic to the extent that it does not expressly isolate that local
congregation from other local congregations and, therefore, other churches. It is
possible that a congregation can make a profession of faith without "... positive
36 Volf Ibid p 154 - 156. "In the Catholic and Orthodox traditions, the constitutive presence of Christ is
given only with the presence of the bishop standing in communio with all bishops in time and space. ...
only in this way can the 'whole Christ,' head and members, in the local church be ensured, a presence
that as such makes a local church into a church. ... Neither can the Free church thesis concerning a
direct presence of Christ in the church apply here since it either misunderstands the character of the
mediation of faith, or mistakenly presupposes that the constitutive presence of Christ is something
other than the presence of Christ in the hearts of believers manifesting itself externally."
37 Volf Ibid p 157.
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connections with other congregations but not in express isolation from them."jS
Openness to all other churches thus becomes the minimum interecclessial condition
by which the confessing assembly, in fact becomes fully participant in the proleptic
congregation of God's people, and not a religious club. Furthermore, the relationships
between individuals that manifest the common Christ, are extrapolated into
relationships between churches. As such these relationships reflect the differentiated
unity of the body of Christ. Secondly, we must reinforce a point made by Volf and
anticipate some possible criticism of this control definition of the church. That is to
say that in the final analysis we are talking not about the one church but about a
plurality of churches.39 That this is the case cannot and should not be denied. To
understand the church as a communio is to embody and express the New Testament
term xotvovta more accurately. That is to say, historically, the 'one' church has always
been the communion of churches which is not in itself a church. This is particularly
true in the contemporary context in which church and state are largely separated and
there is a degree of local differentiation among even established churches.40
Finally, therefore we can present our control definition of the church as
follows:
38 Volf Ibid p 157. "By isolating itself from other churches, a church attests either that it is professing
faith in 'a different Christ' than do the latter, or is denying in practice the common Jesus Christ to
whom it professes faith, the Christ who is, after all, the Savior and Lord of all churches, indeed, of all
the world."
39 Volf Ibid p 158.
40 Stanley Hauerwas repeatedly refers to the type of church-state relations typified by the place and
collusion of the church in the Roman Empire as Constantinian Christianity. For instance see AC p 16,
DFTF pp 92 - 106, CET p 104, AN p 74 - 78. In this Hauerwas follows Yoder and typifies the
Constantinian heritage as an example of a hegemonic power which belied the very substance that made
the church the church to begin with. Davis too is sceptical about the Constantinian heritage that the
church has. His creative disaffiliation is disaffiliation from the juridical-hierarchical model of the
church that arose from this Constantinian formation.
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"Every congregation that assembles around the one Jesus
Christ as Savior and Lord in order to profess faith to him
publicly in pluriform fashion, including through baptism
and the Lord's Supper, and which is open to all churches of
God and to all human beings, is a church in the full sense of
the word since Christ promised to be present in it through his
Spirit as the first fruits of the gathering of the whole people of
God in the eschatological reign of God. Such a congregation
is a holy, catholic and apostolic church."41
Hence we are in a position to test Davis's community of Discourse and Hauerwas's
community of character against the church understood as a confessing assembly
carrying the marks of catholicity, holiness and apostolicity. This test will allow us to
assess the extent to which Davis's and Hauerwas's positions present an accurate
rendering of the church. Indeed, much of the terminology will already be familiar
from our reading of Davis and Hauerwas. Superficially, Davis's understanding of
communication and plurality finds resonances here as will Hauerwas's focus on the
story of Christ as the normative constituent for the church. There are, however,
many more points of contact and in the remainder of the chapter we shall investigate
the extent other aspects of both the community of discourse and of character find
connections.
Before moving on, however, one final point needs to be made. This concerns
the scope of the following discussion. In the course of the discussion of the ecclesiality
of Davis and Hauerwas's communities of faith, the term church will be taken to mean
the holy, apostolic and catholic church avoiding any particular denominational bias.
That this should be the case is for three reasons, first of all, and most obviously, for
41 Volf op. cit. p 158.
252
Chapter 6. Whose Ecclesia? Which Disaffiliation?
ease of analysis. Secondly, our control model has built into it already some
denominational sensitivities and has been constructed in such a way as to make a non-
denominational, or at least interdenominational, approach viable. That is not to say
that denominational issues are not important, rather it is to acknowledge the common
ground between denominations and to take seriously Volf's condition of openness.
We can, nevertheless, note a third, curious point. That, if it were possible, or
desirable, to maintain the distinction between two types of communion then we could
say that Protestantism "... makes the individuals relation to the church dependent on
his relation to Christ." Whereas, on the other hand, Catholicism "... makes the
individuals relation to Christ dependent on his relation to the church."42 According to
this distinction Davis, the Catholic, appears to be more Protestant in that he
disaffiliates himself from the juridical-hierarchical church on the grounds of faith
founded in mysticism. Meanwhile Hauerwas, the Protestant, appears to be more
Catholic since he emphasises the church as the locus and expression on the Christians'
holy stories. Such a simplistic reading, however, ignores the fact that, in real terms, a
person's relationship to the church depends on their relationship to Christ while
simultaneously their relationship to Christ depends on their relationship to the
church. Volf maintains that these two relations are, in fact, mutually determinative.43
It is, therefore, the manner in which different denominations understand these two
relationships, and the weight that they give to one or the other, that mark the
42 Friedrich Schleiermacher The Christian Faith. 1928. H.R. Macintosh & J.S. Stewart (eds.). T&T
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differences rather than any hard and fast incompatibility. Hence we have a final
reason for not allowing a denominational discussion of these matters at this point.44
The relationship of the individual to the church and to Christ will feature again in our
discussion. In the meantime we shall proceed to explore the substance of Davis and
Hauerwas's ecclesiological positions in light of our control model. To this end we
shall explore their attitudes to the church as assembly and as confession, along the way
we shall raise the question of sacraments, revisit the faith-belief distinction and
examine the question of openness to other denominational and religious traditions.
6.3. Ecclesia and Creative Disaffiliation
As we saw in Chapter 3, Davis presented us with a community of discourse as
the model of the community of faith that was the necessary condition for authentic
political action. The importance of this community led us to draw some conclusions
as to the shape of the community of faith that Davis envisages. We saw that such a
community as Davis would lead us to, can have its roots in divine revelation, a
necessary condition for a confessing community according to the our control model
above. For Davis, the result of comprehending this revelation is a post-conventional,
universalistic religious identity, both personal and social, not tied to the fixed contents
and norms of any one tradition or to any permanent collective body. This identity
Clark Edinburgh, par. 24. p 103.
43 Volf op. cit. p 159.
44 According to Bonhoeffer, Schleiermacher, despite the contradictory elements in his understanding of
the church was aware of the mutual nature of these relationships. If he had not been he could not have
anticipated the destruction of the Catholic Protestant opposition (Ibid par. 23 p 101) without the
victory of one over the other. Sanctorum Communio: a dogmatic inquiry into the sociology of the church.
1963. Collins, London, pp 116; 224 n37 and Volf Ibid p 159.
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will correspond to the present level of human social development and will facilitate
authentic political action. Authentic political action comes about from a practical way
of life that revolves around voluntary association in the public sphere. We saw that
the impact of Davis's critical theology on the church is, in the final analysis, to
reconfigure it as a community of discourse providing the transcendent foundation for
sustained communication among human beings, despite their differences. In this
section I will proceed to analyse this reconfigured community against our control
model of a holy, catholic and apostolic church in order to assess the extent to which
Davis's community of discourse fulfils any of the criteria of ecclesiality that are
derivable from a standard model.
6.3.1. Creative Disaffiliation and The Community ofDiscourse
Returning to Davis's community of discourse it is clear that, according to his
use of types, the community of discourse would give priority to what he would call
the mystical-pragmatic type of the church. To this extent, the church as the bearer of
images, symbols, narratives, doctrines and practices should typify "... a way of life,
the result of the transformation of the individual person and the community by the
gift of transcendent love - a love no longer egocentric but self transcendent in a
radical sense and unrestricted, even to the inclusion of enemies."45 In this light, Davis
suggests that the church will exhibit the working out of the implications of the
experience of the beyond. The character of the community that Davis calls the church
to be is exemplified by the question, "... what is the contribution of Christianity to
the present social and cultural situation?"46 In answer to this Davis has argued
consistently that the hierarchical "... visible church is not the exclusive area of the
45 Davis WLWD p 117.
46 Davis WLWD p 119.
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sacred nor the community of the exclusively saved."47 Davis recognises, therefore, that
the church " ... to be true to itself must be (or become) a political society in the truest
sense, that is, a community of moral discourse in which the meaning and purpose of
all human endeavour is made explicit and celebrated."48 This community of discourse
is a pilgrim, nomadic people, constantly uprooted, constantly on the move needing
constantly to improvise to meet new and unexpected situations.49 It is, quite explicitly,
not a community of hierarchical-juridical structure or settled norms. As noted
previously the distinguishing feature of this nomadic community is its appeal to
practical reason in the interests of justice and emancipation. As such it is the model of
creative disaffiliation that picks up on the insights of mystical-pragmatic Christianity.
Nevertheless, while Davis's community of discourse marks the end of
'Christendom' in the hierarchical, juridical sense, it does not mark the death of the
sacred. Indeed, because of the end of hierarchical Christendom, the sacred is more
important than ever. In fact he says that "... Christianity is an eschatological faith."50
That Davis maintains this condition is extremely important. It places him
immediately within the parameters of our control model. As primarily an
eschatological faith, Christianity cannot be equated with, nor identified with, any one
culture or set of traditions or norms. Davis, like Hauerwas, rejects the Constantinian
heritage of the church noting that any culture that generates and sustains a hierarchy
47 Davis A Question of Conscience. 1967 Hodder 8c Staughton. London, p 185. According to Dennis
McCann, Davis has argued this thesis consistently now for over thirty years. TPCT pp 49 - 74. That
this is the case is beyond doubt. Consequently, that we are returning to Davis's early work here does
not mean that his ecclesiological thinking is primitive. On the contrary it is highly sophisticated.
Rather it is to say emphasise the perspicacity of his original position. As we shall see this position was
likely to achieve little more than vague Utopian status until it could be reinforced by the critical
reading of the insights of Jiirgen Habermas which was only available some years later.
48 McCann TPCT p 49.
49 Davis QC p 187.
50Davis QC p 187.
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in the face of the historical weight of secularisation is essentially pagan.51 The church
that emerged in Christendom engaged in this paganism and misrepresented the
biblical God that it confessed. "[T]he biblical God is not a supporter of the status quo
but one who breaks it up."52 Hence, maintaining an eschatological perspective on the
one hand and an understanding of what he calls modern consciousness on the other,
Davis reacts against the settled notion of Constantinian Christendom. This two-fold
agenda provides the impetus for Davis's concern with the social structure of the
church. Thus he understands his task, as he sees it, to provide an acceptable argument
for the "... acceptance of modern consciousness sufficiently strong and coherent to
bring about a change in the structure of the church as a social entity."53 In chapters 2
and 3 we saw how he produced such a coherent argument. In this chapter, by testing
Davis's community of character against our control model, we can assess whether or
not the new social entity is still describable as the church.
6.3.2. Is the church a Community ofDiscourse!
Davis has never moved very far away from the belief that the "... visible
church is the fundamental sacrament in so far as it is the permanent, manifest presence
of Christ in the world, the visible expression of embodiment of his union with men,
the effectual sign of his saving gifts."54 This sacrament should not, however, be
compromised by the demands of orthodoxy. Rather the sacrament should always be a
challenge to orthodoxy to the extent that it engages in and embodies critique. Davis's
important agenda is to show how ecclesial formation and reformation cannot and
51 Davis QC p 187. Davis maintains an important distinction between secularism which is essentially
hostile to notions of the sacred and secularisation which he sees as a process of differentiation wherein
secular autonomy as a sphere of immediate reality is recognised against the sacred which envelops it.
52 Davis QC p 187.
53 Davis QC p 190.
54 Davis QC p 230.
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should not be separated from social transformation. Hence his practical ecclesiology is
not so much a political theology as a theology of political action, realigning theory
and praxis with the emphasis on praxis. In effect Davis presents a theological
understanding for the appropriate location of ethical reflection in Christian social
action. That is to say, abstract ethics cannot be a substitute for practical theology and
practical theology must reflect an ecclesial dimension. Davis says:
"The constant appeal to practice in recent theology is just
an excuse for a lack of theory. The idea of a spontaneous
orthopraxis is a myth. Recourse is had to ethical
inspiration to cover over the absence of theoretical
criteria for action. But where there is a situation of
oppression, a practice inspired by an ethics of change
comes both too early and too late. Too early: because it
comes without the work of analysis necessary to make it
adequate and effectual in dealing with the oppression.
Too late: because theory is thereby led to constitute itself
in relation to ethical rather than political practice and is
not therefore, as it should be, a theoretical discourse
arising out of real emancipatory practice."53
He concludes that the lack of social theory can be filled by a mediator between
Christian faith and social action. The mediator takes the shape of a politicised
ecclesiology that is capable of confronting both the church and society at large as they
are presently organised. For Davis, then, the church is essential not only to Christian
ethics but also to critical theology and political action. That is not to say that the
church as it is in its present condition can fulfil this task. This, according to Davis, is
precisely because the church as it should be, under the terms and conditions of this
political ecclesiology, will allow for the correct realignment of substantive and
practical reason, of theory and practice, which will allow communicative action, as
55 Davis TPS p 61.
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understood by Habermas, to work. Whereas the church as it is, is bound to
orthodoxy and incapable of engaging in critique and endorsing communicative action.
The role of the church as mediator between Christian faith and social action is to
provide the normative tradition that will make the formation of a genuine political
community possible. The shape of the church will be broadly the same as that which
Davis had already outlined in A Question of Conscience. This outline arose as a
reaction against the 'vast administrative structure'56 that was the result of the church's
uncritical complicity with modernity and is typified by attempts "... to control,
arrange and systematize the activity of Christians."57 Thus it is oppressive, crushing
the humanity from Christians "... and frustrating their personal and social
• • • CO
expansion.
On the other hand, the shape of the church as it should be presents the
possibility of endorsing the integrity of humanity, of the individual Christian and of
the Christian faith. If the integrity of the individual Christian, and of the Christian
faith is to be affirmed, as well as realising Davis's politicised ecclesiology the church
has to be re-formed. Davis acknowledges that the integrity of the individual Christian
and of the Christian faith, notwithstanding the personal nature of commitment to
God through Christ, depends upon the continuity of a tradition. Thus, while such
commitment is not based merely upon intellectual agreement with a doctrinal
position, personal commitment would be meaningless without some doctrinal content
reflected in an institutionalised tradition.59
'6 This is, incidentally what Davis means when he talks of the juridical-hierarchical structure of the
church.
57 Davis QC p 208.
58 Davis QC p 209.
59 Davis QC p 213.
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"The presence of God is mediated to us through his
Word, and if his definitive Word is a person, Jesus
Christ, the presence of Christ is mediated to us today
through the preaching of the Gospel. Without a doctrine
of Jesus Christ, of his message and his work,
commitment to Christ would be indistinguishable from
personal fantasy or historical and philosophical
invention. The Spirit within us acts in conjunction with
the historical tradition of Christian belief coming to us
from without. Indissolubly linked to a doctrinal content,
the personal commitment of Christian faith inevitably
undergoes conceptualization and formulation. And the
absoluteness of that commitment is reflected in the
continuity of the historical tradition of Christian belief.
The Christian believer is committed to an
acknowledgement of that continuity."60
Here the christocentric nature of Davis's community of discourse is clearly
demonstrated. Moreover, we can see that the church presents the locus for the
realignment of the Spirit, that is within humanity, and tradition, that comes from
without. As such the church is Christocentric in character and, because of its
historicity, continuous in nature. Davis's Christocentrism, and his emphasis on
traditioned continuity provide the second positive point of contact with our control
model.
Nevertheless, we must return to the matter of orthodoxy because, unless we
elaborate on the relationship between doctrinal content and personal commitment, it
seems that Davis has compromised his earlier eschewal of orthodoxy in favour of
faith. Davis maintains that the church's continuity cannot be protected by enforcing
one particular standpoint or a-historical perspective. On the contrary, continuity can
only be facilitated by subordinating "... all the limited, perfectible formulations to the
60 Davis QC p 213.
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preservation of Christian commitment in a succession of different cultures and to the
drive toward a better understanding of Christ and his work and in the fact that no
development leads to the dissolution of that commitment."61 To facilitate continuity,
then, the church must become an open community of enquiry that eschews
orthodoxy as an unhistorical absolute or, at the very least subordinates it to the
preservation of personal commitment. This condition will be realised:
"... only by regarding Christian truth as belonging to the
Christian community as a whole, as in fact being the
common world of meaning that constitutes it as a
community. Only by being firmly placed in the hands of
the Christian community as a whole will Christian truth
be fully engaged in the process of man's becoming, fully
linked to his individual and social development. And
Christian truth as a common world of meaning will be
preserved and transmitted by open communication.
Open communication will secure that relevant questions
are not suppressed, but are taken up by others and met
by common effort. Through it the inadequacy of
particular formulations will be revealed and counteracted
by fresh thought to meet new situations and problems.
Open communication can provide the remedy for
errors."62
This insight is derived from Davis's understanding of the social nature of cognitive
rationality and his impression of the effectiveness of the scientific community in
establishing a process of open communication. In like manner, personal commitment
of Christians' require the freedom to ask relevant (sometimes even irrelevant)
questions without predetermined definitions of the extent of relevance.63 More to the
61 Davis QC p 213.
62 Davis QC p 215.
63 The parallels with Habermas's principle of universalisation and principle of discourse ethics are clear.
Every valid norm has to fulfil the condition that "... all affected can accept the consequences and side
effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interest (and
these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation.)" And the
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point, however, is the implication for the re-formation of the church. By
subordinating the predetermining limits of orthodoxy to 'open communication' Davis
undermines the magisterial office of the church, as the final guardian and
administrator of Christian truth.
With the demise of its magisterial office the church is free, in Davis's eyes, to
be "... the disclosure of what is present universally in human life and history. It stands
as the permanent embodiment of the explicit revelation of God's purpose for all
mankind."64 Such a role for the visible church is certainly compatible with our control
model and is consistent with the mainstream of ecclesiological thought since Vatican
II.65 Furthermore, Davis focuses on Christian fellowship as the significant
characteristic of the manner in which this disclosure is given.
"The Christian life is the strengthening, promotion and
celebration of all good and genuinely human life. It is not
the creation of a special kind of existence nor the erection
of a separate form of religious life nor the following of an
exclusively Christian way of life. Christian fellowship is
the discovery and building up of universal human
fellowship. It is not the establishment of an exclusive
Christian fellowship. The purpose of the Christian
Liturgy is not to achieve a deeper and exclusive
community experience among a special group. It is the
principle of discourse ethics: "... only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with
the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse." For Habermas, the
principle of universalisation has to do with moral questions of justice and solidarity which pertain to
formal universal solution while the principle of discourse ethics has to do with ethical questions of the
good life which are only addressable in the context of substantive cultures, forms of life and individual
projects. Davis's theological project seems to tie them together.
64 Davis QC p 221.
65 McCann "The Path Marked Out by Charles Davis's Critique of Political Theology." in TPCT 49 -
74. this quote from p 55. See also Schillebeeckx Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God 1963
Sheed and Ward, London; Kiing The Church 1968 Search Press, London.
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disclosure in symbol of the meaning of and basis of the
human community itself."66
Thus, the boundary between church, world and society must remain flexible. It is
only by maintaining flexible boundaries that the Christian community can realise its
historical mission. As Davis understands it, this mission is to make visible universal
human fellowship. The church, according to Davis, should provide for Christians a
common culture whose distinctive signs cannot and will not be disfigured any more
than God's grace can be defeated. That is to say, the visible church can reveal the signs
of fellowship appropriate to humanity but, in the final analysis, none of the church's
dogmatic and doctrinal structures are absolutely necessary and certainly not sufficient
for the mission of creating universal human fellowship. The exclusive nature of the
church must, therefore, be surrendered. That is to say, for Davis in accordance with
our control model, the identity of the church is vested not in the structure, but the
people. For Davis, surrendering the exclusive nature of the church takes the form of
creative, political disaffiliation from the juridical hierarchical structure of the church
that liberates Christians to be the people of God and not 'Church people.'
Davis anticipates that at this point, particularly in Roman Catholic
ecclesiology, there would normally be apologetic recourse to the sacraments as the
final and critical characteristic of ecclesiality to justify its hierarchical structure and to
belie the disaffiliate. Even here Davis is ruthless while maintaining sympathy for those
who do not, or cannot, share the practical implications of his creative disaffiliation.
He allows that it is important that "... people should cling to Christ according to
66 Davis QC p 222. Curiously, Davis rejects, on this basis the conventional ecumenical vision. That is to
say the reunion of all ecclesial bodies in one, unified organisation since this is not an accurate reflection
of the human community in its pluriform manifestations.
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their present understanding... "67 and recognises that it is to this minimal extent that
the juridical-hierarchical church is necessary. Davis's own position, as we might
expect, follows an inexorable logical progression. If the church itself is the
fundamental sacrament,68 or manifest presence of Christ on earth, then this negates the
fundamental status of the seven sacraments, including the Eucharist. He says:
"The seven sacraments are actions of the church. All of
them are professions of faith, hope and love on the part
of the Christian community. Made up of words and
actions, the sacraments are symbols in which the
community proclaims its faith, unfolds its hope and
declares its love - a love that includes repentance.
Looking at the sacraments we can see what is the mind of
the church in regard to Christ and gauge the manner of
its commitment to him. In the setting of this Christian
faith and commitment, six of the sacraments are actions
of the community in relation to particular members. The
Eucharist, as the chief sacrament, is the general gathering
together of Christians for a common celebration of the
total mystery of Christ."69
In short, the attitude to sacraments within the church should reflect the truth of the
Christian faith that lies in its mystical-pragmatic dimensions and not present prior
limits to the extent of possible structural change. That is to say, if Davis's post-
orthodoxy signals the end of the ambiguous relationship between orthodoxy and
orthopraxy, it does so on the basis of exposing the limited and limiting perspective of
a position that appeals to orthodoxy. Equally, it shows that there is no future in
67 Davis QC p 230.
68 See note 52 above.
69 Davis QC p 231. Davis's reference to seven sacraments reflects his Roman catholic background.
Latterly, he maintains that the chief sacraments to be the Eucharist and baptism. The other five
ordination, reconciliation, viaticum, marriage and confirmation are significant in terms of their ritual
practice within the community rather than their sacramental status. In conversation with Prof. Davis.
Edinburgh September 1997.
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orthopraxy if that means absolutising the church's current structures including even
the sacraments.
So far we have seen that Davis's community of discourse certainly corresponds
extensively with our control model. The correspondence occurs in three areas. First
of all, Davis recognises the significance of assembly as a criterion of ecclesiality. This is
evident to the extent that Davis focuses on Christian fellowship as the significant
characteristic of the manner in which this disclosure of that which is present
universally in human life is given. As an assembling community, then, the church
presents, in a proximate and contingent manner, God's purpose for humanity. In the
second place, Davis's community of discourse is a confessing community. The
evidence for this, too, is clear. The presence of God, says Davis, is mediated to us
through his Word and if his definitive Word is a person, Jesus Christ, the presence of
Christ is mediated to us today through the preaching of the Gospel. Without a
doctrine of Jesus Christ, of his message and his work, commitment to Christ would
be indistinguishable from personal fantasy or historical and philosophical invention.
Thirdly, for Davis and according to our control model, the confessing assembly must
also be proleptic and anamnestic. First of all, in this regard Davis is explicit in his
assertion that Christianity is an eschatological faith and thus anticipatory. Secondly,
he is explicit in his concern and acknowledgement of the continuity of Christian
belief, and thus recognises the significance of remembering. Insofar as Davis maintains
these conditions, he is placed immediately within the parameters of our control
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model. Finally, and by no means least, for Davis, in accordance with our control
model, the identity of the church is vested not in the structure, but the people. Given
this level of agreement we can safely conclude that Davis's community of discourse
meets the conditions of ecclesiality laid down in our control model and hence that the
church can be seen as a community of discourse.
6.3.3 The Church is a Community ofDiscourse
We can now draw a number of practical conclusions about the church
understood as a community of discourse as signalled by Davis. First of all, while
returning to one of Davis's earlier works for his understanding of a political
ecclesiology that is capable of confronting the political demands of modernity, it
should be noted that Davis's work must be seen as a corpus which develops,
expanding on themes which could not always be dealt with at the time. For example,
the model of the church outlined by Davis in A Question of Conscience promises
nothing more than to dissolve under the weight of utopianism. That is, until he
invokes critically the work of Habermas to give substance to his own notion of a
community of discourse. This provides the mechanism for establishing the church as
the formal norm for judging the validity of any kind of political action and any kind
of social organisation or praxis. In so doing, Davis allows the church to comprehend
the thrust towards, and the relevance of, emancipation wherever it is to be found.
Indeed, it is the ultimate meaning of the church to realise the real possibility of
liberation, implicit in Habermas's communicative action, in a tradition
institutionalised as a community of faith rather than a community of feudal
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orthodoxy.70 Consequently, the impetus of Davis's ecclesiology is towards
reformation through the transformative principle of faith. Bearing in mind Davis's
critique of Marxism and his claim that "[TJradition is the author of such
transformation, since it is the presence of the Spirit in human history... "71 we can
characterise his ecclesiology with the phrase semper reformanda\
Secondly, we can conclude that the un-reformed church, in Davis's terms, is
patently ignoring its mission, in response to the gospel, to recognise and deliver justice
in the world. That is to say, that insofar as the church does not heed the significance
of Davis's call to a new integrity in its ministry and mission, it remains un-reformed
because it cannot allow the transformative principle of faith to work. If it is the case
that, in common with Habermas, the church seeks a praxis of societal transformation,
then it must envision and empower a normative tradition. That tradition must answer
those critics who cast it in the role of the oppressor. The way to avoid this role is to
be actively engaged in a quest for "...plenitude and totality, [which] as a pursuit of
transcendent truth and value may surely be counted among the sources of
emancipatory experience, and as such, self-criticism against its own imperfect and
corrupt manifestations is built into it."72 This vision depends, of course, on
understanding the critique of orthodoxy to be inherent to the dynamism of faith
itself, which reflects the insight of the mystical-pragmatic model of Christianity.
Understood thus, the church is an ally in the political fight against oppression and not
an enemy siding with oppressors because a community of faith need not be inimical to
emancipation.
70 McCann TPCT p 72.
71 Davis TPS p 103.
72 Davis TPS p 131.
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Thirdly, Davis's creative disaffiliation from the hierarchical church has to be
seen as a positive step towards reformation and transformation rather than a negative
withdrawal to the margins. If the church is a definable cultural tradition in the West
then, it seems that reformers and transformers have often adopted just such a position,
but in historical continuity with the tradition. What marks them out is their vision of
the way the church might operate more effectively. What distinguishes Davis's
position is the promise of a political ecclesiology that can envision a future towards
which its social praxis can be orientated. That promise generates a new articulation
beyond particularism and orthodoxy, embracing a new religious identity that is also
faithful to the religious identity of the past:
"Participation in communication processes for the
formation of norms and values is a basis for a
universalised ego-structure transcending the particularism
of enclosed groups. But such a universalistic ego-structure
does not in itself imply the unconditional worth of the
individual. Are we then simply to relinquish the
Christian stress upon the individual self? After all, the
doctrine of an individual self, distinct from God, but
constituted in relationship to him, is not shared by the
nontheistic religious traditions."73
Thus, Davis is attacking the 'bland catholicity' of uncritical ecumenism, or the naive
relativism or juridical-hierarchical ecclesiality, by introducing a community of
discourse that has primacy over the contents and norms of any one tradition or any
permanent collective body. Its primacy comes from the fact that it can and does forge
links with a broader religious tradition and thus relativises its own content and
norms. Davis, in the end, presents an agenda for a political ecclesiology that reflects
73 Davis TPS p 174.
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and articulates a universal church that does not yet exist.74 The universal church that
does not yet exist can, however, be anticipated and worked towards under already
existing conditions. As Davis says "...active participation in a universality to be
realised in the future. Present working for a yet-to-be-realised universality can already
unite people of different positions." This calls for a creative tension to be developed
between the church as it is and those like Davis who see the church as it should be.
Finally, since Davis has undermined 'bland catholicity' we must examine his
own understanding of a more appropriate catholicity. For Davis, the fact that he sees
the church as a community of discourse, and as the fundamental sacrament, making
visible the manifest presence of Christ in the world has a knock on effect whereby the
meaning of the church is to render visible and explicit universal human fellowship.
Since the Christian world of meaning, which is the visible church, coincides with the
common human world of meaning, which is constitutive of the human community,
Davis can suggest a universality common to both. It is in this way that the church is
universal. The centre is firmly and christocentrically located but the boundaries are
blurred. "The center is Christ, visibly present through those who are explicitly
committed to him through faith."76 Thus Christ is made universally present in the
world. The mission of Christians, ironically, is not to embody the visible church but
the universal community of humanity in anticipation of "the final Kingdom."77 Davis
74 The similarity between this notion of the universal church, presupposed in every moment that the
church attempts to embrace authentic political action, and Habermas's ideal speech situation is
obvious. This ideal speech situation, though not routinely at hand, does imply that communicative
action, although always occurring in an historical context, depends also on an ^-historical dynamic.
Communicative action, or action orientated towards understanding and consensus is, therefore, to be
contrasted strongly with strategic action or action orientated towards success.
Davis TPS p 173.
76 Davis QC p 222.
77 Davis QC p 226.
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says that the history of salvation is not a main-line history, nor is it even a parallel to
main-line history. On the contrary, it is a subversion of history brought about
through faith and vision:
"The apocalyptic lightning flashes group together people
and events unnoticed by and consequently non-existent
for the mighty of this world. That all the discrete
configurations of meaning will somehow all fit together
in the end is a hope for the eschaton not to be sought as
realised in any historical institution."78
Two points are clear from this. First of all, the church described by Davis is clearly
Christocentric, confessional and proleptic. As such it fulfils the criteria laid down in
our control model. Secondly Davis presents an understanding of the church as an
association of "...unstable and transitory groups and movements. These come and
go."79 For Davis, therefore, the People of God, the redeemed community of the Spirit,
are a scattered people, a diaspora.80 Consequently, any attempt to stabilise it in a
permanent collective body is to assert that freedom "... consists in accepting a teaching
and a history which are not and never have been ours."81 Hence, we can conclude
with Davis that it is not only possible but desirable for the church to be understood as
a community of discourse. This community of discourse, however, clearly tends to
catholicity and unity over apostolicity and holiness.
6.4. Creative Disaffiliation and Ecclesia
We turn now to examine Hauerwas's community of character in light of our
control model. Again I will analyse this reconfigured community against our control
78 Davis "Is The church an Idol?" Commonweal. 1 February 1980. Pp 45 - 48, p 48
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model of a holy, catholic and apostolic church in order to assess the extent to which
Hauerwas's community of character fulfils any of the criteria of ecclesiality that are
derivable from a standard model. At the outset we must point out that it is not always
clear that the church that Hauerwas describes either exists or even might come to be
in the future. It might be described as "... a fantasy community which fails to reflect
the ways in which the members of the church are positioned within civil society."82
This reflects a curious and ambivalent relationship between Hauerwas's descriptive
representation of the actual church and his prescriptive proposal for the way the
church might be.83 Hauerwas's own ambivalence is apparent in his self-confessed
churchmanship as a Methodist, high-church Mennonite.84 It is the purpose of this
section to examine this curious relationship and put his claims to the test against our
control model of church. We shall do this by, reflecting on the community of
character and examining the extent to which Hauerwas is successful in showing the
presence of the prescriptive church within the description of the empirical church.
6.4.1. Creative Disaffiliation and the Community ofCharacter
Though difficult to see at times, the conclusion of Hauerwas's counter-cultural
position is not one of isolationism. Rather it is the starting point for a significant
contribution to the wider social world.85 As David Fergusson says, "Hauerwas's claim
is simply that by living genuinely as a distinctive Christian community the church
may have more impact on its surrounding society than by advocating consensus
82 Davis Ibid.
83 We have already noted a similar tension in Davis's critical theology.
84 Hauerwas COC p 6. Also Fergusson op. cit. p 243.
83 See David Fergusson "Another Way of Reading Stanley Hauerwas?" Scottish Journal of Theology vol.
50 no2 1997 pp 242 - 249. Fergusson cites Arne Rasmusson as a powerful ally in this understanding of
Hauerwas's position. I would concur to the extent that there is nowhere for Hauerwas to withdraw to
and appreciate his effort to turn an apparent vice into a virtue.
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solutions to the problems we face."86 This is viable, however, only to the extent that
the church maintains its independence from public language and accountability. By so
doing the church provides "... the space and time necessary for developing skills of
interpretation and discrimination sufficient to help us recognize the possibilities and
limits of our society."87 Thus described, the church embodies the art of the weak. As a
result the church must occupy alien or foreign ground. As such it must use the
language resources and tools that are at hand, but not controlled or determined by the
church. The church cannot withdraw from the public sphere because there is no place
of its own to retreat to.88 The political action that Hauerwas envisions for the church
is, therefore, the tactic of guerrilla warfare. In other words Hauerwas is, like Davis,
advocating a creative disaffiliation. Where Davis's disaffiliation brought him out of the
juridical-hierarchical church and into the cultural desert to be navigated by a
community of discourse, Hauerwas's disaffiliation takes him from the cultural desert
and into the church, understood as a community of character.
6.4.2. Is The Church a Community ofCharacter?
As we have noted above, Hauerwas's ethics are, first and foremost, ecclesial
ethics. That is to say, he presents the church as that community of moral discourse
which embodies and witnesses to a particularly truthful kind of politics thus
rendering a truthful people in service to the kingdom of God. For the church to be
the church in Hauerwas's eyes, then, certain conditions must be present. The church's
identity is shaped by these prevailing conditions; namely, the sovereignty of God, the
imitation of Christ and the presence of the Holy Spirit. That is not to say that the
86 Fergusson Ibid.
87 Hauerwas COC p 74.
88 See Hauerwas AC pp 16 & 163 n. 3. See also CET and RA.
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church's activities are not important. As we have seen Hauerwas assert particular
activities render a particular people. These activities are, however, secondary to, and
derived from, the prevailing conditions. Consequently, the church should be
understood not as a collection of activities but as a people with a particular identity.
First of all, for Hauerwas, the church is a confession of the sovereignty of God.
That is to say, Hauerwas understands Christians to have been "...called to form
communities that manifest the trust and the love possible between people when they
recognise the sovereignty of God over all life."89 Recognition of this sovereignty
requires that the church makes manifest the character of God. That means
participation in the divine character: you must be perfect as your heavenly father is
perfect.90 A quote from Yoder, which could just as easily have issued from Hauerwas's
pen serves to illustrate this point: "The Christian loves his or her enemies because
God does, and God commands his followers to do so: that is the only reason, and that
is enough."91 For Hauerwas, God's sovereignty depends upon and reflects the
kingdom. The practical result of this is that the activities of the church, when they
reflect the values of the peaceable kingdom, are the activities that affirm God's
sovereignty. As we have noted, however, the church is not, for Hauerwas, primarily a
collection of activities but an embodiment of a certain character. This perspective
connects significantly with our control model when we consider that the embodiment
of the character Hauerwas talks about is, in effect, a life of confessing. As such, the
89 Hauerwas Suffering Presence p 147.
90 Rasmussen The Church as Polis p 303. "Jesus Christ inaugurated the kingdom of God ... built on the
conviction that peace is ontologically more basic than violence, because that is the way that God rules
the creation." Again, insofar as Hauerwas argues for nonviolence, this reflects the be-as relationship.
91 Yoder Living the Disarmed Life: A Study Guide for churches on the Nuclear Arms Race. 1981
Washington DC. p 42. Sam Wells points out that Hauerwas and Yoder's arguments are so close that
they can be followed interchangeably. Wells Transforming Fate into Destiny, p 90.
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church envisaged by Hauerwas is both confessional and, being confessional, requires
and fosters commitment.
Reflecting that commitment, we have seen Hauerwas suggest that the church
has to be the most political of all institutions because of its commitment to the truth.
The polity of the church, is the polity of discipleship carried out in anticipation of the
peaceable kingdom of God. The distinguishing feature of the politics of the church's
politics, therefore, is nonviolence. To understand this properly we must understand
that, in performing the politics of discipleship, the church is not concerned with
avoiding conflict either internally or externally. Rather it is concerned with creating
the conditions necessary for the right kind of conflict and confrontation, which is
done through its institutions and associations. The politics of discipleship is, therefore,
the politics of developing "...processes and institutions that make possible
confrontation and resolution of differences so that violence can be avoided."92
Hauerwas concludes that this form of peacemaking, this process "... is not simply one
activity among many but the very form of the church."93 In relation to those outside
the church, the church must be as truthful with them as it is with itself. The church
maintains truthfulness by relating the peace of the kingdom to the Christian
understanding of forgiveness exemplified by the embodiment of the kingdom in
Christ.94 Thus, to be the church is to respond to the sovereignty of God by
embodying the character of God. To make manifest the character of God, however, is
to imitate the fully human and fully divine Christ.
92 Hauerwas Peacemaking pp 95 - 96.
93 Hauerwas Ibid.
94 See Hauerwas The Peaceable Kingdom, and Why Truthfulness Requires Forgiveness: A Commencement
Address For the Graduates ofa College ofThe Church ofthe Second Chance. DFTF pp 80 - 88.
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For Hauerwas, the imitation of Christ is a reflection of his understanding that
Christ is the foundational principle for Christian ethics and consequently the church,
since the church is not to have but be a social ethic. Wells points out that:
"For the situation into which Jesus came, and the forces
with which he came into contact, were ones of abiding
historical and political relevance: then as now, the
kingdom of God confronted racism, militarism,
nationalism, the corruption of justice, mob spirit and
action, religious bigotry and the pressure of government.
Do these forces constitute the true nature of history? Or
did Jesus expose, address and redeem them and thus
define history differently? Yoder and Hauerwas insist
that the latter is the case."95
Given this understanding, Hauerwas can maintain that the imitation of Christ gives
substance to the church's witness to God's sovereignty and the embodiment of the
kingdom for two reasons. First of all, imitating Christ affirms the continuity of God's
revelation in the world from the Old Testament, through Christ and into the church.
Secondly, imitating Christ provides a basis for Christian ethics that outweighs
alternative foundations for Christian ethics.96 I have dealt with much of the material
covering the first point of this discussion in Chapter 5. It is the second point that I
wish to consider here before drawing some conclusions about the church understood
as a community of character.
A community that imitates Christ, maintains Hauerwas, is a community that
has made the journey from community to church by embodying the narrative of Jesus
in its practices and, in so doing, seeks to imitate the character of God. This is, in turn,
95Wells op.cit p 91.
96 For an extremely useful history of Christian social ethics of the kind that Hauerwas reacts against see
Wells Ibid pp 3 - 12.
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a profession of the belief that God participated in human nature insofar as he is
involved in creating a people who refuse to meet the world on its own terms. The
ability to sustain this position of disaffiliation comes as we have noted, from the
appropriate human response to God's revelation, which is the imitation of Christ. For
Hauerwas the best image of Christ for imitation comes from the gospel story of the
temptation.97 In this story, Christ resists the temptation to become a great prophet, a
king or high priest. The resistance represents, Christ's capitulation with God's will for
his life and his death. The point that Hauerwas makes here is that Christ appears to be
called to responsible action in this story, feeding the hungry and the poor, dominion
that will bring peace to nations, and yet he chose the course of humility and love and
went to the cross. The reason for this apparently bizarre choice arises because the
'responsible action', to which he was called was defined and determined by different
parameters than those which gave Christ's life meaning. For Hauerwas, Christ's
response gives shape to a Christian ethic of non-violence and peacefulness, supported
by truthfulness. This, in turn, is the shape of the church in the world in terms of an
alien nation. This represents a creative disaffiliation from the powers of the world and
from Christian ethics that capitulate with them. We shall return to this theme later. In
the meantime we should note that as Hauerwas stresses the imitation of Christ he
signals another point of contact with our control model. The 'path of imitatid' means
that the church envisaged by Hauerwas represents a communion of individuals who,
in confessing Christ, are confessing to his work in revealing God's peaceable kingdom.
By so doing, the Christian commits him or herself to that kingdom. Thus, Hauerwas
understands the church to be confessional and lays particular emphasis on the nature
of the commitment that the confession requires.
97 Hauerwas PK p 76.
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This conception of the church presents serious implications for the life and
worship of local churches. By calling for Christians to rediscover their alien status
Hauerwas, of course, invites a series of questions: 'Where is the church you ... talk
about?' Where did it ever exist in Christian history?' Where does it exist today?'
'How can it exist today?'98 Given Hauerwas's theological commitments, he cannot
respond to such questions simply by distinguishing between the visible and invisible
church. Neither can he talk about what the church ought to be. If Hauerwas's ecclesial
ethic is to be at all viable the local church as it is has to be the starting point.99 For the
purposes of analysis and ease of illustration, we can cast the question in terms of
another question: is the church to be understood as the people of God or the body of
Christ?100 Hauerwas calls for the church not to be merely a community, like any other
that might shape individuals, but to be a body constituted by "... disciplines that create
the capacity to resist the disciplines of the body associated with the modern nation
state. ... For the church to be a social ethic rather than to have a social ethic, means
that the church is a body polity."101 As such, Hauerwas falls on the side of the church
as the body of Christ as distinct from the idea of the people of God, and therefore on
the side of hierarchy and even authoritarianism over against an open democratic
understanding of the church.102 As we observed earlier, this is not necessarily a
problem for Hauerwas since his understanding of practice requires that the participant
98 Hauerwas In Defense ofCultural Christianity: Reflections on Going to Church, p 13.
99 Hauerwas Ibid.
100 Hauerwas What Could it Mean for The Church to be Christ's Body?A Question Without Clear Answers.
Unpublished Conference paper subsequently published as part of the collection by Hauerwas: In Good
Company: the Church as Polis 1995. University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana.
101 Hauerwas Ibid.
102 See George Lindbeck The Future ofRoman Catholic Theology 1970. Fortress Press, Philadelphia. This
is Lindbeck's account of Vatican II and one which, through being a student with Lindbeck, greatly
influenced Hauerwas.
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learn from masters and this, in turn, presupposes the exercise of authority.
Nevertheless, we still have to ask what the shape of Christ's Body will be. Echoing
John Milbank, Hauerwas argues that the church should not be considered in a spatial
sense, in terms of an exemplar or location to which we might arrive.103 This implies an
understanding of the church restricted in time when in fact the church represents a
new time.104 To explain this contention Hauerwas refers to the church's practice of
celebrating the sacraments.105 Rasmussen notes that Hauerwas's sacramental theology
is sketchy and thus creates some problems.106 We are not, however, concerned here
with specifics of liturgical rites. Rather we can reiterate an earlier point and appreciate
Hauerwas's reading of Milbank when he says that it is in the practice of the Eucharist
that the church is truly a body. Hence, the church is neither programme nor even a
real society but an enactment or performance. The church, therefore, is to be found
on the "... site of the Eucharist, which is not a site; since it suspends presence in favour
of memory and expectation."107 This understanding of time makes sense of both the
church as prolepsis and of the localised congregation. It is in this practice that the local
church is connected to all other churches that also celebrate the Eucharist as
participation in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. As such, the church for
Hauerwas is both a communio sanctorum and a communio fidelium, but more the
body of Christ than the people of God, both local and universal.
103 John Milbank "Enclaves, or Where is The Church?" New Blackfriars. 73, 861 (June 1992) pp 341 -
342.
104 See Sam Wells How The Church Performs Jesus's Story: Improvising on The Theological Ethics ofStanley
Hauerwas. 1995 PhD Thesis. University of Durham. See also Hauerwas What Could it Mean for The
Church to be Christ's Body? p 15.
105 Hauerwas Faith in the Republic p 524, CET p 118 - 121.
106 Rasmussen church as Polis. p 192.
107 Milbank Enclaves, or Where is The ChurchI cited by Hauerwas What Could it Mean for The Church to
be Christ's Body? p 16.
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Although christocentric Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics are, however, not at all as
clear as we might expect about Christology.
"It is not clear from Hauerwas's writing whether Jesus
was the last of the prophets ... or whether he was the
first of the saints. ... The latter model is one concerned
primarily with revelation - Jesus is seen revealing how his
followers are to live. The former model is more
concerned with redemption as a once-for-all event. Has
redemption definitively taken place in the resurrection
and ascension, or is it still taking place in the church?"108
That we can ask these questions at all betrays Hauerwas's own diverse ecclesiological
background and, most clearly, his openness to other Christian denominations. We
have already noted various Mennonite and Roman Catholic influences on Hauerwas
but here we can note further the practical implication of this openness. Wells suggests
that we can represent this question by asking of Hauerwas whether redemption is a
story to be remembered by the community or a drama to be performed?1"9 This
question relates to how the church is to embody the kingdom, how to live the politics
of discipleship. As such, Wells suggests, it raises denominational debates. The former
can be said, roughly, to typify the Reformed notion of the Eucharist while the latter
represents, roughly, the Roman Catholic position.110 Inevitably, Hauerwas has to say
that for the church to be the church it must have both, performance and
remembrance. To this extent, added to his concern with the continuity of tradition
Hauerwas presents a community that is anamnestic as well as proleptic.
108 Wells Transforming Fate to Destiny, p 97.
109 Wells Ibid p 98.
110 On this point see Schillebeeckx Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God. 1963. Sheed and
Ward, London, pp 184 - 195.
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So far we have seen that Hauerwas's community of character clearly
corresponds extensively with our control model. The correspondence occurs at three
points. First of all, the community of character is an assembly. Hauerwas understands
the church primarily as a people with a particular identity not a collection of
activities. Secondly, it is confessional in that we have seen Hauerwas's Christocentric
orientation appear repeatedly. In this case it is the focus of the church's confession in
the sovereign God. Moreover, this Christocentrism manifests itself in the Hauerwas's
call for the church to imitate Christ, marking it out as holy and apostolic. Thirdly,
given Hauerwas's focus on the historicity of the Christian tradition and its continuity
as well as his orientation towards the peaceable kingdom, it is clearly anamnestic and
proleptic. Given this level of agreement we can safely conclude that the community of
character meets the conditions of ecclesiality laid out in our control model and hence
that the church can be seen as a community of character.
6.4.3. The Church is a Community ofCharacter
We can now draw a number of conclusions about the church as a community
of character. First of all, that Hauerwas's church is confessional is without doubt. The
church as a counter cultural enclave, in confessing truthfully the peaceable kingdom,
cannot realise justice or peace through force or coercion. Neither can the church
allow injustice to carry on unresolved, because the peaceable kingdom is a kingdom of
justice that is concerned with the well being of the neighbour.111 This disposition,
Hauerwas claims, requires the Christian to become the "... most political of all
animals."112 Consequently the church will be the most political of all institutions,
since the practice of peaceableness requires policies, practices and institutions to make
111 Hauerwas PK p 146.
112 Hauerwas CET p 96.
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possible non-violent confrontation and resolution of conflict which marks the world's
politics. In short, Christians are politically active, in and in light of the politics of the
kingdom, wherein and whereby they are understood to be "... a community which
tries to develop the resources to stand within the moral witnessing to the peaceable
kingdom and thus rightly understanding the world."113 And this is because "[pjolitics
as the art of the maintenance of a good society is the art that is at the heart of being a
Christian."114
Secondly, the witness that Hauerwas describes is only possible to the extent
that it is substantiated by the imitation of Christ. The imitation of Christ forms for
Hauerwas the basis for reinterpreting apostolicity in terms of his focus on the
narrative of Christ and the early church, and aligning holiness with the tradition of
virtue and formation inherent in the church as a community of faith. As we have
discussed, this focus has opened the way for attacks on Hauerwas from the likes of
James Gustafson, to the effect that Hauerwas is a sectarian. Nevertheless, we must
acknowledge that the path of imitation does make it possible for Hauerwas to take the
church as it is as his starting point for authentic politics while subordinating it to the
church as it should be. The substance of the vision of the way the church should be
comes from Hauerwas's understanding of the peaceable kingdom. We should note
here another possible criticism of Hauerwas that relates to his christocentrism and
the idea of imitating Christ. That is to say that he has been accused of Pelagianism to
113 Hauerwas PK p 102.
114 Hauerwas TT p 143.
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the effect that rather than concentrating on grace and justification Hauerwas
concentrates on sanctification.115 It is undeniable that Hauerwas focuses on
sanctification, or holiness. His defence to this (should it need one) would be that
making categories like justification and sanctification primary is theologically
questionable. Moreover, Hauerwas understands the church as a social, eschatological
and practical community that is ill served by traditional radical reformation ideas of
sanctification and justification.116 They are better understood as rules for the right
living of the Christian story. " 'Sanctification' is but a way of reminding us of the kind
of journey we must undertake if we are to make the story of Jesus our story.
'Justification' is but a reminder of the character of that story - namely what God has
done for us by providing us with a path to follow."117 Equally, the new life that
Christians are called to is a gift that is mediated through the adoption into the
Christian holy story such that we can retrospectively acknowledge and discover
"...that our lives have been made more than we could acknowledge at any one
time..." through God's forgiveness.118 Thus Hauerwas subordinates theological
orthodoxy to embodying the Christian holy story.
Thirdly, for Hauerwas, the church is an eschatological communion. All of the
virtue and character and marks of the church are to be properly understood only in
115 Thomas Ogletree "Character and Narrative: Stanley Hauerwas's Studies of the Christian Life"
Religious Studies Review. 6/1/ (Jan. 1980) pp24 - 30 and Rasmussen The Church as Polis. ppl99 - 201
116 Hauerwas COC p 240, 245. AC p 37.
117 Hauerwas PK p 94. This is s revision of his earlier comments in the first edition of CCL.
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light of the new telos promised by the Kingdom of God to which the church is a
witness. That is to say that Hauerwas recognises the eschatological dimension of the
Kingdom to which the church is required to be faithful. Thus "...we are an
eschatological people who base our lives on the knowledge that God has redeemed his
creation through the work of Jesus Christ. Thus we are called to live out of control in
the sense that we must assume God will use our faithfulness to make his kingdom a
reality."119 The overriding virtue, for Hauerwas arises at this point in that this new
telos means that the church and individual Christians are to live "out of control."120 By
this he means that we are no longer called to be effective political agents so much as
we are called to be faithful to the kingdom and embody authentic politics. We are, he
says, liberated from concerning ourselves with making history come out right. Instead
we are called to the responsibility of witnessing to the kingdom, through an imitation
of Christ. Thus it is possible to see the church as a community of character.
Finally, we have noted that Hauerwas, like Davis, is not impressed by 'bland'
catholicity of uncritical ecumenism or naive relativism. Rather, through a counter
cultural structure, confessing Christ and witnessing to the Kingdom of God, the
church:
"... finds in Jesus not simply a restorer of lost creation
known separately from Jesus himself, but rather in Jesus
118 Hauerwas 'On Developing Hopeful Virtues' p 114.
119 Hauerwas PK p 105.
120 Hauerwas PK p 105.
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the church discovers the very nature of the created order.
In short, in Christ we know that creation was not an act
in and for itself, but an act carried out for a
purpose... The original creation is aimed at a new
creation, the creation of a community of all flesh that
glorifies God."121
Hence, Hauerwas envisages a church that is characteristically proleptic and catholic.
The church understood as a community of character is participating in the ongoing
work of creation by God through Christ. The politics of the church is the politics of
the kingdom and as such is the politics of discipleship. Hence the mission of
Christians for Hauerwas is to embody the kingdom in the visible church, but only
insofar as this is an accurate, albeit incomplete, reflection of the yet to be realised
kingdom. The church, therefore, embodies and presents a subversion of the life and
history of the world. That Hauerwas is, like Davis, a creative disaffiliate makes sense
of Fergusson's insight, and Hauerwas's own contention, that he is not advocating
isolationism but providing a coherent starting point for a significant Christian
contribution to the politics of the wider world.122 Hence we can conclude that it is
possible and even desirable for the church to be understood as a community of
character. Nevertheless, we must concede that Hauerwas community of character
does tend to the credal mark of holiness and apostolicity above catholicity and unity.
To conclude this section we shall briefly summarise our findings. Thus far we
have examined the extent to which Davis's community of discourse and Hauerwas's
community of virtue represented the church and related to a control model of the
empirical church. Measuring the communities of discourse and character against our
121 Hauerwas ChiefEnds p 207.
122 Hauerwas DFTF p 18. Fergusson op. cit.
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control model we have concluded that they both reflect a confessing assembly, that
displays the properties of prolepsis and anamnesis. It is possible and even desirable to
understand the church as both a community of discourse and a community of
character. The most significant difference lies in the fact that while the community of
discourse tends to emphasise the credal marks of catholicity and unity above holiness
and apostolicity, the community of character tends to emphasise holiness and
apostolicity above catholicity and unity. Bearing this in mind, we are now in a
position to suggest that we should start to look at Davis and Hauerwas as not,
necessarily, contradictory or irreconcilable. We would contend, therefore, that Davis
and Hauerwas might be better understood in the first instance as complementary.
That is to say, as conversation partners whose positions, rather than issuing in a
deadlock, describe the boundaries of an ongoing theological conversation and a more
complete and integrated picture of the church.
6.5 Redeeming Ecclesia
In the final section of this chapter, then, it is our intention to examine the
consequences of this conversation between Davis and Hauerwas. We shall do this by,
first of all noting the common ground shared between the two as creative disaffiliates.
Secondly, we shall extend the analogy and look more closely at the conditions under
which Davis and Hauerwas might continue the conversation.
6.5.1. The Common Ground ofCreative Disaffiliation
At this point we shall bring Davis and Hauerwas together and list the common
themes and concerns running through their work. First of all we shall note that both
Davis and Hauerwas concern themselves with the church as either the people of God
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or the body of Christ. We have seen that while Davis is more comfortable with an
understanding of the people of God, Hauerwas tends more to an understanding of the
body of Christ. On the one hand, Davis's community of discourse is, he asserts, a
pilgrim, nomadic people, constantly uprooted, constantly on the move needing
constantly to improvise to meet new and unexpected situations. On the other hand,
Hauerwas maintains that the Body of Christ is a collection of resident aliens,
witnessing to the peaceable kingdom. Secondly, the character of the communities
described share a Christocentric vision. Thirdly, both Davis and Hauerwas are
sensitive to the sacramental role of the church as mediating Christ's presence. Davis
holds the church to be the fundamental sacrament of Christ's presence wherein ritual
practice is a derivative, secondary activity. Hauerwas, too, maintains that the ritual
practices of the church are significant only to the extent that they contribute to
substantiating the character of the community of faith and hence mediating Christ's
presence. Fourth, both Davis and Hauerwas share a concern with the boundaries
between the community of faith and the world. For Davis the mythical-visionary
model espoused by Hauerwas created too solid a boundary whereas, Hauerwas sees
the mystical-pragmatic model favoured by Davis as presenting too weak and fluid a
boundary. Fifth, Davis and Hauerwas both share a concern with the continuity of the
community of discourse that they each envisage. Sixth, both Davis and Hauerwas are
concerned with the significance of faith over belief, and any impetus to understand
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Christianity as belief, and therefore orthodoxy, rather than faith.123 Seventh, Davis and
Hauerwas, in the final analysis are both concerned with developing a practical
rationale to justify creative disaffiliation, Davis from the mythical-visionary, juridical
and hierarchical church and Hauerwas from the excess of modern, liberal polity.
To this end, Davis and Hauerwas both agree that political theology, though
useful has been ultimately unsuccessful. It has been useful and correct to the extent
that they assert the truth or truthfulness of Christian conviction cannot be separated
from its political implications. Political theology is, however, misguided for two
reasons, both of which derive from the assumption that politics is not mostly a
question of social change. First of all, the political questions of liberation, freedom
from violence and oppression and so on, must be applied to the church. For
Hauerwas, as we have seen, the rigour of this application must at least match, or out¬
do, the rigour of application to society. Thus, since Hauerwas sees the crucial question
for the church is "... what kind of community it needs to be faithful to the narrative
central to Christian convictions... "124 he advocates and attempts to sustain creative
disaffiliation from modern, liberal polity and embraces a mythical-visionary
ecclesiology. Secondly, Davis suggests a similar question insofar as the kind of
community the church needs to be to be faithful to the narrative central to Christian
convictions requires the politicising of the church. The political issue, therefore, is to
rediscover the impact of the mystical-pragmatic strand of Christianity on the tradition
of moral discourse that is framed by the church and thus enables the church to render
123 Hauerwas In Defense pi - 3. "In liberal cultures it is almost impossible to resist the temptation to
think of Christianity as a set of beliefs." This quote could, just as easily, have issued from Davis's pen as
from Hauerwas.
124 Hauerwas COC p 2.
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visible the possibility of universal human fellowship. Davis, therefore, advocates
creative disaffiliation from the mythical-visionary model of the church, in light of
critical theology and the new religious identity that can realise authentic political
action in this regard.
6.5.2 Whose Ecclesia? Which Disaffiliation?
The question might now be posed, Whose Ecclesia? Which Disaffiliation? As
we noted in Chapter 3, Davis rightly suggests that the mystical-pragmatic type of
ecclesiology that he endorses can really only have its incarnation alongside and in
dialogue with the mythical-visionary type and as such has, historically, acted as a
corrective to the ontological pretensions of mythical Christianity. We suggested that
where Davis's community of discourse represents a feasible expression of the mystical-
pragmatic model, Hauerwas's community of character represented a challenging and
vital expression of the mythical-visionary model. By taking together the types of
political action intrinsic to these models we can see that the complementarity of the
types is increased. In mystical pragmatic Christianity, there is a productive tension
between moral action in this world and withdrawal from action to passive
contemplation. This relationship is coupled with an idea of the church that relates
voluntary association in the public sphere to an invisible spiritual communion.125 In
the mythical-visionary model there is a productive tension between sacraments and
ritual action and either passive expectation or revolutionary action. This relationship
is coupled with an idea of the church as a visible institution and cultural community
of true believers.126 If we relate this to our control model, we can see quite clearly that
by endorsing only one of our protagonists we are endorsing a model of the church
125 Davis WLWD p 54.
126 Davis Ibid.
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that is deficient in some of the conditions of ecclesiality appropriate to the other.
Moreover, these deficiencies become even more acute when we realise that endorsing
only one of these models means making a choice between catholicity and unity on the
one hand and holiness and apostolicity. For the church to be the church such a
dichotomy is not sustainable.
Nevertheless, it might be suggested, from a Hauerwasian perspective, that
Davis is doing nothing more than creating a pluriform Christianity for the purposes
of serving the various religious needs of people. As such Davis would in Hauerwas's
terms be guilty of generating consumer religion.127 As we have seen, however, Davis
does not compromise on the need for a distinctive commitment in the Christian life
and identity. To this extent the practical ecclesiology that Davis envisions makes
substantive, existential claims on the individual. On the other hand Davis might well
criticise Hauerwas for "trying to hold the centre and keeping the boundaries
closed,"128 precisely the opposite of Davis vision of universality. Indeed, it is his
critique of the dominant model of the church that by hardening the boundaries it
loses its centre, thus forcing a compromise on truthfulness and character.
It is now clear that the answer to the question 'Whose Ecclesia? Which
Disaffiliation?' is at one and the same time neither and both. That is to say it is not
better understood as a choice between Davis's critical theology and Hauerwas's
ecclesial ethics, rather it is best understood through Davis and Hauerwas together.
Given the extent of the common ground that they share, we have two choices. The
first is to take one position against the other and thus discard either critical theology
127 Hauerwas AN p 9, RA p 142.
128 Conversation with Prof. Davis. Edinburgh Sept '97.
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or ecclesial. The second, and we would argue, more truthful option is to place Davis
and Hauerwas in conversational opposition to each other. Admittedly, this option
would be more amenable to Davis than to Hauerwas, since Davis sees himself as part
of a communicative tradition.129
There is, however, a second compelling reason for placing Davis and Hauerwas
together. Hauerwas himself says:
"It might well be possible for others to emphasise a
different conception of Christian existence while
accepting the arguments concerning the nature of
rationality and the significance of community. The
gospel is too rich for any one account of Christian
existence to be adequate. Different conditions remind us
of parts of the Christian life we have forgotten. The
claims I make in this respect are therefore put forward as but
one attempt to remind Christians what kind of life they are
committed to living if they believe their lives are not their
own hut God's.""0
If, therefore, we understand Davis to be representative of one such alternative account
of Christian existence, based on the necessity of the supernatural, identity and
political action, then the italicised quote could well be a description of the ongoing
programme of Davis's critical theology. Consequently, we would suggest that Davis
represents precisely one such 'condition' to remind us of part of the Christian life and
would, in these terms, be understood to be operating at the very least contiguously
with Hauerwas.
129 Davis agrees with this suggestion. Particularly as he sees himself in common cause with people of
goodwill everywhere. Thus to the extent that Hauerwas presents a position of goodwill and openness,
Davis and he can be conversation partners. Conversation, Edinburgh September '97
130 Hauerwas TT p 12, my emphasis.
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Consider for a moment Davis's suggestion that religious identity it is given by
active participation in a universality to be realised in the future. Present working for a
yet-to-be-realised universality can already unite people of different positions. That this
is true of people in a shared tradition of either discourse or character is self-evident.
We would suggest that by taking Hauerwas at his word, and including the likes of
Davis as another attempt to remind Christians of the life to which they are
committed, then, by the proleptic nature of the church both Davis and Hauerwas are
working towards a similar 'hope for the eschaton' either through discourse or in
character, we can conclude that they are already united. We must, nevertheless,
consider the nature of the universality in question. To this end, in the next chapter we
shall return, in conclusion, to the metaphor of pilgrimage common to both Hauerwas
and Davis, and inquire, as to what conditions must prevail to allow Davis and
Hauerwas to continue as fellow travellers.
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Chapter 7. Vision and Integrity in Practice
7.1 Introduction
In the conclusion to the previous chapter I suggested that the answer to the
original dilemma for the church, concerning the choice between reason and
tradition, would lie in asking of Davis and Hauerwas 'Whose Ecclesia? Which
Disaffiliation?' Expressed thus, it became clear that for the church the answer to
the dilemma is both. That is to say, the resolution is not better understood as a
having to choose between Davis and Hauerwas, as representatives of reason or
tradition, rather it is better understood through Davis and Hauerwas together.
Consequently, the dilemma is resolved into an issue of discovering the conditions
necessary for maintaining these two apparently contradictory positions in a
constructive partnership rather than a destructive opposition.
7.1.1. Summary of the argument to date
Before I move on to explore these conditions, however, it would be
appropriate to summarise the argument of the thesis to date. I began in Chapter 1
with a description of modernity as the age of critical reason. From this starting
point I explored the responses of the primary philosophical antecedents of critical
theology and ecclesial ethics, Thus, a foundation was laid for the detailed, critical
exposition of Davis and Hauerwas which followed.
The reason for that exposition was two fold. Firstly it was a means of
comparing and contrasting Davis's critical theology and Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics
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in the light of the challenge that each presented for the other.1 Thus in Chapters 2
and 3 I provided a detailed exposition of Davis's position. In so doing I developed
the theme of Davis's important, post-orthodox critical theology. While critical
theology makes use of the philosophical insights of Jiirgen Habermas, it does not
simply import them. Davis criticises Habermas's overstated reliance on abstract
reason and his understated appreciation of tradition in generating moral norms. I
argued, therefore, that Davis's post-orthodoxy offered three important insights.
First of all, it endeavours to realign theory and practice in the Christian life.
Secondly, it shows how Habermas and the Enlightenment tradition have
overstated the claims of rationality. Thirdly, it shows that Christianity, when
theory and practice are properly aligned, and therefore eschewing orthodoxy,
embodies a tradition of discourse that is not sectarian or oppressive. Finally, we
suggested that Davis is pointing toward a much more radical agenda than either
political or liberation theologies. The proper realignment of theory and practice
leads to the possibility of a valid practical theology leading to the transformation
of society in light of the transformative principle of Christian faith. I then moved
on to analyse the promise implicit in critical theology with reference to Christian
ethics and the church. This analysis focused on questions of religious and social
identity, plurality, rationality and the shape and scope of tradition. These themes
exposed a liberal agenda. This liberal agenda, I argued, led Davis to espouse
creative disaffiliation rather than abandonment of the church. Creative
disaffiliation leads to reformation and reformation means, for Davis, conceiving
the church as a community of discourse.
In Chapters 4 and 5 I turned my attention to Stanley Hauerwas's ecclesial
ethics. Here I developed the theme of Hauerwas's distinctive, 'post-liberal' ecclesial
1 See Benhabib Situating the Selfp 24, and note 4 of the Introduction.
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theology. I noted that, as with Davis's attitude to Habermas, Hauerwas's attitude
to Maclntyre was not uncritical and that, as a result, Hauerwas's 'post-liberalism'
offered three important insights. First of all, as Christians our understanding and
interpretation of reality is mediated through the narrative community of faith that
is the church and the church in turn is Christological in focus. Secondly, Christian
ethics, focused on the church as the normative community, in particular is a direct
challenge to the theories of autonomy upon which liberal theologies and theories
like those of Davis and Habermas are based. Thirdly, he insists on the exclusivity
and separateness of the church from the world and the necessity, as he sees it, for
renouncing the liberal priority of the self while acknowledgement that all that is
good comes to us not as a right but as a gift. Finally, as with Davis, this suggests a
much more radical agenda than either political or liberation theologies,
endeavouring as he does so to relate the concepts of practice, virtue, identity,
narrative, character and tradition to form coherent ecclesial theological discourse
that is not compromised by capitulation with modernity.
From here, to complete the comparison, I had to analyse the promise
implicit in ecclesial ethics with reference to Christian ethics and the church. That
is to say, authentic political action represents the tactical deployment of the art of
maintaining a good society subject to the witness of the peaceable kingdom which,
in the final analysis, for Hauerwas represents the conversation necessary for a
people to discover the goods they have in common. This analysis took us through
questions of religious identity, identity and the Christian tradition and plurality
and the role of revelation. In the final analysis, the impact of Hauerwas's ecclesial
ethics on Christian ethics is to construe appropriate response to God's revelation
in the church as the ongoing presence of Christ in the world. This presence has
significant political and social consequences. From here we went on to analyse the
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implications of ecclesial ethics for the church by revisiting the charge of
sectarianism. In so doing we noted that Hauerwas's authentic political action was
akin to the tactics of guerrilla warfare. From there we examined the possibilities of
embracing the ecclesial counterculture and finally portrayed the church as a
community of Christian character.
In Chapter 6 I argued that the church was a central concern for both
critical theology and ecclesial ethics in terms of any attempt to redeem the
promises of either. Davis and Hauerwas both reconfigure the church into the
normative community that is appropriate to their theological positions, so Davis's
church is a community of discourse and Hauerwas's is a community of character.
As such Davis represents creative disaffiliation from the juridical-hierarchical
church, that was bound into the mythical-visionary model of ecclesiology, in
favour of a mystical-pragmatic model. Hauerwas, however, also represented
creative disaffiliation but this time from the violent power-games of liberal polity
and into a mythical-visionary model of the church. By testing these communities
of discourse and character against a control model of the church, provided by
Miroslav Volf, I was able to realise the complementary rather than oppositional
nature of Davis and Hauerwas's models. Hence, I was in a position to return and
address the original dilemma in another way: that was to ask of Davis and
Hauerwas 'Whose Ecclesia? Which Disaffiliation?' Expressed thus, it became clear
that for the church the answer to the dilemma is both. That is to say, the
resolution is not better understood as a having to choose between Davis and
Hauerwas, as representatives of reason or tradition, rather it is better understood
through Davis and Hauerwas together. Consequently, the dilemma is resolved into
an issue of discovering the conditions necessary for maintaining these two
295
Chapter 7. Vision and Integrity in Practice
apparently contradictory positions in a constructive partnership rather than a
destructive opposition.
7.1.2. The themes that have emerged
In order to understand the extent of this possible constructive partnership,
I will highlight the common ground shared by Davis and Hauerwas. We have seen
that both Davis and Hauerwas are concerned with five similar issues. Firstly, the
modern privatisation of religious conviction. This flows from the second area of
concern that is the incoherence or excesses of modernity as the context for the
church and its practices, both being sceptical about the merits or effectiveness of so
called political theology as a response to this situation. The third point of shared
concern is that the contemporary context has forced a divide between theory and
practice generally, and in particular for the Christian tradition. This results in
other familiar theological dichotomies such as reason and faith, reason and
revelation, reason and tradition. The fourth point is that for a proper realignment
of theory and practice we need to rediscover a more effective understanding of
tradition and narrative. Fifth and finally, this realignment should issue in a
practical ecclesiology that ought to facilitate authentic political action. That this is
shared ground does not, however, overlook the fact that the conclusions which
Davis and Hauerwas reach, and the promises implied, appear on the face of it to be
at odds with each other.
In the face of these shared concerns three common themes have percolated
to the surface through out this thesis. They are first of all, the transformative
principle in critical theology and the performative aspect of ecclesial ethics.
Secondly, the idea of ecclesial reform in critical theology and the idea of
truthfulness in ecclesial ethics. Thirdly, the notion of non-violence and non-
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coercion implicit in both critical theology and ecclesial ethics. In the remainder of
this chapter I will focus on the first two themes. I will not raise a separate
investigation or discussion of the third. This is for two reasons. First of all, in
many ways this is implicitly the final reason for my contention that critical
theology are complementary and provide necessary, mutual checks and balances.
As such it has been discussed extensively throughout the thesis, mostly in reference
to Hauerwas's politics of peaceful kingdom. However, it has also been introduced
in terms of Davis's claim that the normative Tightness or acceptability of any
claim, when worked out in discourse, rests on the degree to which an uncoerced
consensus is reached.2 In fact, the emancipatory interest that grounds
communicative action requires that participants in discourse adopt non-
coerciveness as the regulatory norm in their action.3 Thus the only 'force'
presented in discourse is the 'force' or the weight of the rationally better argument.
Davis discerns this condition from Habermas's ideal speech situation.4 I do not,
however, wish to be tied into a theoretical discussion of the role and limits of the
principle of non-violence or non-coercion in the respective communities. That is
the topic of another thesis.
Secondly, if I can demonstrate that transformation and performance as well
as reform and truthfulness are sufficient conditions in themselves for an ongoing
conversation, such a theoretical discussion can be avoided. That is to say that if the
other principles are sufficient to generate a conversation, then the regulative
principle of non-coercion falls into place as a conversational maxim, bearing in
2 Davis RMS p 200.
3 Davis TPS pp 80 - 97.
4 Davis TPS pp 88 - 89. This ideal speech situation is not ideal in any Utopian sense but it is ideal in
the sense that it is an implicit norm in all communicative action as an expectation of all
participants in rational discourse.
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mind Hauerwas's insight that Christian ethics should be prepared to generate the
conditions for the right kind of conflict and resolution.5
7.1.3. Conclusion in Outline
With this in mind, it is my intention in this concluding chapter to explore
further this relationship between transformation and performance as well as
ecclesial reform and truthfulness. Davis's radical, post-orthodox, Critical theology
suggests a unity between the mythical-visionary and the mystical-pragmatic models
of the church. I have shown that Davis's understanding of ecclesia falls broadly
into the mystical-pragmatic model while Hauerwas's radical, post-liberal ecclesial
understanding represents the mythical-visionary. I have further argued that Davis's
insight is basically correct and that Hauerwas provides an effective expression of
the mythical-visionary model to be placed together with Davis. Moreover, we can
now press the point and assert that Davis and Hauerwas not only provided
complementary calls to vision and integrity in the ministry and mission of the
church, but that they provided mutually corrective visions. This vision leads to an
integrity in practice that allows for authentic political action and presence,
grounded in proleptic and anamnestic solidarity in the face of humanity's negative
contingencies. It is the purpose of this chapter to flesh out this claim.6 To this end
and picking up from the conclusion to the last chapter we must consider the
nature of the universality in which I contend that Davis and Hauerwas are both
participants and which I contend already unites them. In this chapter, and in
conclusion to the argument, I will endeavour to explore the necessary conditions
5 See my discussion of this in Chapter 6.
6 As we shall see later in this chapter, in the face of ultimate limit situations such as suffering and
death, the practical ecclesiology of discourse and character that we endorse relies on hope and
truthfulness to supply pastoral insight. Religious hope as described by Davis and Hauerwas contains
an element of anamnesis, in the sense of faith as remembrance, and prolepsis in the sense of
anticipated outcome. Truthfulness, is the skill of living patiently and confidently under these
conditions.
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for the constructive conversational participation that this universality requires, and
examine vision and integrity in practice.
The chapter, therefore, will be laid out as follows. First I will explore the
relationship between the transformative principle in critical theology and the
performative aspect of ecclesial ethics in Davis and Hauerwas. This will lead us
into a discussion of the consequences of reform and truthfulness. Thereafter, I will
develop these themes further against the background of a challenge to the integrity
of both discourse and character and thus demonstrate that, not only are critical
theology and ecclesial ethics mutually compatible but they also provide a necessary
check and balance each for the other. The result of this relationship is a more
complete and integrated vision of the church. Finally, we shall conclude by
showing that, by holding Davis and Hauerwas together in constructive
partnership, we can endorse the possibility of the church's authentic political
action in the public sphere.
7.2. Imagined Alternatives in Critical Theology and Ecclesial Ethics
Davis suggests that a vision empowers and failing this it remains a weak
dream. To elevate it beyond the status of a weak dream, a vision has to have
substantive content. The substantive content must, nevertheless, be subject to
critique. The difference between a straight-forward description and analysis of a
situation and an empowering vision of the same situation, therefore, is the
imagining of alternatives. This is true for both Davis and Hauerwas. Empowered
by the vision of communicative rationality, Davis is led to explore new
possibilities for the church. These new possibilities call for, on the one hand,
7
Davis "The End of Socialism?" in Centre for Theology and Public Issues Occasional Paper no 32
After Socialism! The Future ofRadical Christianity. Edinburgh 1994 pages 3-10. See also page 103 of
this thesis.
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subordinating the oppressive, hierarchical, totalising church which Davis feels is
inimical to liberation and hence the kingdom of God. On the other hand he sees
the possibility of an alternative understanding of the church as a community of
discourse, which is nevertheless loyal to its tradition. This is the vision to which
Davis calls us. Meanwhile, Hauerwas is inclined to say, when confronted by
contemporary culture's standards of truth and right, that "... 'We don't look at
things that way,' and to nurture communities that offer an alternative vision."8
The alternative vision that Hauerwas demonstrates is dependent on the ecclesial of
character to embody the politics of discipleship. In this section, therefore, we shall
explore the implications of the imagined alternatives presented to us by Davis's
and Hauerwas's positions.
7.2.1 ImaginedAlternatives ofa Transformative Critical Theology
We noted, at the end of the last chapter, that Davis's ecclesial vision was
proleptic and catholic and represented the real possibility of impetus towards re¬
formation through the transformative principle of faith. For Davis, the fact that he
sees the church as a community of discourse, and as the fundamental sacrament,
making visible the manifest presence of Christ in the world has a secondary effect
whereby the meaning of the church is to render visible and explicit universal
human fellowship. To Davis's mind, "[t]radition is the author of such
transformation, since it is the presence of the Spirit in human history... "9 The
tradition that Christians must recognise, as both the starting point and conclusion
for their reflection, is the church. I therefore characterised Davis's ecclesiology
with the phrase semper reformanda. In this process of continual reformation I
asserted that critical theology, because it breaks the grip of orthodoxy, allows the
8 Placher Unapologetic Theology p 19.
9 Davis TPS p 103.
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church to comprehend the thrust towards, and the relevance of, emancipation
wherever it is to be found working from an internal dynamic of the tradition
itself. Indeed, it is the ultimate meaning of the church to embody the real
possibility of liberation in a tradition institutionalised as a community of faith,
orientated towards the mystical-pragmatic construction, rather than a community
of feudal orthodoxy. Liberation, embodied thus in a fellowship allows the
explication of the possibility of universal, free human fellowship.
At this stage, however, the relationship between critical theology and
emancipatory practice requires some consolidation. For Davis the nature of this
relationship lies in the imperative that critical theology possesses to attempt to
dismantle the ruling concepts of religion taking religious texts, the standards of
faith, and relocating them in a context that covers the whole field of cultural
practices. For critical theology political action should be a consistent expression of,
and be consistent with, its cultural analyses. These in turn develop from an
engagement with religious texts to reveal their role in the ideological construction
of the subject. Davis says, "... [t]he texts are to be mobilized beyond
straightforward and received interpretations for a transformation of the subject
within a wider political context."10 By religious texts Davis is here extending the
connotation of 'text' to religious traditions and practices, which in turn is definable
10 Davis WLWD p 4. Davis here acknowledges his debt to Terry Eagleton on the subject of
revolutionary literary criticism whom he cites as follows. "It [revolutionary literary criticism]
would dismantle the ruling concepts of "literature", reinserting "literary" texts into the whole field
of cultural practices. It would strive to relate such cultural practices to other forms of social
activity, and to transform the cultural apparatuses themselves. It would articulate its "cultural"
analyses with a consistent political intervention. It would deconstruct the received hierarchies of
"literature" and transvaluate received judgements and assumptions; engage with the language and
"unconscious" of the literary texts to reveal their role in the ideological construction of the subject;
and mobilize such texts, if necessary with hermeneutic "violence" in a struggle to transform those
subjects within a wider political context." Walter Benjamin; or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism.
1981, Verso. London, p 98. Davis, while seeing this as a paradigmatic statement is, nevertheless,
wary of the connotations of 'revolutionary.' Hence the transformation that he seeks is less
pretentious.
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as the narrative produced by participants in the course of their life practice
generally and as participants in the Christian tradition particularly. This
broadening of the connotation of 'text' obviously correlates with Hauerwas's
extension of the notion of interpretative community. By this extension Hauerwas
encompassed the interpretation of political activity within the ambit of the
interpretative community. Likewise, Davis extends interpretation beyond letters
to cultural and social activity, the substance of narrative.
An excellent example of how this transformative principle, including the
transformation of the subject, works in practice comes, for Davis, in the form of
feminist theology. While feminist theology is a daughter of the academy, it is all
the while driven by a political movement. Consequently, it can and does transcend
the boundaries of the academy and received habits of thought of male dominated
academic theology.11 Although Davis does not actually pursue the implications of
any possible connection between critical theology and Feminist theology, his
critical theology is perceived by some to establish a 'warm current' that is
amenable to Feminist theology and vice-versa.12 It is important to note, however,
Davis's significant critical insight that Feminist theology is of value because it is
11 We might also add European, white and middle class to male dominated. The following brief
discussion of Feminist theology reflects themes that appear in Theology and Praxis Volume II: Doing
Ethics in Context. South African Perspectives. C. Villa - Vicencio & J. De Gruchy (eds.) 1994 Davis
Philip. Cape Town, introduces a discussion of Black, Feminist, African, and liberation theologies.
The conclusions reached in a the discussions of each of these emancipatory movements reflect the
conclusions drawn by Schiissler Fiorenza in But She Said: Feminist Practices of Biblical
Interpretation. 1992. Beacon Press, Boston.
12 See Marsha A. Hewitt Charles Davis and the "Warm Current" of Critical Theology: A Feminist
Critical Appreciation. In TPCT pp 117 - 131. This warm, sympathetic current doesn't always
extend to Hauerwas. For instance Gloria Albrecht has had a longstanding dialogue with Hauerwas
to the effect that women's lives and experiences in the church contradict Hauerwas's vision of it.
See "Article Review of In Good Company: The Church as Polis" Scottish Journal of Theology vol.
50 no 2 1997 pp 219 - 227. See also Albrecht The Character ofour Communities: Toward an Ethic of
Liberation for the Church. 1995 Nashville Abingdon Press. She argues, despite her sympathies, that
Hauerwas's project of a characterful church of resident aliens fails because it results "not in the
formation of a non-violent people but the maintenance of social privilege for dominant white
society generally and for dominant white males in particular." p 138.
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driven by a political movement that seeks transforming social justice grounded in
the individual's, and consequently the community's, apprehension of the
Transcendent.13
"With respect to these and other themes, the critical
theology of many feminist writers and Davis express a
Utopian dimension best described in the words of Max
Horkheimer as 'the longing for the wholly other ...
without which radical transformation is
unthinkable'."14
Seyla Benhabib refers to this longing as "... the regulative principle of hope."15 The
regulative principle of hope in turn, translates into a demand for justice and human
well-being and the assurance that, in the face of life's irremovable and unavoidable
negativities,16 there is some hope that these negativities do not have the last word.
We shall return to the theme of these existential negativities in a later section.
In the meantime, we should note that the realisation of the transformative
element in critical theology reflects a creative dynamic implicit to emancipatory
movements. Elizabeth Schiissler Fiorenza states that "...emancipatory movements
create discursive communities based on shared assumptions and values which
define boundaries and validate claims to authority."17 We might reflect on this in
13 Feminist theology is a critical theology. That is to say, feminist theology also aspires to the
possibilities flowing from genuine intersubjectivity that will lead to both personal and social
transformation. Feminist theology is actively involved in a critique of power structures and
domination within theological and political discourse. For an excellent and intriguing discussion of
these issues, which are outwith the scope of this present thesis, see Hewitt TPCT p 117. Moreover,
we have already quoted from Elizabeth Schussler Fiorenza's But, She Said noting the similarity
between women's ecclesia and Davis's ecclesia as a community of discourse.
14 Hewitt TPCT p 118. The internal quote, is a translation of Horkheimer's Die Sehnsucht nach dem
ganzAnderen, Ein Interview mit Kommentar von Helmut Gumnior. 1970, Fruche-Verlag. Hamburg.
15 Benhabib "Feminism and Postmodernism: An Uneasy Alliance." Praxis International 11, no 2.
July 1991 p 147. See note 4 above with regard to a proper understanding of Utopian.
16 This is a phrase used by Davis RMS p 200 "There are many ways in which people deny death
and pretend that the irremovable negativities of human existence can be ignored.
17 Schussler Fiorenza But, She Said p 129.
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another way in order to press the point. Schiissler Fiorenza notes further that
emancipatory movements properly understood, including feminism and therefore
feminist theology, are not engaged in a struggle for equal rights simply to become
the same as their oppressor. For feminist theology this means that women struggle
to achieve the rights, benefits and privileges legitimately theirs as women and equal
citizens but denied "... to them by the patriarchal and kyriarchal regimes of
Western societies and religions."18 For such an emancipatory movement to sustain
the possibility of emancipation, it must operate not in biological or cultural bases
for alliance but in political action. In this regard, the biological or cultural
construct 'woman' can be replaced by a democratic, political construct. In other
words, the struggle for emancipation becomes focused upon the political links that
can be and are made in terms of race and class as much as in terms of gender.
Interestingly Schrissler Fiorenza concludes that:
"Within the logic of radical equality one can theorize
the ekklesia of women as the site of feminist struggles
for transforming societal and religious institutions.
Such a theoretical frame can displace the feminist
alterity construct woman as the theoretical space from
which to struggle and replace it with the democratic
construct of the ekklesia of women, which is at once
an historical and an imagined reality, already partially
realized but still to be struggled for."19
By eschewing the sterile 'identity' debate, in favour of the logic of radical equality,
we have here a focus on identity that is not fixed to the norms and contents of one,
particular, orthodoxy. Rather, it relates to the political identity of 'humanity'
under the regulative principle of hope, striving for transformation and
emancipation. Here we have an account of a practical political struggle configured
18 Schiissler Fiorenza But, She Said p 129.
19 Schiissler Fiorenza But, She Said p 130.
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almost precisely along the lines of the political action imagined by Davis's
community of discourse. I shall briefly illustrate the parallels. First of all, the
sterile identity debate in feminism equates with Davis's understanding of
orthodoxy, or received or traditional wisdom. This orthodoxy must be subject to
critique for the debate to move on and the deadlocks broken. Secondly, the logic
of radical equality provides the critical leverage that makes the critique possible.
The logic of radical equality, while providing fresh illumination on the debate on
identity nevertheless stands in the tradition of that same debate. Thirdly, the
emancipation sought after is at once an historical and imagined reality, partially
realised yet still to be struggled for. This relates precisely to Davis's 'yet to be
realised universality'. The struggle for emancipation in this case focuses, therefore,
on 'universal human fellowship' (political links) in order to corroborate the future
actuality of the imagined possibility of emancipation. Thus it is part of the task
and meaning of feminist theology, and the church, to make that fellowship 'visible
and explicit'. We may conclude, therefore, that to render 'visible and explicit
human fellowship' in the interests and for the sake of emancipation, implies for
Davis recognising and forging the political links described by Schiissler Fiorenza.
It is this that allows the transformative principle of faith to work in practice.
Though this may be the case for feminist theology we must ask if this
transformative element is, however, a necessary consequence of embracing the
mystical-pragmatic model of Christianity. On the one hand, emphasising the
pragmatic inheritance articulates the Christian tradition as a practical way of life,
understood as a response to the revelation of divine love. As we have seen, for
Davis this is the locus of Christianity's authentic religious and, therefore, political
content. On the other hand, emphasising the mystical inheritance of Christianity
recognises a means of recovering a sense of the transcendent while providing an
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insight into the inadequacy of all language in articulate expression of the
transcendent. This is, essentially, a post-metaphysical realist position with two
consequences.20 The first consequence is that Christian realism, for Davis, does not
mean stressing the objective reference of religious propositions, nor does it
concern knowledge with regard to religious truth claims. It is, however, "...the
rejection of a separate sacred world, and an affirmation of the sacredness and
meaningfulness of the concrete reality of human, historical life."21 As a way of life
Christianity represents the transformation of the individual person and, in
consequence, the community in response to the gift of transcendent love. What is
foundational in Christianity for Davis, as we have observed, is not knowledge but
love.
Nevertheless, the foundational love of which Davis speaks, in order to
avoid distortion and abstraction, requires modulation. That modulation comes
from a related tradition. Davis says:
"Those who like myself interpret Christianity
primarily as a practice or way of life and thus ally
ourselves with the pragmatic form of Christian faith
cannot without loss and distortion pass over the
contribution of visionary or apocalyptic Christianity.
That contribution is to the effect that Christian faith
is a genuinely new life, that it is not to be reduced to
the limits of any mere humanism that it is ecstatic in
its call to rapturous bliss and transcendent love.
Christianity is not a moralism; it is a practice beyond
human measure, founded in a vision of foolish love
and impossible hope."22
20 See Chapter 4 of this thesis for an exposition of Davis's claim to be a Christian realist..
21 Davis WLWD p 117.
22 Davis WLWD p 94.
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Here, the mystical-pragmatic model of the church represents the possibility of
providing the transcendent foundation necessary for sustainable communication
among human beings, despite their differences. The foundation of this possibility
and the practice that it inspires is precisely described by the foolish love revealed in
the story of the life death and resurrection of Christ. The ability to provide the
foundation comes not from moralising nor from philosophising but from focusing
on the practical human and political links that already partially unite humanity.
The Christian churches to the extent that they can forge these links, Davis says,
are "... still in an initial fashion able to unite people of different social groups and
political opinions, which could serve to facilitate authentic conversation or
colloquy in our present society."23 The church represents, therefore, the possibility
of the embodiment of a transforming, practical theology. In a later section we shall
be returning to this issue in an endeavour to ascertain how that practical theology
manifests itself in practice. At this point, however, we should note Davis's
acknowledgement that the mystical-pragmatic model of the church is to be
modified by an alternative insight that arises in the mythical visionary-model of
the church.
The second consequence of Davis's focus on transcendent love has a bearing
on our final reason for placing Davis and Hauerwas together. That is to say, this
focus equates to a very similar focus in Hauerwas's post-liberalism. To make the
point most forcefully, I will approach it from the another angle. It is generally
considered that post-liberal thinkers are operating with a different ontological
agenda, epistemology and so on, and consequently are broadly anti-metaphysical in
their approach. As a result, they offer historical narrative and pragmatics as an
alternative to autonomous, immanent reason. For instance, John Milbank claims
23 Davis WLWD p 122.
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that he, and those of like mind to himself, are advocating universalism of love, that
is made incarnate by the advent of Jesus and the Spirit in the church.24 On the
other hand, Davis is accused by Milbank, who would certainly align himself with
those described as post-liberal, of operating with a modern onto-theological
metaphysics which is at odds with the ontology of created being in time. And yet,
as we see above, Davis is just as much concerned with the primacy of love and
situated-ness as Milbank claims the post-liberals to be. To the extent that, like
Davis, the post-liberals are 'Christian realists' they share the 'foundational' insight
that love, not knowledge is the starting point for Christian reflection and so the
motivation behind the 'appropriate human response' of Christian ethics. For Davis
and for Hauerwas, therefore, ontological truth lies in faith and experience rather
than propositions. Faith quite simply demands living one way rather than
another.25 Thus in analysing this way of living there are questions that we may
appropriately ask and questions that we may not ask. We can ask, for instance,
'what is Christian?' We cannot, however, ask 'is Christianity true?' The latter
question, in Lindbeck's26 terms relies on a 'cognitive-propositional' approach to the
Christian faith and this in turn commits us to essentialistic theories of meaning,
time-bound, falsifiable cosmologies and soteriologies.27 This would be a position, as
I have demonstrated in our exposition, completely at odds with Davis's
understanding of the proper disaffiliated relationship of the critical theologian to
orthodoxy. Thus, Davis's and Hauerwas's basic positions have in common the
24 Milbank "Review of Religion and The Making of Society." Theology 98, 1995. pp 320 - 322.
25 "The message of revelation is a praxis, an ethical life, a way of being and acting. It may be partially
articulated in propositions. It may stimulate theoretical reflection. But it is essentially the
establishment of a practical way oflife." Davis RMS p. 95.
26 Lindbeck The Nature ofDoctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age. 1984 Westminster
Press Philadelphia, p 101.
27 For an interesting discussion on Lindbeck on religious truth in relation to John Hick and world
religions see Peter Slater "Lindbeck, Hick and the nature of religious truth." Studies in
Religion/ScienceReligieuses 24/1 1995. pp 59 - 75.
308
Chapter 7. Vision and Integrity in Practice
'Christian realist' focus on transcendent love.28 Where Davis is content to subject
this basic position (as well as faith and hope) to communicative reason and its
demands, Hauerwas will not. In Hauerwas's case, therefore, this conclusion brings
us on to a discussion of the matter of truthfulness in answer to the question 'what
is Christian?'
7.2.2 ImaginedAlternatives ofPerformative Ecclesial Ethics
As I have argued throughout, Hauerwas's vision of integrity in the ministry
and mission of the church focuses on the counter cultural nature of the church as
the normative community for theological and ethical discourse. This differs from
Davis's position to the extent that, although both recognise the significance of
normative tradition, Davis wishes to emphasise what he calls the tradition of first
level of narrative brought about through shared humanity rather than the tradition
of second level narrative brought out through shared traditional orthodoxy. The
focus on shared human experience allows him to forge the political links necessary
for authentic political action. On the other hand, Hauerwas would call us into a
tradition of praxis that is always subordinate to the tradition of orthodoxy. Davis's
position seems to emphasise the performative aspect of generating narrative. It
would, therefore, be remiss not to re-iterate the significance of the performative
aspects of Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics.
28 Joseph Runzo in Is God Real? (1993. MacMillan, London and Basingstoke) p xiv points out that
the theological debate surrounding realism and ant-realism is not the same as the one in
philosophy. The difference lies, he says in the theological focus on 'what is the ontological status
... of a transcendent divine reality?' McKinnon in Hilary Putnam's Internal Realism and Postliberal
Theology. PhD. University of Edinburgh 1997, suggests that "non realism seems for some
theologians to hold out hope of a path that worth following. This again is because realists have to
be forever explaining and justifying themselves. It is also seen as the path to follow if you reject
modern foundationalism." p 23. Here we have, in Davis and Hauerwas, an example of two
theologians who are neither 'non-realist' nor 'foundationalists' thus suggesting as McKinnon does in
her thesis that it is possible to be a realist and non-foundationalist. p 26.
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Hauerwas sees the church, the Christian community, as the embodiment of
truth. This community can be understood as performing the scripture and thereby
witnessing to the only means of testing its validity. That is to say, Christian beliefs
about "...God, Jesus, sin, the nature of human existence, and salvation are
intelligible only if they are seen against the background of the church - that is a
body of people that stand apart from the 'world' because of the peculiar task of
worshipping a God whom the world knows not."29 Thus, Hauerwas like Davis, is
not so much concerned whether Christianity can be justified at a theoretical level
since this would tend to a foundationalist conclusion. Rather, the truth or falsity
of Christian claims lies in pragmatic criteria. For Hauerwas, because truth and
authority are embodied in the Christian characterful community, truth claims can
only be verified in regard to actualised events, people and places. As a consequence
of this, Hauerwas is not so much interested in the truth or falsity of dogmatic or
doctrinal claims as he is in the truthfulness of Christian lives. Truth, therefore, is
not a virtue on its own. It can be distinguished but not separated from other "...
measures of value - from consistency, righteousness, justice happiness
satisfaction."30 That is to say, truthfulness takes priority because it does more than
provide an accurate picture of events - that would be the function of truth on its
own. Truthfulness helps one go into the unknown without a false story.31 He says:
"The true stories that we learn of God are those that
help us to know what story we are and should be,
that is, which gives us the courage to go on. Namely
the story that is necessary to know God is the story
that is also necessary to know the self, but such
knowing is not passive accommodation to an external
object. Rather such knowing is more like a skill that
29 Hauerwas AtN p 42
30 Hauerwas TT p 80.
31 Hauerwas TT p 80.
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gives us the ability to know the world as it should be -
it is a knowing that changes the self."32
In this sense, for Hauerwas, the assessment of truth claims is a skill. As such we
learn the skill of assessment through living within a tradition that nurtures that
skill. In turn the skill is always as subordinate to the practice of being the church."
In other words, according to Hauerwas, one learns how to judge the truth of any
story by learning to live truthfully within one story. This claim, if it works, allows
Hauerwas to avoid falling into the trap of either epistemological relativism or
naive epistemological realism. On the one side relativism suggests that any
assessments of a truth claim is circular at best or impossible at worst because there
is no neutral vantage point. On the other side, naive realism depends on an
unsustainable level of objectivity.34
Learning to live truthfully, Hauerwas tells us, equips the individual
Christian, and hence the church, with the conceptual tools with which to make
pragmatic decisions about the relative values of particular ways of life or individual
truth claims. Nevertheless, Hauerwas must be held to account for the extent to
which he is able, or not able, to articulate a coherent case for saying that one way
of life or proposition is better or worse, of more value or less value, than another.
32 Hauerwas TT p 81.
33 See my description of practices in regard to Maclntyre in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
34 For more on this topic see Hilary Putnam's Internal Realism and Postliberal Theology. Dr
MacKinnon's convincingly argued thesis is that George Lindbeck, another 'post-liberal' claims a
very similar pragmatic method to make sense of the theological truth claims he makes concerning
the nature of doctrine but because of the lack of critique of theology's foundations. She argues that
by augmenting Lindbeck's position with the pragmatically charged internal-realism of Hilary
Putnam, theological truth claims may in fact have some public viability. In her conclusion Dr
MacKinnon develops these themes along-side the insights of David Tracy. So while she holds that
Lindbeck ultimately, and without the help of Putnam, ends up in a ghetto of self-description, she
backs the development of a distinctive critical theology. Dr MacKinnon, in dealing with Hauerwas,
does not feel that he pulls off the 'pragmatic' angle on assessment either and ultimately he too falls
into irretrievable sectarian relativism. On this matter, as is clear from the thesis I disagree and
would rather suggest that Hauerwas has managed, unapologetically, to turn this alleged vice into a
virtue, and has thus come some of the way out of the ghetto.
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In other words, if there is no such thing as 'truth' in a propositional sense, to avoid
displaying the worst inconsistencies of relativism he must be able to make a
coherent case for announcing that one way of life, life-style or practice is better or
worse than another.35 One case that did, in point of fact, directly challenge
Hauerwas was the mass suicide of the followers of Jim Jones's People's Temple
cult.36
His response to this situation was that, in the final analysis, it was a tragedy
brought about by adherence to false beliefs. Hauerwas concludes that the people in
Jonestown were not wrong to give their lives for their beliefs. Rather, they were in
the wrong because the cause for which they died was not worthy. For Hauerwas
the clue to the falsity of Jones's claims lay in his command to suicide "...[o]ur life is
not for us to do with as we please, but rather we must learn to look on our life as a
gift that is not ours to dispose of. ... Those ... who would contemplate and indeed
even practice suicide as did those at Jonestown must be judged worshippers of a
false god."37 Violence generally and suicide in this particular case represents "...a
sure sign that something has gone wrong with the claim to worship the God of
truth and peace."38 In other words the practices of the people in Jonestown, in
terms of their violent behaviour belied any verbal assertions of confessions that
MacKinnon op. cit. "Theological excursions into post-modernity are, therefore, problematic.
Acceptance of extreme relativism and the incommensurability of languages will, I suggest, leave
theology in a ghetto unable to say anything to anybody." p 25 . This is a position that Hauerwas
must avoid because he desperately wants to be able to say something to everybody.
36 Hauerwas AtN pp 91 - 106 "On Taking Religion Seriously: The Challenge of Jonestown." It is
important to note the features that the People's Temple cult had in common with Christianity.
"Like the early Church, the people's temple thought in terms of a cosmic struggle between good
and evil, a struggle that required of the disciple a complete sacrifice both privately and publicly -
wealth, status, money, health, family even life itself. The Christian community took precedence
over one's own family. Thus it is not for the Church to follow secular critics and attack the
Peoples Temple for interfering with personal autonomy: the church should have no stake in
underwriting the notion that religion belongs only to the private realm." Wells Transforming Fate
into Destiny p 88 - 89.
37 Hauerwas "On Taking Religion Seriously" p 101 -102.
38 Hauerwas "On Taking Religion Seriously" p 106.
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they might have made concerning their commitment to 'the God of truth and
peace.' Truthfulness, therefore lies in the continuity between what is confessed and
the practices that result from that confession. Equally, this provides a pragmatic
criterion for determining the 'truth' of the object of the confession. Thus,
narratives such as that of Jonestown can only be countered by the narrative of
conviction that is fostered in the truthful community of character that is the
church.
For Hauerwas, the power of truthfulness is that it is the effective antidote
to politics of violence. Notwithstanding this, we should still reserve a question for
Hauerwas on the subject of Jonestown. As outsiders it is easy for us to criticise
events in Jonestown after the fact, either from the Hauerwasian truthfulness
perspective or from the perspective of the liberal concern with the curtailing of
autonomy. Nevertheless, Hauerwas has not accounted for the fact that the victims,
the insiders, lived and died true to their convictions, even if these convictions
might be deemed wrong with hindsight. Why could they, as individuals, not
perceive the falsity of Jones's position? Clearly, they adopted a story and
developed a character in and through the community. That this character was not
good from either of these perspectives is clear, as is the fact that they became
victims of this false teaching. But at what point could they have done anything
about it? To suggest, on the one hand, that they might have, at some point, seen
through Jones weakens Hauerwas's case for pragmatic criteria because it implies
that there must be a degree of critical reservation about any narrative and this
mitigates against total truthfulness. On the other hand, we should not assume,
even according to Hauerwas that these people were informed by only one
narrative. Which begs two questions as to why another narrative may not have
illuminated for them the falsity of Jones's teaching and why they suspended all
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critical reservations about Jones? Nevertheless, the principle force of Hauerwas's
understanding of truthfulness in preference to propositional truth is not greatly
diminished.
7.2.3 Reform and Truthfulness
At this point I wish begin to draw together the conclusions concerning
reform and truthfulness as the significant features of Davis's critical theology and
Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics. These conclusions are concerned with stating, first of
all, that reform and truthfulness are not only theologically compatible but that
they are mutually dependent. Secondly I will consider, in light of this claim the
implications for the relationship between reform and truthfulness, ecclesia and
political action. I will explore these matters by showing how, on a theoretical
level, Davis's understanding of communicative action and the implicit validity
claims relate to similar validity claims implicit in religious, and particularly
Christian, hope. In the course of this investigation I will show that Hauerwas's
idea of truthfulness augments Davis's understanding of hope and hence
communicative action, and informs a better understanding of the function of the
normative community that communicative action relies upon.
The first case to present, therefore, is that reform and truthfulness are not
only mutually compatible, but mutually dependent. According to Davis's reading
of Habermas, communicative action is human action directed at reaching mutual
understanding and agreement.39 As such it makes possible a non-violent non-
instrumental procedure for justifying and co-ordinating interpersonal relationships
based on rational consensus. In turn, consensus is attained by complying with
39 See Chapter 1 of this thesis and, for the following, Lalonde in TPCT p 8, and White The Recent
Work ofjiirgen Habermas. Chapter 3.
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implicit, universal validity claims of communicative competence. This theory
holds, with an insight gleaned from philosophical pragmatism, that there are three
universal validity claims signified within every ordinary speech act. These claims
are truth, normative rightness and truthfulness, each of which corresponds to a
particular mode of argumentation: scientific, practical and aesthetic discourse
respectively. As we have seen Davis endorses, with critical reservation, Habermas's
insights. He notes that "... [o]nly if speakers are willing to justify their validity-
claims in argumentation, namely a form of discourse in which validity claims are
thematized and reasons given for them, can there emerge a rationally motivated
agreement, a rational consensus, on how to co-ordinate actions."40 While it is the
case that all three validity claims are implicitly raised in every speech act only one
kind is explicit at any one time.
I argued in Chapter 2 that Davis foresaw limits on the role of reason in
theological discourse. The limit on communicative reason arose because of the
tension between its pragmatic, procedural character and the substantive content
inherent in its structure. The substantive element required some minimal reference
to a tradition of discourse. This tradition of discourse can be understood, for
Davis, in terms of 'hope' in relation to reason/' We will analyse the practical
theological import of this claim in more depth in a later section of this chapter
when we deal with religious hope in the face of the challenge of the limit situations
of suffering and death. For the moment, though, I wish to make a theoretical
observation that relates Davis's community of discourse with, its insight on hope,
to Hauerwas's understanding of truthfulness.
40 Davis RMS p 194.
41 Davis has appealed variously to Walter Benjamin and Max Horkheimer and Hannah Arendt to
flesh out the notion of remembrance and history and of hope generally considered. TPS p 142 -
143, 134 - 138. RMS p 71, 118.
315
Chapter 7. Vision and Integrity in Practice
We should note, therefore, that Christian hope, as understood by Davis,
presents its own series of validity claims that coincide with truth, rightness and
truthfulness.42 The first validity claim implicit in hope arises from Davis's notion
that, as the expression43 of an inner conviction or stance, hope makes a validity
claim to "... truthfulness, sincerity and authenticity."44 In this light, two criteria
apply to the coherence of hope in the face of the challenging situations. First of all,
"... consistency of behaviour is the key criterion in determining sincerity. The
implications of Hauerwas's politics of discipleship are obvious. Hauerwas's insight
into the politics of discipleship means that consistency implies truthfully living out
one's convictions. The second criterion comes in the form of a problem to be
avoided, that is to say the problem of self-deception. The correct response to
which is "... therapeutic dialogue... "45 in the face of distorting self-deception. Here
again we might profitably invoke Hauerwas's understanding of truthfulness. We
shall return to this discussion in the next section of this chapter.
The second validity claim implicit to hope is that of normative rightness.
According to Davis this concerns the practical attitude of confidence governing
action.46 "When challenged, the acceptability [of normative rightness] is established
by discourse or argumentation directed toward achieving an uncoerced
consensus."47 This vision, of course, implies and requires a network of
intersubjective relationships wherein the argument can be worked out. In other
words, the claim to rightness presupposes an interpretative community. In
42 We religious hope generally in Chapter 2. The matter at hand is a consideration of Christian
hope in particular.
43 By 'expression' Davis implies linguistic, bodily, behavioural, affective and emotional. RMS pl99
44 Davis RMS p 199.
45 Davis RMS p 200.
46 Davis RMS p 200.
47 Davis RMS p 200.
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Christian terms the claim to rightness involves, at the very least, reference to the
norms of the traditional Christian interpretative community or church. As Davis
notes, and as it is easy to observe, the traditional interpretations of matters such as
hope are by no means clear cut. The impact of Liberation Theology, the
development of political theology, the debates concerning the ordination of
women: all of these issues, and more besides, suggest that there is a tension within
the Christian community concerning the interpretation of hope. The matter of
working out the rightness of claims with acknowledged reference to the Christian
community requires, as Hauerwas suggests and Davis acknowledges, that practical
reason is not a disembodied process based solely upon abstract principles but the
process of a community in which every member has a role to play. Such a process
does not disdain the importance of logical rigour for aiding in their deliberation,
but logic cannot be a substitute for the actual process of discernment.48 This
conception of practical reason represents a process of discernment which in turn is
shaped by the virtues or character of the community itself,49 and as we have noted
character relates to truthfulness. Further to this, practical reasoning, he says,
should be the activity of the whole community, not merely the function of the
expert.
The last validity claim to be explored in relation to hope is the claim to
truth. This exploration can be reduced to a two fold distinction for Davis: that is
to say, first the affirmation of the objective possibility of and secondly the future
actuality of hope.50 While we might endorse the future possibility of hope on the
basis of reasons sufficient to suggest the possible existence of the state of affairs that
we wish to describe, this says nothing about the future actuality. The actual
48 Hauerwas CET p 73 (67 - 87), PK pp 130 - 134, CC p 54.
49 See Chapter 5 of this thesis
50 Davis RMS p 202.
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realisation of the possibilities of human existence is often frustrated by the negative
contingencies of that very existence. It is at this point that Davis wishes to put the
final seal on the necessity of the supernatural in relation to the otherwise
disconsolate nature of human existence in the face of these negative contingencies.51
Davis's example in regard to the claim to truth involves the hope for a just and
emancipated society, central to both critical theology and Habermas's
communicative action. Davis claims that, if the conditions of that society are
freedom, reciprocity and shared responsibility in social and political life, then,
according to his understanding of Habermas, an orientation towards that goal, and
presentation, in some measure of those conditions, is written into the very fabric
of communicative action. Hence, since we are social subjects and, therefore,
"...participants in communicative action we cannot but affirm, in performance if
not in words, the norms and values of communicative rationality. Because of that,
we are justified in seeing our hope ... as an intrinsic possibility of our actual
situation."52 Thus the extent to which an appropriate social situation is present is
the extent to which communicative action is possible. Davis does not, however,
provide us with a description of the practicalities of such a situation. In this regard
we can profitably turn to Hauerwas and present his understanding of Christian
social ethics. That is to say, that the first task of the church is not to make the
world just, but to make the world the world.53
This raises two matters. The first is that as Christians, within the ambit of
the church, Davis maintains that it is our first task to discern these conditions of
freedom, reciprocity and shared social responsibility in the fabric of our normative
51 We should note here Davis's understanding of the word supernatural. It refers not to beings but
to the grace that elevates human beings to participate in the divine life. RMS p 9. See Chapter 2 n
9.
52 Davis RMS p 202.
53 See Chapters 2 & 3 of this thesis for an exposition of this claim.
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community before we can comment on their possibility or actuality in a broader
context. This is precisely what I take Hauerwas to mean when he talks of the
church not having a social ethic but being a social ethic.54 Realising these concerns
within the church as a proleptic body, as Hauerwas would suggest, enables us to
comment, advise and act in the public sphere precisely because we are affirming, at
least in performance, the norms and values in our own tradition that link us
politically to the wider human fellowship. So, Davis's call for a politicisation of
the church is not at all incompatible, and is in fact illuminated by Hauerwas's
insights. The second issue is the extent to which the substantive content of hope
suggested by a tradition might be obscured or limited by the orthodoxy of that
very tradition. Obviously, in this respect, we must endorse Davis's position of
disaffiliation that mitigates orthodoxy. However, to endorse Davis is not to deny
the significance of the performative aspect of Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics.
As we noted at the end of Chapter 4 and in Chapter 5, the church is to be
recognised in and through the character of the people who constitute it. Further,
the extent to which this character is in evidence is the mark of the truthfulness of
the church's witness. Consequently, the shape of the church reflects the patterns of
the coexistence of its members and this, in turn is determined by their character as
disciples. The key to understanding the shape of the church with regard to this
third characteristic lies in the first characteristic, which is to say, Hauerwas's
understanding of the church as a body that performs the politics of the kingdom.
This performative aspect is most apparent in the church's sacramental activity.
Hauerwas notes, therefore, that the community that he describes as marked by
holiness is not a community of moral perfection, but of a people who have learned
not to fear one another and thus are capable of love. Individuals do not go ahead,
54 Hauerwas RA p 43, COC p 40, PK p 99, AN p 74, CET p 101.
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he suggests, with their own meals alone, nor with their own lives alone, but have
learned to live in the presence of others without fear and envy. They learn that
forgiveness of the enemy, even when the enemy is oneself, is the way God would
have his kingdom accomplished.55 These lessons are learned in the performance of
the actions themselves, being the church and becoming the church are one in the
same. To put it another way, the church possesses a certain insight into the way
that people might best live their lives together in light of the revelation of God.
People learn to appreciate these insights, not because they are able to give
intellectual assent to them but because to be part of the church is to perform these
actions. The pattern of the church, therefore, represents a pattern of acceptance, of
forgiveness and willingness to forgive, including reconciliation. To the extent that
freedom, reciprocity and shared responsibility are the conditions necessary for a
just and emancipated society, the embodiment and performance of a just and
emancipated society is anticipated in the action of forgiving and forgiveness and,
hence, in the church. Here we can see that the performative aspect of Hauerwas's
community of character bears a startling resemblance to the performative
affirmation of the norms and values of communicative rationality that Davis has
discerned. Performing ecclesia, then, gives substance to the norms and values
intimated by Davis's exposition of hope. Likewise, these norms and values seem to
be central to both the ecclesia of discourse envisioned by Davis and the ecclesia of
character envisioned by Hauerwas.
The second related conclusion that we can draw from identifying the
significance of reform and truthfulness as characteristics of the ecclesia of discourse
and character arises from the very idea of a normative community and its role in
political activity. Hauerwas suggests that:
55 Hauerwas PK p 110.
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"... if the church, which after all is a public
institution, can be the kind of community that
manifests the political significance of virtue then the
church may well have a political function not often
realized. Moreover, to be such a community is not to
withdraw from 'society' but rather to stand within
our society making present what would otherwise be
absent."56
Rasmussen points out that, according to Hauerwas, Christian ethics is an ethics for
friends, for people sharing an ongoing tradition, arguing together about what
following Jesus Christ means.57 Further to this, Hauerwas maintains that all
Christian ethics are social ethics "... because all our ethics presuppose a social,
communal, political starting point - the church."58 As all Christian ethics are social
ethics he can suggest, as we have seen, that a richer conception of politics is in
order. This richer conception of politics offers people a sense of participation in an
adventure. "For finally what we seek is not power, or security, or equality, or even
dignity but a sense of worth gained from participation and contribution to a
common adventure. Indeed, our 'dignity' derives exactly from our sense of having
taken part in such a story."59 The adventure, or story, to which Hauerwas alludes
is, in fact, the story of an ongoing "community of moral discourse"60 that renders
the character of God before the world.
That is to say, Hauerwas conceives of the church as presenting a process of
discussion the parameters of which are given by the church itself. This is where we
encounter a problem. If the discussion that Hauerwas envisages as necessary for the
church to be the church is already prescribed by the church in terms of orthodoxy,
56 Hauerwas CET p 195.
57 Rasmussen The Church as Polis p 262.
58 Hauerwas RA p 81.
59 Hauerwas COC p 13.
60 Hauerwas PK pp 130 - 134 and CET pp 67 - 68.
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then it would be very easy for the conversation to bog down in torpid
conservatism and become an internal, dogmatic discourse with no hope of
accessibility or relevance. This is precisely the spectre of sectarianism that lies
behind so much suspicion of Hauerwas's position. In Chapter 5 we discussed this
matter and showed that Hauerwas is indeed a sectarian, but not in any facile sense.
We showed that by conceiving of the church's political action in terms of tactic
rather than strategy, Hauerwas managed to turn the alleged vice into a virtue. At
this point, however, we would suggest that something more is needed to allow
Hauerwas to adopt a more detached relationship to the inevitable dogmatic
orthodoxy that militates against the type of ecclesial discourse that he in fact
advocates. Otherwise he will be unable, fully and truthfully, to render the
character of God to the world.
Hauerwas's relationship to orthodoxy, it is now clear, can feasibly be
moderated by employing the insights we have gleaned from Davis's understanding
of the church as a community of discourse. The significant methodological insight
that we should bring to bear arises from Davis's understanding that the message of
revelation is a praxis, an ethical life, a way of being and acting, a practical way of
life. The necessary condition for this practical way of life is that the normative
community that is the locus of orthodoxy, is reconfigured as a community of
discourse.
We can conclude that reform and truthfulness, taken together, provide the
space and the impetus for an understanding of critical theology and ecclesial ethics
that, rather than describing a deadlock, describe the boundaries of an ongoing
conversation. This conversation, in practice, describes the proper boundaries of the
community of moral, ecclesial, theological and political discourse that both Davis
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and Hauerwas identify as necessary for the church to carry on its ministry and
mission with integrity. In other words, to bring Davis and Hauerwas together
leaves us with a more full understanding of the church that is at one and the same
time an ecclesia of discourse and of character.61 This image of the church is one
that participates in reform and truthfulness, as well as vision and integrity in
practice. Moreover, our discussion of hope makes it clear that both Davis and
Hauerwas are concerned with the transformation of fate into destiny.62 Hauerwas
says that "[cjommunities formed by a truthful narrative must provide the skills to
transform fate into destiny so that the unexpected, especially as it comes in the
form of strangers, can be welcomed as gifts."63 Equally, it should be noted here
that, for Hauerwas, the transformation of fate into destiny is the transformation
from the domination of the exigencies of human beings into realising a place in the
destiny of creation. In other words, as Davis suggests, participating in the divine
life and promise. The question now arises as to how we might best develop this
more full understanding of the vision and integrity of the church. To this end, in
the following section, we shall return to explore the thematic metaphor of
pilgrimage used by both Davis and Hauerwas in order to settle the conditions for
their continuing journey as fellow travellers.
61 This community, as we have seen, is also holy, catholic and apostolic (see Chapter 6 of this thesis).
Interestingly Karl Barth says that "...the term 'holy' when applied to the church, to God's work
and to believers has then no direct moral meaning. It does not mean that these people are
particularly suited to come near to God, to deserve his revelation, that these things are particularly
adapted to serve God. Rather, holiness is conferred upon them as a matter of the fact that God has
chosen them, both men and things, in order to reveal himself in them. The notion of catholicity is
quite near that of holiness. The Church, being different from any other human community,
thereby is catholic, that is universal. She is limited by no barrier, either of state or of race, or of
culture. Exclusively and properly belonging to no one, the Church belongs to everyone. She is
really 'national' because she is really 'independent'. She belongs to every man because she belongs to
no man in particular." Jean-Louis Leuba (ed) & Gabriel Vahanian (trans.) The Faith of the Church: A
Commentary of the Apostles' Creed According to Calvin's Catechism. 1958 (1964) Fontana. London pp
116 - 117. The similarities to Hauerwas's position should be obvious given Hauerwas's association
with the Yale 'School'. However it is interesting to note how similar Barth's comments catholicity
are to Davis's.
62 Wells Transforming Fate into Destiny p 2
63 Hauerwas COC p 10.
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7.3. The Pilgrim Vision64
In this section we return to a thematic metaphor common to both Davis
and Hauerwas: the metaphor of pilgrimage. Davis suggests that the church
represents a pilgrim people of God, a diaspora in the sense of the Israelites of the
Exodus. Davis's post-orthodox vision can be summed up thus "... we have no
lasting city, but we seek the city which is to come."65 Meanwhile, Hauerwas is
equally at home in the margins, where the church is to embody a vision and story
that is radically different from the mainstream of culture, and which will, in turn,
tend to a different way of life. For Hauerwas, too, the quote above would be
apposite.
My suggestion is that the political activity of the church, with Davis and
Hauerwas in productive conversation rather than opposition would realign
authentic political activity in terms of both political action and presence, which
641 use the metaphor 'pilgrim' here for two reasons. The first is because, as I have said, it is a theme
that recurs in the work of both Davis and Hauerwas. Secondly, it reflects a line from W.B. Yeats's
poem When You are Old which, it seems to me, epitomises an appropriate response to the
negativities of human existence that maintains both the integrity of hope and avoids the trap of a
false web of significance, (see pp 320 - 330)
When you are old and grey and full of sleep
And nodding by the fire, take down this book,
And slowly read, and dream of the soft look
Your eyes had once, and of their shadows deep;
How many loved your moments of glad grace,
And loved your beauty with love false and true;
But one man loved the pilgrim soul in you,
And loved the sorrows of your changing face.
And bending down beside the glowing bars,
Murmur a little sadly, how love fled
And Paced upon the mountains overhead,
And hid his face amid a crowd of stars.
65 Hebrews 13:13.
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reflects both proleptic and anamnestic solidarity with the oppressed. For Davis
authentic political action involves the recreation of society in light of the
transformative principle of faith, which begins with the politicising of the church.
For Hauerwas authentic political action lies primarily in developing the practices
learned by Christians within the Christian community, such that the church does
not have a social ethic but is a social ethic. Hence, both action and presence define
the politics of the church. Thus understood, the marginal nature of Christian
existence today might be seen as much as a blessing as a curse.
"...the margin is not a strange place for Christians; it
is not only a problem but a place of opportunity too.
Indeed, one could argue that it is a more proper place
for Christians to be, than at the centre of things. After
all, Jesus himself was a marginalised person, who
'suffered outside the gate in order to sanctify the
people through his own blood.' "66
As a place of opportunity for the pilgrim people of God, with no fixed city, the
margins describes both the route and the nature of the journey of the creative
disaffiliate. As we have argued, Davis and Hauerwas, as creative disaffiliates,
converge on the margins of a plural society in a secular age wherein beliefs,
allegiances and practices still retain some public currency. The opportunity that
they experience here is one that fosters the vision of a public, practical theology
founded on a declared moral discourse eschewing the limitations of sectarianism.
Neither Davis nor Hauerwas are, in the end, willing to abandon commitment to
the shared public arena in his quest for a theology arising from the specific witness
of a community of faith.67 To attempt to understand the conditions necessary for
66 Forrester Encounter With God 1983. T&T Clark, Edinburgh, p 176. The internal quote comes
from Hebrews 13:13.
67 See also Forrester Beliefs, Values and Policies: Conviction Politics in a Secular Age. 1989 Oxford
Clarendon. Forrester presents here a community based theological discourse that does not
compromise on a commitment to shared public arena and standards. He is concerned with
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Davis and Hauerwas to continue as fellow travellers we shall now explore a
practical issue that poses a fundamental challenge to both a community of
discourse and a community of character. That is to say we shall explore the
challenge that suffering and death offers to both Davis and Hauerwas's theologies.
This exploration arises for four reasons. First of all, it brings us back to the
shadow of nihilism raised by both Habermas and Maclntyre in response to
Nietzsche.68 Secondly, Davis notes that human communication, at the heart of his
Critical theology, faces the ultimate challenge of the "...the death of its
participants."69 Thirdly, Hauerwas notes that truthfulness, at the heart of his
ecclesial ethics, requires a language and narrative that will enable us to face "... our
own and other's death without weaving false webs of personal significance."70
Fourthly, the vulgar fact of death presents the church with a serious pastoral and
political issue that we shall argue generates a paradigm for theological responses to
the other issues. In exploring this issue we will be able again to observe the manner
in which Davis and Hauerwas represent the possibility of serious dialogue which
will inform the possibility of authentic political presence and action in the public
sphere witnessing to the character of God an both proleptic and anamnestic
solidarity.
7.3.1 Suffering and death, the ultimate challenge to communication and
community
In this section it is our task to consider the reality of suffering and death as
the ultimate challenge to both communicative solidarity, as understood by Davis,
and community as understood by Hauerwas. This is a challenge to which the
developing a theology that will become part of the shared language of the good within a pluralist
culture.
68 See Chapter lof this thesis.
69 Davis RMS p 151.
70 Hauerwas TT p?...
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church must respond in its pastoral office on a daily basis and as such it presents an
excellent lens with which to examine the co-operation of the Davis and
Hauerwas's community of discourse and character. Moreover, it is a lens that will
bring into sharp focus once more the implications of Davis's and Hauerwas's
concerns with transforming fate into destiny. Davis describes for us the problem
created by the destruction of communication by death. He says "...one cannot
consistently take a stand for communicative rationality and ignore the aporia
created by the destruction of communication by death."71 For Hauerwas too
suffering and death present a problem for the community of character. The fact of
suffering, death and other tragedies tempts us to weave false webs of personal
71 Davis RMS p 204 & TPS p 148. Davis is not the first to pick up this particular issue, both
Helmut Peukert and Rudolf Siebert raise the matter. Peukert, in Science, Action, and Fundamental
Theology: Toward A Theology of Communicative Action, suggests that Habermas's theory of
communicative action demands a theological foundation if it is to maintain its rational coherence
and rigour. He claims that "a certain convergence can be established between contemporary
reflection on the fundamental principles of theology on the one side and the results of research into
the philosophy of science on the other. It seems to me that the pint of convergence lies in
communicative action." (Peukert Ibid p xxiii) The specific moment of convergence for Peukert lies
in the in the disclosure of an aporetic moment in the structure of communicative action itself. The
aporetic moment centres on the death of the innocent other in history. If the theory of
communicative action is to provide a normative foundation for the identity of the human agent
acting and interacting in history, then it must be able to take account of the substantial
contributions made to this identity of persons now dead (Peukert Ibid p 171 - 172). That is to say
communicative solidarity with the dead is required by the logic of communicative action. Such
solidarity would be impossible in Habermas's view, and the lack of such solidarity would render
the new social identity a meaningless deception. However, rather than taking this as the signal for
rejecting the theory of communicative action, Peukert seeks to move for its completion. The
completion can be realised, he argues, by demonstrating how the praxis of communicative action
points beyond itself to a reality that saves the other in death, and therefore saves the identity made
possible by communicative action. He says: "This reality disclosed in communicative action,
asserted as the saving reality for others and at the same time as the reality that through this
salvation of the other makes possible ones own temporal existence unto death, must be called
'God.' Within a situation of communicative action, ... the reality of God becomes identifiable and
nameable through the communicative action itself. In this way the basic situation of the disclosure
of the reality of God and its identifiablity, and hence at the same time the origin of the possible
discourse about God, are given." (Peukert Ibid p 245). The identity and name of God ultimately
professed by Peukert is the risen Christ. The resurrection of Jesus, he argues can be seen as
empowering an anamnestic existence in universal solidarity, and as the impetus to suggest the
possibility of such an existence through the manner of one's own communicative action (Peukert
Ibid p 226 - 227). This assertion contains echoes of Davis's insights into religious hope, and as we
have already pointed out, brings Davis back to the necessity of the supernatural (Davis RMS p 18 &
188ff and chapter 2 p 60 of this thesis). Unlike Peukert, however, Davis does not make any claims
about the identity of the transcendent object of faith.
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significance, and thus compromise on the criterion truthfulness. It is at this point
that Davis's investigation of religious hope is, once more, so illuminating and in
this setting of practical concern needs further elaborating.
The problem that suffering and death present is the problem of
abandonment.72 Abandonment suggests the confrontation of the loss of
possibilities for human fulfilment in death. In the face of this limit situation,
affirmation of the possibility of an ultimate fulfilment of human needs and desires
must somehow be underwritten. Davis, developing the exposition of hope turns to
the particular significance of religious hope properly understood. Religious hope,
Davis suggests, expresses the "...appeal to a transcendent source or power that
underwrites not only the possibility but also the future actuality, together with the
present anticipation, of that ultimate fulfilment, the object of human hope."73 The
future actuality of what is hoped for is, for Davis, further grounded in an event of
divine disclosure or experience of the transcendent. He says, "... as a contingent
gift the fact of final fulfilment has to be guaranteed by a revelatory event."74 He
claims further that the correct theological understanding of these revelatory events
72 Siebert describes significance of the aporetic moment thus: the "... longing that the murderer will
ultimately not triumph over the innocent victim" (Siebert The Critical Theory ofReligion, p xii). In
other words, Siebert again is concerned that the value of universal solidarity central to
communicative action is rendered meaningless unless it includes in that solidarity the innocent
victims who have suffered or have been destroyed in the past. He concludes the description with
an injunction that the one who survives must forget nothing: "... neither the most cruel
abandonment nor the faithful, hopeful and loving trust of the innocent victim. It is possible that
the abandonment shall destroy the trust. That is nihilism! It is the great temptation of people living
in the dialectic of late civil society. But there is also the possibility that the trust will conquer the
abandonment: the possibility of the fulfilled life, the good state the free humanity and the messianic
redemption in God's Kingdom."(Siebert Ibid p 502. my emphasis) Clearly, this vision of hope feeds
into the proleptic, holy, catholic and apostolic nature of the ecclesial community that is the
normative context for both Davis's critical theology and Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics.
Simultaneously, in his injunction not to forget Siebert it endorses the idea of anamnestic solidarity.
It is on these points, indeed, that Davis's investigation of religious hope is, once more, so
illuminating and in this setting of practical concern needs further elaborating.
73 Davis RMS p 204.
74 Davis Ibid p 204.
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is as the divine promise which is, in turn, not made immediately to individuals on
their own. Rather, the divine promise and hope are mediated through community.
This brings us back to a consideration of community that Davis never fully
embarked upon. He says only that:
"The revelatory events that ground Christian hope
are at the same time the founding of a new level of
community, namely, a community built upon a
shared experience of the Transcendent. Even though
it introduces a new level of communicative action,
that community is not exempt from following the
norms and values of all communicative action, and
thus meeting the requirements of a communicative
rationality."75
It is in this light that Davis has endeavoured to relate the Christian values of faith,
hope and charity to reason and its demands. In so doing he recognises the need for
a normative interpretative community. Faith, hope and love come to us, he says,
"...as the personal appropriation of the collective remembrance of a community, a
collective remembrance that has accumulated a long historical experience, together
with many attempts at its expression."76
Understanding faith as remembrance, depends on the realisation that faith
and tradition are, in fact, closely related. Moreover, in theological terms, the
relationship is further reinforced in so far as faith is response to a divine initiative.
The divine initiative that Davis refers to is none other than the self-disclosure of
the transcendent as a saving reality in the face of the aporia created by death, thus
hope grounded in anamnestic solidarity becomes the 'assurance of things hoped
for, the conviction of things not seen.V7 That this is the precise biblical definition
75 Davis Ibid p 205.
76 Davis TPS p 150.
77 Hebrews 11:1.
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of faith is no mistake. That is not to say that the experience of the divine initiative
exclusively affirms "... God as the Judaeo-Christian tradition presents him."78
Making the argument for one particular religious tradition is more than the
evidence can sustain. Nevertheless, Davis at this point moves to examine the
method by which the experience of the transcendent in the face of the boundary
situation of death is articulated. He concludes along with Metz and Peukert that
narrative is, in fact, the primordial form of religious language.79
"Storytelling is the original and indispensable way of
we articulate our understanding of they world and the
self. Theories or rational argumentation can never
abrogate primal narrative consciousness. But for that
very reason, story telling is not primarily religious;
nor is religious language to be identified exclusively
with sacred stories for there are another forms.
Storytelling is not exclusively religious. I am speaking
of story telling ... as the basic articulation of
individual and group experience. As such it is the
primordial form of political as well as of religious
language."80
This brings us back to an assertion we made in Chapter 3 to the extent that, for
Davis, there is no special preserve for religious concerns. It is also the basis of his
call to authentic political action, which is not merely administration but a process
of communication among fully individual subjects in freedom. This, Davis
contends, is a more humane and richer conception of politics acknowledging the
essentially religious aspects of communicative action.81
78 Davis TPS p 148 and his comments in RMS p 204.
79 Davis TPS p 152.
80 Davis TPS p 152 - 153.
81 That narrative is the formal quality of experience and the fundamental category of expression is
attested to in "Mayibuye iAfrika!" A Grounded Theology ofLand Restitution in South Africa, D.S.
Gillan. Edinburgh University. 1996. This is a fascinating, as yet unpublished, PhD thesis that
argues by "foregrounding the voices of those who have been said wrongly to have been voiceless"
(p35 - 36) that in the struggle to reclaim ancestral land of which a people were robbed under
apartheid depends on narratives of suffering wherein the land itself becomes a locus theologicus as
well as a medium for expression of the history and identity of the people. See also Stephen Crites
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A curious correspondence, therefore, lies in the pastoral significance of the
question of death. The pastoral significance itself lies in the realm of authentic
political action. As we have noted Davis is at pains to maintain that politics is at
heart "... an affair of communicative action... "82 and as such it is subject to the
aporia described above. Politics and religion, therefore, while they remain
distinguishable, must rely on each other for their healthy functioning to the extent
that religion is capable of closing the aporetic moment. Thus, we must conclude
that, if the task of critical theology, as we have noted, is the recreation of society in
the light of a practical way of life in response to the divine initiative, then such a
society can only achieve a humane politics with religious interpretation. Hence the
pastoral significance of the response to death relates to the language proper to
religion and the possibility of an articulation of hope. While 'storytelling' is not
exclusively religious, religious language as Davis points out, is not merely
storytelling. It also depends on proverbs, lyrics, prayers, law texts and
commentaries.83 Religious language can not, and should not, be reduced to one
type of expression or articulation, consequently it cannot, and should not, be
locked into any one type of denominational or traditional discourse. Davis
maintains that, in the final analysis, religious language points to mystery, and thus
refers to God but not as something identifiable with any doctrinal orthodoxy.
The Narrative Quality of Experience Journal of The American Academy ofReligion. 1971. No. 39.
pp 291 - 311. Crites also suggests that the formal quality of experience through time is narrative.
He draws a similar distinction between mundane and sacred stories where the mundane, in Davis's
terms relate the sphere of communicative action and the sacred to relates to religious stories. He
further distinguishes between memory and recollection, a useful distinction in this context since
faith as remembrance seems to tend more to active recollection rather than passive memorial.
Nevertheless, he does not present such a sophisticated understanding of narrative as a two-order
phenomenon as Davis does. Moreover he seems to conclude by giving greater significance to the
sacred mode of storytelling concluding "[b]ut if we are really thinking of a sacred story what can
we do but testify." p311. Note the similarity with Hauerwas's witnessing community of character.
82 Davis TPS p 153.
83 Davis TPS p 154.
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This God of mystery is the ground of possibilities, and is experienced in and
through grace:
"But that, clearly does not exhaust its content. In
referring to God, it is also speaking to us about
ourselves, about our lives, about the world. What,
then, in general terms does it say about these matters?
In other words, what distinguishes the religious mode
of speech concerning the self, other people, the world,
from other kinds of talk on the same topics? It is, I
suggest, that religious language is an ever-renewed re-
description of human experience and worldly reality
according to unexpected and unformulable
possibilities."84
Thus, religious language provides a relational model relating humanity to the
transcendent and each to the world. This model provides a description of human
experiences and possibilities revealed in the divine initiative of the Transcendent.
Which brings us back to the application of hope in the face of suffering and
death. The overcoming of the aporetic moment in communicative action is not
something we can know anything about, it cannot be inferred from an inspection
of human existence or reason, that is why Davis returns to talk of religious hope.
As Davis says religious hope properly understood "... is contingent with the
gratuitousness of a gift... ,"85 and authentic politics, therefore, is about imagined
possibilities in dynamic relationship with the future actuality not yet realised.
Thus, the imagining of alternatives is possible and so too is the possibility of
liberation: liberation from the oppression of totalising, inauthentic politics and
liberation from the aporia in communicative action caused by death. This is a
84 Davis TPS p 155 - 156.
85 Davis RMS p 204.
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position with tremendous political, theological and pastoral significance since it
ties together the two aspects of proleptic and anamnestic solidarity.
If, however, as we suggest Davis's critical theology is successful in
recognising and providing a remedy for the aporetic moment of communicative
action then he creates a problem of his own. That is to say, he presents us with the
problem of relating the 'horror and terror'86 of nature and human history to the
existence of a good God. That is to say, despite the fact that hope points to a
transcendent reality, there is a practical and pastoral necessity to attempt to
determine some characteristics of God and to aid in the articulation of hope. How,
for instance do we affirm the essential goodness of creation, or anything else for
that matter, in the face of suffering and tragedy? Theodicy, or relating the
existence of a good God to the existence of evil, has a long and varied history. It is
outwith the scope of this thesis to excavate this history. Nevertheless, we might
venture to suggest that Hauerwas here provides a useful check and balance for
Davis. We can turn to Hauerwas's understanding of truthfulness in an effort to
close Davis's own theological aporia.
Turning to Hauerwas, then, we should note that the church should be a
people offering an alternative history of ways of dealing with conflict, responding
to violence and dealing with tragedy.87 For Hauerwas tragedy represents the
affirmation "... of a horrible bond between man and a greater fate than man's
fate."88 Hauerwas's understanding of tragedy betrays one of his basic assumptions
about the nature of Christian existence. That is to say tragedy, understood not
merely as unfortunate events but rather as the bond between humanity and its
86 Siebert op.cit.
87 Hauerwas PK p 135.
88 Hauerwas TT p 12.
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greater fate, is a necessary characteristic of our lives. When a people loses touch
with the tragic, "... we must redescribe our failures in acceptable terms. Yet to do
so ipso facto traps us in self-deceiving accounts of what we have done."89 In the face
of these self-deceiving explanations Hauerwas relies on truthfulness whereby the
truthful "... narrative is one that gives us the means to accept the tragic."90 By
truthful narrative he means, of course, the Christian narrative. Christian
conviction, Hauerwas believes, should help people not to cure the tragic nature of
human existence but to face up to it:
"For tragedy consists in the moral necessity of having
to risk our lives and the lives of others in order to live
faithful to the histories that are the only means we
have for knowing and living truthfully."91
From this position Hauerwas can admonish the people of God for relying on
compassion as a virtue in dealing with tragedy. Christians are formed, he says, by a
"... harsh and dreadful love, but one we think truthful rather than the generalized
forms of sentimentality we call compassion."92 Clearly, if compassion is not an
acceptable virtue for the people of God to exhibit then there must be an
alternative. We noted in chapters 4 and 5 that the church, in Hauerwas's opinion,
was called to realise the character of God. The politics of discipleship that this
requires is informed by certain virtues. At the heart of it all though, lies hope and
patience. Hauerwas suggests that hope creates a space for a truthful apprehension
of the world and is based upon the understanding that God has already determined
the course of history in the life, death and resurrection of Christ:
"Our unwillingness to employ violence to make the
world 'better' means that we must often learn to wait.
89 Hauerwas TT pp 37 - 38.
90 Hauerwas TT p 12.
91 Hauerwas COC p 106.
92 Hauerwas DFTF p 166.
334
Chapter 7. Vision and Integrity in Practice
Yet such waiting must resist the temptation to
cynicism, conservatism or false utopianism that
assumes that the process of history will result in
everything coming out 'all right.' For Christians hope
not in the 'processes of history' but in the God whom
we believe has already determined the end of history
in the cross and resurrection Christ."93
From this quote we can see that patience and hope are indispensable for facing
tragedy truthfully. Interestingly, as we shall see, Hauerwas's reliance on hope in
the face of tragedy bears a remarkable resemblance to Davis's.
For Hauerwas hope differs from optimism to the extent that optimism can
exist separately from truth. As a result optimism can turn easily into nihilism.
Hope on the other hand, is "... based on truth and forces the imagination to look
for alternatives. If we are unable to look for alternatives we are forced to rely on
power."94 By power Hauerwas means complicity in the politics of violence which
typify modern liberal polity. The politics of violence require the elimination of
tragedy like death. The church, however, can and must be able to absorb such
tragedies because it is a community trained in the habits and practices of hope. The
only appropriate theological and pastoral response to tragedies such as suffering
and death, therefore, is to learn how to live with them. Hauerwas contends that:
"
... no account of the moral life which is worthy of
our consideration can avoid asking us to endure
suffering. Indeed, the morally interesting question is
not whether we are asked to suffer, but how and for
what we are asked to suffer."95
93 Hauerwas PK p 145.
94 Hauerwas CET p 201.
95 Hauerwas SP p 25.
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Hauerwas writes repeatedly on the topic of medical ethics. He perceives medicine
as a useful example of the manner in which Christians might practically respond to
suffering while Christianity provides for medicine a practical example of living
with conviction.96 The important aspect of this relationship lies in the fundamental
task of the physician that parallels directly the Church's role in the world. That is
to say the task of the physician is to care rather than to cure. Hauerwas says "[t]he
physicians basic pledge is not to cure but to care through being present to the one
in pain ...,"97 whereas the constant temptation to the physician is to eliminate
suffering. The task of the physician is, therefore, to bridge the gap between the
sick and the healthy teaching the healthy about the frailty of our reason and facing
tragedy. Thus the healthy and the sick are built into the same community.
Similarly, by the way it is present to the sick, the dying and the suffering the
church makes present the character of God and affirms the role of truthful, patient
hope. It is precisely on this point, therefore, that Hauerwas's insights would prove
useful to Davis. Making present the character of God, for Hauerwas, is about
truthfulness and not propositional truth. Thus, living truthfully in light of our
convictions, the guarantee given by God's self-disclosure, the object of human
hope can be brought to bear on a situation of tragedy suffering or death. The
goodness of God, in other words, depends almost entirely on the goodness and
truthfulness of God's people. That truthfulness is most sustainable within a
truthful community and the truthful community's role is not to make the world
just but to let the world be the world. Thus, Davis's radical politic of action is
modified and enhanced by Hauerwas's radical politic of presence.
96 See for example Truthfulness and Tragedy, Suffering Presences-, "Killing Compassion" in Dispatches
from The Front.
97 Hauerwas SP p 51.
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7.3.2. Ecclesia ofDiscourse and ofCharacter
In this exploration what has become evident is the significance of hope for
both critical theology and ecclesial ethics. In the face of the limiting experience of
finitude Davis and Hauerwas both rely on an understanding of religious hope. For
Davis it should be understood as the substantive content of the mystical moment
of faith that leads directly to, and allows, authentic political action and closes the
aporia in communicative action. For Hauerwas hope is best 'articulated' as patient
presence that articulates the character of God. Curiously, though, For Hauerwas
the very act of being present is, by definition, an action. Moreover it is an action
that communicates. To this extent, therefore, Davis's understanding and
exposition of communicative action helps to flesh-out Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics.
On the other hand Hauerwas's position helps to remind us that Davis's authentic
political action is a witness to the possibility of anamnestic existence and universal
solidarity and the possibility of such an existence through the manner of one's own
communicative action. As such Hauerwas's tactical deployment of ecclesial ethics
allows Davis's critical theology to move out of the theoretical realm to confront
the realities of an embodied tradition where we live out our practical ways of life
in response to the divine promise. As both Davis and Hauerwas believe,
Christianity has much to offer society in its current predicament, but it will not
commend itself to troubled and confused men and women if it hectors and
condemns them, nor if it is bland and insipid.98 Rather, it will commend itself, in
the face of life's irremovable negativities because the church, the people of God, is
an ecclesia of both discourse and character, exploring the imagined possibilities for
authentic political action and presence that displays both proleptic and anamnestic
solidarity.
98 Holloway Dancing on the Edge p 122.
337
Chapter 7. Vision and Integrity in Practice
It is through action and presence that discourse and character, justice and
virtue meet. Justice and Virtue do not meet in the center of the social and cultural
desert nor do they meet in the ghetto. Rather they meet productively in an ecclesia
of discourse and character in the margins "... from where it can speak truth to
power and serve the life of the city more authentically."99 Such an ecclesia may
represent civility, authentic politics and virtue as challenging relevance to broader
society.100 As such the ecclesia of discourse and character is not a soft liberal option,
nor is it a comfortable conservative bastion. By the very nature of its existence it
represents an authentically active political voice, as well as an authentically present
political witness to the society and culture in which they are set. The ecclesia of
discourse and character presents a better way and is itself an instrument and locus
of anamnestic solidarity in political struggle and proleptic solidarity in terms of
Christian hope.
7.4. Conclusion: Vision and Integrity in Practice
This thesis began by characterising the moral debate in history, and in the
contemporary Western social and cultural context by saying that there was a
choice between reason and tradition. This choice is evident in secular moral
philosophical debate as much as in Christian ethical debate. It is true to say that
theologians and church people, lay and ordained, inevitably and appropriately take
sides and very few of us are disinterested. Generally speaking we support systems
that confirm our virtues and ignore our vices, and we tend to identify the vices of
those in opposition to us and ignore their virtues. There are two great values in
human moral discourse: the value of freedom, on the side of the liberals and the
value of authority on the side of the, so called, communitarians. These values
99 Forrester "The Place of The Church in the New Europe." In Jurjen Wiersma (ed.) Discernment
and Commitment. 1993 Kok Pharos publishing House. Kampen, the Netherlands, pp 67 - 98.
100 Forrester Ibid p 82.
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provoke a tendency either to look for and defend liberal values or the tendency to
take recourse in a normative tradition. They frequently conflict, and people often
tend to characterise themselves by leaning towards one or the other.101 It was in
this light, as representatives of these conflicting camps, that I initially characterised
Charles Davis and Stanley Hauerwas. The argument I developed, following careful
exposition of their work and most importantly allowing it to speak for itself,
however has shown that, although this dilemma is pressing, from the point of view
of the authentic political presence and activity of the church, the real question is
how to live on the margins, how to be creatively disaffiliated.
We have argued that, in this light, Davis and Hauerwas, who would
normally have been assumed to be opposed to each other, in fact, provide not only
complementary but mutually corrective calls for the ministry and mission of the
church. In so doing the weaknesses of each might be overcome, while the strengths
can be enhanced and make a positive contribution to the vision, integrity and
practice of the church. I should make one further note and say that, in this present
chapter, it has become clear that no matter what else critical theology or ecclesial
ethics might be, they are not driven principally by either philosophy or dogmatics.
The language of philosophy and dogmatics is indeed used to articulate their ideas. I
would suggest, however, that since it has become clear that both critical theology
and ecclesial ethics have led us to assert the necessary condition for authentic
political presence and action is the ecclesia of discourse and character, then we are
dealing with a practical ecclesiology. Finally, such a practical ecclesiology, as we
have seen from Davis and Hauerwas, must be driven by both the transformative
principle of faith and character. That is to say its proper concern and its grounding
can only be fully realised in concrete pastoral and political situations. Hence, if
lul Holloway Ibid, p 58 - 59.
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theology in future is to be driven by anything then it is to be driven by practical
pastoral concerns, whereby authentic political presence and action becomes the
contemporary mark of the holy, catholic and apostolic church.
The church, thus constituted, I would conclude is the locus of Christian
reality that acknowledges love as foundational. It comes into being in response to
the divine promise, proclaimed and heard. It is thus capable of engaging with the
contemporary social and cultural world, and is not a world-denying sphere of
hygienic righteousness. The authentic political presence and activity of the church
will, therefore, be corrective.102 That is to say in the manner of a teacher the
corrective will be administered in an attempt to inform and transform, often by
confrontation but never by indoctrination. Thus, the church in authentic political
practice and presence, invoking the principles of reform and truthfulness at the
heart of the ecclesia of discourse and of character, stands witness to the grace and
character of God, rather than becoming an instrument of doctrinal orthodoxy and
propaganda. This does not always mean maintaining either the tradition or a
specific doctrine. It does mean constant and ongoing criticism and correction. In
this manner the promises implicit in critical theology and ecclesial ethics are to be
redeemed. Placing them together in the ongoing conversation will mean that each
will provide a necessary and effective counter balance to the other, rescuing virtue
from the ghetto and bringing justice in from the desert and placing them together
in the ecclesia of discourse and character.
102 Gabriel Vahanian makes a similar comment with regard to Barth's theological agenda. The Faith
of the Church: A Commentary ofthe Apostles'Creed According to Clavin's Catechism, p 11.
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